


NEPAL AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

Nepal and the East India Company

B. D. SANWAL




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P R E F A C E

IN THE following pages Nepal is viewed primarily as one of our frontier States, closely related in language, culture and her political past with our own country. One of the main approaches to the problem, therefore, has been to evaluate the relations in political and cultural spheres between Nepal and our own country. An effort has also been made to study the methods and the drawbacks of Asian diplomacy in the first half of the nineteenth century. Some side-light is also thrown on the influence of confabulations in the households of Eastern monarchs on the course of State affairs.

In this account I have followed the example of early British-Indian historians and have quoted extensively from contemporary records. Wherever possible the original record has been referred to in the footnotes.

Lastly, I have to thank two young men Pushkin and Mukul who by their constant goading made it possible for me to arrange the material that I had earlier collected into the present book.

B. D. SANWAL

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Chapter 1

THE GEOGRAPHY OF NEPAL

NEPAL is properly the name of the valley of the Baghmati, which contains the famous towns of Kathmandu, Bhatgaon, and Patan. The name, however, has now been applied to the entire political area administered by the Gorkha Government. Nepal is said to be the same word as Newar. Thus, it would seem, Nepal is the country of the Newars. On the other hand legend has it that the valley of the Baghmati had been blessed by a great saint called "Ne" who practised the sacred and austere rites of meditation at the junction of the Baghmati and the Keshwati (now called the Vishnumati) in the Nepal valley.¹

Nepal is a country situated in the lap of the Himalayas. Its boundaries are well defined on all her frontiers except the northern, where Tibetan and Nepalese frontier-posts are few and far between. The reason for this is quite plain. Nepal till recently has had only one powerful neighbour, namely the British and, therefore, the boundaries between Nepal and British India on the one hand and Nepal and the British-protected State of Sikkim have been definitely settled and laid down. Tibet and Nepal, on the other hand, were both weak Asian powers — Asian in the sense that they had deliberately refused to embrace the modern scientific and industrial civilisation of the West, and weak in that they were weak in their armed and industrial strength. They were also both in the sphere of influence of the British power in India. The Foreign Department of the Government of India, true to the British policy of laissez-faire, would not favour any disturbance of the status quo in the Tibeto-Nepalese frontier and although there have been no boundary commissions in that region, the Survey of India tried to define the Nepalese frontiers in the map they issued in 1927. This is the most up-to-date and authentic map of Nepal that

¹ Ne=Name of a Muni; Pal=cherished, blessed; hence Nepal. Capt. Eden Vansittart, *Notes on Nepal*, 1896, p. 1.

we possess today.² The northern boundary has recently been demarcated between People's China and Nepal, and generally follows the Survey of India map of 1927.

It will be seen from this map that Nepal is separated in the west from the district of Pithoragarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh by the river Maha Kali or Sarda, in the east from the district of Darjeeling in Bengal by the Mechi river and from the State of Sikkim by a well-defined water-shed line passing through Kanchanjunga. In the south the frontier has been defined by treaties between Nepal and the East India Company in 1816, and between Nepal and the British Government in India in 1860.

In the north the Survey of India map tries to lay down the Tibeto-Nepalese frontiers along the line of the water-sheds, but with a few exceptions. Many rivers in Nepal have their origin in professedly Tibetan territory and thus the frontiers laid down by the Survey of India map cannot follow strictly the line of the water-sheds in these regions, e.g. near Khojarnath Peak and Rasul Garhi Peak respectively, the rivers Humla Kurnali and the Trisuli enter Tibet; and in the areas surrounding the lofty peaks of Everest and Gauri Shankar the water-shed itself has not been determined precisely. The latest Chinese and Nepalese agreements have now tried to determine these disputed frontiers.

The most important region near our northern frontiers which is equally important to Nepal is the Mansarowar-Kailash area from where most of the important rivers of Northern India take their origin. If we draw a circle with the Kailash Peak as its centre and a radius of 120 kilometers, we shall get a rough idea of this important region. It will contain the hamlets of Gartok and will touch on the Gar Gunja (both are on the Gartang Chu, one of the main tributaries of the Upper Indus); it will also contain Jaichan on the Indus, Barka between Rakas Tal and Mansarowar, Khardam on the Kauriala or Gogra and touch Tamjam on the Sanpo or the Brahmaputra. Further the sources of the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej, the Kali, the Kauriala or Gogra and the Bhagirathi or the Ganges will also lie within it.

² See the skeleton map of Nepal published with the *General Report of the Survey of India* for 1926-27.

It would not be profitable to dilate upon the geographical importance of this region which mostly lies in Tibet but is of vital importance to India and Nepal. Students and explorers have come to this region from times immemorial and a strange fascination holds the affection of millions of Hindus to this wind-swept, dreary and desolate country.

In shape, Nepal is a long and narrow country, the length lying east to west, and as one proceeds towards the west, the country inclines northwards. The greatest length is about 880 kilometers from the Mechi in the Nepalese district of Morang to the Kali in the district of Kanchanpur. The average length is about 840 kilometers. The greatest breadth is 250 kilometers from Baha-durganj in the district of Syuraj to Chanpekhola in the district of Laddak. The average breadth is about 150 kilometers.

From Nepalese accounts the area is about 168,000 square kilometers and the population seven million. On an average, therefore, there are 42 men to the square kilometer in Nepal. This may be compared with the density of population in Afghanistan which is roughly half that of Nepal (20).

This is due to the inclusion in Nepal of the fertile belt of land below the hills about 32 kilometers broad and stretching along the entire length of the country. The other parts of Nepal except for the river valleys are sparsely populated. The population per square kilometer in Nepal can also be favourably compared with that of Turkey (32) and Tibet (1.5). On the other hand, Switzerland has about 127 persons per square kilometer, a figure about three times that of Nepal.

It is difficult to claim natural physical and climatic frontiers for Nepal. In both these respects she is part and parcel of the Indian sub-continent. The loftiest peaks of the Himalayas separate Nepal from Tibet but there are many significant links of union and few barriers of separation between her and India. Nepal is as much a part of the Indian mainland geographically and climatically as Jammu, Himachal Pradesh, Kumaon and the Darjeeling and Sikkim areas. Nepal is more an integral part of India in the geographical sense than Ladakh or the Srinagar valley. The links that connect India with Nepal are mainly the rivers that arise in Nepal and flow down to join the Ganges in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. This has led to the present state of affairs where Nepal has to depend on India for

most of her progressive activities. She buys and sells almost exclusively in the Indian market, she gets her cultural and linguistic inspirations, whatever they may be, from India and mainly from Hindi and Bengali and the Universities of Benares, Patna and Calcutta. Present day Nepal has thus absorbed a great deal from India but India has taken little from Nepal except the Gorkha soldiers whom she keeps mainly on her frontiers.

In her climate, Nepal is "typically monsoonal with the regular cool, hot and wet seasons." In this respect, too, she is a part of the Indian mainland. The only difference with the climate in the plains of India is that, owing to height, the conditions in the habitable areas are much pleasanter and healthier than in any part of India, e.g. the maximum temperature in the hot season in Kathmandu is seldom above 33°C . and the mean rainfall seldom above 152 mm.³

This leads us to the conclusion that Nepal has been separated from the rest of India not so much by geographical obstacles, climatic differences or, as will be shown later, by ethnic, linguistic and cultural contrasts as by political and historical accidents. That is to say, Nepal is distinct from the rest of India not as a geographical but as a political unit.

Geologically, as well, Nepal seems to have the same features as Kashmir, Kumaon or Sikkim, which have been extensively explored by the Department of Geological Survey of the Government of India. It is interesting to note, however, that our knowledge of the geological formation of the main Himalayan range for a length of 800 kilometers from Kumaon to Sikkim is almost non-existent because of the indifference of the Nepal Government to the sciences of the West.⁴

One further point may be adverted to here. Earthquakes are of frequent occurrence in Nepal, and time and again the valley of Nepal has been rocked by severe shocks, which have

³ Professor Lyde, *Continent of Asia*, p. 373. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th Ed.) gives the mean temperature of the Nepal Valley as 60°F and the mean rainfall 60".

⁴ The only note on the geology of Nepal is to be found in the *Records of the Geological Survey of India*, Vol. VIII, part 4, p. 93-101, and was contributed by H. B. Medlicott, M.A., F.G.S., Deputy Superintendent, Geological Survey of India, who had an opportunity to visit the Kathmandu Valley in 1875.

resulted in numerous deaths and great damage. It will be remembered that the 1935 Bihar earthquake greatly affected Nepal as well. There have been other instances as well. For example, back in 1833 we hear of another severe earthquake.

Let us now come back to physical geography and seek the natural physical divisions of the country. The study of mountainous countries like Nepal may be profitably divided into two parts. Firstly we might study the country keeping our eyes on the variation in altitude as we proceed from the plains to the loftiest peaks. In this study we shall find the Tarai and the Bhabar plains at the foot of the hills. The nature of this tract of the country will become clear from the diagram on page 6.

It will be seen that immediately below the foot of the hills there lies a narrow belt of country usually covered with shrubs and remarkable for its absence of water. In this area called the *Bhabar* no water can be seen except where one of the larger rivers takes its course. There is but a thin covering of alluvial soil on a vast dry bed of boulders and shingle through which all rain that falls seeps rapidly and which absorbs in the same way all the minor streams from the lower hills. Instead of weeds and grasses, gigantic trees above a tangled undergrowth of creepers and thorns present a barrier to progress that an elephant alone can surmount. The width of the waterless tract is from 8 to 20 kilometers. South of this lies the Tarai, which, in general, is a tract of forest and swamps, with scattered patches of cultivation, and which, as we proceed southwards, merges into the plains of India.

At the other end of Nepal are the highest peaks of the Himalayas which are always covered with snow and which present an almost impenetrable barrier between Nepal and Tibet except for a few dangerous passes, e.g. (i) the Takla Khar Pass, (ii) the Mastang Pass through the Hindu shrine of Mukti-nath, (iii) the Kerong Pass, (iv) the Kuti Pass, leading to Lhasa from Kathmandu, (v) The Hatia Pass, and (vi) the Vallong Pass in the extreme east. There is scarcely any vegetation to be found in these altitudes and hardly any animal life.

In between these two extremes lie the numerous ranges of the lower Himalayas which vary in height from 3,000 to 6,000 meters above sea level. Near the Tarai, some of these lower hills




Fig. 1: NEPAL

present a marked similarity with the Siwalik hills, running in a east-east-south direction. However, it is better to consider these hills as the first range of a series of three parallel ranges in the Himalayas in which the first rises to about 1,000 to 1,500 meters, the second to about 3,000 to 4,000 meters and the third to about 6,000 meters and more. In between the first two parallel ranges are longitudinal valleys, which are the most important geographical features of the entire country of Nepal. These rivers drain the country longitudinally and join together to form great rivers which then force their way through the lower hills into the plains of Hindustan. There are, however, a number of transverse ridges of great height between the highest and the second highest ranges which run almost at right angles to these parallel chains of mountains, and in upper Nepal the drainage is practically latitudinal.

The other method of studying mountainous countries is to look for the water-sheds and the drainage systems of the rivers. Going back to the map of Nepal, we find that there are three great river systems in the country from west to east — namely the Karnali or the Gogra, the Narayani or the Gandak and the Sapt Kosi. Sandwiched between these great river systems are the minor valleys and drainage areas of the Kali in the extreme west, the Rapti between the Gogra and the Gandak, the Baghmati between the Gandak and the Sapt Kosi, and the Mechi, in the extreme east. Whatever civilisation the inhabitants of the country developed in the past owes its origin mainly to the valleys of the Rapti and the Baghmati, i.e., in the areas round Piuthan and Kathmandu respectively, and curiously enough the areas of these valleys are comparatively larger than those of the greater river valleys. Perhaps both these valleys are of volcanic origin and, as legends have it, great lakes might have existed there at one time.

The area of the Kathmandu valley is about 800 square kilometers and that of Piuthan about 450 square kilometers, and both are at an elevation of from 1,200 to 1,600 meters above sea level.⁵

⁵ Computations of the area of the valley have varied greatly. Brian Hodgson says the valley is 16 miles by 16 miles; Dr. Oldfield 15 miles by 14 miles; Dr. Wright 16 miles by 9 miles; Dr. Allen and Mr. Fergusson 12 miles by 9 miles and Dr. Lyde (in *The Continent of Asia*) 25 miles by 15 miles.

The Kathmandu valley has been the only accessible part of Nepal to Europeans and we have the accounts of numerous travellers about the size and social life of the valley from those of Father Greuber of the Catholic Mission, to the present day. Father Giuseppe, who was turned out of the valley along with the Mission after the Prithvi Narayan conquest, calls it "the extensive plain of Nepal, resembling an amphitheatre covered with populous towns and villages".⁶

The valley of Nepal or the Doon of Nepal — as the inhabitants call the valley of the Baghmati — is an oval plateau crossed by numerous streams with an average level of about 1,500 meters above the sea. It is surrounded by mountains on all sides which rise to over 1,250 meters above sea level. On the north are, Ghyanche (2,400) and Sheopuri (2,800), to the east Manichur (2,200) and Nagarkot (2,150), to the south Phulchok (2,850) and to the west Champadevi (2,450), Chandragiri (3,500) and Nagarjun (2,100).

The Doon of Nepal has been a rich and prosperous valley since time immemorial and large and beautiful cities have clustered together in this rich plain. We hear of the great Buddhist King Asoka coming to the valley and erecting the five Stupas of Patan. At present there are numerous inhabited localities in the valley, the most populous being Kathmandu (population over 100,000), Patan and Bhatgaon.

The most important rivers of the valley are Baghmati, Karmanasha and Pravawati to the south of Kathmandu; Vishnumati and Bhadramati to the west of the city; and Rudramati, Manimati, Hanumati and Ikshumati to the east of the city.

The valley has many places sacred to the Hindus and Buddhists. These are the Hindu temples of Pashupatinath, Guhyeshwari, Telaju, Surji-Binayaka, Ganesha, and Changa Narayan and the Buddhist shrines of Swayambhunath, Buddhanath and Maha Buddha which are visited every year by thousands of devoted pilgrims from India and Tibet.

Practically all our knowledge of the natural history of Nepal is derived from the numerous papers of Brian H. Hodgson who

⁶ Father Giuseppe's account is reported in *Asiatic Researches*, Volume II, pp. 307 et seq. He says Kathmandu had 18,000 houses and 50,000 soldiers, Lalit Patan had 24,000 houses and Bhatgaon 12,000.

left Nepal in 1845. No one else after him has undertaken any similar work worth mentioning. As specimens of his painstaking work the following interesting excerpts are given from his papers:

In the Tarai, Bhabar and the lower hills "the royal tiger, the panther, the leopard, the elephant, the wild buffalo, the rhinoceros and stags of the noblest growth abound. In the middle regions (4,000 to 11,000 feet) only the leopard is found confining itself almost entirely to the woods." (*J.A.S.B.*—Vol. I, p. 335, on the mamalia of Nepal.)

"Some of the small cats of the central region are numerous and beautiful, such as the *Felis Nipalensis*. . . and in the northern region is found a species of wild cat belonging to the section of the lynxes or medial cats, with shortish tails and pencilled ears." (*Ibid.*, p. 341.)

"The noble beast — usually denominated the Nepal dog — is found only in the Kachar, where alone in Nepal he can live. It was introduced into the Kachar from Tibet, in which region it is indigenous, and in various parts of which there are several varieties. . . This would seem to be the dog whose extraordinary powers, ages ago, surprised Alexander and his Grecians." (*Ibid.*, p. 346.)⁷

Internally we notice that Nepal is a mountainous country and, therefore, cut off from the rest of the Indian mainland because of the obstacles to inter-communication. Geographically Nepal has an autonomous existence as regards India and within Nepal herself the mountains have created numerous sub-divisions. Even today the easiest way to travel from Eastern Nepal to Western Nepal is to come down to the Indian railway terminus nearest to the region in the east and then travel by rail to the Indian railway terminus in the west and then travel inland by foot or on horse back. Because of these communication facilities to India the Kiranti from Eastern Nepal finds himself at home in Darjeeling while the Dotiyal from the west easily mixes with the inhabitants of Kumaon. The difficulty of lateral commu-

⁷ For a complete list of Hodgson's papers see *Life of Brian H. Hodgson* by Hunter. See also the paper on the "Fauna of Nepal" by S. H. Prater, Curator, Bombay Natural History Society, which is published as Appendix XIII and a list of the "Flora of Nepal" compiled under the authority of the Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens, Kew, published as Appendix XIV to Landon's *Nepal*, Volume I.

nications would naturally tend to link the different parts of Nepal, especially the different major and minor river valleys with the plains just below them rather than with the sister valleys separated by transverse mountain ridges. On the other hand the political power of the Gorkhas and the influence of Kathmandu as the capital tends towards a different goal. It is insisted that the language of the Gorkhas in Kathmandu should become the national language, and the culture and manners of the gentry at the capital become the standards to be honoured throughout the country. For the last hundred years the latter tendency has been the more powerful one because the former natural give and take of geographical facilities has been systematically subdued by the Government at Kathmandu. Still, Kathmandu itself imports its culture and standards of social well-being from India and thus the influence of Indian thought and civilisation gradually percolates to the remotest corners of Nepal. Other bonds of inter-communication between the two countries are: firstly, the recruitment of thousands of Gorkhas in the regular Indian Army; secondly, the seasonal immigration of thousands of labourers into the adjoining Indian districts every year; thirdly, the visits to Nepal especially to Muktinath and Pashupatinath of hundreds of Indian pilgrims; fourthly, the import of Hindi books into Nepal; and fifthly, the import of luxury goods etc. by the nobility of Nepal from or via India.

Switzerland and Afghanistan are also mountainous countries that have borrowed their languages and cultures from their neighbours. Both these countries are polyglot and their frontier provinces have the culture of the neighbouring countries. Thus Switzerland is racially and linguistically divided into Teutonic and Latin (including French and Italian) groups. So also is Afghanistan which has a Turkish population in the north speaking a Turkoman dialect, an Aryan population in the west speaking Persian and an Indo-Aryan population in the rest of the country speaking Pushto. Similarly Nepal is the meeting ground of the Tibetan and the Indian languages and races. Here we might notice a great historical fact, namely that the mass immigration, which changes the racial and linguistic composition of countries, takes place only from higher altitudes to lower altitudes or in other words from colder to warmer places. Whereas culture may travel in the opposite direction, as it often

does. Thus Tibetan immigration into Nepal has brought influences of Mongolian languages into Nepal but the only things that travelled up from India and Nepal to Tibet, were Buddhism and the Sanskrit language and culture. This is due mainly to the fact that life in warmer places is easier and pleasanter than in colder places and is more congenial to the growth of handicrafts and the finer arts.

The other main influences in the evolution of the civilisation and the political and social life of Nepal have been the development of cottage industries and trade in her river valleys and the constant quarrels of her numerous petty kingdoms. Because of her inaccessibility Nepal seldom attracted the attention of Indian Princes and she was allowed to develop her political institutions in isolation from the main currents of Indian history. But in Nepal itself, there have been constant clashes between the rulers of the rich river valleys and the chieftains of neighbouring mountain regions. The rulers of the rich valleys become soft, ineffective and deeply involved in internal intrigues against one another and then they are swept from power and replaced by hardier people from the neighbouring mountains. This balance between the rich valleys and the poorer mountain ranges has been a consistent feature of Nepalese history.

Chapter 2

THE PEOPLE OF NEPAL

A study of the different races that inhabit Nepal is both interesting and rewarding to a student of Nepalese history. Many travellers who have visited no other part of the country except the Kathmandu valley have tried to give us pictures of the racial complexity of Nepal. These attempts have not been quite successful, because, out of the scores of travellers who have written about Nepal, only two were serious students of ethnology, namely Brian Hodgson and Sylvian Levi. It is in their writings only that one finds a scientific attempt at classification and arrangement of the knowledge we have of the different races of Nepal and an effort at essaying their achievements and drawbacks in the pages of history. Other writers merely give us catalogues of some of the representative races and, at the most, unconnected and incomplete accounts of their physiognomy, marriage customs, military aptitudes or religious predilections.¹

In fact, however, the ethnology of Nepal appears to show to a certain extent the results of the same historical processes that have changed the racial characteristics of the Indian sub-continent. In a way, the study of the ethnology of Nepal helps to a great extent in the study of the ethnology of India herself. The mountain fastnesses of Nepal have afforded shelter to the aboriginal inhabitants of pre-historic India and still there may be found in out-of-the-way places in Nepal men, women and children living in a state of primitive savagery that could never have been possible in the plains of Hindustan; partly because of over-population there and partly because of competition from superior types. The struggle for existence would by itself have exterminated this early type of humanity in most parts of India.

¹ See Landon's *Nepal*, Vol. II; Appendix xvii; *The Races of Nepal*, pp. 239-46; also Sylvian Levi: *Le Nepal Les Nevars et Les Gurkhas*, pp. 219-78; also Eden Vansittart: *Notes on Nepal*, pp. 56-187.

Only in unapproachable places could the bow and arrow still survive as among the Veddas in South India. And in Nepal have been found people who approach the Veddas in the use of primitive weapons and in primitive standards of living. Again, Nepal has provided a refuge for all those races from India which preferred to adhere to their own manners and customs and preserve their identities distinct from the militarily superior races who were forcing their own culture upon the conquered. Also, Nepal has been over-run in part, especially from the north-west, by the Mongolian races, who, in search of warmer valleys, left their homes in the snow covered plateau of Tibet, and migrated with all their flocks to parts of northern and eastern Nepal. In short, we find that geography has introduced Tibetan blood into Nepal from the north and through Sikkim, and history has sent stream after stream of fugitives from the keen struggles for existence, and annihilating conflicts of cultures and values, into the different valleys, mainly from the south-west.

As a result of these processes Tibetan blood is predominant in the north and east of Nepal and Indian Rajput and Brahmin blood, as distinct from earlier Nepali blood, in the valleys of the Karnali and the Rapti, while some other parts of Nepal preserve to a certain extent the same racial complexion that they did about 1,000 B.C.

The earliest known inhabitants of Nepal are the Chepang, the Kusunda, and the Hayu tribes. Hodgson thought that they were "like fragments of an earlier population". Their numbers are very small and, like the Veddas of South India, they are decreasing in numbers, as the civilisation of a more vigorous type approached their homesteads in its gradual expansion and search for more living space. These tribes live in the wildest imaginable state of nature. They do not pay any taxes because they have no material possessions except their bows and arrows and skins used as warming material for their bodies. They do not even acknowledge allegiance to the Maharaja of Nepal or do the bidding of the officials except under threat of immediate punishment. They themselves claim to be the masters of the uncultivated wastelands they subsist in, and decline to have anything to do with the Maharaja's domain where fields are cultivated and administrative authority is accepted. They sometimes procure arrow-heads made by the village blacksmiths

near their forest homes in return for the "Kastura" of the musk deer or other produce of the jungles. Their homes are mostly in the mountain caves which are closed and opened every day in winter with the help of tree trunks, branches, pieces of rock, etc.

Sometimes "boughs torn from trees and laid dexterously together constitute their houses, which they are perpetually shifting according to the exigencies of the hour."

They do not use any implements known to primitive mankind except the bow, which seems to have been their invention. Their only means of subsistence is hunting wild beasts with the bow and arrow, snaring them and catching wild fowl. Cultivation is an art unknown to them. So also are the arts of spinning threads, weaving cloth or pressing wool into felt. Little else is known about their social life and customs and they are said to bury their dead. Their figures are not very pleasing to the eye and people who have seen them say that they are actually a dirty and ugly race. Hodgson thought the Chepangs to be slightly above the Kusundas and thought that the former were beginning to hold some slight intercourse with civilised beings and to adopt the most simple of civilised arts and habits. He added that "compared with the mountaineers among whom they are found, the Chepangs are a slight but not actually a deformed race: they are about the same in height but in colour are very decidedly darker or of a nigrescent brown". In one respect, however, Hodgson seems to be wrong. He thought that "linguistically these tribes were allied to the Lhopas of Bhutan (Lho is the native name for Bhutan and hence Lhopa, an inhabitant of Lho). Their language seems to be allied to the language of the Mundas and the other Kolarian races found in India. This, however, requires the attention of a good philologist. This work, unfortunately, has not yet been brought to an authoritative conclusion. However, one is led to think that these primitive races represent the "fragments", as Hodgson has so well termed it, of the protoaustraloid race which inhabited the Indian mainland in very early times. It is difficult to decide whether the Kusundas, the Chepangs and the Hayus are all representatives of the protoaustraloid race or whether the Kusundas represent an even earlier race — the Negritos — and the Chepangs and the Hayus the protoaustraloids who inhabited parts of India

either at the same time as or after the conquest of the Negrito race by them.

The Kusundas and the Chepangs are rarities in Nepal. They are like backwashes of civilisation that linger against the processes of evolution and assimilation in human history. The main and the underlying elements in the Nepalese population are formed by the second group, namely the Mediterranean race. The most important representatives of this race are the Newars in the valley of Kathmandu, who have contributed most to the culture of Nepal as we know it. The bulk of Nepal's population is either Mediterranean with very little admixture of foreign blood or the product of foreign male mating with the Mediterranean type of female from the higher social classes. These vigorous conquerors from outside have thus given a note of foreign culture and manners to the whole community. It is thought by some that the Boksas from Western Nepal, the Newars in the valley of the Baghmati, the Tharus in Western Nepal tarai, the Mechi is in Eastern Nepal tarai, and many others, are all representatives of the Mediterranean race which inhabited the whole of Nepal from the earliest known times. There are, however, other considerations which point to a different classification. According to this view, which is simpler and more logical, the Chepangs, the Kusundas and the Hayus belong to the Negrito race; the Tharus, the Boksas, and the Mechi belong to the protoaustraloid race; and the Newars and the Khas belong to the Mediterranean race. There has been little scientific work done on the subject and definite conclusions cannot be given. On the whole it seems the latter classification will stand up to the test of further investigation.

The Tharus and the Boksas are found in the tarai and bhabar areas. They call themselves Hindus, and Brahmins officiate in their religious ceremonies. They usually burn their dead but are also known to bury them especially if the death is due to snake-bite, cholera or small-pox. Their main occupation is the cultivation of rice.²

² See Crooke, *Castes and Tribes of North-Western Provinces and Oudh*. Vol. IV, pp. 380-406; also Census of India 1931, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Part I.

The Tharus in the U.P. allege that they originally lived in the hills of Nepal. The powerful Panchayat of the U.P. Tharus and Boksas is a typically Nepalese institution.

The Mechis live in the hills to about 800 meters above sea-level. They inhabit also the hottest valleys with immunity to malarious fevers. They call themselves Hindus, but little Brahminism is in evidence among them. They use no sacred words or prayers and the old men of the tribe themselves officiate as priests. Most of them are illiterate, and, therefore, have great respect for learning and the Brahmins who possess that learning. Hodgson said of them: "In their dark-hued skin, slender forms, oval faces, elevated features and peculiar dialect — barbarous patois as the last now is — may be traced, however, the indispensable signs of a southern origin."³ They are akin to the Tharus and Boksas, and it seems that their material difference from the Tharus and the Boksas is that of habitat — the Tharus inhabit the western half of Nepalese tarai and the Mechis the eastern half. All these races resemble closely the Newars of Nepal, except that the Mechis and the Tharus "have no towns and rarely even live in permanent villages, generally quitting a clearance after having had two or three successive crops from the land, to take up their abodes in a fresh portion of the fest."⁴

The Newars are a civilised people. They are agriculturists and cowherds by occupation and they devote their lives to the arts of peace and the enjoyment of life rather than to military glory. The similarity between Newars and Nayars and the looseness of sexual morality among both these peoples is a hint that at one time the greater part of India was inhabited by these polyandrous tribes of the Mediterranean race. However a common origin for the Newars and the Nayars is not claimed but it seems that both these peoples originally sprang from different branches of the same race.

It seems that before the people with the Vedic civilisation became the masters of the Indian mainland, an earlier civilisation

³ Hodgson, J.A.S.B. (1840), p. 1121.

⁴ J.A.S.B., Volume II, (1839), p. 623.

The following account of the Mechis in this article is true in its essentials to the present day: "They are addicted to trade, are averse to military service, have no artisans among them, are truly in a very primitive state of society. They are, however, very cheerful, have no jealousy or prejudice towards strangers, are industrious and honest and crimes of violence, are of rare occurrence among them."

was flourishing in most parts of India and a people having the same or related blood and civilisation were inhabiting Nepal. These people were of the Mediterranean type and form to this day the largest component of the Nepalese population. Some remnants of their speech and forms of worship are still to be found throughout Nepal. The temperament of the Newars and their psychological make-up owe a great deal to their early civilisation which must have flourished at the same time as the Mohenjodaro and Harappa civilisations.⁵

Afterwards new races invaded Nepal. The snows of Tibet sent the Bhotias across the mighty Himalayan heights. They came mostly as peaceful settlers from the North, and settled in the upper regions of the Himalayas at heights ranging from 3,000 to 4,000 meters above sea-level. Their only possessions were flocks of sheep and yak and their occupation was to look after their flocks which formed their only wealth and main source of food. They also brought their own culture and language with them but in course of time many of them became bilingual. Every year the Tibetans came down in winter to sell wool, borax, salt, musk etc. to the people inhabiting the lower Himalayas as can be seen in Kumaon to this day, and they returned to their country in spring. It might be that some of these nomadic tribes remained in the Upper Himalayas by choice or in certain years the rigours of the weather forbade their returning home or perhaps the head of the clan fell ill south of the Himalayas and the whole party had to remain with him or perhaps some chief with his followers fled from the fury of his rivals in Tibet and took refuge across the Himalayas. Whatever the particular reason might have been, one thing is certain, that in these altitudes the migrations of the Tibetans has been peaceful and with the tacit permission of their neighbours below them.

But Tibet also sent a number of conquerors to Nepal mainly through Sikkim and the North-Eastern passes. These swarms

⁵ See "Newars — An Essay on the history of Newar Culture" by K. P. Chattopadhyay in *J.A.S.B.* (1923), p. 465. An exhaustive bibliography will be found in the footnotes to this essay. His conclusions, however, suffer from the defect of his never having visited the Nepal Valley. The best account of the Newars, however, still remains the classical description of these people by Sylvian Levi.

of Tibetan manhood which moved down in search of warmth upon more fertile soils involved larger numbers than the migrations across the Himalayas. In both cases, however, the Tibetans came with their womenfolk and children (as they do to the present day in their winter sojourns in Kumaon). This custom enabled them to retain their language and culture, and to keep their identity separate. The invaders through Sikkim, however, were partly absorbed by the conquered. Murmis, Limbus and Rais are all, to some extent, the descendants of Tibetan new-comers to Nepal. They have gradually submitted to Brahminical influence and especially the Gurungs and Magars are now almost completely Hinduised and rank as Kshatriyas. At present any member of these races will feel offended if he is not called a Hindu. It is an honour to be a Hindu and a Kshatriya in Nepal and, although these races have a great deal of Tibetan blood and a large number of words of Tibetan origin in their vocabularies, yet they all call themselves and want others to call them Hindus. And, therefore, they are Hindus now.

Dr. A. Campbell was interested in these tribes and his investigations may be summarised in his own words as follows:

“I have not met with any Murmis who could give me particulars of their Tibetan origin, all being satisfied with the knowledge of their tribe having at some remote period migrated across the snows from Bhote (Tibet).”⁶

Dr. Campbell was also informed by Ilam Sing (Dewan of the Sikkim raja) who was a Limbu himself that “the original country of his tribe was the province of Chung in Tibet”. Also about the Magars, he added “they are unquestionably a people of this side of the snows, and the original country is Sikkim from which they were first driven west by the Lepchas across the Mechi and the Kouki rivers and thence further west by the Limbus beyond the Arun and the Dodh-Koshi.... As to Gurungs, we people of Tibeian origin have nothing to do with them.”⁷

The result of Hodgson's incomparable experience and study deserves the greatest respect and the following is a résumé of his main conclusions as regards these races of Nepal:

⁶ J.A.S.B. (1842), p. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 4-5.

The "physiognomy exhibits no doubt generally and normally the Scythic or Mongolian type of human kind; but the type is much softened and modified, and even frequently passes into a near approach to the full Caucasian dignity and beauty of head and face, in the same perplexing manner that has been noticed in regard to the other branches of the Allophylian tree, though among the cis or trans Himalayas there is never seen any greater advance towards the Teutonic blond complexion than such as consists in occasional ruddy mustaches and grey eyes among the men and a good deal of occasional bloom upon the cheeks of the children and women. A pure white skin is unknown, and the tint is not much less decided than in the high caste Hindus; but all are of this pale brown or isabelline hue in Tibet and the Sub-Himalayas, whilst the many in the plains of India are much darker."

The evidence of comparative vocabularies also shows that most of these races are of Tibetan origin.

Thirdly, the creeds, customs and legends of these races also point to the same conclusion. Their legends indicate a transit of the Himalayas from 35 to 45 generations back — say 1,000 to 1,300 years. Hodgson preferred the remote period, because, in his view, the transit was certainly made before the Tibetans had adopted from India the religion and literature of Buddhism in the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. This fact is as clearly impressed upon the crude dialects and religious tenets of the Sub-Himalayas as their Tibetan origin is upon their peculiar forms and features.⁸

Lastly we come to the penetration, through South-Western Nepal, of the Brahmins and the Rajputs from different parts of India. Tradition has it that most of the high caste Brahmins came to Kumaon and Nepal from Maharashtra or the Doab. The Pantes are said to have come from Maharashtra, the Joshis from Jhansi, the Tripathis from Kanauj and the Pandes from

⁸ J.A.S.B., XVI, pp. 1238-1389.

"Selections from the Records of the Government of Bengal", No. XXVII.

Papers relative to the colonization, commerce, physical geography, etc. of the Himalaya Mountains and Nepal by B. H. Hodgson. The following papers may particularly be seen: (i) On the Aborigines of the Sub-Himalayas; (ii) Comparative vocabulary of the several languages, dialects of the Eastern Sub-Himalayas; (iii) Origin and classification of the military tribes of Nepal; (iv) On the Chepang and Kusunda tribes of Nepal; (v) Note on Nayakote and the remarkable tribes inhabiting it.

Kangra. Even today the Gurus of the Nepalese royal family and the nobility in Nepal are Kumaoni Brahmins who themselves trace their original homes outside the Himalayas. Similarly the high caste Kshatriyas trace their origin back to the Surya and Chandra Vanshi Rajas of Udaipur and other States of Rajasthan. The facts seem to be that Rajputs and Brahmins, of great tenacity and full of idealism, voluntarily retired from the plains of India when they had been defeated by Muslim soldiers on the battlefields. Some of these refugees were very capable men, and succeeded in creating honoured places for themselves among the people of Nepal. The Rajputs sometimes carved out petty principalities for themselves and the Brahmins, by their learning, established themselves as the ministers and preceptors of the local chiefs. Gradually by the mixture of this foreign blood with the local blood a number of sub-castes of Brahmins and Rajputs grew up. At the same time a number of hill people slowly adopted the titles and manners and creeds of either Brahmins or Rajputs, and inter-marriage sometimes followed between these new Brahmins and Rajputs and the outsiders on terms of equality. But still the main distinctions remained. The hill Rajputs and Brahmins were considered to be not quite their equals by the Rajputs from Rajasthan and the Brahmins from Prayag (Allahabad) and Benares. Thus arose in the Himalayan principalities innumerable sub-castes of Brahmins and the large groups of Kshatriyas collectively called the Khasiyas or the Khas.

The Khas are in fact the backbone of the Himalayan population. They might be called Khasiya Rajputs in Kumaon, and Gorkhas in Nepal (Gorkhas include Khas, Thakurs, Gurungs and Magars). In Doti the Khas blood is more mixed with Kshatriya blood from India than elsewhere in Nepal. The Thakurs claim royal descent, i.e. they claim to possess the blood of royal houses from Rajasthan or Nepal itself, but outside connections are always supposed to show the highest social standing.

The Khas race is mentioned in many ancient books. Asoka is said to have given his daughter Charumati in marriage to Devapala — the King of Nepal — who was most probably a Khas. It seems that the Newars and the khas were two branches of the same Mediterranean race that in early times inhabited the Eastern and the Western parts of the modern kingdom of Nepal.

The Khas came more into contact with Hindus from India, the Newars were partly overwhelmed by Tibetan invaders especially in the Eastern extremities of Nepal, and the Tibetan influence in language and blood penetrated even to the tribes which we now call as Gurungs and Magars to the west of the valley of Kathmandu.

Not much is known about the lower castes of Nepal. They are called Doms, and represent perhaps the remnants of the protoaustraloid inhabitants of the country who were subdued by the Mediterranean race (Khas, Newars etc.) and who accepted a lower and servile position in the social organisation of their conquerors. They thus became parts of the dominant Hindu or Buddhist communities and shared some of the benefits of their civilisation whereas the other members of their race who retired to the hills are still as barbarous as they were 1000 B.C. or earlier.

Chapter 3

THE SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF NEPAL

THE sources for the history of Nepal have been examined extensively and critically by Sylvian Levi in the chapter on Documents in his book on Nepal. He has sub-divided these into European, Chinese and Tibetan and indigenous categories. He brought an unrivalled knowledge of languages to the task and his work in fixing some dates in Nepalese history from Chinese and Tibetan sources has helped the chronicler immensely. Since his days, however, hardly anything important has been contributed to the serious study of the problems concerning Nepalese history except for the works of Jayaswal, Basak and Majumdar.

For the early history of Nepal, recourse must be had to the inscriptions and coins of the country and the brief references to Nepal in the writings of Chinese and Tibetan travellers. The inscriptions and the coins give us the names of the princes ruling in the different parts of the country and their times can be settled accurately by the known dates of the journeys of the Buddhist travellers.

The *Vamsavali* is claimed to be the national history of Nepal. It provides us with the names of the princes of the different dynasties but there are no historical certainties as regards the time factor. Some princes rule for thousands of years and some for hundreds. Sometimes the names of nearly all the members of a ruling family are given. It is very difficult, then, to decide whether all of them followed in the kingship or that at times two or more exercised the supreme authority jointly at the same time.

However, the *Vamsavali* is the most important historical document we have for Nepalese history after the 15th century and the accounts given therein are substantially accurate for the

Malla Kings of the valley of the Baghmatti and the Gorkha Kings of the Sahi dynasty.¹

The *Vamsavali* gives us the indigenous account of Nepal immediately before the conquest of the country by Prithvi Narayan Shah. For this period of turmoil we have got in addition the account of Father Giuseppe who had been an eye-witness of many of these incidents and who writes with a definite bias against the Gorkhas who had ordered the Capuchin monks peremptorily out of Nepalese boundaries in 1769.² On the other hand the *Vamsavali* accounts being Court chronicles could not be unfavourable to the Gorkhas. By reading the two accounts together we get a fairly accurate picture of the events leading to the establishment of the Gorkha dynasty in Nepal.

For the history of the East India Company's relations with Nepal, there is enough accessible material on the Company's side. The records of the Political and Secret Department throw full light on the relations between Nepal and the Presidency of Bengal, whenever acute problems cropped up between the two governments.

These documents are very important for the history of the frontier troubles which ultimately led to the Nepal War in 1814. There is abundant documentary account for the policies of Lord Hastings, his strategy for the Nepal War, the conduct of the war, the failures of the generals except Ochterlony and in general for the military history of the entire Nepal War. After 1816, however, Nepal does not appear to claim much attention from the Governor-General and we get merely random glimpses of the intrigues in the Kathmandu Durbar in the despatches of the Residents who were sent to Nepal, namely Gardner from 1816-1829, Hodgson from 1829-31 and 1833-43, and Major H. Lawrence from 1843-46. The correspondence between Lord Ellenborough and Hodgson from the Public Record Office and included in Ellenborough's private correspondence throws

¹ *History of Nepal*, translated from the Parbatiya by Munshi Shew Shunkar Singh and Pandit Shri Gunanand with an introductory sketch of the country and people of Nepal by the editor Daniel Wright, M.A., M.D. (Cambridge, 1877).

² "Description of the Kingdom of Nepal", by Father Giuseppe in *Asiatic Researches*. Volume II.

much light on the conflict between the policies of the Resident and the Governor-General. For Jung Bahadur's journey to England there are notices in the London Press, the East India Company's Records and in the histories of Nepal written about that time.

For the diplomatic side, the documents are given with an admirable summary in Aitchison's *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*. Unfortunately we have no records of these developments from the Nepal side. There seems to have been no Court chroniclers in Nepal and no permanent secretariat as at the Peshwa daftar in Poona. However, some interesting documents are now collected in the Nepal Museum and may be seen there. But on the whole we have to rely, for the Nepalese viewpoints, on the references by the Residents about how the Nepalese entertained the proposals emanating from the East India Company's government and how the latter carried on the policies of their country both internally and externally. Sometimes we also get material for our history from out-of-the-way sources. Thus the selections from Punjab papers Ludhiana Agency (David Ochterlony) furnish interesting details of the Ludhiana Agency and the part played by Amar Singh Thapa in the negotiations preceding the Nepal War.

As regards secondary authorities, there is a large number of books, both big and small, purporting to give first hand accounts of the kingdom of Nepal. But among all these writers only a few were really serious students of history. First and the greatest among them was Brian Hodgson who lived in Nepal for about 20 years, first as the assistant to and later as the British Resident, at the court of Kathmandu. Even today that great name stands for the supreme and classical authority on all Nepalese subjects—from the study of natural history, to that of law and administration, race and language and religion and social organisation. Unfortunately Hodgson did not write a comprehensive book on Nepal incorporating his vast knowledge about Nepal and her history. We have to go to the Journals of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and other literary journals of the period to find out his voluminous writings, as only a few of these contributions were published by the Bengal Government in a separate book. Hodgson was the only person who could have written an authentic book on Nepal; but because

of the coldness shown to his literary abilities by the East India Company's authorities, he never essayed the task.

There are however a number of accounts of the kingdom of Nepal by British Residents and surgeons who were posted to Kathmandu in later years. The important ones are given in the bibliography attached to this chapter. For an exhaustive accounts of the Prime Ministers of Nepal, Landon's two volumes are invaluable. He had been given the best facilities by the then Prime Minister himself and he relates the achievements of the different Prime Ministers of Nepal in great detail.

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Chapter 4

THE EARLY HISTORY OF NEPAL

THE main source of our knowledge of the early history of Nepal is the indigenous *History of Nepal*, which was translated into English by Munshi Shew Shunker Singh and Pandit Shri Gunanand and edited by Daniel Wright, the Residency Surgeon at Kathmandu from 1863 to 1876. This knowledge is supplemented by some inscriptions of local kings and by the descriptions of Buddhist Chinese pilgrims who visited the sacred places of their religion in Nepal.

This indigenous history opens with the sentence, "The Valley on the Southern side of the snowy range, which is within Sumeru (the Himalaya), which was created by Ishwar (who emanated from the great Ishwar, the first Buddha...) was formerly known as Nag Hrad i.e. the tank of the serpent."¹

It seems certain that about 2000-1500 B.C. the valley of Nepal was a big lake. It might have been infested with Himalayan water snakes. This lake was visited from time to time by sages from India and Tibet. Just as lake Mansarowar is visited by hundreds of Hindu and Buddhist pilgrims in our own times, similarly Nag Hrad in Nepal must have attracted wandering sages from the South and the North. The sheer physical beauty of a lake with a surface area of over 500 square kilometers in such high altitudes must have given a peculiar charm and ennobling atmosphere to its banks. Indian sages must have found its banks and its waters very welcome to their philosophical minds and nomadic habits. The Parbatiya history records that in very early times the sage Bipaswi came to the lake from a city known by the name of Bandhumati and resided for some time on the mountain, which he called Jat Matrochcha (Nagarjun).²

Later Sikhi Buddh visited the lake and resided on the mountain which was called Dhyanochcha (Champadevi) because of

¹ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*

the meditation practised by the sage there. Still later Biswabhu Buddh came from a country called Anupam and resided on the mountain called Phulchok. It was about this time that the hillock on which Swayambhunath temple is built first shown above the surface of the water and the sage Biswabhu pointed out to his disciples the place through which the water of the Nag Hrad should be made to run out.

The task of cutting out a channel for the water of the lake was left to another sage, Bodhisatwa Manjusri, who came from Tibet. He examined the terrain and decided to cut a passage through the low hills on the Southern side between Champadevi and Phulchok. He then cut through the mountain called Kotwaldar, the place where the Baghmata to this day passes out of the valley.³

The draining out of the lake prominently put out two mounds in the bed of the lake, namely Swayambhu and Guhjeswari, and the sage Manjusri built a town called Manju Patan from the Swayambhu hill to Guhjeswari. He also installed a king, by name Dharmakar, in the new town and himself returned to Tibet.⁴

It is not certain as to when this took place. But we might place this event sometime about 1000 B.C. Manju Patan was afterwards visited by Krakuchhand Buddha, Kanak Muni Buddha, etc. The valley was gradually reclaimed from marshes and slowly the entire plain was brought under cultivation. In time the entire valley became a prosperous colony of settlers from East, West, North and South. The orthodox history of Nepal records the coming of Pandit Dharma Sri Mitra from Benares;⁵ Raja Gunkamdeva from Gaur;⁶ the Kirati⁷ rajas who came from Eastern Nepal; Raja Dharma Datt⁸ from Kanchi (who is said to have built the temple of Pashupati and presented much wealth and many valuable articles to the shrine as also to have built a chaitya to the North West corner of Pashupati); and Rani Pingala from Marwar.⁹

It was some time during these early years of cultivation in the valley that the great sage Ne came to Nepal. It is from him that Nepal derives her name. He is said to have lived at the

³ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 78. ⁴ *Ibid*, p. 79. ⁵ *Ibid*, p. 84. ⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 85-56. ⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 89-90. ⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 92-93, ⁹ *Ibid*, 104-05.

junction of the Baghmati and the Keshwati (or Vishnumati) and to have instructed the people living in the vicinity in the true path of religion. He also ruled over the country.¹⁰ Afterwards, he installed as King the son of a cowherd named Bhuktamana. Eight Kings of this dynasty are said to have reigned in Nepal.¹¹ The last of them, Yaksha Gupta by name, had no issue and an Ahir, Bara Sinha by name, who came from the plains of Hindustan came after the last cowherd King and ruled over the country.¹² The Ahirs were overthrown by the Kirati rajas who came from the east of the valley.¹³

The orthodox history of Nepal records that it was during the reign of these Kirati kings that both Gautama Buddha and Asoka visited Nepal. Confirmation of these facts is obtained from the stupas and pillars of Asoka and the records of the journeys made by Fa-hien and I-tsing to these places. The Lumbini-bana, which was marked by a stone pillar by Asoka as the place where the great Sakya-Muni Gautama Siddharta was born, is a deserted place today situated amidst the thick forests of the Tarai of Nepal. Again tradition has it that Kapilvastu the capital city of the Sakyas was also situated in the Tarai and that the Buddha visited the Valley of Nepal and lived there for some time. He is said to have established a great 'bihar' and to have made Saliputra, Maudgalyayana and Ananda his disciples in this valley. He is said also to have accepted here the offerings of Chuda, a female bhikshu.¹⁴

The Emperor Asoka came to Nepal and built five stupas in Deo Patan presumably to commemorate the abode of the Buddha when he was in this valley. All the five stupas are in existence to this day. He is also said to have married his daughter Charumati to Devapala, a Kshatriya by descent. It was Charumati and Devapala who founded and peopled the town of Deo Patan round the five stupas erected by Asoka.¹⁵

¹⁰ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 89, ¹⁴ Ibid, p. 108. ¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 108-09. ¹³ Ibid, p. 109.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 110. The Buddha came to Nepal in the reign of Jitedasti, the 7th Kirati King.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 110-11. "In the reign of Sthunko (the 14th Kirati Raja). Asoka, the Raja of Pataliputra having heard of the fame of Nepal as a sacred place, and having obtained the permission of his spiritual guide, Upagupta Bhikshu, came on a pilgrimage to Nepal, accompanied by his family and followed by a large number of his subjects."

There were in all twenty-nine Kirati Kings, the last of whom, Gasti by name, being hard pressed by the Somabansi Raja, Nimikha, fled from his capital. After five long reigns, the Somabansi, gave way to the Solar dynasty founded by Bhumi Verma. According to the orthodox history, Nepal had become predominantly Buddhist during these long centuries, and the valley was dotted with 'bihars' for Buddhist monks and nuns. A special sanctity attached to Deo Patan and its Asokan stupas and the 'bihar' established there by Charumati, his daughter. Learned and pious men came from distant places and held discourses on the paths of virtue taught by the great Buddha.

Tradition says that Sankaracharya, the prophet of Hindu renaissance, came to Nepal during the reign of Brihaddeva Varma, the eighteenth king of the Solar dynasty.¹⁶ On his arrival in the valley, he found that there were no learned Buddhists in Nepal. The four Hindu castes had all become Buddhists. Of these some lived in 'bihars' as Bhikshus; some were Shravaks, also living in 'bihars', some were Tantrikas, and called themselves Acharyas; and some were Grihastas, following the Buddhist religion. The first two categories had no clever men to argue with him; and the Grihastha Acharyas, who were prepared to argue with him, were soon defeated. These he ordered to do 'hinsa' (i.e. to sacrifice animals) which is in direct opposition to the tenets of the Buddhist religion. He likewise compelled the Bhikshunis or nuns, to marry, and forced the Grihasthas to shave the knot of hair on the crown of their heads, when performing the 'chura karma' or first shaving of the head. Thus he placed the Banaprasthas (ascetics) and Grihasthas on the same footing. He also put a stop to many of their religious ceremonies. There were at that time 84,000 monks of the Buddhist religion, whom he searched out and converted most of them to Hinduism. In place of the Buddhist religion he introduced the Shaiva Hindu religion in Nepal. There were, however, a few Buddhists still left in the country who were respected by the people for their piety and learning. Even Sankaracharya was obliged to leave Bandhamargis in some places as priests of temples, because he could not find other

¹⁶ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 118.

persons worthy enough to carry on the religious services in these ancient and highly consecrated temples.¹⁷

In the reign of Vishwadeva Varma, the 31st king of Suryabanshi dynasty, the Vikram era was introduced in Nepal. The throne now passed to Ansu Varma, a Thakuri Rajput, who had married the daughter of Vishwadeva Varma. This raja founded the Thakuri dynasty which gave 18 rajas to Nepal.

The names of some of the Suryabanshi rajas are also known from inscriptions of early Nepal. Most of these inscriptions are dated. There is, however, great difference of opinion regarding the eras used in the different inscriptions. The later inscriptions of Ansu Varma and Jayadeva II refer to one era and the earlier inscriptions to another era. It is generally agreed that Ansu Varma ruled in the Valley of Kathmandu a few years before the visit of Hiuen Tsang to the neighbourhood in A.D. 646. Dr. R. C. Majumdar has examined the various theories about the eras used namely those of Pandit Bhagwan Lal Indraji, Dr. Flect, S. Levi and Dr. R. G. Basak. He offers a tentative chronology of the Suryabanshi or Licchavi Kings of Nepal as follows:

1. Jayadeva		(2nd century A.D.)
2 to 12		(3rd and 4th century A.D.)
13. Vrsadeva	}	
14. Shankardeva		
15. Dharmadeva		
16. Manadeva		C. 400 — 460 A.D.
17. Mahideva		C. 460 — 495 A.D.
18. Vasantdeva		C. 495 — 510 A.D.
19. Udayadeva		C. 510 — 520 A.D.
20. Manadeva II	}	
21. Guna Kamadeva		C. 520 — 610 A.D.

¹⁷ Wright's *History of Nepal*, pp. 119-20.

22. Sivadeva (?)	}	
23. Narendradeva (?)		
24. Bhimdeva (?)		520 — 610 A.D.
25. Sivadeva II		C. 610 A.D.
daughter=Ansu Varma.		

The social history of Nepal, as of the rest of India, is the history of social and religious reformers. In the earliest days we find learned sages coming from distant parts of India with retinues of their disciples, some of whom remained as permanent settlers in the valley. Next great epoch in the history of Nepal was the coming of Gautama Buddha to the banks of the Baghmati and the acceptance of his teachings by the inquisitive and the prosperous people living in the valley. The whole valley gradually became Buddhist in culture, architecture and social life, and the coming of the Emperor Asoka put a seal on the Buddhist way of life in the valley. Deo Patan was endowed with five stupas and a number of 'bihars' sprang up from the donations of the pious and the prosperous. The ascendancy of Buddhism was proclaimed by building the Swayambhu Chaitya on top of the highest ridge in the valley. But throughout this period of religious and cultural predominance of Buddhism, Hinduism remained subservient but still alive. The temples of Pashupatinath and Guhyeshwari, which perhaps the Hindus themselves had inherited from the earlier Mediterranean people in the valley, were always respected by the rulers as well as the ruled throughout this period. Hinduism again become dominant in a new form, partly influenced by the Mahayana form of Buddhism and partly by the Vedantic philosophy of Sankaracharya in the 9th and 10th centuries A.D. Another influence was afterwards added to the religious complexities of Nepal when Gorakhnath brought Tantrik practices and Matsyendra-nath to Nepal. It is said that Gorakhnath came to Nepal in the reign of the 8th Thakuri Raja, Bardeva by name.¹⁸

It is said that on account of the Nag-Sadhana of Gorakhnath, Nepal was visited by a terrible famine which came in the wake

¹⁸ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 140.

of a drought, which lasted for twelve years. The people were in great distress and Raja Bardeva, much troubled in his mind, saw no means of relieving the sufferings of his subjects. One night the young Raja overheard the conversation between Bandhudatta Acharya of Triratna Bihar and his wife. The wife asked the Acharya the cause of the drought and its remedy. The Acharya replied, "the only one who is able to put a stop to this is Ariyavalokiteshwara, who resides in Kapotal mountain; and he cannot be brought except by the prayers of the ruler of the country. Now the raja is young and foolish, and the old man his father, Narendradeva, is living in a lonely 'bihar', because he and his son do not agree."

Having overheard this, the raja returned to his palace, and next morning he went to his father and fell at his feet. He brought the old raja home with him, and sending for the aged Acharya, asked him to do something to relieve their distress. The Acharya and Raja Narendradeva, then, performed elaborate religious ceremonies and propitiated Machchhindranath or Matsyendranath by consecrating him the ruler and protector of Nepal. The deity was then brought to the banks of the Baghmati and a great *jatra* or moving fair was held in his honour. Nepal then had a plentiful rainfall and every one rejoiced and accepted Machchhindranath as the protector of the valley.¹⁹

The deity is placed in a temple at Patan and to this day, once every year Machchhindranath is taken out in a *jatra* procession from his temple to the banks of the Baghmati and back again. The Machchhindra Jatra is the greatest festival of the valley and Hindus—from the Maharaja downwards—and Buddhists, all take part in it. The *jatra* is held after the warmest days of summer and is supposed to bring the much needed rain.

The Thakuris were followed by a collateral line of Vaisya-Thakuris who had been previously ruling in Nayakot. The 5th Raja of this line was expelled by Bamadeva who founded a new Rajput dynasty. These rajas were great builders and delighted

¹⁹ The Gorkhas consider Gorakhnath as the special protector and ruler of their race. The Nepalese coins are issued in the name of Gorakhnath and the ruling prince. And the above story to some extent testifies to the conflict between Gorakhnath and Machhindranath and the races respectively protected by them.

in founding new towns. The 3rd Raja founded Kirtipur and the 12th, Bhatgaon or Bhaktapur. The 10th King of this line, Abhaya Malla was the first raja to hold the surname Malla, because his father, when he heard the news of the birth of his son, was engaged in wrestling and gave the child the name Malla.²⁰ The name Malla, however, has great historical associations. The Buddha who died at Kusinagar called the Mallas to his death bed, family by family. The Mallas had also shared the republican sovereignty of these areas with their neighbouring clan of Lichchavis. The name Malla also occurs in the Code of Manu and on the pillar set up by Mana Deva and his mother, Rajyavati, at Changu Narayan in A.D. 496.

The 12th Raja of this Rajput dynasty was ruling in Bhatgaon with his father still ruling in Kathmandu and Patan, when Raja Nanya Deva, who came from the south Karnatak country, entered Nepal and brought the entire valley under his own control. He is also said to have brought the Newars with him. These Newars are said to be the descendents of inter-marriage between Brahmins and Kshatriyas and to have come originally from a country called Nayera.²¹ It is difficult for a historian to accept this as fact. The Newars seem to have lived in the valley from great antiquity. Perhaps a few matriarchal Nayars came with Raja Nanya Deva from South Karnatak and were gradually absorbed by the Newars, who were already settled in overwhelming numbers in the Nepal valley.

The Karnatiki dynasty ruled Nepal for just over a hundred years. Towards its declining days, Nepal was invaded by Mukund Sena from the West, the country of Palpa and Butwal. It was during this invasion that some Khas and Magar tribes came into Nepal and settled there permanently. But a pestilence overtook the invading armies of Mukund Sena and the raja himself escaped from the country in the garb of a Sanyasi.²² Great confusion reigned in the three cities and at length the Vaisya Thakuris of Nayakot again seized the throne and ruled the country for about 225 years.

About A.D. 1320 the Raja of Ajodhya, Hari Sinha Deva by named fled to Simraungarh when his country was over-run by

²⁰ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 162. ²¹ *Ibid*, p. 167. ²² *Ibid*, p. 171 et. seq.

the Tughlaks. Raja Hari Sinha Deva, with the idol of his family goddess, Turja Bhawani, entered Nepal in A.D. 1324. He built a temple for Turja Devi at Bhatgaon and, through her influence over the minds of the Thakuris and the people of Bhatgaon, came to be respected as the Maharaja with a nominal superiority over the other Rajas in the valley. His descendents ruled till about A.D. 1415 when the last raja of this line gave his only daughter in marriage to a Malla raja, one of the descendents of those Malla rajas, who had fled to Tirhut on the invasion of the valley by Nanya Deva.

It was during the reigns of the last three rajas of the dynasty of Hari Sinha Deva (about A.D. 1380 to 1415) that friendly envoys were sent to and received from the Chinese Emperor. The orthodox history of Nepal records that Raja Sakti Sinha Deva sent presents to China, which so pleased the Emperor, that he sent in return a seal, with the name Sakti Sinha engraved on it, and in addition the title of Rama, with a royal despatch, in the Chinese year 535.²³

The most important of the new dynasty of Malla Rajas was Jayasthiti Malla who reigned about A.D. 1425. He had married the daughter of Raja Shyam Sinha Deva, the last of the line of Hari Sinha Deva. This marriage had greatly added to his prestige.

Jayasthiti Malla was a great law-giver to the valley of Nepal. Firstly, he codified the laws regarding the rights of property in houses, lands and religious endowments. These rights were made transferable and saleable. Secondly he reformed and reorganised the criminal law. Formerly criminals were allowed to escape with blows and reprimands, but Jayasthiti Malla prescribed a scale of fines varying with the criminality of the offence.²⁴

Thirdly, this raja reorganized the entire social structure of his people. People were divided into definite castes with fixed places in the social hierarchy. The low caste people were obliged to show proper respect to the people of castes higher than their own. Regulations regarding dwellings, dress and

²³ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 180; Also Perceval Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. I, p. 37. ²⁴ Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 182.

ornaments were made to control the lives of these people. The Bandyas—or Buddhists converted to Hinduism—were classed as Brahmins or Kshatriyas. The Brahmins were also graded into numerous sub-divisions. Newars were also divided into Acharyas, Baidas, Sresthas and Daivagyas and each group was again sub-divided. The Sudras were divided into 32 groups and the rest into 64, depending upon the occupations followed.

Fourthly, he classified houses and lands in different categories varying with their price. Lastly he standardised the measures for land and commodities. These improvements contributed a great deal to the prosperity of the valley in later years, but with wealth and riches came also laxity in morals, jealousies and mutual heart burnings. Unfortunately in A.D. 1472 the Malla raja divided his kingdom into four parts. Bhatgaon was given to the eldest son, Banepa to the second son, Kathmandu to the third son and Patan to a daughter. Later Banepa was absorbed by Bhatgaon. But still three different lines of Malla princes ruled in the valley from this time to the time of their final overthrow by the Gorkhas. To their west was the small principality of Nayakot, which was under the suzerainty of the Malla Raja of Kathmandu. In the 16th Century Patan had again been absorbed in Kathmandu on the extinction of the ruling line, but about A.D. 1600 the line of the Mallas of Kathmandu was subdivided into two, and two independent princes held their courts at Kathmandu and Patan respectively. This line of the Malla Kings occupied the Western half of the valley, while the line of Bhatgaon Mallas occupied the eastern half. There is not much to be recorded about these different Malla Kings. They seem to have had their authority much curtailed by the 'pradhans' or representatives of the different localities in their areas. Surrounded by barren hills, and occupying the most productive parts of Nepal, these Malla princes never had the necessity of carrying war to their neighbours' domains. They were peaceful and preferred to remain on the defensive. The authority of the raja was, therefore, not supreme; primarily because he was not, and did not try to become, a war-lord with a disciplined army under his command. The authority and dignity of the raja were greatly undermined and there are not a few examples in the history of the Malla princes when the

“bharadars” or feudal chiefs and the people turned out their inefficient or licentious rajas without even rising in arms.²⁵

In the 18th century the valley of Nepal was divided into the three principalities of Bhatgaon, Kathmandu and Patan. Different branches of the same family were ruling over these three principalities but there was no confederacy or union of any kind amongst them. There was on the other hand jealousy and ill-will amongst the members of the Malla family, and their mutual quarrels had proceeded to such extremes that not even the greatest danger to their power could forge them into a federal unit capable of resisting any aggressor with a united army. In A.D. 1736 Nar Bhupal Shah, the Gorkha ruler, crossed the river Trisuli and attacked the Vaisha raja of Nayakot. The Gorkhas were defeated and thrown back. Nar Bhupal Shah, however, sent his son Prithvi Narayan to Bhatgaon to learn the practices of the civilised Malla Durbar, and Ranjit Malla readily accepted him as a welcome guest. It was this experience of the Mallas that helped Prithvi Narayan Shah greatly in his conquest of the Nepal valley; and all this he owed to the hospitality of a Malla prince. In 1769 Prithvi Narayan Shah again came as a guest to Ranjit Malla's court after his conquest of Kathmandu and Patan and the old prince, realising that the country did not need his peaceful rule any more, abdicated in favour of the Gorkha raja and retired from statecraft to lead a hermit's life at Benares.

The last Malla king of Kathmandu was Jai Prakash Malla. He ascended the throne against the wishes of a number of

²⁵ For example, see Wright's *History of Nepal*, pp. 208-09, where the *Vamsavali* says: “His subjects seeing his (Sadashiva Malla) wickedness, determined to take vengeance. So one day, as he went towards the Manohara, they assaulted him with sticks and clubs and he was compelled to take refuge at Bhatgaon (where he was kept in confinement).”

“The people, after having expelled Sadashiva Malla, made his brother Siva Singh Malla king.”

See also Wright's *History of Nepal*, p. 222, where the Ranis and Maijus of Bhaskara Malla nominated a distant relative as the next heir.

Also in the same book, p. 223, where some durbar officials made the son of Jai Prakash Malla king over five villages; p. 225 where Jai Prakash Malla is reported to have said that Thapas, Budhathokis, Bists, Baghis and Bansyats were his enemies because they had said to his father that they would not take him as king; pp. 250-52 where an account is given of the king-making practices of the six Pradhans of Lalit Patna.

important and powerful castes. To secure his own position, he had to ask his younger brother Rajya Prakash Malla to leave his domains and the 'Thoris' to absent themselves from his durbar. Rajya Prakash quietly accepted his brother's orders and lived peacefully at the court of Vishnu Malla at Patan. The 'Thoris' did not accept their loss of power meekly. They tried to set up one of Jai Prakash's brothers, Narendra Prakash, as the chief at Deo Patan. This attempt was suppressed with great cruelty, but the 'Thoris' persisted in their opposition to Jai Prakash. They succeeded in putting Jyoti Prakash Malla, the 18-month old son of Jai Prakash, on the 'gaddi' with the Rani as one of their supporters. Jai Prakash Malla had to leave his kingdom for some time and his enemies persisted in turning him out from Mata Thirtha, Godawari and Gokarna. At length he settled at Guhyeshwari, from where he later collected a small army and re-established himself at Kathmandu. He had then to turn out his old 'bharadars' and to administer the country with the help of entirely new men. Such was the political condition in the principality of Kathmandu when the Gorkhas planned their attacks on it. For sometime victory lay with Jai Prakash Malla, and the Gorkhas were turned out of Nayakot which they had occupied in 1736 and again in 1748. In 1768, Prithvi Narayan Shah attacked Kathmandu with a large army of Gorkhas. He was helped by numerous disaffected chiefs from Kathmandu and Patan. He also timed his attack when Raja Jai Prakash Malla was residing near the temple of Teleju. Preparations were being made for the procession of the Indra Jatra and the city was quite unprepared for a military surprise. Jai Prakash Malla fought very bravely but his good fortune was gone and the valley of the Baghmati passed from the hands of the Mallas to those of the Gorkhas.

In the third principality of Patan, petty squabbles were going on as to who should be the chief while the Gorkhas were threatening their neighbouring kingdoms. About 1750, Vishnu Malla died childless and Rajya Prakash Malla, the exiled brother of Jai Prakash Malla, was placed on the gaddi by the powerful group of the six 'pradhans'. These 'pradhans' found that Rajya Prakash did not see eye to eye with them in many matters of administration and they caused the unfortunate man's death by blinding him. Then for some time the 'pradhans' called Ranjit Malla from

Bhatgaon to rule over the principality, but Ranjit Malla, not liking to work under their instructions, returned to Bhatgaon leaving the 'pradhans' to administer the country as best as they could. It was now that Jai Prakash Malla established himself for two years at Patan, but again the 'pradhans' were successful in ousting him by placing the maternal grandson of Vishnu Malla on the 'gaddi' of Patan. This young prince was also killed in turn by them and they invited Dalmardan Shah, the brother of Prithvi Narayan Shah to rule over them. He in his own turn, retired to his native place after his experience with the 'pradhans'. For the last three years of their hegemony the 'pradhans' put a nominee of theirs — Tej Narsingh — a scion of the line of Vishnu Malla on the gaddi, and at last in 1768 Patan was conquered by Prithvi Narayan Shah. The ruthless Gorkha prince put all the six 'pradhans' to death for their murderous intrigues, and maladministration.

It was in these circumstances that the Gorkhas stepped in from the Western mountains into the fertile valley of Nepal and established their sway over the indigenous people. The old story was repeated again — hardy mountaineers came in to establish their rude justice in green valleys where the people at the top had fallen to interminable intrigue and given themselves up to luxuries and pleasures.

Chapter 5

THE HISTORY OF THE GORKHA CONQUEST

ACCORDING to the *Vamsavali*, the ruling house of the Gorkhas is a branch of the Rana family of Chitor. The family traces its origin to one Rishiraj Bhattarak, Raja of Chitor. Twenty-eight rulers followed Rishiraj on the 'gaddi' when, during the reign of the last king, Bhupati, the Moghul Emperor, Akbar, attacked Chitor. The *Vamsavali* narrates that Bhupati was killed together with his son Fateh Singh. Uday Brahma, the heir apparent, escaped and founded the town of Udaipur, and Manmath, the youngest son, found refuge at Ujjain. Manmath had two sons, Brahmanik and Bhupal. Bhupal, not being on good terms with his elder brother, came and stttled in the Tarai lands near Palpa. He had two sons, Kancha and Mincha, whose names indicate that Bhupal must have married in his adopted country. Bhupal, however, succeeded in securing Raghubanshi Kshatriya brides for his sons. These marriages helped Kancha in conquering the country of the Magars, and Mincha in establishing himself at Nankot.

Jagdeva, who was fifth in line of descent from Mincha, had seven sons. One of his younger sons was sent to rule the Lamjungs at their own request. This unfortunate prince was murdered by one of his subjects. The Lamjungs again approached Jagdeva to give them another son as ruler. At first Jagdeva refused their request because he did not want another of his sons to be murdered by a wild and unruly people. At length he consented to send his youngest son Yashobrahma to the Lamjungs. Yashobrahma had two sons — Narhari Shah and Dravya Shah — and it was the younger son, Dravya Shah, who conquered the town of Gorkha in 1559. In 1716 Narbhupal Shah came to the throne. He was the tenth ruler of the Gorkhas from Dravya Shah. He was an ambitious and courageous man. He found that eastwards from his mountain home lay the prosperous valley of Nepal which was divided at that

time amongst the three principalities of Bhatgaon, Kathmandu and Lalit Patan. There was no love lost between the Newar rulers of these principalities. There was no pact of common defense amongst them, and none of them was strong enough to repel outside invasion for any great length of time. Their energies and resources were being squandered in fighting petty wars amongst themselves. Narbhupal Shah was quick enough to see his chance of conquering the fertile valley of Nepal. He determined to get hold of the fortresses leading to the valley. These were the two fortified towns of Nayakot and Kirtipur. In 1736 he collected a large force and attacked Nayakot. There was bitter fighting with the garrison of the fort which was also helped by Jaiprakash Malla, the ruler of Kathmandu. Narbhupal had to accept defeat and retreated to his mountain fastness of Gorkha. In 1742 Narbhupal Shah died and was followed by his eldest son Prithvi Narayan Shah who was only twelve years old at that time.

But Prithvi Narayan Shah was a boy of great promise. At quite a young age, he had distinguished himself in bravery and daring.

Prithvi Narayan Shah turned his organising powers and will to the task of militarising his people in Gorkha. He patronised the hardy mountaineers around his town and formed from them an army more numerous and better-led than any that his neighbours commanded. However, the strength of his army lay in its commander's irrepressible will to power. Prithvi Narayan Shah was courageous and resolute and knew well how to derive the fullest advantages from the difficulties of his enemies. By his personal example, he gathered around him Sardars who were brave in the battlefield and loyal in misfortune. Under these Sardars, he collected a large army (about 4000-5000) consisting of the Magars, the Gurungs, the Khas and the Thakurs. The one great secret of Prithvi Narayan's success was his disregard of traditional caste rules in enlisting all these heterodox castes into the fighting forces. In the earlier days only the Thakurs were recognised as the genuine Kshatriyas, but in Prithvi Narayan's army the Magars, the Gurungs and the Khas were all given Kshatriya rank though they were not considered to be as good Kshatriyas as the Thakurs. This change in custom enabled Prithvi Narayan Shah to recruit his army

from a much larger source, and in the end he was successful because his enemies could not replace their losses in men from just one class of the population while he could enlist his men from practically all classes living in his principality. Thus, after each battle, Prithvi Narayan depleted the strength of his enemies, while he kept his own intact, if not augmented.

In 1748, he collected a large army and attacked Nayakot, which lay on the road from the town of Gorkha to the valley of Nepal. Nayakot was the key to the possession of the valley. The Gorkha army penetrated the country of the Newars as far as Kirtipur and a pitched battle was fought on a plain nearby. In this encounter the Gorkhas could not bear the onslaught of the larger army of Jai Prakash Malla of Kathmandu. A large part of the Gorkha army was slain. Jai Prakash Malla also lost equally heavily in men. But the Gorkhas were routed and Prithvi Narayan, narrowly escaping death, was rushed out in a palanquin to his mountain capital.

About this time Ranjit Malla of Bhatgaon was on very strained terms with his relations who were ruling at Kathmandu and Patan. One of the causes for his jealousy and ill-feeling was the increase in power of Jai Prakash Malla of Kathmandu. It was in these circumstances that Ranjit Malla offered his friendship and hospitality to Prithvi Narayan Shah, which were readily accepted by the ambitious Gorkha prince. But in a few years Ranjit Malla came to realise that Prithvi Narayan Shah was not content to remain subservient to him and was planning to expand his dominions at the expense of the Malla princes. The Newar Raja tried to retrace his steps and patched up a hasty alliance with his brother chiefs of Kathmandu and Patan. The alliance was aimed at expelling the Gorkhas from the mountain fastnesses north-west of the valley, but it came too late and achieved little.

Prithvi Narayan, however, "succeeded in securing in his interest many of the mountain chiefs, especially those connected with or feudatory to the principality of Patan, by promises to keep them in possession of their jagirs and largely to augment their authority and importance. By their assistance he gained possession of all the mountains which surround the valley of Nepal, and built numerous small forts upon their summits, in which his troops were stationed and from which they were

able to command all the approaches to the valley. Then, collecting his forces, he entered the valley and laid siege to the city of Kirtipur, anticipating little or no opposition. Kirtipur is situated in the south-west quarter of the valley and stands alone upon and around the level crest of a hill, about 70 to 100 metres above the surrounding plain. It was strengthened on all sides by a wall which encircled the whole town, having in it a few gates which were strongly fortified; while within were several buildings which acted as fortresses, especially in the upper part of the town, around and supporting the durbar, which was situated at the highest point of the hill.”¹

In this attempt, Prithvi Narayan Shah was defeated in battle by Jai Prakash Malla and the Gorkha Army was forced to withdraw from the entire valley. Prithvi Narayan, however, was not a person to accept his defeat easily. He next tried to starve the valley into submission. He posted his troops at all the passes of the mountains and forbade the entry of any food stuffs into the valley. But the valley produced enough food for its own requirements and could easily do without those articles of food which came from outside. Having again failed in his endeavours, Prithvi Narayan Shah had at last to put his hands to other methods. Instead of subduing the people of the valley by the sword or through their stomachs, he now tried to break their will to resistance by subtle propaganda and intrigue. In the words of our own times, we might say that he now tried to introduce fifth column elements into the dominions of his enemies. Oldfield says about this phase of his activity: “Not gaining his object by these means, i.e. force or starvation, Prithvi Narayan Shah had recourse to the assistance of that ever intriguing class, the Brahmins, and by their means, fomented dissensions among the leading nobles of Nepal, and attached many of them to his party by holding forth liberal and enticing promises.”²

At last, after many other attempts, Prithvi Narayan Shah collected all his men and laid another siege to Kirtipur in 1767. The siege lasted a long time, but in the end, through the treachery of one of the nobles of Patan who was a personal

¹ *Sketches from Nepal*, H. A. Oldfield, Volume I, p. 268-69.

² *Ibid*, p. 270.

enemy of Jai Prakash Malla, the Gorkhas entered the town. The entire garrison was put to the sword and the male inhabitants were punished severely. Prithvi Narayan Shah then marched his troops to Patan and numerous engagements were fought on the outskirts of the city. In the meantime the news of the arrival of Captain Kinloch in the Tarai with a body of British troops forced Prithvi Narayan Shah to take away his army for the defence of his southern frontier.

After the retreat of Captain Kinloch, the Gorkhas again appeared in the valley of Nepal and in September 1768 at the time of the Indra Jatra entered the city of Kathmandu and took Jai Prakash Malla and his army entirely by surprise. The Malla prince escaped with some of his troops to Patan and tried to make his stand there. But fortune had deserted the Mallas and even the nobles and their soldiers, fearful of the vengeance and brutality of the Gorkhas, advised surrender to the invader. This forced Jai Prakash Malla and Tej Narsingh (of Patan) to retire, with whatever men they could gather, to Bhatgaon. Early in 1769, however, the victorious Gorkha army appeared before Bhatgaon itself.

Prithvi Narayan Shah had been a close friend of Bir Nar Singh, the only son of Ranjit Malla, who had died during the life time of his father. Prithvi Narayan Shah now came to live at Bhatgaon as the guest of Ranjit Malla. When he reached the durbar of the old king, he very courteously said "Maharaj: You are old and worthy of respect. I have not come here coveting your throne. Please continue to rule over your people as you have done in the past." But the old king replied that he was old and that old age and the loss of his only son had enfeebled him. He therefore asked the Gorkha king to take over his kingdom also and permit him to proceed to Benares. Prithvi Narayan Shah agreed to this and after the departure of the old king, established the Gorkha administration in the entire valley. Jai Prakash Malla had been allowed to live at Pashupati, where he died within a short time and Tej Nar Singh was imprisoned for life under orders of the Gorkha chief, who was prejudiced against him because Tej Nar Singh had accepted the throne of Patan when the 'Pradhans' had deposed Dalmardar Shah, the brother of Prithvi Narayan Shah.

Thus in 1769, "the two countries of Gorkha and Nepal were united into one kingdom, under one name and ruled over by one prince. Having established his power in Nepal, Prithvi Narayan crossed the Dudh Kosi river, the eastern boundary of his new dominions, and entered the country of the Kirats and the Limbus. He now extended his territories to the Mechi river, which separated the Limbu country from Sikkim. In 1772, a great battle was fought between the Gorkhas and the Raja of Tanbu. Thousands of Gorkhas were slain on the field of battle. Tanbu was incorporated in the Gorkha dominions as a result of this battle, but the Gorkha power was greatly reduced by continuous campaigning, and they had to stop for consolidation before proceeding further with their conquests.

After the death of Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1774, his eldest son, Singh Pratap Shah, came to the throne. Singh Pratap suspected his younger brother Bahadur Shah of plotting against him and kept him in prison for some time. The Raj Guru, however, persuaded Singh Pratap to release his brother on condition that Bahadur Shah should leave Nepal and never enter the country again without Singh Pratap's permission. Singh Pratap's rule lasted only three years; and most of this time, he was engaged in waging war against the Raja of Morung.

On Singh Pratap's death in 1778, Bahadur Shah returned to Nepal and placing on the throne Ram Bahadur Shah, his infant nephew, he assumed the regency in the latter's name. It was in his time that Nepal first had some one like a Prime Minister. The name was that of the nephew, but the hand that carried on the administration was that of the Regent. Bahadur Shah was a great organiser, and he sent the Gorkha army to new conquests in the west and in the east. His growing power was not pleasing to the mother of Ram Bahadur Shah. She remembered the treatment meted out to Bahadur Shah by her late husband; and she was afraid that Bahadur Shah, after consolidating his power, might usurp the throne and exile or imprison both his nephew and his sister-in-law. This distrust led to quarrels and palace intrigues. At length Bahadur Shah had the Raj Mata placed under restraint, but all the chiefs and nobles protested against this step and Bahadur Shah had to go into exile again. He then retired to Bettia and the

administration was carried on by Rajendra Lakshmi, the mother of the young prince Ram Bahadur.³

In 1786, after the death of Rajendra Lakshmi, Bahadur Shah returned to Nepal and acted again as Regent. He called himself Fateh Bahadur Shah, and again organised the resources of the kingdom for fresh conquests. He now prepared to attack the principalities to his west known as the Chaubisi and the Baisi Rajas, i.e. the confederacies of 24 and 22 Rajas. At this time the most important and powerful of the Chaubisi Rajas was Palpa where Sen Vanshi Kshatriya princes were ruling. Bahadur Shah thought that it would be difficult for the Gorkhas to conquer the Chaubisi Rajas if the Raja of Palpa was in the camp opposed to them. He, therefore, decided on winning the friendship of Palpa; and proposed that some of the gains from the conquest of the Chaubisi Rajas would be handed over to Palpa if Palpa took a friendly view of the Gorkha designs. This was accepted by the Raja of Palpa and he came over to the Gorkha side, although he still processed to be the leading chief amongst the 24 Rajas.⁴

Bahadur Shah now sent the Gorkha army under the command of Damodar Pande towards the west and the various principalities were conquered one after the other. Most of these chiefs went to the court of Palpa and requested the Raja of Palpa to help them. But instead of helping them, he confused them by his advice. In this way all the Chaubisi principalities were absorbed by the Gorkhas before 1787, with the exception of the districts of Gulmi, Argha and Kachi, which they presented to the Raja of Palpa.

In 1787 Bahadur Shah turned his attention southwards. He now chose Swarup Singh as the Commander of the army because sending Damodar Pande would have greatly increased the latter's prestige and power. This southern army conquered the mountainous country right up to the Someshwar hills. Then in 1789 the Gorkhas established themselves in the country both south and west of Sikkim. The 'Tesu' lama (the Panchen Lama of Tashilonpo) was then on his way to Peking and his brother the Sumsur Lama (Cho-ma-eul-pa) taking a huge lot of treasure from Sikkim and Tibet, sought refuge in Kathmandu.

³ *Sketches from Nepal*, H. A. Oldfield, Volume I, p. 278. ⁴ *Ibid*, p. 279.

This led to the Tibetan War which ended by Nepal accepting defeat in 1792 after a military disaster, in which the Tibetan army was helped by Chinese Imperial Soldiers.

In 1790 Bahadur Shah planned the invasion of Kumaon. He was well acquainted with the state of affairs in Kumaon, where murder and intrigues were taking place in the ruling family. The Gorkha army set out from Doti early in 1790 under the command of Chautariya Bahadur Shah, Kazi Jagjit Pande and Amar Singh Thapa. One division crossed the Kali towards the north and a second was sent to occupy the southern road to the capital city of Almora. When news of this invasion arrived at Almora all was confusion and despair. The soldiers of Mahendra Singh, the Chief at Almora, and his uncle Lal Singh were easily defeated in battle and the Gorkhas took possession of Almora in the early part of 1790.

In the following year great preparations were made for the invasion of Garhwal. The Gorkhas, however, never penetrated beyond Langur Garh which for a whole year defied their efforts to reduce it, and in the midst of their arrangements for a more determined attack on the fort, news arrived that the Chinese had invaded Gorkha possessions in Nepal, and all the troops were ordered to return to Nepal. The Gorkhas hastened back to Nepal but they had so impressed Pradhyuman Shah, the ruler of Garhwal, with a sense of their power, that he agreed to pay a yearly tribute of Rs. 25,000 to the Nepal Government. This arrangement gave some semblance of amity between Nepal and Garhwal from 1791 to 1802.

The conquest of Kumaon (i.e. Almora and Naini Tal) brought the Gorkhas into some disputes about the Tarai lands with the Nawab Vizir of Oudh. These were amicably settled through the good offices of the British Resident: on an understanding by which the Gorkhas agreed to yield up all pretensions to the low country; and the Nawab, on the other hand, promised to respect the position of the de facto rulers of Kumaon.

In 1803 the Gorkhas made another big push westwards. Their soldiers were now sent towards Garhwal under Amar Singh Thapa Hastidal and Bam Shah Chautariya. Pradhyuman Shah was a weak chief and he retired to Dehra Dun without opposing the Gorkhas. The Gorkhas, however, followed him to Dehra Dun and forced him to seek refuge in the plains. With the

help of the Gujar Raja Ramdayal Singh of Landhaura, Pradhyuman Shah collected a small army of some twelve thousand men and, entering the Dun Valley, fought a decisive engagement with the Gorkhas. The Garhwal Chief was killed (1804) and his brother retired to Kangra. The Gorkhas now established themselves as far west as the Jamuna.

In 1805 the Gorkhas got another opportunity for expansion. Between the Sutlej and the Jamuna were a number of petty chiefs trying to impose their authorities one over the other. The ambition of Sansar Chand in particular had already made his neighbours either into his vassals or his enemies. He had conquered the lands of the chief of Bilaspur who, in desperation, had thrown himself on the support of the Gorkha Commander, Amar Singh. Amar Singh Thapa gladly took up the cause of the Raja of Bilaspur and crossing the Jamuna in 1805, defeated the army of the chiefs of Nalagarh and the other confederates of Sansar Chand. The Gorkha authority was then established as far west as the banks of the Sutlej and Amar Singh Thapa even crossed that river and laid siege to the fort of Kangra. Sansar Chand was prepared to ask for the help of Ranjit Singh, but negotiations protracted themselves, and the Gorkhas withdrew from Kangra. The natural defences of the fortress were sufficient to keep the Gorkhas at bay. The Gorkhas, however, returned to lay siege to the fortress again and again. In 1809, Ranjit Singh played a dexterous game and, while pretending friendship towards both Sansar Chand and Amar Singh, got his Sikh troops admitted into the fortress and left both his adversaries to fend as best they could for themselves. The Gorkhas were forced to withdraw to the left bank of the Sutlej and Amar Singh returned to his headquarters with a grievance against the Sikhs. This led him to propose a joint war against the Sikhs to the British authorities in Ludhiana. Nothing, however, came of it and in 1814 when the Gorkhas themselves fought a war against the East India Company, their control on the mountainous territories between the Jumuna and the Sutlej had not been stabilised.



Chapter 6

POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN NEPAL BEFORE THE GORKHA CONQUEST

NEPAL, being a mountainous country, has been for long periods of her history a country divided into innumerable petty principalities. It is only after the consolidation achieved by the Gorkhas that the entire country has been under one Government. Throughout the greater part of her history, Nepal has had different chiefs of different clans in different valleys and sometimes even in the same valley.

The political organisation of Nepal for the greater part of her history has been primitive. The people of different localities knew no other and no higher loyalty than that which they owed to their hereditary chiefs. The smaller chiefs sometimes accepted the nominal superiority of the chiefs who claimed the noble blood of Chitor or who could punish them for their arrogance in battle. There was no other public law known to these tiny principalities than that of superior power. Similar conditions prevailed in the North West Frontier Area till recently where rival chieftains went to war with one another, made treaties and violated them and were unmindful of the rules of the British Indian Political Department. Other examples of such chieftains could have been found in the last century in the Punjab hill states, and the Central India Agency States.

The most important date in Modern Nepalese history is 1768, when Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha conquered Kathmandu and put on a firm footing the process of Gorkha expansion in Nepal. In the present chapter an attempt is made to discuss in detail the conditions obtaining in Nepal on the eve of the Gorkha conquest. This will give us an idea about the weakness in the political system in the different principalities of Nepal and the problems and facilities that these chaotic conditions presented to the vigorous and consolidating genius of Prithvi Narayan Shah and his Gorkha people.

About 1750 Nepal was divided into a large number of very loose circles or federations of smaller principalities. Some of these principalities consisted of merely a few villages each, which were too poor for the plunder of neighbours and too secure to fall under the subjection of neighbouring chieftains because of the mutual jealousy of the princely order surrounding them. The chieftains often claimed pure Rajput blood and called themselves Thakurs. The Brahmins acknowledged them as Rajputs, worked as their priests and counsellors and created and guided the public opinion of the territories where they lived.

The country of Nepal was, at that time, roughly divided into the following groups, from West to East:

1. The Baisi Rajas, chief of whom was the Raja of Jumla.
2. The Chaubisi Rajas, one of whom was the Gorkha Raja.
3. The Newar principalities in the valley of the Baghmati.
4. The principalities under the Raja of Mackwanpur or the group of the Kiranti chiefs.
5. The Limbu and Lepcha chiefs under the Raja of Sikkim.
6. Certain Rajas of the Tarai who submitted to the suzerainty of hill rajas e.g. the raja of Butwal.

The Baisi rajas lived mainly in the valleys of the tributaries of the Gogra and included the principalities of Doti, Jumla, etc. to the number of twenty-two, whence they derived their name.

The Chaubisi rajas included the chiefs of Palpa, Gorkha, Nayakot, Piuthan etc. and were to be found mainly in the valleys of the tributaries of the Gandak. As their name implies these rajas were twenty-four in number.

The valley of the Baghmati was the home of the Newar people and included the principalities of Kathmandu, Patan, Bhatgaon, Kirtipur and Chaukot.

The Raja of Makwanpur was a Rajput prince although his soldiery mainly came from the Kirantis. He was the most influential chief in Nepal next to the Newar princes.

In the extreme east of Nepal the petty chieftains nominally acknowledged the Lepcha raja of Sikkim as their superior. They were mostly Limbus or Lepchas pretending to Rajput blood.

In the Tarai were a number of petty chieftains who had to pay tribute to the hill rajas of the interior in order that the mountaineers might not plunder their possessions. These chiefs or zamindars found it economical to pay a tribute to the hill rajas

rather than keep a large standing army ready to fight the mountaineers at any time. The raja of Butwal was one such chieftain whose subservience to the Makwanpur Raj led to the Nepal War in 1814. Other such chieftains were the rajas of Tulsipur, Tapa Siwa, Argha, etc.¹

Looking at these principalities as a whole, we find two factors of great importance that are common to them all. Firstly these territories are hardly influenced at all by the events that happen outside Nepal. Secondly all the political changes that take place in these territories are determined and guided by Hindu ideas of statecraft and of the relationship between neighbouring Hindu states.

Coming to the first point, at that time Nepalese history had little to do with the history of the rest of India. Nepal was secure within her own mountain fastnesses. Mohammedan conquerors came and established their rule over large parts of India. Islam gradually found many converts amongst the lower caste Hindus and in big towns Persian culture and civilisation made its appearance with Islamic jurisprudence and taxation coming in its van. Nepal remained Hindu-cum-Buddhist as India had been in the 10th and 11th centuries A.D. Thus we do not find the least Islamic influence in the local administration of justice or the culture of the common people of Nepal. At the same time Nepal, because of her isolation, could not play any part in the course of Indian history. It is interesting for a student of history to imagine that if Prithvi Narayan Shah had appeared on the scene a century earlier, the Gorkhas might have reached the Bay of Bengal before the English came there. The reasons why the Nepalese did not avail themselves of their historical opportunities is one of the interesting problems of Nepalese history. Afghanistan and the Punjab have played a determining role in Indian History but Nepal has hardly made any intrusion into the history of the mainland.

The main reason for this seems to be the scarcity of good horses in the Himalayan mountains. Unlike central Asia, the Himalayas only breed small ponies fit only for climbing the mountains. Scarcity of good mounts has perhaps prevented the

¹ See Map of Nepal in *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal* by Francis Hamilton (formerly Buchanan), M.D.

Nepalese from interfering in the military history of India. In this we see a fundamental aspect of Nepal's geopolitical relations. Nepal could not in the past and may not in the future interfere in the affairs of the Indian continent because the Nepalese lack the essentials of a successful waging of war, namely cavalry in ancient times, and heavy industry in modern times. At the same time, in olden days the princes in India seldom made war on Nepal because Nepal was comparatively barren and the countryside very strenuous for Indian troops to traverse. The Tarai separating Nepal from the plains in India was also a natural barrier. It was covered with thick forest and grassy marshes. A virulent type of malaria called the "awl" was endemic in the Tarai and people were unwilling to cross the forest regions except through established paths along perennial water courses and forest clearings. This malarial fever of the Tarai was one of the main factors which prevented closer relationship between Nepal and her southern neighbours.

The other factor we notice in the historical development of Nepal is that Nepal is a separate historical unit. It has innumerable internal divisions, but it has been a political unity in spite of this diversity. That unity is the acceptance of Brahmanical dogma of princely conduct by all the petty principalities of Nepal. The main conceptions in these Brahmanical teachings will be found in the words of Bhishma to Yudhister in *Mahabharata*, *Shanti Parva*; in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*; in *Manu* and in many other books. The following is a resume of these precepts bearing in mind the special history of Nepal about this time:

Kingship is hereditary and a man secures all the rights of royalty by being born in a princely family. These rights are that a king is not to be removed from his throne and least of all killed except when he is a tyrant and would not mend his ways in spite of the requests of his subjects and the solemn warnings of the Brahmins.² Thus the princes have the right to the submission of their subjects and the subjects have the right to expect good government from the Princes. But the subjects may not remove a prince. The right to remove a prince from the throne,

² Compare the teachings of Montana and the Jesuits in Spain in early 17th Century.

to kill him in battle³ or, otherwise, to secure his dispatch by poison through the Kitchen or the Pharmacy etc. are reserved for the princely order as against one another. But the princes are supposed to be performing their proper duty when they kill one another and one another's followers in battle. Perhaps that was the only outlet that the Brahmins desired for the full display and appeasement of the pugnacious instinct in man.

The princes would kill one another in battle, but after the battle the usual practice was to allow the descendants of the dead prince to succeed him. They had merely to acknowledge the supremacy of the victor and pay him a little tribute occasionally. Sometimes, the defeated prince was asked by the victor himself to continue to rule as if no battle had occurred, e.g. Prithvi Narayan asked the ruler of Bhatgaon to continue to rule as he had done previous to the conquest of Bhatgaon by the Gorkhas.⁴

The descendants of the royal families displaced by the Gorkha conquest still have the highest place in the social hierarchy of the Rajputs in Nepal and are called the Thakurs. Vansittart mentions 18 Thakur classes and says that the best Thakurs are the Sahi (The Maharaja Dhiraj is a Sahi), Malla, Sing, Sen, Khan, and Sumal.⁵

In the Brahmanical political system in all the activities of the Kshatriyas or Rajputs, the rest of the population took very little part or interest. The business of government was reserved to the Rajputs and whatever happened amongst themselves was of no consequence to the rest of the populace. The rest had merely to obey all the orders of the established government and

³ Maharaj Prithvi Narayan Shah was in a dola (palanquin), and a sepoy raised his Khoda to cut him down, but his hand was held by another, who exclaimed that he was a Raja and not to be killed.

A History of Nepal translated from the Parbatiya, Editor, Daniel Wright, p. 227.

⁴ Prithvi Narayan then paid his respects to Ranjit Malla and respectfully asked him to continue to rule as he had hitherto done, although he (Prithvi Narayan) had conquered the country. Ranjit Malla replied that Prithvi Narayan had obtained the sovereignty by the favour of God and all that he now asked for was to be sent to Benares. Prithvi Narayan entreated him to remain; but the recollection of the treachery of the Satbahalyas was fresh in his memory and he would not consent. Prithvi Narayan then gave him leave to go and also provided for his expenses on the road. *History of Nepal* translated from the Parbatiya, p. 256.

⁵ Captain Eden Vansittart, *Notes on Nepal*, p. 80-81.

to pay certain taxes on the produce of the land or on their occupations to whichever government they found in power. The cultivators could, therefore, go on with their ordinary occupations 100 yards from a scene of battle and witness unconcerned the trial of strength between the rival princes for securing the government over them. The Hindu conqueror never took civilian prisoners or punished them for any help exacted from them by his enemy. The civilians were never allowed to take up arms for or against any cause. The rajputs would never tolerate fighting side by side with any non-Rajput, especially a cultivator or an artisan. Further the Brahmins enjoyed the enviable position of being immune from the death penalty, and they enjoyed quasi-diplomatic privileges when they carried messages from one warring chief to another.

Thus we find that all the political changes in Nepal took place within the framework and the customary limits of a polity governed and guided by Hindu ideas. We might almost say that a Hindu *staaten-gericht* prevailed in Nepal. It had its advantages and disadvantages, but so long as the entire country of Nepal accepted the general principles of Hinduism-cum-Buddhism, this *staaten-gericht* secured the undisturbed progress of the day-to-day life of society and also the satisfaction of the ferocious elements in man; which however much we might censure them, are still part and parcel of our human inheritance. This system would have meant disaster to its followers if the fights had taken place between chiefs who obeyed its dictates and those who despised everything Hindu as happened in the plains of Hindustan. For a fight against the non-Hindu, the Hindu *staaten-gericht* would have been a source of great weakness to those who followed it, and an advantage to the adversary who would reap all the benefits out of it but would not honour the conventions securing moderation and kindness in the case of his own victory. However, such a contingency never arose in Nepal except on the occasion of the Tibetan wars and the war with the East India Company. But on all these occasions the adversary had no intention of conquering Nepal proper, and establishing his own rule there. These wars were made to punish the Nepalese and the Nepalese always managed to escape with light punishment in spite of reverses in battle.

Chapter 7

POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN NEPAL AFTER THE GORKHA CONQUEST

THE GORKHALI dynasty ruled in the small town of Gorkha which was one of the Chaubisi principalities. They claimed descent from the Chandra Vamshi rajas of Chitor. The greatest man they produced was Prithvi Narayan, the founder of the kingdom of Nepal as we know it today. He was born in the year 1652 Saka (A.D. 1730) and came to the throne at the age of twelve. He ruled for 32 years.¹

Prithvi Narayan Shah might very well be called the founder of modern Nepal. Primarily he was a soldier and a general. He excelled in the powerful military virtues of tenacity and an indomitable will to success and victory. But that was not all. He was a good strategist as well. He set his heart to the final result of a long-drawn campaign, and severe disasters in intermediate operations never deterred him from carrying out his military programmes to their victorious conclusions. He realised the importance of blockade as an instrument of war; and propaganda and intelligence were his great allies. We find him utilising the services of a number of Brahmins for such work. We also learn from the *Vamsavali* that Prithvi Narayan carefully noted the enemies of Jai Prakash Malla, in order to use them for his own purposes later on.²

¹ *History of Nepal*, translated from the Parbatiya, editor D. Wright, p. 281.

² Wright: "(Jaiprakash Malla) treating these Pradhans very ignominiously, let them go. These Pradhans after their release endeavoured to dethrone Jaiprakash. The Gorkhali Raja was very glad to hear of all these events. (p. 225.)

"The Raja (Jaiprakash Malla) put the Kaji of Lalitpur in prison, where he died. The Gorkhali Raja was glad to hear of these things. (p. 226.)

"For the greater number of his successes Prithvi Narayan Shah depended upon the treachery by some of his enemies against the rest. He seems to have entered Kantipur by bribing some of the influential people. The

Here, mention must be made of the account of the atrocities committed under the orders of Prithvi Narayan Shah after his conquest of Kirtipur, for circulating which, Father Giuseppe is mainly responsible. It seems probable that severe punishments were inflicted on the heroic defenders of Kirtipur, but this solitary instance of cruelty cannot fairly be used to mar the good name of Prithvi Narayan Shah. Father Giuseppe's account should be treated with caution. One must also remember that the Catholic Missionaries had been turned out ignominiously by the Gorkhas on their conquest of the valley of the Baghmati and consequently it was natural that they spoke ill of the Gorkha prince. Most of the foreign writers have given currency to Father Giuseppe's account without warning the reader about his prejudices and personal ill-will against Prithvi Narayan Shah. For a balanced view, perhaps, one might be referred to Colonel Kirkpatrick's estimate of the character of Prithvi Narayan Shah, remembering that in no case could Colonel Krikpatrick be claimed to have been enamoured of the Gorkha ruler. Colonel Kirkpatrick says:

"Prithvi Narayan did not long enjoy the fruits of his perfidy and aggress, dying about three years after the final conquest of Nepal, or in the year 1771. There are some apparent contradictions in his character which our imperfect knowledge of his history does not enable us to clear up: thus, notwithstanding the cruelty he manifested in his treatment of the inhabitants of Kirtipur, in his ungenerous vigour towards the Patan Sovereign, and on some other occasions, he is said to have disgraced one of his principal adherents for wounding one of the enemy while in the act of fleeing from the field of battle. In fine, we may conclude from the respect in which his memory is yet held by the Parbatiyas, and especially the military part of them, that whatever his conduct as a conqueror or however severe his nature may have been, he was not inattentive to the means of conciliating those on whose support he principally depended."³

It must be pointed out that Kirkpatrick refers here to Father Giuseppe's account which he quotes in full in the Appendix.

Vamsavali simply records that 'eight months after this on the 14th of Bhadon Sudi Nepalese S. 888 (A.D. 1768) Prithvi Narayan entered Kantipur'." (p. 231.)

³ Kirkpatrick, W. J., *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, p. 271.

It is very difficult to believe that the prince who allowed Christian Missionaries to depart with all their material possessions, who manifested the most courteous behaviour towards the Malla kings whom he had defeated in battle but requested them to continue to rule in their kingdoms, could be a monster of brutality as Giuseppe would like us to believe. The accounts of the *Vamsavali* appear to be factually correct and the account of Father Giuseppe seems to be biased.

Prithvi Narayan was a great man and what we definitely know about him makes him one of the great men that Nepal produced in her medieval darkness. He was born to expand and consolidate his hereditary dominions and by directing and guiding the military abilities of his people he prepared a future for them, of conquest and greater responsibility. It is very difficult to say anything about the man apart from his military virtues because we do not know anything about him except his military exploits and the magnanimous treatment that he meted out to his enemies after conquering them. He was really an ideal Kshatriya 'prince according to the Hindu view of life. And he is remembered in all Nepalese homes as the founder of Nepalese military tradition and as the ideal hero for every Gorkha child.

Hereditary Kingship is the greatest weakness of despotic principalities. It is not my intention here to discuss at length the reasons for this assertion, namely: the uncertainty about a despot having an equally able son, the presumption that the despotic sons would not fall into vice and corruption, the inexperience

'A *History of Nepal*, translated from the *Parbatiya*, editor D. Wright. See page 232 about his order to continue the Jatha Yatra after his victory, and his confirmation of the acts of charity performed by a Pradhan whom he put to death for his treachery to the previous ruler of Kathmandu. See p. 252 about "Prithvi Narayan, knowing the six Pradhans to be traitors (to the previous ruler of Patan) bound and killed them". See pp. 254-55.

"The next morning Sri Prithvi Narayan Shah inspected the field of battle and seeing Mahindra Sinha Rais' (One of his enemies) life less body pierced with wounds, he praised his bravery and sent for his family, that they, being the relatives of so brave a man might have proper protection. They were brought and fed morning and evening from the royal Kitchen." See pp. 255-58 about his extremely generous treatment of Ranjit Malla and Jai Prakash Malla.

of the princes when they ascend the throne because few despots allow even their sons any authority till they die, etc. In constitutional monarchies the vagaries of the throne are controlled by the ministers of the Crown who are responsible to some authority other than the throne in the last resort. This check on royal authority is also a guarantee of preventing the Kingdom from slipping into internal chaos at each change of the royal master.

The difficulties in Nepal were not peculiar to herself. They were in the main the same as the student of the political history of India meets with everywhere else in the Indian sub-continent. The history of the Marathas, the Sikhs and practically all the States of India reveals the cruel fact that in the India of the middle of the 18th century we did not know what was meant by a constitutional state. Power was everything in Nepal as everywhere else in India. "*L'etat C'est moi*" was true of the judicial, military, political and administrative functions of the state for the man in power. There were no conventions for the guidance of the State except the whims of the despot at the top. Absolute power had corrupted our political systems completely. In Nepal as elsewhere in the Indian States, the population would then roughly be divided into two parts:—those who had no say in the government and had merely to obey and to work and those who were in high offices and who made others obey them and work for them. The first and the majority of the population were indifferent about the state and the distribution of power within it. The second and a very small percentage of the total population consisted of the military chiefs and clerical brahmins, who took part in the dangerous and uninhibited scramble for power and authority. In this, however, no rules had been prescribed. There were no judicial tribunals which could pass verdicts over the actions of the high and the mighty in the state. Justice was merely the synonym of power—brutal, revengeful and sanguinary. There were neither any councils of state where birth or office gave right of hearing to the nobility as a whole. Even as a class the nobility or the men in office hardly mattered. Their heads could be chopped off by their enemies and officers of state could be deprived of their offices without any reasons being adduced merely at the will of the faction or the particular person in supreme power.

Such was the state of political affairs in Nepal at the time of the Gorkha conquest and such conditions had existed for several centuries.

After Prithvi Narayan the Sahi dynasty did not produce any great prince. The history of Nepal afterwards becomes mainly the history of her great Prime Ministers who have sprung from the Thapa and the Rana families. In the period which I have confined myself to, we meet with the venerable names of Bhim Sen Thapa and Jung Bahadur Rana, who as Prime Ministers ruled Nepal in the name of the Sahi Kings. Bhim Sen and Jung Bahadur had no other claim to the Prime Ministership which Bhim Sen enjoyed from 1804 to 1836 and Jung Bahadur from 1845 to 1877 than that of genius and administrative ability. Both these statesmen had humble origins. Nothing definite is recorded about Bhim Sen's ancestors, but he seems to have been related to the elder Amar Singh Thapa the conqueror of Kumaon and Garhwal. The latter must have helped the young Bhim Sen when he first entered his office through the favour of the king—Ran Bahadur Shah. Jung Bahadur's father was Bal Nar Singh who slew Sher Bahadur when the latter had fatally wounded Ran Bahadur in open court. Both of these men rose to the highest authority in Nepal by sheer dint of their courage, cool headedness and vigour.

Bhim Sen Thapa had been in attendance on the deposed Ran Bahadur Shah when the latter had been forced to retire to Benares by the Pandes. He was a loyal servant of the Sahi family and the Regent, the dowager Maharani and the young Prince Girwan Judha Bikram Sah continued to trust him absolutely for the greater part of his Prime Ministership. Bhim Sen had to establish the conventions of a new political system in Nepal, i.e. of a permanent Prime Ministership and Civil and Army service in the Thapa family side by side with the reigning family. Bhim Sen came to a tragic end, but the practice he had tried to establish was revived and re-established in Nepal by Jung Bahadur who was also related to the Thapa family. Bhim Sen Thapa had been called to guide the destinies of his nation in a critical time. The Nepalese were in an expansive mood in the early years of the 19th century. They had then conquered the districts of Kumaon, Garhwal and what we now call Himachal Pradesh in the West and Sikkim in the East. Their

expansion towards Tibet had, however, been checked by a military defeat the Chinese inflicted on them in the year A.D. 1792.

The Nepalese also looked southwards towards the banks of the Ganges with avaricious eyes. They did not like the British, but feared their military technique. This was why they were following a policy of gradual absorption of the Tarai villages without provoking the East India Company to open war. However, the Company's Government was not to be bypassed. The Governor-General had already decided to absorb part of Western Nepal in the Company's dominions and not to permit the Gorkhas to descend from their mountainous country on to the plains of India. It was during this difficult period that Bhim Sen had to guide the political and military actions of the Gorkhas. He had to find some outlet for the military genius of his countrymen and at the same time to curb their recklessness before any irreparable disaster overtook them. The greatness of Bhim Sen lay in that, he succeeded firstly in keeping the independence of his country after the military triumphs of the Company's arms and secondly in keeping the peace between the Company and his own country after the war was ended. He dreaded the Company, and tried to keep its officers and army always at arm's length. His main policy was to have as little to do with the East India Company as possible because he knew that its officers were superior to him in knowledge, had greater financial resources at their disposal for winning over disgruntled elements and obtaining intelligence and that they commanded military skill and forces far superior to what his country possessed.⁵

In his internal policy Bhim Sen started the practice of reserving most of the important offices in the state for the members of his own family as they were the only persons whom he could

⁵ H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nepal*, Volume I, pp. 300-01. "Now, equally as in the days of Bhim Sen, the Nepalese durbar wish to have nothing to do with us . . . But they look on us as dangerous and encroaching neighbours, and judging from the experience and fate of other states throughout India, they are firmly convinced that if once the British gain a footing (even though it be of a friendly character) within the valley of Nepal, from that time the knell of their national independence will have struck."

trust implicitly. But this was a new departure and before establishing it firmly as an accepted principle of Nepal's Government, the Thapa family and most of the other influential families of Nepal had to shed much blood and to suffer great privations.

These were the first steps towards a new constitutional system which were undertaken by Bhim Sen Thapa who had already established himself as the permanent Prime Minister. This permanent tenure of the Prime Ministership by a particular person could ensure the tranquillity of the kingdom for the life span of an able Prime Minister. The natural corollary to this principle, therefore, was the fixing of the Prime Ministership in a particular family with a definite rule of succession for its members to the supreme authority. At the same time it was necessary that most of the offices of the state should be placed in the hands of the family of the Prime Minister to safeguard against conspiracies to overthrow him in critical times. This meant the rule of a particular family in Nepal. It thus resembled the shogunate of Japan in that the supreme authority in the state was nominally vested in the King but was actually exercised by the Prime Minister, but differed from it in that in Nepal the entire Thapa family shared in and monopolised the higher offices of the state. At that time there was no conception of loyalty to the state or the ancient rights and customs of the state. Even the conception of the state as different from the person and the property of the ruler or that of the government as something different from the personalities that occupied the higher offices of state was altogether absent in Nepal and for the matter of that in the greater part of India. This was the sort of primitive personal administration that prevailed throughout India at that time. The Indian people had not learnt then to differentiate between the person who holds an office for the time being and the office itself. To them the individuals, the living man on the spot was everything. It was, therefore, necessary to entrust most of the offices of state to the members of the family whose head occupied the office of the Prime Minister. That was the solution evolved by Bhim Sen and Jung Bahadur for the maladies of their age.

Another important episode in Nepalese history of this period is the conflict between Brahmins and Kshatriyas. We find evidence of the same conflict in the Post-Vedic period and

especially in the period when the Buddha was advocating the equality of man against the caste divisions of the Brahmins. In Nepal during this period the Brahmins tried to have the final say in the affairs of the state twice i.e. before and after the Prime Ministership of Bhim Sen Thapa. In the first period Damodar Pande held the office of the Prime Minister and in the later period the Pandes came back to office, at first alone, and then in company with the Chautariyas.

It is not my purpose here to give great details about this conflict between the preceptor and the spiritual Brahmin and the administrator and the soldier Kshatriya. It will be sufficient to notice that in Bhim Sen's administration, the Nepalese government resumed to a great extent the rent-free tenures of the Brahmins.⁶

The net result of this struggle for power was a compromise. The Brahmins were accorded certain social and legal rights, and the administrative power was entirely vested in the hands of the Thapas who represented the Kshatriyas. The Brahmins were exempt from capital punishment by execution and the punishments prescribed for them for the violation of the social code of private property and the sanctity of the endogamous marriage system were much less severe than for the rest of the citizens including the Kshatriyas.⁷

⁶ See *Sketches from Nepal*, H. A. Oldfield, Volume 1, p. 303. The government resumed... "grants of land which had been made at various times to the temples and other religious establishments. This system had been commenced during the war by Bhim Sen, who called on all Brahmins holding such lands to come forward and assist the state, promising when the exigency was passed, to put them again in possession of their tenures. Some few, perhaps, of the holy orders were influenced by patriotic motives and, of their own accord, poured the contents of their coffers into the public treasury; the vast majority demurred but were compelled by the strong arm of secular authority to disgorge their wealth... These lands were never restored to the Church, but were devoted solely to defray the expenses of the army; and as a large portion of these were in the most fertile parts of the country, the addition to the state revenue was very considerable."

⁷ *History of Nepal*, translated from the Parbatiya, p. 268. For example, "The senior Maharani died. Except the Brahmins all castes shaved their heads and beards, as a sign of mourning. The Brahmins were only four days in mourning, but all officers and other subjects had to observe the full period of mourning, i.e. a whole year".

The position of the Raj guru exemplified the solution of this conflict between the soldier and the priest. The Rajgurus were hereditary as were the Prime Minister. Even the King had to carry out the religious behests of the Rajguru though it is difficult to imagine that the King or the Prime Minister would lay aside an important political task merely because the Rajguru opposed it. The voyage of Jung Bahadur to Europe is a case in point. However, in the ordinary religious life of even the highest people in Nepal, the respective gurus of the family exercised great influence.

These constitutional practices were further developed by Jung Bahadur when he came to wield the supreme authority in Nepal. Jung Bahadur derived his power from his own influence with the soldiery and his own sagacity and *savoir faire*. In this respect his position was securer than Bim Sen's. The first Prime Minister was sustained in office mainly by the Maharani Tripur Sundari who died in 1832. She had been an able and virtuous queen and throughout her life had remained a firm ally of the great minister. But his power began to suffer immediately on the death of the queen. In Bhim Sen's time the great offices of state including that of the Prime Minister were renewed every year by the King and they were held at the pleasure of the King. Jung Bahadur, however, obtained a royal warrant which made the Prime Ministership and all the other high offices of state hereditary in his own family.

Jung Bahadur's position in Nepal was unique. He was the ablest and the most courageous Nepalese of his time. At a time when the Indian princes were blindly following the orthodox tenets of their religion, this Hindu Prime Minister of one of the most orthodox Hindu Kingdoms in India decided upon and successfully undertook a sea voyage to London and Paris thus defying in flagrant manner one of the most binding regulations of the Hindu caste system.

Jung Bahadur had a sound appraisal of the military power of the British. He knew that even alone the British East India Company was more than a match for all the Indian Princes combined. His grasp of this fundamental reality of the political condition in India may be found in his refusal to help the Sikhs in the Sikh Wars and afterwards, in his offer of help during the sepoy war and his actually taking part in the

campaign to suppress the rising in Oudh. He had come to the conclusion that the Company's authority could not be thrown out of India by the efforts of the Indians themselves. Therefore, in respect of Indian affairs his policy was to keep on the friendliest terms with the Company and at the same time not to give them the slightest opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal. Increase in British interest in Nepal, he knew well, would inevitably lead to British absorption of Nepal. Even if Nepal remained as a protected state like the other states in India, the Rana family would lose their monopoly of power in Nepal which would fall to the Resident and through him to the Political Department of the Government of India. Jung Bahadur firmly laid down the principles of his country's policy towards British India namely the greatest distrust of the foreigners inside Nepal and the friendliest attitude towards them outside Nepal.

Internally Jung Bahadur established and consolidated the position of his family in Nepal. In this he was handicapped by the non-existence of laws and conventions in Nepal. There were no conventions regarding the succession to the office of Prime Minister and there were no laws which the great officers of state were subject to. Everywhere there was confusion, backwardness, ignorance, and corruption. In this medieval and anarchical system his alone was the supreme responsibility and authority. The remedy he prescribed for the political evils of his country was based on the concentration of practically all the higher offices of state in his own family and a system of rotation by age of the highest office in that family. For about 70 years after his death, this system worked and kept internal peace in Nepal.

The fundamental human element in the history of Nepal on which both Bhim Sen and Jung Bahadur founded their policies was the Gorkha nationality of Nepal. The Gorkhas were only one of the many social groups that inhabited Nepal, but the State was in a way, run for their benefit and hence the Gorkhas were more attached to their ruling families than the other clans and tribes. The Gorkhas include only those groups which call themselves the Thakurs, the Khas, the Gurungs and the Magars. The other tribes did not consider the government to represent them or to be run for their benefit, and were therefore less attached to the ruling families.

The basis of Gorkha power is their patriotism or loyalty to their King and country. Under no conditions will the Gorkhas hold up arms against their country or enter into the service of the enemies of their country. The Gorkhas are incorruptible in this respect. This has been true of almost all the Nepalese. In 1801 Captain Knox wished to take Damodar Pande and some of his colleagues into the pay of the British, but the Nepalese would not listen to the proposal.

This loyalty of the Gorkhas to their King and country is the basis of their military qualities. It is their supreme military virtue. And it is this quality alone that has preserved them from the interference of their neighbours, and that has helped their governments to pursue their policy of deliberate isolation from outside contact and inquisitiveness.

Chapter 8

EARLY RELATIONS WITH THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

IN A LETTER dated Patna, 20th April, 1767, T. Rumbold, the Chief Officer of the Company's Government in Patna, reported to the President of the Council in Calcutta that the Gorkha raja had besieged Nepal¹ and that these military operations started by the Gorkhas had interrupted the trade that had existed between the Nepal valley and the Province of Patna. He inquired from the Government if any help, which had been solicited from the Company's Officers, should be given to the Newar Government of the Nepal Valley against the siege by the Gorkhas. On 30th April, Rumbold was directed to write to the Gorkha raja to raise the siege of Nepal. They also instructed him to use an armed force for this purpose in case the raja paid no heed to the letter, and they also authorised him to raise an extra battalion of sepoy in case recourse was to be had to armed force.

By this time two vakils of Raja Jai Prakash Malla of Nepal—Muktanand and Sadhu Ram Das—had come to Patna and related to Rumbold how desperate the condition of the Newar raja had grown and how necessary it was to send him help without any further delay. Captain Kinloch the military officer at Patna also submitted what steps he thought necessary for sending an expedition to Nepal, and an account of the stages from Patna to Nepal. The Company's Government sanctioned the despatch of a force to relieve Nepal provided Rumbold was certain of success. This meant that the Company's Government in Calcutta tried to clear itself of any responsibility arising from the failure of the expedition and showed that the Company merely wanted success and stood for no other political arguments. In fact the

¹ At that time Prithvi Narayan Shah, the Gorkha raja, was the hereditary ruler of Gorkha and the Nepal Valley was under the Malla Chiefs most prominent amongst whom was Raja Jai Prakash Malla.

Company's words amounted to saying "Go ahead if you think you will be successful, but stay your hands if you are not sure of success."

The expedition proved to be a failure. Sadhu or Faqir Ram Das who acted as guide was strongly attached to the interests of his master the Malla Chief of Nepal and his zeal led him to give the Company's Officers at Patna too favourable an account of the ease with which troops could enter the Nepal territories. Once the expedition had been embarked upon, he gave every flattering hope to Captain Kinloch of soon overcoming these difficulties of terrain, which appeared throughout the progress of his march. The roads were found to be extremely bad, and provisions were impossible to get. This was the main cause for the frustration of the attempt. To this failure many other unlucky circumstances also contributed, namely, the repeated accounts of the distress of the raja of Nepal, not only given by the Faqir but also received from the Jesuits who had fled from Nepal to Bettiah and who positively affirmed that the Nepal Raja could not hold much longer than the beginning of October, if not relieved, which account induced Kinloch to push on with the detachment rather early in the season. The weather, however, proved remarkably unfavourable. The people from the countryside were slow in bringing in grain. A few stragglers were attacked by the hill people in the rear of the detachment. This struck such a panic into those who were engaged to supply the troops, that not a man moved without being escorted by a sufficient force, and the men employed for carrying grain and provisions would frequently make off during the night leaving their burdens to be carried by whatever fresh levies could be procured. Captain Kinloch had been assured that plenty of provisions could be had in the Nepal valley proper and having reached a spot 50 kilometres from the Nepal Valley he had constructed a raft bridge to cross a river lying on his way to Nepal. (Probably this was the river Baghmatti and this place reached by Kinloch was Hariharpur. The name given in the MSS is indistinct and appears as Hariharpur. The river is unnamed). But a most violent rain storm overtook the troops, the waters rushed in a torrent from the mountains, swelled the river immensely and almost instantaneously washed away all the rafts. The rains continued for

many days and the want of provisions was now felt keenly. The sepoys who all along had shown great reluctance in entering a mountainous country began to mutiny, but were brought to order by the spirited conduct of the officer. Kinloch now decided to move back. His opinion of the Gorkhas was poor. He found them badly armed, and according to him only in places difficult of access did they show any degree of spirit. At a more favourable season, Rumbold was convinced from the reports of Kinloch, that the same force could with ease have opened the communications with Nepal. The trade with Nepal was considered to be worth the trouble of another expedition, and Rumbold asked the Government to allow him to prepare for it during the next year (1768).² He also proposed to retain all the territory bordering on Bettiah and extending as far as the hills, all of which had been annexed by the forces under Kinloch. By the best accounts that Rumbold could procure, this region yielded to the Gorkha Raja nearly a lakh of rupees yearly and also supplied him with grain. The inhabitants had all returned to their villages and were likely to submit readily to the authority of the Company's Government. Prithvi Narayan Shah was certain to be distressed by the loss of these districts and would be glad to come to terms to have them returned to him. While this area was in the Company's possession, Mr. Rumbold thought it would also prevent incursions of the hill people into the Bettiah country. The timber to be obtained from these districts was another advantage to be derived from their possession.³

The Committee in Calcutta thought that it was hasty and imprudent on the part of Captain Kinloch to progress when in want of provisions especially when he had been cautioned against this in Rumbold's instructions of the 16th August 1767. They considered this a deviation from the most material part of the orders issued to Captain Kinloch, and ordered that he should be relieved of his commission. They also instituted an

² *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768, pp. 6-10. Letter from Rumbold dated Patna 19th December 1767 and read in the Council on 12 January 1768.

³ Letter from Thomas Rumbold to Verelst dated Patna 3 January 1768. In the *Secret Committee Proceedings (Foreign Department)* 1768, pp. 10, 11.

enquiry to be held on his conduct in that expedition. At the same time they concurred with Rumbold in asserting that the territories bordering on Bettiah be retained so as to reimburse the Company for the expense of the expedition.⁴

Later, the Committee, on being positively told by Rumbold in a letter dated 28th January 1768, that a variety of unavoidable occurrences alone had occasioned the miscarriage of the Nepal enterprize, revoked the order that a Court of Inquiry should report on the conduct of Captain Kinloch. They had, however, not yet given up plans for ordering a second expedition to relieve the raja of Nepal and asked Rumbold to state the number of troops which would be necessary for a renewed attempt.⁵ Rumbold was depending primarily on Captain Kinloch's despatches about the conditions prevailing in Nepal. Captain Kinloch wanted to open correspondence with the hill Chiefs who had been deprived of their possessions by the troops of Prithvi Narayan Shah, in order to secure grain and other provisions in different parts of the hills. This would at once remove the greatest difficulty confronting the Company's troops in conquering the valley of Nepal. Captain Kinloch thought there "were two things to be determined upon at once, first, that unless assistance was sent soon, the confederate Rajas of Nepal could not hold out long against the Gorkhas, in which case all the (possible) allies (of the Company) in the mountains would hardly be a match for Prithvi Narayan Shah, while at that time his troops were so much employed that he could not send off any considerable body without untying their hands. Secondly it was necessary to decide whether or not Kinloch should enter into any agreements with the hill rajas or pledge the Company's faith should Vakils come from these rajas".⁶

In deciding in favour of a second expedition, Rumbold was also influenced by the letter of one of his junior officers, Golding by name, stating that Raja Jil (?) Bikram Singh had made an offer of conducting the English Army through his country if

⁴ *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768, pp. 13-14, Letter to T. Rumbold, Chief of Patna, dated 12 January 1768.

⁵ *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768. Letter dated Fort William, 10 February 1768, addressed to T. Rumbold, Chief of Patna.

⁶ *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768. Letter from Captain G. Kinloch to T. Rumbold, dated Barra, 25 December 1767.

a second expedition was sent to Nepal. This raja also promised to bring over many other rajas of the neighbourhood to his party. There were other letters also received by Golding to the same effect.⁷

Rumbold considered that Kinloch's detachment, much reduced by sickness and desertion, needed a complete battalion consisting of five or six companies and some artillery, before it could undertake the relief of the Malla rajas of Nepal.⁸

But the Committee thought the force recommended by Rumbold to be added to Captain Kinloch's detachment was too considerable to be employed in such an enterprize, considering that the Secret Department in Madras in their letter dated 9th January, 1768, persisted in requesting a further reinforcement of sepoys from the Bengal Presidency. Prudence, therefore, directed that a second enterprize should be postponed for the time being and they directed Captain Kinloch to remain with his force in order to secure the countries newly brought under the Company's rule in that quarter.⁹

Nepal was then forgotten for some time by the East India Company.

⁷ Extracts from the letter of Golding to T. Rumbold in the *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768, dated 10 February 1768, p. 85.

⁸ *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768, p. 96-97, Letter from T. Rumbold, dated 16 February.

⁹ *Secret Committee Proceedings*, 1768, p. 98, Letter to T. Rumbold dated 16 February.

Chapter 9

THE WAR BETWEEN NEPAL AND TIBET

THE OCCASION of the war between Nepal and Tibet gave a golden opportunity to the East India Company to try to increase their trade in woollens with the Tibetans. An account of this war may be useful in a study of British Nepalese relations. The Official history of Nepal puts the account in the following words:

"In the West he (Ran Bahadur Shah) conquered The British trembled in the South Having learnt the particulars of the northern country from Syamarpa Lama, whom he had sent for, he despatched troops to Sikharjun, who plundered Digarcha, and did not respect the Chinese authority. The Chinese Emperor, being unable to brook this insult, sent a large army, under the Command of Kaji Dhurin and Minister Thum-tham. This army reached Dhebum (a hill north of Nayakot) when the Raja employed one La haya Banda of Bhinkshe Bahal to perform sacred rites, while Prime Minister Damodar Pande cut the Chinese Army to pieces and obtained great glory. Afterward, the Chinese Emperor, thinking it better to live in friendship with the Gorkhalis, made peace with them."¹

The Nepalese court account is as follows:

The trade between Tibet and Nepal was carried on through the medium of the Mahendra-Malli coinage² which was also current in Tibet. The Mahendra Malli was much debased by the last Malla Kings, Jai Prakash Narain and Ranjit Malla. Prithvi Narayan Shah, immediately after the conquest of the valley of the Baghmati, withdrew this coinage from the Valley and at the same time, sent a friendly deputation to Tibet for the purpose of emphasizing the grievous consequences to trade that would follow if they kept the base coin in free circulation and exhorted the lamas to revert to the ancient usage by giving circulation only to a pure currency.

¹ *History of Nepal*, Translated from the Parbatiya, edited by Dr. David Wright, pp. 260-61.

² Coinage of the Malla Rajas of the Valley of Baghmati.

These negotiations took about ten years without any accommodation taking place between the two Governments. At length the Gorkhas proposed that as the Tibetans could not stop the circulation of the base coin with which they had been supplied, they should at least establish a just rate of exchange between the base and the pure coinage so that the merchants of either country might stand in their commercial transactions on the same footing as formerly. The Tibetans would not agree to this and, on the contrary, directed that the base and the genuine money should be considered in all negotiations of trade in Tibet as one and the same. As a consequence of this deadlock, no traffic was carried on between the two countries for a period of about 4 years, greatly to the loss of both the states. The Tibetans even sent haughty words to the Gorkhas that if they wished for war, their King was welcome to advance.

The Gorkhas say, that notwithstanding, the obstinate refusal by the Tibetans to settle this point amicably and the menacing countenance which they had assumed, their government, thought that it would be improper to commence hostilities against the Tibetans and tried to secure the good offices of the Peking Government to effect a compromise. They decided to send a deputation to the Emperor of China in Peking, together with letters to the Chinese representative at Lhasa and to the Lamas of Diagarchi and Sankia. The Tibetans, however, did not permit the bearers of these letters to proceed to Peking or to meet the Chinese representative at Lhasa and the deputation was sent back to Nepal.

After another address to the Tibetans, the Gorkha King, provoked by the vexatious conduct of the Tibetans, sent a force to invade them. The Gorkha army penetrated as far as Shikardzong and laid siege to this strong hold of the Tibetans. On the mediation of some persons of rank on the part of the Teeshoo Lama and Sankia Lama, the Gorkhas agreed to withdraw to their frontiers provided the Tibetans came to an amicable settlement with their government regarding the two coinages of Nepal.

In the meantime, the Emperor of China on being apprised of these occurrences in detail, sent Chanchoo, a military Commander with three or four Umbas or general officers and a large force to Lhasa to help the Tibetans. A last effort was

made by representatives of the Tibetans and the Nepalese to come to an agreement. The Nepalese demanded 50 lakhs as indemnity from Lhasa, or the cession to the Gorkhas of all the districts South of (the snowy mountains) which had fallen into their hands, or an annual tribute of 1 lakh of rupees. The Tibetans did not accede to any of these proposals, but were pressed by Chanchoo to agree to pay the Gorkhas annually fifty thousand rupees. The Tibetans discontinued the payment of the tribute settled by the treaty and never, indeed, discharged more than one year's amount. The consequence was a renewal of the hostilities, which terminated in the invasion of Nepal by a Chinese force. Defeated in battle by this force, the Nepalese asked for British help.³

The Tibetans on the other hand thought that it was only because of his covetous disposition that the raja of Nepal wanted to engage in hostilities with others. In the years 1789 and 1792, he provoked disputes with the Dalai Lama of Tibet who had shown no disposition to contend with him. But, the Gorkha raja out of sheer perversity, persisted in his hostile behaviour to the Lama.

The Gorkhas in several places attacked Tibetan officers, and wanted to occupy Lhasa. "But by the favour of God", the Dalai Lama wrote to Lord Cornwallis "this country has the protection of the Emperor of China; accordingly two deputies always remain here for my protection; they wrote information of this circumstance to the Emperor, who detached a large army under the command of his officers to this country. When this intelligence reached the Gorkhali troops they quitted my territory and fled to Nepal." The main purpose of the Lama's writing to Lord Cornwallis was to dissuade him from helping the Gorkhas militarily. The Lama added ".....The Emperor is not hostile to any except the Gorkhali and it is maxim of his majesty to take measures against him who first commences hostilities". He requested Lord Cornwallis' government to seize and deliver any chiefs or companions of the Gorkha raja should they fall into the Company's hands to the Emperor's Officers or, if he would

³ Extract from a Memorial of the Court of Kathmandu, relative to the origin of the War with Tibet, pp. 153 and 339. See *An account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, Kirkpatrick, Appendix No. 1.

not deliver them up, not to allow them to return to their country. He also assured Lord Cornwallis that the Imperial Officers at Lhasa would convey their appreciations of His Lordship's kindness in so acting, to the Emperor, to whom it would afford satisfaction.⁴ Besides these rival accounts, we have also got accounts of these events from the British and the Chinese sides.⁵ The Accounts of the Chinese historian Wei Yüan is interesting. He says:

"From ancient times Nepal had no relations with China; the beginning of the hostilities between them dated from the 55th year (1790) of the Ch'ien Lung reign, when Nepal invaded Tibet.

In the 46th year of the Ch'ien Lung reign the Panch'en Lama of Ulterior Tibet came to the capital of China, when he passed away in the Capital, his remains were escorted back to Tibet.

As to his treasures they all became the property of his elder brother Chung-pa-Hutuktu. But the latter gave no donations either to the Monasteries or to the Tangut soldiers; besides, he turned down the claim of his younger brother She-ma-rh-pa to have his share in the division of treasures, on the ground that he (She-ma-rh-pa) had embraced the Red Religion. Angered by

⁴ Letter from the Dalai Lama at Potala, Lhasa to Lord Cornwallis, Received 3rd August 1792. See *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal* by Kirkpatrick, Appendix No. II B, p. 348.

The defeat of the Gorkhas in A.D. 1792 is also recorded on a stone slab below the Potala. See *Tibet Past and Present*, Sir Charles Bell, Appendix II, p. 275.

⁵ Particulars relative to the origin of the War between the emperor of China and the Raja of Nepal. From a paper (in Persian) communicated by Mr. Duncan, See *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, Kirkpatrick, Appendix No. II A, pp. 345-48.

A descriptive account of the Military Operations of the sacred (Manchi Dynasty) (Sheug-Wu-Chi). Literally translated (1926) by Mr. H. S. Brunert. Appendix XXI (II), pp. 275-82, in *Nepal*, by Percival Landon, Volume II. Also translated by C. Imbault Huart in *Histoire de la conquête du Nepal*.

The chronology of the main events in this war is as follows:

1774 Gorkhas attacked Sikkim.

1788 Gorkhas occupied some Tibetan districts near their frontier.

1789 An agreement was signed by the Tibetans to pay Rs. 50,000 annually to the Gorkhas.

1791 Second invasion of Tibet by the Gorkhas.

1792 The Chinese army defeated the Gorkhas and dictated peace. The Gorkhas agreed to send a Mission every five years to Peking.

this refusal, She-ma-rh-pa brought his complaints to the Gorkhas, and used the hoarded treasures of Ulterior Tibet and the Chung-pa's arrogance as incitements to them to invade this country.

In the 3rd month of the 55th year of the Ch'ien Lung reign, the Gorkhas, using as the pretext the increase of taxes on merchandise and the admixture of dust in the table-salt, sent troops and invaded the frontier area. The Tangut soldiers were not able to put up any resistance. As for the officers whom the Government appointed, in order to help in the extermination of invaders, e.g. officer of the Guards Pa-chung, Tartar Generals Ao-Hui, Chieng-te and others—they tried to settle the matter amicably and to get peace through bribery. So they secretly advised the Tibetan Abbots and other ecclesiastics privately to pay the Gorkhas a yearly subsidy of 15,000 in gold in order to stop the military operations.

At that time the Dalai Lama could not agree to the suggestion. Nevertheless Pa-chung ventured to deceive—the Emperor by presenting a memorial to the effect that the rebels had surrendered.....In this "War" not a single soldier was lost, but a million was spent on soldiers' rations.

In the 7th month the Gorkhas sent an Envoy to Tibet to bring the tribute and to present a letter to the Imperial Resident there, requesting that the stipulations of the Treaty (with Pa-chung) be complied with. But General Ao-Hui fearing the disclosure of the above mentioned facts, put this letter aside and did not inform the Emperor at Peking.

Next year Tibet again did not observe the treaty, as regards the yearly subsidy. In consequence the Gorkhas again raised troops and penetrated deeply into Tibet, under the pretext of punishing the country for breach of the Treaty.

After the Gorkhas had achieved great successes, both the pontiffs of Tibet urgently memorialised the Throne about the critical state of affairs. On hearing that the Gorkhas had again invaded Tibet Pa-chung, the officer of the Guards, who was at that time accompanying the Emperor to Yehol, committed suicide.

The Emperor commanded Duke Fu-K'ang-an to assume the post of Tartar General and Duke Hai-Isn-ch'a to be his Military Assistant; also, to mobilise the Manchu troops of the solon tribe and the native drilled forces for the extermination of rebels (the Gorkhas).

The rebels, relying on the precedent of the last year, when peace had been obtained through bribery, returned to their country, taking with them all the booty and leaving one thousand men to guard the frontier.

During the 5th month, the rebels, who had been left to guard

the frontier, were several times defeated and the government troops completely recovered the Tibetan territory. In the beginning of the 6th month the main forces penetrated deeply into the enemy's territory.....On the 9th day of the 6th month our troops reached the Yung-ya mountain. The Gorkha barbarians, stricken with consternation, then despatched envoys to our camp, offering submission but the Tartar General and his Military Assistant sternly rejected this offer and for several days did not send any answer. Afterwards our troops again attacked the rebels from three directions routing them in six engagements, and then passed over the big mountains. Successively they killed 4,000 rebels and invaded more than 7000 Li of their territory. Our troops were by this time nearing the enemy's capital city, Yang-pu.

About this time the Gorkhas also had addressed themselves to P'i-ling (the Europeans, i.e. the English in India) asking to help them in their critical situation. But P'i-ling pretending that they would come to the assistance with their soldiers, in reality invaded secretly the Gorkhas' frontiers. The Gorkha barbarians, being forced to withstand two powerful enemies, were afraid that they could not succeed in it; moreover, they apprehended that this news would rouse our troops energy. Therefore they again sent envoys to our camp to ask humbly for mercy. At that moment our troops had just suffered a reverse, whereas the enemy's country presented more and more dangers to them; besides after the 8th month, the big snow in the mountains would make the return most difficult. Therefore, the rebels request for surrender was granted.

They gave back the former treaty; restored all the treasures plundered in Tibet, the golden spires of pagodas and the golden tablets, seals, etc. released Tan-Chin, Pan-Chu-Rh and others, formerly held by them; gave back the corpse of She-ma-rh-pa and promised to present, as tribute, tame elephants, horses and musicians, asking the eternal observance of the stipulations and the withdrawal of our troops. Originally the Emperor had intended to divide the Gorkha country between the chieftains of various native tribes and to bestow the title of Prince of the 2nd degree on Fu-K'ang-an, but on hearing that the rebel's request for surrender had been granted he gave his sanction to this settlement."

In the 60th year of the Ch'ien-lung reign, the English Ambassador, who was bringing tribute, himself made the following declaration:

"Two years ago, when your Tartar General, leading the troops had reached the land of Ti-mi tribe, situated to the South-west of Tibet, our country's soldiers also rendered assistance. If, in future, you again stand in need of employing foreign troops,

we are willing to exert our strength.⁶ Then for the first time did our Government learn that, during the previous punitive expedition against the Gorkhas, they also had had troubles from foreigners on their Southern frontier.

When in the 20th year of the Tao-Kuang reign A.D. 1840 the English barbarians had invaded the provinces of Kuang-tung and Chekiang, the Gorkhas on their side, also sent Envoys to the Imperial Resident in Tibet, to make the following declaration: 'Our country borders upon the land of P'i-teng which is a dependency of Li-ti and at the hands of which it repeatedly suffered insults. Now upon learning that hostilities have commenced between Li-ti and the Metropolitan Dependency, and that the latter has gained several victories, we are willing to lead our troops to make an attack on the dependency of Li-ti in order to render assistance in the punitive expedition undertaken by your Emperor.' At that time the Imperial Resident in Tibet did not know that Li-ti meant England or that the Metropolitan Dependency meant the Kuang-tung province of China or that in consequence a dependency of Li-ti meant Bengal (Meng-Chia-La) of Eastern India. Therefore, he rejected their offer, answering that 'the barbarians were attacking one another, and that the Heavenly dynasty (of China) never interfered in such matters'.

The Capital city of England is situated beyond a great western ocean, but England's Dependency—India—borders upon the land of Gorkhas. As there was a hereditary enmity between these two countries, and the English barbarians did not fail to seize their opportunity when China attacked the Gorkhas—the Gorkhas, on their side also, were willing to assist China when this country attacked the English barbarians."⁷

This account is corroborated by Mr. Duncan from the British side, except for two particulars. Firstly he omits to mention the hostile intentions, if any, on the part of the East India Company towards Nepal during the course of this war. Secondly, he says that in January 1792 the Emperor sent his Vakil with letters to Nepal.

"The Vakil wrote to the raja of Nepal while at the distance of two day's march.

In (the letter) was written that he (the Gorkha raja) should

⁶ No record of any such statement by Lord Macartney at Peking can now be traced.

⁷ A descriptive Account of the Military operations of the Sacred (Manchu) Dynasty (Sheng-Wu-Chi). Literally translated by H. S. Brunnert (1926).

refund 52 crores of rupees which he had plundered from the Lamas, and must release the Vizir of Lhasa, whom he had made a prisoner, and send Sumhur Lama, who, having put himself under his protection, had been the cause of all the disputes. The Raja refused to comply with these requisitions and wrote to the Emperor to proceed as soon as he pleased in the manner he thought proper, and the Vakil took his departure in fifteen days, from his arrival, without succeeding in the objects of his mission. On his arrival in China and relating the result of his embassy, the Emperor, on hearing of the insolence of the Raja, and of the plunder of Diagarchi, with the forts and temples there, which is a place of religious respect in the consideration of the Emperor, he sent a large force under a chief of his own, with the name and title of Sund Fo."

Out of all these varying reports, there emerges one comprehensive account of the actual happenings. It seems that Sumhur Lama (She-Ma-Rh-Pa Lama) was the person mainly responsible for the war. He must have aroused the covetous instincts of the Nepalese by his stories of the wealth that could be plundered from the practically unprotected land of Tibet. It is reasonable to believe at the same time that there had been trade disputes, and even cessation of commercial activities, between Nepal and Tibet because no agreement could be reached about having the same pure currency in circulation in both the Kingdoms or about establishing a proper rate of exchange between the new pure currency of the Gorkhas and the baser currency of the Mallas. All the accounts record great successes for the Gorkhas in the first period of hostilities, after which the Tibetans agreed to pay an annual tribute to them. The amount of the tribute is said to be 50,000 by the Gorkhas, and 15,000 in gold by the Chinese Chronicler Wei Yüan. Perhaps both these amounts are identical and the difference lies in the fact that 15,000 Chinese gold coins were equivalent in value to 50,000 silver coins of the Gorkhas. The recurrence of the hostilities in 1791 is also unanimously said to be due to the failure of the Tibetans to pay the yearly tribute as required under the treaty. Then, according to Mr. Duncan, the Chinese Emperor seems peremptorily to have asked the Nepalese through a Vakil to submit and to return all their gains to the Tibetans; the Vakil was sent back with discourtesy by the Gorkha raja and the Chinese started an Imperial Campaign. The Chinese chronicler, on the other

hand, maintains that the first treaty between Nepal and Tibet was arranged by a Pa-chung, an officer of the Imperial Guards, and that the Chinese Emperor sent Duke Fu-K'ang-an to crush the Gorkhas on the urgent representations made by both the Teshoo and the Dalai Lamas. It is difficult to choose between the two authorities. After studying the history of Chinese authority in Tibet, it seems quite probable that the Chinese did have, both political and military officers in Lhasa, as representatives of the Peking Government. They were, however, mere titularies, and, therefore, in times or crises they shifted their responsibilities from one to the other. It was only when the Nepalese had over-run Tibet more than twice that the Chinese Emperor came to the rescue at the request of both the high Pontiffs of Tibet. The result of the Sino-Nepalese campaign was a decided defeat of the Gorkhas which the latter do not themselves admit. But it is well established that the Chinese reached a point only two days' journey from Kathmandu, that the Nepalese gave up all their gains in Tibet, and that they agreed to send a quinquennial mission to Peking.

There are, however, some interesting sidelights given in these accounts into the national policies of the respective countries concerned in these affairs. The Chinese assert that the English in India harboured none but evil designs on the Kingdom of Nepal and had actually invaded her during the crisis. It is difficult to reconcile this with the East India Company's accounts.

It is certain that the English did not want to embroil themselves with the Tibet-Nepal War, but it is certain that they would have claimed a share of the Nepalese territories had the Chinese Emperor proceeded to dismember the newly consolidated Kingdom of the Gorkhas. Perhaps the progress of Kirkpatrick with his escort was taken by the Chinese to be an aggression against Nepal by the East India Company.

The main purpose of Colonel Kirkpatrick's journey to Kathmandu was to exact for the East India Company some toll of profit from the Nepalese debacle. A trade treaty had already been agreed upon and Kirkpatrick was evidently sent to arrange and further this trade. Colonel Kirkpatrick says that "Owing to the solicitude of Mr. Duncan at Patna, seconded by the good offices of Gajraj Misser (the Raj Guru in Nepal), the foundations of a firm and beneficial intercourse had been for the first time

laid in the treaty of commerce concluded about a year before his journey to Kathmandu, but the communication between the two Governments had consisted in little more than the occasional intercourse of letters, the trade having languished so much, in consequence of impolitic restrictions, as scarcely to merit notice. On Colonel Kirkpatrick's pressing for increased commerce between the two states, the Gorkhas replied that "the season was approaching fast, when almost all intercourse between Kathmandu and the neighbouring countries would cease and of course any effectual enquiry concerning their production, in a commercial view, become impracticable; and that the trade of Bhootan and Tibet was then totally suspended, owing to the late hostilities with the Bhootias and Chinese and could not, for some time, be either restored to its proper channels or be susceptible of any improvement." And thus the Gorkhas refused to have increased commercial intercourse with the East India Company. Thus the only benefit accruing to the Company from Colonel Kirkpatrick's mission was increase in their knowledge of the topography and the recent history of the kingdom of Nepal. The commercial treaty of 1792 between Nepal and the East India Company was not implemented.

Chapter 10

KNOX'S MISSION

EIGHT YEARS after the return of Colonel Kirkpatrick from Nepal, events in Nepal again forced themselves upon the attention of the East India Company. Raja Ran Bahadur Shah of Nepal had fled to Benares after he had been denounced by the people, and the Chiefs of his own country. To escape being confined, he had retired to the Company's dominions. There still subsisted in Nepal a party which favoured his resumption of power, but there also existed such animosity between those in favour and against him that all hope of a peaceful solution was despaired of. This was a favourable opportunity for the Company's Government, to obtain possession of the country, if it wished, and to achieve its purpose moreover with the greatest facility during these commotions, as the internal Government of Nepal could be relied upon to be weak, vacillating and torn by serious internal disputes.¹ At the same time a vigorous Governor General held sway over the destiny of the Company. He, too, could be relied upon to use his opportunities to the full. The events of the next four years show the efforts of the Company's Government to extract concessions from the Nepal Government during one of the most critical periods of her history.

Ran Bahadur Shah was a cruel tyrant, as only maniacs who are born to Kingship in the East can be.² On his arrival at Benares, Captain W. O. Knox was appointed to attend on him.³ At first Captain Knox thought it probable that he would be authorised by the expelled Raja to open a correspondence with the Chiefs of Nepal for his restoration. But the Raja was of unstable temperament and by nature he was incapable of relying on honest and sincere people. Gajraj Misser, the Raj Guru, had accompanied him to Benares. His efforts were directed

¹ Secret consultations, No. 71, dated 26 June, 1800.

² Secret consultations, No. 42, dated 30 June, 1802.

³ Secret consultations, No. 86, dated 26 June 1800.

to obtaining a suitable stipend for Ran Bahadur Shah with the help of the Company, even at the cost of getting the commercial treaty of 1792 renewed. He had himself been instrumental in arranging that treaty and he also expected to get some pecuniary considerations from the Company's Government for his exertions. In Benares, Ran Bahadur also came into contact with Hakim Antony, an adventurer of mixed Indian and Portuguese parentage, and a disreputable character. What Ran Bahadur wanted was to get financial assistance from the Company's Government and to persist in his intrigues against the Government then in power in Nepal without any interference from the Company's Officers. Even on being pressed, he would not divulge his intentions to the Company's Government, apart from soliciting its general friendship.⁴ The Raja had no wish to employ the mediation of the Governor General and intended to send the Misser to Nepal, without the concurrence of the Governor General, in order to facilitate his return to power. Ran Bahadur Shah, however, requested the Governor General to allow him seventeen thousand rupees per month which would be paid back afterwards by him. The Governor General directed Captain Knox to allow the Raja, not as monthly stipend, but as an occasional aid, sums of money not exceeding Rs. 6,000 per month.⁵

In September the exiled Raja sent a request to the Governor General asking for the loan of 9 battalions of sepoy and one battalion of Europeans with a large portion of artillery to accompany him back to Nepal and he promised that on being reinstated in his Government, he "would defray the just charges of the troops in the usual manner by instalments" and would "fulfil any stipulation of an attachment and alliance..."⁶ The Company's Government, however, had already started independent negotiations with the ruling prince in Nepal. On learning of these negotiations, Ran Bahadur Shah determined to rid himself of his British protection. But the Governor General was "of opinion that the British Government by the protection which

⁴ Letter from W. O. Knox to Colonel Kirkpatrick, Secretary to Government, Political Department dated Benares, 17 July 1800, Secret consultations, No. 2, dated 25 August.

⁵ Secret consultations No. 3, dated 28 August 1800.

⁶ Arzee from Ran Bahadur Shah, received 25 September, 1800, Secret consultations, No. 18, dated 2 October 1800.

had been afforded to the Raja of Nepal and the heavy expense which had been incurred in providing for his safety and accommodation, had acquired a right to receive by every just and practicable measure the attainment of the political benefit to be expected by mediating the differences between the Raja and the Ruling Power in Nepal, and that the Raja of Nepal did not possess the right to deprive the British Government of those expected benefits by withdrawing himself from the protection of the British power, without his Lordship's consent and approbation."⁷

Captain Knox was also directed to "take effectual measures to prevent the departure" of Ran Bahadur Shah, even in case the exiled Raja attempted to elope in a clandestine manner.⁸

A treaty of friendship was meanwhile forced on the Nepalese deputies who had been sent by the ruling authorities in Nepal to satisfy the demands made by the British. The draft treaty was concluded in October 1801, the various articles of which can be seen in Aitchison's *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*. The greatest opposition from the Nepalese side was to the stipulation that a Resident should stay at Kathmandu. But in the end they were forced to submit and put their signatures, however unwillingly, to the treaty. In Benares, Ran Bahadur Shah felt keenly the restrictions imposed on him,⁹ and unsuccessfully requested a number of times that the sepoy and chaprasi placed over him be removed by the Company's Government. Ran Bahadur Shah also wrote to the Chiefs in Nepal asking them not to trust the British and not to conclude any alliances with them.

This letter as translated by Captain Knox runs as follows:

"I have received the solemnable obligations you have nothing to apprehend from my remaining (in Benares). The appetite of the English is insatiable. They wish to tax you with something after obtaining a writing from me and making me subscribe to an oath. You should not write in terms of sincerity or

⁷ Letter from the Secretary to the Political and Foreign Department to Captain Knox. Secret Consultations, No. 84, dated 19 March 1801.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ For details of these restrictions See Secret Consultations, Nos. 126 and 127, dated 16 April 1801.

conciliation. Misser Gajraj is interested in the prosperity of the English and he will deceive you. He has written to them hence asserting his fidelity in the most solemn manner but you should keep this circumstance secret from him and the English, he will swear a thousand oaths to you and the English also will conciliate you in various ways with a view of gaining, their object, which is to your injury. This you should consider in every sense as the advice of your friend that the English wish to deceive you; they will not resort to violence, from the country being entirely mountainous. They are now at war with Oudh and the Sikhs, the French and the rulers of the South; the French have lately captured six of their ships; and a son of Mr. Graham, the first member of the Board of Revenue was killed on one of them. After learning these circumstances it is not proper that you should enter into friendship with the English you must not expect to satisfy them with silver and elephants and presents. Their hope and object is the Gold mine. Neither will they be satisfied with a factory. Do not by any means give credit to Gajraj Misser; if you do, your lives will be a sufferance of hardships. By giving a daughter in marriage a son-in-law is obtained, but no son-in-law is obtained by giving up a wife; weigh well this circumstance. After the English shall have gained their object they will invest Misser with the title of Raja and give him a Jagir. I send two pieces of paper under cover; one of them you will publish before all but you will tear this after having read it. Let not the contents of it be known to the English Gentlemen or to Misser."¹⁰

On the other hand, the proposals of the Nepalese about a friendly treaty were quite different from those of the Company. The draft of the treaty they had themselves proposed was as follows:

"That as a treaty was formerly entered into between the two states and since it is the mutual wish of both Governments to draw more closely the relations of amity, it is agreed that the Amlahs and Nobles of both the states shall, for ever from generation to generation, keep up a friendly intercourse with each other, and considering each other's state as their own and without any difference or disunity of interest shall endeavour agreeably to their respective tenets and religion to promote the prosperity, success and welfare of both states and all territories appertaining to them, and that they shall consider from

¹⁰ Letter from Captain Knox, dated 23 February 1801.

their hearts the friends and enemies of the one state the friends and enemies of the other."¹¹

This clearly shows that the Nepalese (as all other Indian states) were thinking in terms of a mediaeval and religious *Staatengericht*, which was completely out of place in dealing with the British, who used the diplomatic language of 18th Century Europe. Curiously such instances bring to one's mind the picture of a man clothed in skins and with a bow and arrows standing up heroically to a man in a brass hat and field-grey, and armed with a match-lock gun. The mannerisms of our Indian diplomacy in those days are hardly less outdated. The following is an extreme example.

Captain Knox had informed the Nepal Government that he was to withdraw to the Company's territories unless the stipulations of the treaty were strictly fulfilled without delay. His party was "at the point of moving when a messenger, called Bainor Dhut (?) by Captain Knox entered his tent, and standing before him with his hands extended as a suppliant, acquainted him that he (Banior Dhut) had been commanded by the Rani, the Choutras, Damodar Pande etc. not to quit that attitude, until he should have prevailed upon Captain Knox to comply with their united request, to delay for a few hours his march" ¹² If we compared this incident with some of the important crises in Europe of those days, we realize the great difference that existed between the Indian and the European methods of diplomacy. The comparative study of the development of European and Indian standards and methods of diplomacy would be an engaging subject. For diplomatic intercourse certain essentials were possibly lacking in most Indian States of the 18th and early 19th centuries, e.g. stability of governmental institutions, a continuity of national interests, and a clear appreciation of the national policies by the leaders of the respective governments.

Lord Wellesley was well aware of the jealousy and alarm with which the Government of Nepal and the body of her in-

¹¹ Secret Consultations, No. 130, dated 16 April 1801.

¹² Secret Consultations, No. 29, dated 7 July 1803, Letter from Captain Knox to the Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department.

habitants had always contemplated an intimate connection with the Company's Government, and of the solicitude with which the reigning power had always discouraged every attempt on the part of the Company's Government to improve the political relations between the two states. He also knew that the consent of the then administration of Nepal to conclude that the terms of an improved connection with the Company was not to be ascribed to any diminution of jealousy on the part of Government or to the will of the People of Nepal, but to the desire of the members of the administration to confirm, by means of an alliance with so powerful a neighbour, an authority which was endangered by the influence, and intrigues of an opposing faction and mainly to prevent the Company's Government from being instrumental in having the abdicated Raja re-instated. It was considered necessary, therefore, that the resident should conduct himself with the utmost circumspection. It was pointed out to him that the primary object of his attention should be to remove the prejudices which had hitherto proved an obstacle to the establishment of a close connection with the Company's Government; to conciliate the confidence of the government and the people by a mild and affable deportment, by avoiding any indication of a desire to interfere in the internal administration of the country, and by convincing the nobles and the people of Nepal that the object of the Company's Government in cultivating this alliance, was to promote the mutual interest and prosperity of the two States. The Resident was also asked to be particularly careful to restrain his domestic staff and the sepoys composing his escort from committing any acts tending to irritate the passions and to offend the prejudices of the people of the country, and to punish in the most exemplary manner any person who should be guilty of such outrages. For the same reason it was thought necessary that the utmost caution should be at first observed in the measures which the resident might adopt for obtaining information with respect to the civil and military Government, the alliances and the connections of the state and the wealth, resources and products of the country. Any show of keenness to investigate these subjects would obviously have aggravated the jealousy and suspicion of the Nepalese, the very thing which the Company wished to avoid, and would have hazarded the loss of all the

advantages afforded by the new alliance. The resident was, therefore, asked to use his discretion as to how and when he would finally make the aforementioned enquiries.

With a view to gaining influence in the actual administration of Nepal, Lord Wellesley was also disposed to adopt a suggestion of Captain Knox's that the Company's Government should grant pensions to Damodar Pande and Bum Shah Choutra, who at that time appeared to be the most powerful figures in the Government of Nepal; but this concession, he said, was to be considered wholly unconnected with any obligation on the part of the Company's Government to support the interests of those Ministers who were in opposition to the leaders of the adverse faction, because such an obligation was thought to be inconsistent with the dignity of the Company's Government, and would be incompatible with the fundamental principles of the alliance. "It would produce hazardous interference", added the political Secretary in his despatch to Captain Knox, "in the administration of Nepal, transfer the connection from the body of the state to the views and interests of a party and subject all the advantages of that connection to the uncertain issue of a contest for power. When the influence of the Company's Government shall have been established in Nepal upon a secure and permanent foundation the policy of affording its support by direct or indirect means to the existing legal administration, may become an object of discussion. The decision of this question, however, must depend upon the circumstances at the time of its occurrence. His Lordship directs that you report the specific amount of the pensions which you recommend to be granted respectively to the above named persons. Although the peculiar circumstances of our recent connection with the state of Nepal render it advisable to grant these pensions, it was not his Lordship's intention that they should become a permanent burden upon the finances of the Company. His Lordship accordingly directs, that at a proper season you will endeavour either to charge those pensions upon the revenues of Nepal, or to commute them for Jagirs in that territory, under the Company's guarantee". The estimate of the character of Nepalese chiefs made by Captain Knox was entirely wrong. The idea of receiving pensions from the Company's Government for their good offices in the interests of the Com-

pany never occurred to them. They owed allegiance to one power only and that was their country. They did not want to barter it for any material gains. From the Raja Ran Bahadur Shah down to the commonest soldier, none was prepared to take up arms or supply intelligence against his country. There was, therefore, nothing more to be said about the pensions, and we hear no more about them in the despatches from Captain Knox or the Governor-General. They had simply to be dropped when there was no one to accept them.

Lord Wellesley also sent detailed instructions to guide Captain Knox's conduct in securing the commercial and the political interests of the Company's Government. The resident was asked to make it his primary object to secure the implementation of the Treaty of Commerce, which had been concluded between the Company and the Government of Nepal—on the 4 February 1792; basing the claim on the 7th article of the new Treaty, which provided for the complete fulfilment of the commercial engagements subsisting between the two Governments. He was, however, placed at liberty to exercise his discretion with respect to the time and mode of urging this requisition, which was to be made with due regard to that degree of circumspection which had been laid down for the regulation of his general conduct towards the Government of Nepal.

The information which had been obtained by the Company relative to the products of Nepal was that many valuable drugs, dyes and other articles were produced in that territory the importation of which into the Company's provinces and into Europe, might essentially promote the commercial interests of the British nation. The resident was, therefore, urged to obtain the earliest and most accurate information respecting the mineral, botanical and agricultural products of the territory of Nepal and to suggest the most practicable means of applying any of these products to the purposes of commerce. He was also asked to ascertain and report what articles among the produce and manufacture of Europe, and of the Company's provinces were already in demand in Nepal or were likely to obtain a market in that country.

He was also to direct his attention to opening a beneficial trade with the countries of Tibet, either directly with the Com-

pany's provinces or through the medium of the native merchants of Nepal.

The importation into the Company's Provinces of gold and silver bullion was an object of considerable importance. The territories of Tibet were said to abound with gold and silver mines, the produce of which by an exchange with the commodities produced in Europe and in the provinces of India, might be encouraged to find their way into the Company's territories. With this view, the resident was asked to ascertain the practicability of opening a direct channel of commercial intercourse between the Company's provinces and the provinces of Tibet and also to avail himself of every opportunity to encourage the Government of Nepal to revive the commerce with Tibet which the envious policy of that Government had injudiciously annihilated. In short, the commercial aim to be achieved by the resident in Nepal was the establishment of a beneficial system of commerce with Nepal and the territories adjacent to her which was rendered possible by the newly established connection with Nepal.

Independently of those considerations which suggest the general policy of forming a close connection with neighbouring and contiguous states, the local situation of the territories of Nepal, skirting a considerable part of the Northern frontiers of Bengal and Bihar, and nearly the whole North Eastern limits of the subsidiary State of Oudh, rendered an intimate alliance with that State an object of peculiar importance to the political interests of the Company.

Secondly, the territory of Nepal, adjacent to that of the Company, had on various occasions afforded an asylum to the turbulent and the refractory from the pursuit of criminal justice, and in the defective state of the Company's connection with that country, and its Government had no means of exerting pressure upon the Government of Nepal in order to make them apprehend and surrender such delinquents.

Thirdly, various territorial and other disputes had frequently arisen between the subjects of the Company and those of Nepal, on the frontier of Tirhut and Bettiah districts. A more intimate connection and intercourse between the two states might have afforded the means of adjusting this problem. A British resident at Kathmandu, it was hoped, would secure the cooperation

of the Nepal Government in the equitable adjustment of boundary disputes and in bringing fugitive criminals to justice.

Fourthly, in the event of any commotion in the territories of the Nawab Vizir adjacent to those of Nepal, the Company's connection with the latter state was expected to aid the means of suppressing such commotion, by depriving the insurgents of any assistance or protection from that quarter and by enabling the Company to draw supplies from Nepal for the troops employed in the restoration of order and tranquillity.

There was much for a resident of the Company to do in Nepal. Captain Knox was asked to obtain the most accurate information relative to the civil and military administration of Nepal, viz., the extent of her resources; the number, description and discipline of her troops; her connections and alliances; the state of her internal and external defences; her revenues, products, manufactures and commerce; and generally all matters of a statistical nature.¹³ To aid him in these enquiries Captain Charles Crawford was appointed to command his escort with the expectation that his professional abilities as a surveyor would be of essential service in obtaining a geographical knowledge of the route to Nepal and of the country. Mr. Blaker, a mineralogist and chemist, was also directed to accompany Captain Knox for the purpose of investigating the natural products of Nepal.

There was also another matter of interest to the Company which Captain Knox was directed to attend to. The forests which skirt the southern frontier of Nepal were said to abound in sal trees, and the hills in their vicinity were known to produce an abundance of pine and fir trees. It was thought that these trees would be of a size and description suitable for masts and spars of ships. This made it an object of the utmost importance to the maritime interests of the Company and the British nation to command supplies of timber from Nepal. At that time the supply of these articles, which were almost exclusively imported from the Coasts of Pegu (Burma) and the Eastern Islands, was precarious and expensive and it was feared in 1801¹ that cir-

¹³ Secret Department No. 11, Letter to Captain Knox dated 30 June 1802, Para 31.

cumstances might arise causing a total interruption of the import of timbers from those quarters.

It was also thought on examining pine and fir trees, specimens of which had been brought from Nepal, that an ample supply of pitch and tar could be obtained from them. The attainment of such a source of supply in these valuable articles, which were then imported into India exclusively from Europe, was considered to be an object equal in importance to the former. Captain Knox was, therefore, asked to try to effect such an arrangement with the Government of Nepal as would enable the Company and British merchants to command the produce of the hills and forests of Nepal in pine, fir and sal timber. The arrangement most beneficial to the interests of the Company was thought to be the cession of the forest lands. Lord Wellesley accordingly directed Captain Knox, that at a proper time he should sound the disposition of the Government of Nepal with regard to ceding a portion of these lands for an equivalent either in territory or in money. The Government of Nepal had already shown itself to be extremely anxious to obtain from the Nawab Vizir the cession of the villages of Kashipur and Rudrapur, and had frequently made representations to the Company's Government that it should exert its influence with the Nawab Vizir in this connection. It occurred now to Lord Wellesley's mind that possibly the Government of Nepal might consider the attainment of this object an equivalent for the cession of a part of the forest lands. But the Company valued these forest products so much that Captain Knox was asked to endeavour to obtain the privilege of cutting and transporting timber on a contractual basis if he found the Government of Nepal disinclined to come to terms over the cession of the forest lands.¹⁴

Considerations intimately connected with the arrangements made with Nepal and having some bearing on the interests of the Company rendered it extremely desirable for the Governor-General to ascertain the exact nature and extent of the connection and intercourse subsisting between China and Nepal. The Resident, however, was asked to prosecute his enquiries

¹⁴ For the above instructions see Letter from the Secretary to Government to Captain Knox dated October 31st 1801, Secret Department No. 11, dated 30 June 1802.

upon this subject with the utmost degree of circumspection, and in a manner calculated to preclude any suspicion that the Company's Government had any interest in the enquiry.¹⁵

Captain Knox had originally been appointed by the Governor-General in Council as Political Agent on the part of the Company's Government with the abdicated Raja. Subsequently he was directed, as the Company's Resident in Nepal, to secure an adjustment between Ran Bahadur Shah and the actual government of Nepal. On instructions from the Governor-General Captain Knox informed Ran Bahadur Shah of the stipulations which had been made in his favour by the Company's Government in their draft treaty with Nepal. The Governor-General expected Ran Bahadur Shah to observe implicitly the obligations imposed on him by the terms of the separate articles. Ran Bahadur was also told that a deviation from the terms of the engagement would absolve the British Government from the obligation of the guarantee to which it pledged itself, and would hazard the loss of every concession which the Government of Nepal had been induced by the Company to make in his favour.

The most important part of the separate article, attached to the treaty with the Raja of Nepal and concluded at Dinapur (October 1801) runs as follows:

"That an annual income, amounting to Patna Sicca Rupees eighty-two thousand of which seventy-two thousand shall be paid in cash and ten thousand, in elephants, half male and half female . . . shall be settled on the said swammee jee (Ran Bahadur Shah) as an humble offering to assist in the maintenance of his household; and for the purpose of supplying the said income the pargana of Beejapore, with all the lands thereto attached . . . shall be settled on the said swammee Jee."

Captain Knox was sent to Kathmandu with the counterpart of the Treaty of Commerce and of the separate articles relative to the abdicated Raja. A detachment of Indian Infantry consisting of two Companies, with their usual proportion of European and Indian Officers, was appointed to attend him as an escort.

The Nepal Government was not prepared to accept a Resi-

¹⁵ Secret Department, No. 11, Letter to Captain Knox dated 30 June 1802, paragraph 30.

dent; but the whole government was so unstable at Kathmandu at this time that it submitted to the mediation of the Company's Officers. In fact, the coming of Ran Bahadur Shah to Benares had placed the Company at a great advantage in its dealings with Nepal. The people in power at Kathmandu wanted to come to some terms with the Company so that the exiled Raja might not return to wreak his vengeance on them after being carried to power by British bayonets. The extreme solicitude of the Nepal Government for an accommodation with the Company's Government is evident from the letter which was sent by the reigning Raja of Nepal to the Governor-General shortly after Ran Bahadur Shah left Nepal for Benares. This interesting letter is reproduced below. It sheds great light on how letters were sent with trusted messengers by Indian States to the Company's Government. The letter is supposed to be from the infant Raja of Nepal and was translated by the Company's officials as follows:

"I have the honour to represent to your Lordship that my honoured father (Ran Bahadur Shah) after resigning in my favour his throne and all the Insignia of Dominion devoted himself to a life of religious abstraction and worship, than which there is nothing more conducive to the blessings of futurity. I had earlier addressed a letter to your Lordship from which as well as from the verbal communications of Dinanath Upadhyaya and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya all the particulars of that occurrence will no doubt have been made known to your Lordship. In the cold season I proceeded for devotional purposes to Nayakot while my father continued at the Capital. During this period some turbulent ill-disposed persons published certain injurious reports regarding intentions which had absolutely no existence, but which inspiring my father with disgust and uneasiness; he considering the Company's territories, as in truth they are, the repository of friendship and as another home, proceeded in the midst of hot season, and quite unprovided, to Benares. Now the request I have to make that out of regard to mutual harmony your Lordship will be pleased to write instructions to the gentlemen professing the authority in that Province to meet my father in such a manner that during his stay there he may enjoy every possible comfort and accommodation. This will be a source of satisfaction. I shall not on my part fail to manifest every proper mark of duty towards him. Dinanath Upadhyaya and Chandra Shekar Upadhyaya have no doubt fully communicated to your Lordship the manner of his departure from Nepal.

To keep open the gates of correspondence will add strength to the foundations of friendship and attachment."

This letter started diplomatic intercourse between Nepal and the Company again, and it was decided by Lord Wellesley to utilise this occasion for getting a treaty of Commerce from the Nepalese. The most important article in the proposed treaty was the stipulation concerning the British Resident at Kathmandu. "With the view of carrying into effect the different objects contained in this treaty" ran the article, "and of promoting other verbal negotiations, the Governor General and the Raja of Nepal under the influence of their will and pleasure, depute a confidential person to each other as Vakil that remaining in attendance upon their respective Governments, they may effect the objects above specified, and promote whatever may tend to the daily improvement of the friendship subsisting between the two States." Two more articles were specially added to indicate the rights and duties of the agents and to allay the fears of the Nepal durbar at the system of keeping a permanent and diplomatically recognised agent at the other's Court. The article put in a solemn treaty the rights and privileges of a foreign agent and was meant to illustrate the law of nations to an unsophisticated people. "It is incumbent, upon the principal's and officers of the two States", said Article II of the treaty, "that they should manifest the regard and respect to the Vakil of each other's Government, which is due to their rank, and is prescribed by the laws of nations; and that they should endeavour, to the utmost of their power to advance any object which they may propose, and to promote their ease, comfort and satisfaction, by extending protection to them which circumstances are calculated to improve the friendship subsisting between the two Governments, and to illustrate the good name of both States throughout the Universe." Another article added to allay the fears of the durbar stipulated that "it was incumbent upon the Vakils of both states that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of Government, without the permission of those officers; neither should they carry on the correspondence with any of them; and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer

it, without the knowledge of the head of the State, and acquainting him of the particulars, which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerity of our friendship." This article was specially put in on the insistence of the Nepal durbar.

These articles in the Nepal treaty should be compared with corresponding articles in the treaties entered into by the East India Company with other Indian and neighbouring States. About this time the Governor General was inaugurating his policy of subsidiary alliances. The most important part of the treaties entered into with other Indian States was the clause stipulating the raising, composition, discipline and use of subsidiary forces to be kept by the Company inside the territories of its subsidiary allies and to be paid for by the Indian States themselves. Thus article 5 of the Treaty with the Nizam, which was concluded in 1798, runs as follows:

"The said subsidiary force will at all times be ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors, from race to race, and overawing and chastising all rebels or excitors of disturbance in the dominions of this state; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor like sebandy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenue thereof."

Similarly Article 2 in the Subsidiary Treaty with the Raja of Mysore (1799) stipulates that "The Honourable East India Company Bahadur agrees to maintain, and His Highness Maharaja Mysore Krishna Raja Oodiaver Bahadur agrees to receive, a military force for the defence and security of His Highness's dominions; in consideration of which protection, His Highness engages to pay the annual sum of seven lakhs of Star pagodas to the said East India Company, the said sum to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments, commencing from the 1st of July Anno Domini 1799, and His Highness further agrees that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops to be maintained by it, shall be entirely left to the Company."

These treaties are to be compared with those entered into by the Company with the States on its frontiers.

Thus the Treaty of friendship with Shah Kumran of Herat

(August 1839) in its 3rd Article says that, "With a view to strengthen and perpetuate the concord subsisting between the British Government and Shah Kumran, an accredited British Agent shall always reside at the court of His Majesty; in like manner, should his Majesty see fit, he will depute an accredited Agent to reside at the Durbar of the Governor General."¹⁶

Also the treaty with Iran (1841) stipulates the sending of accredited representatives. Its 2nd Article runs as follows:

"As it is necessary, for the purpose of attending to the affairs of the merchants of the two parties, respectively, that from both Governments commercial Agents should be appointed to reside in stated places, it is therefore arranged that two commercial Agents on the part of the British Government shall reside, one in the Capital and one in Tabrez, and in those places only and on this condition that he who shall reside at Tabrez and he alone shall be honoured with the privileges of Council General; and as for a series of years a Resident of the British Government has resided at Bushire, the Persian Government grants permission that the said Resident shall reside there as heretofore; and in like manner two commercial Agents shall reside on the part of the Persian Government one in the Capital of London and one in the port of Bombay, and shall enjoy the same rank and privilege which the commercial Agents of the British Government shall enjoy in Persia."

These clauses in the various treaties might be compared with Article 4 in the Treaty with Amir Yakub Khan of Afghanistan (concluded on May 26, 1879), which says:

"With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness's dominions, it is agreed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghanistan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both states, on the occurrence of any important external fact. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy

¹⁶ Aitchison, V. 339, IVth Edition.

and Governor General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon."

These treaties are not of one uniform character. The treaties with the Nizam and with the Raja of Mysore are subsidiary treaties. They are not exactly treaties between two sovereigns. They possess some of the characteristics of sanads granted by an over-lord to his feudal nobles. Throughout Indian history we find that the idea of a Sarb-Bhaum, Chakra-Vartin, Emperor or a paramount power over the other petty states in India influences the minds of her politicians and statesmen. The different states within India have to come in some sort of definite and subsidiary relationship with the most powerful and therefore paramount power in India. Lord Wellesley's idea was that this relationship must be based on the comparative military strength of the Indian States and the foreign East India Company. This relationship was to be that between a paramount military power and its militarily weak neighbours and supporters. This was the subsidiary system of alliances whereby the Company increased its military strength without creating new enemies whom it would have to watch carefully after dethroning them and without adding to the burden and responsibility of governing comparatively less fertile tracts. It also increased its military strength without adding new burdens to its finances. That was perhaps the most important part of this new system of alliances or sanads. These are not really treaties in that the real sovereign power in India rested with the Company i.e. the Company controlled the foreign policy and the military power of the Indian princes absolutely. At the same time the internal policies of these Indian States had to follow the lines indicated by the Resident who could take as much or as little interest in the internal affairs of the Indian States as he was instructed to do by the Governor General. In this sense these are not international treaties but are merely sanads or charters granted by the acknowledged sovereign power to autonomous bodies within its own dominions. These treaties are to some extent similar to 'ikrar-namahs' or grants and agreements by Indian princes to their Jagirdars. However, they are legal and constitutional documents of consequence and the importance of their existence, execution and history cannot be minimised.

These documents, however, cannot be placed on par with the documents executed by the East India Company with its frontier States. The treaties with Iran, and Afghanistan are more international than constitutional documents. However, they too are not agreements between two sovereigns; they are agreements between one powerful sovereign power and its weaker neighbours within its sphere of influence. These are international documents in that the reason for their execution was the rivalry between two sovereign European Powers—Russia and Britain. This is made clear by the clauses stipulating an exchange of diplomatic representatives. These representatives were to keep watch not on the internal affairs of the country they were accredited to but on the moves of Russian diplomacy or army towards the frontiers of these weaker neighbours of the Company. Thus the Company wanted to have its representatives reside not at Kabul and Tehran, the centres of the internal affairs of these countries, but at Herat and Tabrez, the centres where the Russians were known to be active.

The difference between these treaties may be looked into in another way. One has to ask what were the circumstances under which these treaties were executed and, what was the purpose aimed at in executing these treaties. In the case of the Indian States, the circumstances leading to the signing of the treaties and the purpose of these treaties were connected with India alone and her internal affairs. The Company was forced to establish some definite political relationship with the Indian States because peace within its own territories could not be had without some sort of peace being established throughout India. By the system of subsidiary alliances the Company took upon itself the responsibility of preserving the peace and the status quo in administrative and social spheres throughout India. The Company's peace and the Company's prestige now displaced the Mughal Emperor's peace and the Emperor's prestige. The Sarkar or the mighty State for the peasants and the taluqdars now became the Company Bahadur as for the last two hundred years it had been the Great Emperor—the Padshah—at Delhi. Even within the boundaries of the Indian States themselves there was some one more powerful than the ruling chief and he was the representative of the East India Company. The history of Hyderabad, Oudh and Mysore shows how the common people

and the nobles approached the Residents with grievances against the officers of the ruling chief and sometimes against the chief himself. But the main point one has to notice here is that the treaties with the Indian States were concerned only with events in India and the purpose aimed at, i.e. the preservation of the Company's peace in India, was also a matter confined to the internal affairs of India. Some sort of order was needed within India and these treaties and sanads with Indian chiefs were merely the directions of the paramount power as to how that peace was to be maintained in India.

On the other hand the treaties with the frontier states like Iran and Afghanistan were entered into for reasons which had their origin not in Indian politics but in the international chess-board of Europe. The Company was obliged to enter into some sort of relationship with these frontier states because it felt itself threatened by the designs of Imperial Russia. The events leading to the conclusion of these treaties were associated with the relations between the national States of France, Great Britain and Russia and the clash of their empire building in the Balkans, North Africa and Western and Central Asia. The circumstances here are truly international and the interests of England as a national state were at stake. The objects aimed at in these new treaties are also different. Here the main purpose was to prepare advance-posts for British diplomacy and army in neighbouring territories so that in a clash with Russia, the Company's armies might have some strategical advantage. Thus the treaties with the frontier states were concluded with a view to a coming war with Russia, while the engagements with the Indian chiefs were aimed at securing the British hold in India. The international treaties aimed at war, while the subsidiary alliances aimed at peace. In other words the representatives of the Company who signed the treaties with the frontier states were anticipating a clash of arms with a European power, while those who signed the treaties and engagements with the Indian states were looking forward to a prolonged period of peace in the states concerned and the British territories on their borders.

The treaty with Nepal comes somewhere in between these two categories. Nepal was also a frontier state and some of its boundaries lay along non-British territory. Therefore Nepal was

like Iran and Afghanistan and not like say Hyderabad or Mysore which were bounded on all sides by British territory. But we might ask in this connection consider, Kashmir and Baluchistan which also lay on the borders of India and touched independent territories which were not British. It must be admitted that their geographical situations brought some complications of an administrative nature, but there was a fundamental difference between them and Nepal. Kashmir adjoins Sinking and Western Tibet, but the officials who were posted at the frontier-posts towards all independent territories were officials under the direct and absolute control of the Government of India. They received their appointments and orders from the Political and Foreign Department of the Government of India working through and sometimes independently of the Resident and not from the Maharaja of Kashmir. The same story could be repeated about the ports and frontier posts on the Iran border of Baluchistan. In Nepal on the other hand her frontier posts with Tibet were officered entirely by Nepalese soldiers and officials. Perhaps Nepal was lucky in having a militarily weak power as her northern neighbour, because another big power on her borders would have certainly led to tension between her two powerful neighbours. This meant that Nepal was not prominent on the international chess-boards. She was, more or less, forgotten in the 18th and 19th centuries; while Afghanistan and Iran could not be.

Coming back to our narrative, we find that the treaty with Nepal was executed in strange circumstances. The Nepal administration had invested Gajraj Misser, the Raj Guru, with full powers to conclude an alliance with the Company's Government, and (according to Captain Knox) he had been given blank papers bearing the seal of the reigning Raja for the purpose of drawing up the proposed Treaty.¹⁷ This treaty was duly signed in October, 1801, by Gajraj Misser on behalf of the Nepal durbar.

Ran Bahadur Shah did not consider the treaty satisfactory to his interests. He wrote a letter to the Governor General dated February 18, 1802, stating that the pargana of Beejapore

¹⁷ Secret consultations, No. 9, dated 30 June 1802 (report of Captain Knox's letter dated 7 October 1801).

was inadequate for his support and that its acceptance would be a degradation to him. He also informed the Governor General in another letter that he had borrowed Rs. 50,000 from his bankers who were becoming very importunate. At the same time he requested that the sepoy and chaprasi placed over him be removed ¹⁸ and that he should be given greater freedom of movement. The Governor General did not accede to these requests made by Ran Bahadur Shah then styling himself Swami Nirgun-Anand. The cruelties and barbarities which Ran Bahadur Shah had committed in Nepal were known to the Company's Government and it was thought advisable not to give him such freedom of movement as to enable him to return to Nepal and disgrace himself and humanity again.¹⁹

In the Nepal durbar, also, it was the dread of their late capricious ruler, and the universal mistrust of one another which compelled the durbar to enter into a treaty, which every one realised was only the first step towards the loss of Nepalese independence. "The treaty had certainly been the off-spring of fear", thought Captain Knox and "it would, no doubt, continue in force, as long as Ran Bahadur Shah remained under the protection of the Company's Government". This was the main reason why the Company wanted to keep Ran Bahadur Shah under close surveillance at Benares. His death or his flight would remove this hold which the Company had over the Nepal durbar. An alternative coercive hold was proposed by Captain Knox in his letters to the Governor General, namely the attachment of the Raja of Butwal to the Company's cause. Captain Knox wrote in his letter dated February 1, 1802: "To keep the Nepal Government true to their engagements, they must believe that they could be easily punished for violating them; but this they knew to be impracticable unless we acquire the command over such a number of the hill people as would be requisite for the transportation of provisions and baggage, without which a military force could not penerate any distance into their country. The Nepalese realise that the Raja of Butwal is fully able to perform this service for the Company. His

¹⁸ Secret Consultations, Nos. 18 and 23, dated 30 June 1802.

¹⁹ For a description of the cruelties perpetrated by Ran Bahadur Shah see Secret Consultations No. 42, dated 30 June 1802.

country opens the easiest access into theirs, the most accurate information would be obtained from him and his people respecting the roads and passes, and his troops, not inferior to their own in quality, and in number, are more than sufficient to perform those duties which, however necessary could not be performed by men unaccustomed to find their way through pathless woods, and over almost Alpine mountains presenting every kind of difficulty in its most repelling form. In short, by every account, were it suspected in Nepal that the Raja had devoted himself to our interests more would not be required to keep them steady to every engagement they have contracted, or may contract with the British Government."²⁰ The Raja of Butwal was a tributary of the Raja of Palpa who had extensive forests in his domains. Captain Knox advocated that the Palpa Raja should also be taken under the protection of the Company. The Governor General did not agree to this. After the withdrawal of the Residency, Raja Zalim Singh of Palpa was induced to come to Kathmandu by Ran Bahadur Shah, who had returned to Nepal in 1804, and the Raja was there put to death under his orders. The Raja of Butwal was however taken under protection by the Company's Government.

The treaty of 1801 was unwelcome to every party in Nepal as it was forced upon the durbar much against its will. The pledge of having a British Resident at Kathmandu was resented most. Knox had to wait many weeks at the frontier before he was allowed to enter Nepal territory. The durbar had sent some of its important officials to meet him at the frontier. These included Bum Shah and Damodar Pande who were in favour of the treaty and Indra Bir and others who were secretly opposed to it. Ran Bahadur Shah had in the meantime sent to the Regent Rani at Kathmandu a ring and a letter applauding her for having displaced Damodar Pande, whose adherents had been put in prison shortly after the latter was sent to meet the British Resident. Ran Bahadur Shah also advised the Rani to procure the death of Damodar Pande and Gajraj Misser and charged her not to allow Knox's party to enter Nepal upon any account.²¹

²⁰ Secret Consultations, No. 43, dated 30 June 1802.

²¹ Secret Consultations, No. 46, dated 30 June 1802, paragraph 4.

The durbar and the Rani were in a state of great consternation. For the peace of the country, they thought it absolutely essential to keep on good terms with the Company. But they could not understand why the Company wanted to keep its Resident in Nepal unless it wanted ultimately to absorb Nepal in its own dominions. There was no agreement amongst the deputies as to what was to be done and no arrangements were made for carrying the Resident's baggage to Kathmandu. Captain Knox, then, directed Abdul Kadir, his maulvi, to wait upon Bum Shah and to acquaint him "that he (Knox) had already, in compliance with Bum Shah's wishes, stayed longer at the frontier than he could justify to the Company's Government and that the failure of the several appointments made for his proceeding gave him reason to conclude that there existed some obstacle, unexplained to him, in his proceeding to Kathmandu and that, therefore, he conceived it necessary to despatch a messenger to the Nepal Capital, with a letter to the Maharaja".²² Bum Shah on receiving this message, came immediately to meet Knox and entreated him not to suspect any double-dealing from him. He attributed the delay to lack of having enough people to carry the Resident's baggage. A few days after this, preparations were made for the journey to Kathmandu, which was fixed for March 14th. On that day the Nepal deputies, accompanied by the Butwal Raja and Gajraj Misser came to Knox's tent about three in the afternoon. After many apologies for his long detention, Bum Shah requested that he should now proceed to Bhagwanpur within Nepal territory. He also told him that his son Lachman Shah, Damodar Pande's son, Kulbir Pande, and Indra Bir's son, Krishna Jung Singh, would be sent on that same day to Patna with a letter from the Maharaja to the address of the Governor-General. The first two were youths of 17 years and the last a boy of 14. They were sent as a testimony, that the three families to which they belonged and in which was centered the whole power of Nepal pledged themselves to the faithful execution of the Treaty concluded with the British Government. The Raja of Palpa was also sent with these young men that he should also pay his respects to the Governor-General at Patna. Maulvi Abdul Kadir from the

²² Secret Consultation, No. 53, dated 30 June 1802.

Resident's staff was also sent to accompany them and instruct them in all points relative to their behaviour.

On the 15th, however, another difficulty arose. The senior Maharani of Nepal, who had been living in British territory, came to the camp of Bum Shah. Bum Shah sent a message to Knox to proceed without him, adding that he would join the party later. This caused great embarrassment to Knox. Three of the deputies namely Tribhawan Singh, Indra Bir and Birbhadra had gone ahead in the morning with a view, as they said, to lessening the inconvenience incurred by too large a concourse travelling through the difficult passes at the same time. Damodar Pande did not want to return to Nepal unless all his adherents were released. Bum Shah's remaining behind would thus have resulted in Knox's travelling in Nepal territory without a conductor on the part of the Nepal Government. Messengers now travelled between the camps of Bum Shah and Knox and at last Knox returned to his last standing post within British territory. However, after the delay of another ten days, Knox was taken to Kathmandu by slow marches by Gajraj Misser and Bum Shah.

The astrologers fixed the 18th April for the first visit to be paid by Knox to the Maharaja. In the afternoon of the 18th the eldest son of Ran Bahadur Shah (a boy of seven years of age) accompanied by some officers of high rank came to the Resident's tents and conducted him to the Palace, at the outside gate of which he was received by the Maharaja while a Salute of guns was fired in his honour. The young Raja who was borne in the arms of a confidential servant was then placed on a musnad with his half-brothers seated next to him. Expressions of good will were exchanged and the Resident took his leave. On the following day grains of different sorts and a plate with 428 Nepali Gold Mohars were sent to the Resident and on the 21st the Maharaja attended by his brothers and the whole of his principal officers returned the visit.²³

Damodar Pande and his party, which had concluded the treaty, were now in disfavour; and their opponents took up the leadership of the administration. This party had openly declared against the engagements entered into with the

²³ Secret Consultations, No. 46, dated 30 June 1802, para 5.

Company. They now planned to set aside the whole of the engagements contracted by that Treaty. Prudence, however, advised that they should continue good relations with the Company. The new ministers continued to show the Resident every attention and respect and they placed at his disposal a big house constructed in the most extensive of the Maharaja's gardens. Within a month, however, the guards placed at his house began interfering with his communications with Nepalese subjects. The latter were actually refused admittance to the Resident's house. After three fruitless remonstrances to the ministers, Knox retired to the lines of his escort and there got tents pitched for his accommodation. This caused a hubbub in the durbar, and it was only on the Maharani's request that Knox consented to return to the house placed at his disposal, and at that on three conditions. Firstly the orderlies, who had been discourteous to him were to be immediately relieved. Secondly the relieving party was to receive in his presence the most positive injunctions to behave with due respect, to pay the promptest obedience to his orders and not to interfere in any matter without his express authority. Lastly the Nepalese who had been asked to return to their homes, particularly the men employed by Doctor Buchanan, were to be sent to his tents with full permission to continue their services.

This incident shows clearly that the ministers were trying to find the least offensive means to compel the Resident to withdraw from their country. Amar Singh Thapa, who had newly been made a Qazi was obstinately opposed to the Treaty; and his sincerity and irreproachable character lent great weight to his opinions. In this opposition he was joined by Bakhtawar Singh, who kept the seals of state, and was the Superintendent of the household expenses. For a short time, however, the party which had concluded the Treaty again gained the favour of the Regent Rani and proceeded to cement their friendship with the Resident. Two ceremonies were especially arranged for this purpose. In the first a great durbar was held where the Treaty was publicly presented by the Resident to the Maharaja and khilat was received by him in return. In the second, the Resident went through a ceremony of adopting the eldest son of the Regent Rani as his brother.²⁴

²⁴ Secret Consultations, No. 88, dated 30 December 1802.

In the next year (1803) an unexpected event led to the return of the British Resident to the Company's territories. The senior Rani of Ran Bahadur Shah left her residence on the frontier of Nepal and proceeded towards the capital. On receiving this intelligence the junior Rani, who was the Regent at Kathmandu, sent a body of troops to stop the senior Rani's progress and to capture and send back as prisoners every one of her male attendants. But the governing Rani did not know how to deal with a royal person, who in social and political status was senior to her. She also approached the Resident that he should mediate between the two of them. He consented on condition that, firstly, the senior Rani should get Rs. 18,000 per annum, and a house at Patna and, secondly, her Nepalese attendants should be given Jagirs suitable to the established custom of the country. These proposals were conveyed to the senior Rani by the Maulvi of the Residency. The Senior Rani however, held that those who composed the government of Nepal had been her servants, and had been indebted to her for the stations they possessed, and that instead of showing her gratitude so justly her due, they had not only shown to be their fixed intention to keep her in a state of banishment from her native country but also by seizing her jagirs, had deprived her of the means of a decent living in a foreign land. She said that she had been for long deceived by promises and assurances treacherously made for the purpose of keeping her inactive, and that she had remained at Kurrirbarnah (?) exposed to the danger of an unhealthy climate, and had suffered a great deal in body and mind until finding no probability of any provision being made for her, she had left that place with a determination to proceed to Kathmandu. She said that the rejection of her demands had not in the smallest degree weakened her determination to return to Kathmandu, and that having commenced her journey, as no outrage would deter her, so no offer could induce her to turn back, that therefore nothing but the loss of life could prevent her from making her way good to the Capital.²⁵

The senior Rani was aware that the troops sent against her

²⁵ Secret Consultations, dated 7 July 1803. Letter from Knox to Secretary to Government, para 4.

were to a man deeply affected by the hardships she had suffered, and were well disposed to her call. She, therefore, proceeded towards Kathmandu and the sepoys far from offering any interference to her progress, vied with each other for the honour of carrying her palanquin over the difficult passes. Fresh troops sent by the junior Rani surpassed their predecessors in protestations of zeal for her service. This caused the greatest consternation and disorder in the counsels of the durbar. The junior Rani and her party were every day losing their influence over the populace and the army in the Capital. At last she placed the entire conduct of this business in the hands of Damodar Pande, whom she had dismissed from office previously, and promised that she would place the chief direction of public affairs in his hands if he brought this business to a successful issue. Damodar Pande then proceeded to meet the senior Rani who was encamping at Thankot. But in the meantime the governing Rani fled to the sanctuary of Pashupati Nath, taking with her the Maha Raja and all the officers of Government. This step decided her fate. "As soon as this was known at Thankot, the senior Rani moved on to within a mile of the Capital, and then for the first time avowed her intention of assuming the regency. Her authority was instantly acknowledged by all; and in a few days the Maha Raja was taken by her orders from the charge of the now deposed Rani, and conducted back to the palace".²⁶

The senior Rani was a devout and kindly lady. She solemnly promised that no trouble would ever be given to the junior Rani on account of her past transactions. She made Damodar Pande her principal minister and gradually most of the offices in the administration were filled by the friends and the dependents of Damodar Pande. This was the natural consequence of a change in the principal office in the administration. There being no permanent civil service, the administrative officers had to be changed with every change in the person of the principal minister.

Damodar Pande gave the fullest assurances to the Residents that the engagements entered into by the previous government would be fulfilled. But the subas of Morang and Beejapore

²⁶ Secret Consultations, dated 7 July 1803.

did not make a single remittance to Benares, and the Resident thought that a threat of his return to British territories would have a salutary effect on the durbar. The Resident notified the Maharani that if no instalments were paid for Ran Bahadur Shah within a week, he would on the day following commence preparations for his departure. This produced a sharp reprimand from the Maharani to the Ministers, and Rs. 30,000 was paid to the Resident the very next day in settlement of the previous instalments (25th February, 1803).

The Resident now asked the durbar for passports for two more Englishmen, Lloyd (Assistant Resident) and Proctor (Surgeon) to come to Kathmandu. He did not realise that the Gorkhas were determined not to open their country to foreigners and that it had been with the greatest reluctance that the Resident himself had been allowed to enter the country. The discussion over the grant of passports brought the whole question of British-Nepalese relations before the durbar. Men of importance like Ranjit Pande and Tribhuwan Singh openly opposed the granting of facilities to the British to penetrate the country, and the Maharani herself gave strength to this opposition by expressing her dislike to the mediation of the British Government in matters concerning the abdicated Raja, which she thought, ought to be left entirely to herself, as the means of affording her an opportunity of fulfilling the most sacred of her duties.²⁷

The Resident now sent an ultimatum, saying that if he found the engagements of the durbar unfulfilled on the 12th March, he would on that day send formal notice of his intention to leave Kathmandu on the 18th in order to return to British territories.²⁸ This upset the Maharani, and she called all the important officers and nobles to a big durbar to discuss the matter. Nothing, even after a three day debate, was however, decided by the durbar. The Resident, on the 12th sent a formal message to the Maharani through his munshi intimating his intention of leaving Kathmandu and asking her to appoint a day for his formal taking of leave. The Maharani in reply, sent word that

²⁷ Secret Consultations, 1803. Letter from W. D. Knox to the Political Secretary Govindganj, 8 April 1803.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, para 3.

"her ministers would wait upon the Resident shortly with such a settlement, as would preclude the necessity of his moving from Nepal at so bad a season".²⁹ However, as the durbar could not come to a decision on the question of granting passports to two more Englishmen, no one came to the Resident. He now pressed the durbar to provide him with 700 coolies to take back the Residency baggage. On the 17th a deputation of the leading men in Nepal waited upon the Resident and told him that the durbar had finally adjusted all matters between the two governments, and agreed to grant passports to the two Englishmen and to make definite arrangements for the payment to Ran Bahadur Shah. They, then, requested the Resident to give up the idea of his return to British territories. To this request the Resident turned a deaf ear, and directed the durbar to approach the Governor General and ask for the Resident's return upon the setting in of the next travelling season. On the 19th March, 1803, Knox left Kathmandu after a formal meeting with the Maharaja, and retired to Govindganj, a small frontier village inside the Company's territories, and close to the Nepalese border.

During the ensuing cold weather the Nepal durbar took no positive steps to come to terms with the Company's Government. The dowager Rani and the principal officers of the Nepal Government merely wrote letters to Guru Gajraj Misser, who was living at Benares, and unofficially represented the interests of Nepal in India, asking him to invite the Resident to return to Nepal and assure the Company's Government, that the Nepal durbar would maintain a stricter adherence to the treaty in future.³⁰

At the same time the Nepal durbar sent similar letters to the Governor General and Captain Knox. The return of the Resident had the effect of forcing the Governor-General himself to take up the problem of the Company's relations with Nepal. He asked for the entire correspondence with Captain Knox since the conclusion of the treaty in October, 1801, to be placed before him. From a perusal of this correspondence the

²⁹ *Ibid.*, para 5.

³⁰ Letter from Charles Lloyd to Secretary to the Government, dated 11 January 1804; Political and Secret Consultations 1804.

Governor General came to the conclusion that none of the objects which the British Government had contemplated in concluding an alliance with the state of Nepal had been attained and that their accomplishment had been frustrated by causes in the very constitution of her Government and in the character of the persons who had successively exercised the administration of affairs in that country. The Governor General held that the failure of the state of Nepal in fulfilling the stipulations of the treaty virtually constituted the dissolution of that alliance and that, therefore, the British Government was at liberty to withdraw from the alliance contracted. He did not expect that the stipulations of the treaty could be carried out by any party in Nepal, and thought that the only way of establishing a permanent and efficient system of administration in Nepal was "the interposition of the British authority to an extent which on different grounds of policy and expediency he considered to be inadmissible".³¹

Under these circumstances, the Company's Government formally denounced the treaty concluded with Nepal in 1801. By that treaty the Company's Government was pledged to prevent the return of Ran Bahadur Shah, who was living under its protection at Benaras, to Nepal. After the dissolution of the alliance the Company thought that this obligation necessarily ceased to exist. The views of the Governor General would be clear from the following extract from his minutes on Nepal affairs:

"We are aware of the sanguinary disposition of Raja Ran Bahadur and of the probability of his restoration to the Government of Nepal on his return by the influence of a powerful party which was prepared to support his design of regaining his abdicated rights. His restoration to power would probably be followed by a repetition of those cruelties and that oppressive violence which originally occasioned his expulsion from Nepal and those who have endeavoured to maintain the late alliance with the existing Government of that country may be expected to become the peculiar objects of his barbarity and revenge.

"These considerations however cannot supercede the rights acknowledged by the established law of nations nor does the British Government pretend to a right of reforming the internal

³¹ *Ibid.*, paras 9 and 10.

Government of Nepal if it were convenient to attempt such a reform by the only probable means of success by the introduction of an armed force and by the assumption of the Government".³²

Raja Ran Bahadur had offered to enter into engagements with the British Government on terms similar to those contained in the treaty of October 1801. The Governor General, however, abstained from entering into any engagements with a prince whose character was entirely unreliable and whose public conduct was noxiously scandalous. The Company's Government, resolved to leave Ran Bahadur at liberty to return to Nepal unconditionally. Previous to this the Raja of Nepal had been informed of the decision of the Governor General, considering the late alliance as dissolved, and of the consequent permission to Ran Bahadur Shah to retire from the Company's provinces. The deputies of the Nepal Government, who were staying in Benares, were dismissed with courtesy and escorted back to the Nepal frontier. Early in next spring Ran Bahadur Shah returned to Nepal and succeeded in putting himself on the throne again through the wifely submission of the dowager Rani. Damodar Pande and his party men were imprisoned and the affairs of state were entrusted to Amar Singh Thapa's son, Bhim Sen.

But Ran Bahadur Shah had given up none of his vagaries and cruelties and the Nepalese again groaned under his despotic oppression. At length he was beheaded in open durbar by his own brother, Sher Bahadur. The authority of the state now passed entirely into the hands of Bhim Sen Thapa, and this able soldier and administrator guided the destinies of his country for the next 30 years.

³² Political and Secret Consultations, No. 297, dated 24 January.

Chapter 11

THE PRELUDE TO NEPAL WAR

ABOUT THE beginning of the nineteenth century, the dominions of the Gorkhas and the British were coterminous along the Tarai to an extent of over 1100 kilometers. The frontiers in Asia, not to speak of India in particular, have never been well defined. The problem of frontiers was in its acutest form in India during the chaotic times that found the British advancing from Bengal to establish their military power throughout the Indian mainland. At that time no one knew the boundaries of the Indian principalities for certain, as the majority of them were changing hands incessantly.

The Gorkhas and the British found themselves facing each other on the Tarai, each claiming the dominions of those whom their military power had overthrown in recent years. When these territories were first conquered, no one cared to know or define the exact limits of the conquest. It was afterwards, when the Gorkhas had consolidated their positions in the hills, and the Company had organised its conquests in the plains, that the officials of the two Governments on their respective frontiers began to look up old records and revived or contested claims forgotten in the hurry and first carelessness of easy triumph. For the Gorkhas the Tarai was the main source of their national income and every acre of it was precious to them. But they dreaded the military power of the only European nation in India and throughout this period and even during the actual progress of the Nepal War were most solicitous for friendly and peaceful solutions. However, the accounts of their negotiations with the East India Company and its officers is one-sided. The Nepalese accounts are not available for scrutiny. The following narrative is, therefore, based on the documents and correspondence that are available in the India Office Library.

Lord Moira penned a severe indictment of the Gorkhas in his

secret letter¹ to the Directors. But its language and its acerbity may be ascribed to his zeal in proving the expediency and the righteousness, of his carrying war to the hills a step which had been criticised by competent persons in London. He recounted a series of boundary disputes with the Gorkhas, whom he invariably called the aggressors. But an examination of the evidence embodied in the "Papers respecting the Nepal War" which were laid before the General Court of the East India Company in order to "enable the court to judge of the propriety of entertaining the question of further remuneration to the (late) Governor-General" proves that the Gorkhas were not "audacious and insolent aggressors" and the Company's Government in India had not been "marked by unexampled moderation, if not overstrained forbearance." The evidence gleaned in detail from the documents, is thus contrary to Lord Moira's statement.

In the extreme east, the Gorkhas were said to have occupied the Zamindari of Bhimnagar, in subversion of the proprietary rights of the Zamindar and the Sovereignty of the Company. This had taken place several years previous to 1808 at which time the Governor-General suddenly took the case up, and after a preliminary enquiry by one of his own officers, demanded its restitution from the Nepalese. This demand, with some "delay and evident reluctance on their part" was complied with by the Nepalese, when ultimately the British Government "menaced the Nepalese with the forcible resumption of the lands."

In the district of Tirhut also, Lord Moira alleged that innumerable cases of encroachment had taken place, some as old as the year 1787. Some other instances of encroachment in this quarter were brought to the notice of the Company's Government in the year 1798, by the Board of Revenue, whose attention was attracted to the subject by the cessation of the payment of revenue of certain villages, some of which on enquiry were found to have been occupied by the Gorkhas. This subject was again revived by the Board of Revenue in 1804, and an enquiry was held. The affair was however again lost sight of, although from a report of the Magistrate of Tirhut, it appears that the Gorkhas had between 1787 and 1812, taken

¹ Secret letter from Lord Moira, dated 2 August 1815, to the Secret Committee in London.

possession of more than two hundred villages near the frontiers.

Disputes in the Saran district also came to a head in the year 1811, when serious affrays took place on the border between the subjects of Nepal and the tenants of Raja Bir Kishor Singh, the Zamindar of Bettiah. In one of these affrays a Nepalese Suba Lachman Gir was slain, together with others on both sides. The Magistrate of Saran, in reporting these occurrences, had blamed the Nepalese as being the aggressors. In the correspondence which ensued with the Raja of Nepal on this occasion, the two States agreed to depute officers to the spot and fix the boundaries. The Company's Government entrusted the conduct of the enquiry to Mr. Young who, on his arrival on the frontier, found that the Nepalese, had actually taken complete possession, not only of the villages which formed the previous subject of dispute, but of other villages also, making a total of twenty-two villages. The Nepalese claimed that Mr. Hastings in 1783 had definitely pronounced that Rotihut belonged to the Nepalese Government and had withdrawn the Company's protection from Abdullah Beg, its Zamindar. The Company, on the other hand, claimed that the 22 villages in question belonged to Nunnore and not to Rotihut and, therefore, the decision of Mr. Hastings did not apply to them. Secondly they said that these villages had been in the possession of Raja Bir Kishor Singh's family for about 30 years prior to the date of the Nepalese claim.

However, the incident of the death of the Nepalese officer, Lachman Gir by name, by the Company's subjects was pressed with great earnestness by the Nepalese Government, to prove that the intentions of the Company's subjects were indeed aggressive and to discredit the Company's Government in its support thereof. In his report the Magistrate of Saran did not clearly make out which party was the immediate aggressor in the affray in which Lachman Gir was slain, but the probability was that the servants of Raja Bir Kishor Singh had taken the Nepalese unawares and had premeditated their attack on the Nepalese. But the Company's Government held that "whatever might have been the misconduct of the people of Bettiah on that particular occasion, in commencing the affray, the provocation which they had received, and the absence of the support of their own Government, constituted strong grounds for an indulgent consideration of their behaviour. The Govern-

ment of Nepal could have no tenable claim to expect that they should be brought to trial for what it was pleased to consider as an offence against it.² On these grounds no judicial proceedings were authorised against Raja Bir Kishor Singh or his servants. However, strict injunctions against any measures of self-redress were issued to Raja Bir Kishor Singh. These disputes were finally referred to Major Bradshaw, and he was asked to take them up after completing the investigations in Butwal.

North of Gorakhpur, occurred the disputes about the rights of possession over Butwal and Sheoraj which were the immediate causes of the war; but it will be convenient to deal with them exhaustively later.

In Bareilly the Gorkhas were charged with having occupied five of the eight taluks of pargana Khairgarh namely "Buns Burdeea, Betawaj Seek, Pukolee, Mahlwara and Pudna." The first three were occupied prior to the cessation of the Bareilly district by the Nawab Vizir in 1801, and the last two after 1807. In this connection Lord Moira's logic about the first three taluks is to be noticed and compared with his logic in refusing to apply the same principles to the case of Butwal which was a Zamindari held by Makwanpur. He says "with respect to those usurped before the cession from the Government of the Nawab Vizir, our right appeared to be equally incontestable. The unjust seizure of those taluks from the Vizir's Government was substantiated by the evidence taken by the Resident at Lucknow, and included in the report of the Collector of Bareilly, above referred to; and its occurrence antecedently to the period of our acquiring the dominion of Khairgarh, could not be considered to invalidate our rights to lands forming a portion of that pargana, although in the actual possession of another power, unless that power could make good its claim to them. The British Government had succeeded to all the rights of the Vizir, and became entitled to enforce them."³

It must be added that in spite of this reasoning, Lord Moira, in a spirit of moderation, intended "to acquiesce in the retention by the Nepalese of the three taluks acquired before the

² "Narrative of the War", Secret Letter of Lord Moira dated 2 August 1815, para 63.

³ *Ibid*

cession, and to confine his demands to the relinquishment of those occupied subsequently to that transaction." But hostilities commenced before this amicable proposal could be made.

In the district of Moradabad, the Gorkhas laid claim to a considerable tract consisting of the parganas of Kelpury, Rudrapur, Kashipur, Nanak, Mata, Subra and Bellari. The Gorkhas had not forcibly occupied these places, but had been pressing their claims in letters to the Governor General's Agent in the Ceded and conquered Provinces. Their claims were founded on the fact that these parganas were formerly in the possession of the Raja of Kumaon and as the Gorkhas had conquered Kumaon, they claimed all the possessions of that Raja. Their claims were admitted by the Agent only so far as they referred to Kelpunj. The Governor General, however, was satisfied that all these parganas had been conquered by Shuja-Ud-Dowla before the invasion of Kumaon by the Gorkhas, and instructed the Agent to signify to Bum Shah that the British Government could not under the circumstances of the case, permit the pretensions of the Nepalese to these districts to be a subject of discussion.⁴ No attempt was afterwards made by the Gorkhas to put forward this claim again.

In their westward expansion the Gorkhas were at that time carrying on operations in the hills on the Northern side of the territories taken under British protection. There likewise were no fixed boundaries between the territories taken under the Company's protection and those outside it. As a matter of practice the local authorities under the Company's Government concerned themselves exclusively with the Chiefs below the hills, and considered the hills as outside the Company's spheres of interests. However, the matter was not so simple as it appeared, and Lieut. Colonel D. Ochterlony, Officer Commanding the Company's garrison at Ludhiana, confessed that his knowledge of the geography of the country was so limited that the Gorkhas might even unintentionally trespass upon what at that time was considered to be within the Company's boundaries. He understood that the Raja whose forts the Gorkhas were attacking at that time (i.e. in 1809) had some considerable villages at the foot of the hills not far from Sirhind, and that

⁴ *Ibid.*, para 19.

the Munny Majra raja (under the Company's protection), on the other hand, had some lands on the hills.⁵

About this time Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala informed Ochterlony that there was a long established friendship between him and the Gorkhas and that he was going to send some of his troops to join the Gorkhas in their attack on Raja Karam Prakash of Sirmur. Probably Sahib Singh expected that such assistance would be rewarded by the Gorkhas by the gift of some villages belonging to the raja of Sirmur which were contiguous with those of Sahib Singh in the neighbourhood of the hills.

It became, therefore, necessary for Ochterlony "to ascertain the wishes of the Company's Government respecting any limits which it might be considered desirable to fix to the encroachments of the Gorkha troops, who though at that time (1809) confined to the hilly districts, might extend their depredations and attack some places belonging to Sardars who considered themselves under the Company's protection."⁶

Ochterlony's report was promptly attended to by the Vice President in Council, who thought that on account of "the near approach of the Gorkha troops to the possessions of the Sikh Chiefs under the Company's protection, considerable embarrassment might ensue unless Amar Singh Thapa, the Gorkha chief, was early apprized of the limits to which he must confine his operations in order to avoid interference with the possessions under the protection of the British Government."⁷ Lack of exact geographical knowledge of the places which were the scenes of the operations of the Gorkhas prevented the Company's Government from defining these limits with much precision, but Ochterlony was instructed that the Governor General in Council "would approve his stating to the Gorkha Chiefs that the Gorkhas could not be permitted to extend their conquests to the districts below the hills."⁸ He was also asked "to intimate to Sahib Singh

⁵ Despatch from Lieut. Col. D. Ochterlony, Commanding at Ludhiana, to C. Lushington Esq., Acting Secretary to Government in the Political Department, No. 43, dated 30 December 1809. ⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ From C. Lushington Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Fort William to Lieut. Col. D. Ochterlony, Commanding at Ludhiana, dated 23 January 1810.

⁸ *Ibid.*

that if he took any part in the contest (between the Gorkhas and Ranjit Singh or the other hill rajas) he would incur the displeasure of the British Government.”⁹

It seems, then, that the Company's Government had determined to confine itself to the territories below the hills and to foreswear all interest in the hills. This was emphasised in the definitive instructions given to Ochterlony in which it was considered “necessary to establish some principle with a view to fix a certain limit both to the aggressions of the Gorkhas and to the exercise of the Company's interference in that quarter”. This principle was to be that “Lieut. Col. Ochterlony should be instructed to afford protection to all the possessions, to whomsoever they may belong, situated below the hills, and, on the other hand, to refrain from any interference within the hills.” When these instructions were laid down, the Governor-General “was aware that several of the Company's dependents, whose principal possessions were in the plains, had also lands in the hills, but did not consider them to possess any claim to the Company's assistance beyond the natural boundary of the country which the Company had taken under its superintendence. From the security which they enjoyed under the Company's protection for their possessions in the plains, they would be enabled to apply all their resources to the defence of those possessions which they held in the hills.”

Ochterlony, however, had his own ideas about the expansion of the Gorkha power and he went a step further than his instructions indicated. He wrote a letter to Amar Singh Thapa affirming that the Sardars bordering on the hills had come under the protection of the British Government, and added that he had received orders from Calcutta to the effect, “that, as friendship was established between the British Government and the Maharaja (of Nepal), it was not probable that any molestation would occur to any person or persons under the Company's protection, but should such an event happen it would be necessary for him to address the servants of the Maharaja on the subject, when they would abstain from such proceedings.

⁹ From N. B. Edmonstone Esq., Secretary to Government in the Political Department, Fort William, to C. Lushington Esq., Acting Secretary to Government, Secret, Political and Foreign Department, Fort William, dated Fort St. George, 26 February 1810.

Although nothing of this kind had yet occurred, it appeared to him a proper caution to communicate."¹⁰

This is a very vague statement and Ochterlony himself admitted that by this letter "he trusted the door was left open for further amicable expostulation or positive prohibition as should have been thought most convenient with justice, policy or convenience."¹¹

It will be noticed here that Ochterlony has definitely set aside the precise instructions of his Government and is trying to ask them to base their policy towards the Nepalese not on any principles but merely on political expediency. In his reply to this letter from Ochterlony, Amar Singh simply stated that "Punjore, Narayan Garh and Lahurpur were under or belonged to the Sirmur or Nahan district, and under Hindur were Buddea and Pullasea which places had always belonged to whoever possessed Sirmur and Hindur."¹² Ochterlony denied Gorkha claims to all these places, and told Amar Singh "that interference by Gorkha troops within the countries on this side of the Sutlej to the foot of the hills would not be approved by the Company", and warned him that, "it might give rise to disputes."¹³

At the same time Ochterlony determined to go to Sirhind personally and to procure evidence to prove that "the Gorkha claims to the valley of Punjore were inadmissible, and ought to be resisted."¹⁴

He succeeded in making a case against the Gorkha claims. Firstly, he said that, "the Valley (of Punjore) widened towards the Sutlej from Nangal to Ropar, and that, in ceding to the Gorkha Commander the places he pretended to claim, the Company should in fact be admitting him into the low country and virtually giving him the whole tract between those two points." Secondly, he admitted that "all the country from Ludhiana to Nangal belonged to dependents and some of it to the most strenuous adherents, of Ranjit Singh," but he thought that "that

¹⁰ Ochterlony to Lushington, Secretary to Government, dated 5 April 1810.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Amar Singh Thapa's reply to Ochterlony's letter, enclosed in the letter from Ochterlony to Lushington dated 5 April 1810.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Ochterlony to Lushington, dated 3 May 1810.

consideration should (not) influence the Company to withhold its protection when the assumption was so far from being forced that it was considered by long and established usage as the determined boundary." Thirdly, he added that "to concede the places demanded by Amar Singh Thapa on the plea he claimed would make a most unfavourable impression of the British character, as admitting of encroachments within those limits which time and usage had fixed as the boundary of the Sirhind Foujdari."¹⁵

The Government of Bengal agreed to Ochterlony's proposal and directed him to consider the valley of Punjore as being comprehended within those lands, which "according to the principle already laid down by the Governor General in Council must be protected from the encroachments of the Gorkhas."¹⁶

The net result was that the Nepalese were kept out of Punjore, and although Sirmur and Hindur were allowed to be absorbed by the Gorkhas, the fertile valley of Punjore and its adjoining small hills to the South were taken under British protection. The Company did not deny that these places had belonged, before its protection was proclaimed, to the rajas of Sirmur and Hindur, and that the Company had no concern with what happened between the Gorkhas and the rajas of these hills. The fact was that Company's Government did not want to allow the Gorkhas to occupy these productive lands and derive handsome revenues from them. However, no cudgels were taken up by the Company on behalf of Dehra Dun and Kaardeh, which were also situated between the lower hills (the Siwaliks) and the mountains even though Punjore and these places were similar valleys and belonged to the hill rajas. About Dehra Dun, Ochterlony wrote:

"From the end of Kaardeh,¹⁷ and running the whole way from the Jamuna to the Ganges and between the two first ranges of

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ From N. B. Edmonstone Esq., Chief Secretary to Government to Lieut. Col. D. Ochterlony, Agent to Governor General, Ludhiana, dated 29 May 1810.

¹⁷ "In my despatch No. 59 I had the honour to transmit a description taken from information of the valley of Kaardeh lying between the Jumna and Sutlej and recently seized by the Gorkhas from the Raja of Nahan".

hills, is the valley of the Dehra Dun, which has been seized in the same manner (i.e. like Punjore) from the Garhwal or Shrinagar Raja. I am not aware that the private character of either of these Princes entitles them to any commiseration, and, as they have neither solicited the bounty nor requested the intercession of the British Government, it may appear extraordinary to suggest a request to the Gorkha Chief to relinquish his conquests and to bestow those valleys on the Rajas of Nahan and Shrinagar respectively, their former possessors.

But if such a request were practicable and an acquiescence certain, would not such an extension in favour of long established Rajput Princes have a good effect throughout Hindustan."¹⁸

It is clear, then, that the policy of excluding the Gorkhas from the plains and the valleys on the Northern side of the Siwaliks was not a uniform one, Punjore was supposed to be under British protection while Kaardeh and Dehra Dun were definitely outside it. In 1810, however, the Gorkhas submitted to the peremptory request of the Company's Government to clear out of Punjore. On the whole the Gorkhas were trying their best to keep the Company in good humour and to sacrifice some of their interests to keep peace with its troops.

In 1813 strong protests were made by Ochterlony about four villages belonging to Butowley which had been forcibly occupied by Gorkha troops. Full military preparations were made by Ochterlony to attack the Gorkhas in the hills and teach them a good lesson. Captain William Richards was asked "to give every local information his notes or memory could furnish of the general knowledge he had acquired of the Gorkha possessions in an excursion which he had made on a permission obtained from the Kajee (Amar Singh Thapa) into the Valley of Kaardeh for timber."¹⁹

Mr. Hearsey, an adventurer who was familiar with most of the hills in this area, also submitted his observations for the use of the military authorities, and efforts were made to sound and employ an ex-minister of Kumaon, Harak Deo by name, and described as the Earl of Warwick by Hearsey, in a projected invasion of Kumaon. The Company's servants were well aware "that the possession of these hills held out no object of

¹⁸ Lieut. Col. Ochterlony to Lushington, No. 63, dated 18 May 1810.

¹⁹ Colonel D. Ochterlony to J. Adam, Secretary in the Secret Political and Foreign Department, No. 171, dated 23 July 1813.

desire or even of indemnification, but Ochterlony undertook to defeat the Gorkhas so thoroughly in this area as to be able "to insist at once on the relinquishment of all claims, on any pretence, to any lands situated under the hills along the whole extent of their recent conquests."²⁰

The Governor General in Council, however, had no "wish or intention to engage in any extended scheme of operations such as that contemplated by Colonel Ochterlony. His Lordship in Council was on the contrary desirous of maintaining the existing relation of friendship with the Nepalese Government, and of effecting an adjustment of all disputed points by amicable negotiation, if practicable. If, however, the obstinacy and arrogance of the Nepalese should compel the Company's Government to have recourse to arms in the defence of the rights of its subjects and dependents, it would be still His Lordship in Council's wish, as long as it was practicable, to confine their measures to the expulsion of the Nepalese from the lands under their protection which they (the Nepalese) might usurp, without retaliating by an attack on their possessions in the hills, with respect to which the Company claimed no right of interference".²¹

This clear exposition of the Company's policy immediately cooled down the ardour of Colonel Ochterlony for an expedition to the hills. In the meantime all the four villages were restored to the Raja of Patiala by the Gorkhas, who "professed a readiness to give up twenty villages, if required, rather than permit the slightest diminution of the harmony which had subsisted so long between the two Governments."²² The Nepalese vakils also requested Ochterlony on Amar Singh Thapa's behalf to come and meet him especially "to mark the amicable adjustment of all disputes in this quarter and the cordiality and good will existing between their respective superiors."²³

On the 10th of November 1813, near Punjore, Ochterlony held his interview with Amar Singh Thapa, "who in a long and laboured speech expressed his joy at the amicable termination of all disputes, and his regret that he was not fully informed

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ From J. Adam, Secretary to Government to Col. Ochterlony, Agent to Governor-General, Ludhiana, dated 20 August 1813.

²² From Ochterlony to J. Adam, dated 28 October 1813.

²³ Ochterlony to J. Adam, dated 28 October 1813.

by his Vakil and different messengers of Ochterlony's anxiety for the restitution of Butowley etc. Ochterlony answered this speech by saying that he was equally gratified by the amicable termination of the disputes and that, as the places had now been restored, there was one essential benefit which had accrued from the delay, namely that each of them had received such instructions that there was scarcely the possibility of a recurrence of the disputes.²⁴

At this point let me diverge for a moment to give side-lights on political negotiations of those days. On the day following the interview, Bhagti Singh Thapa a relation of Amar Singh's, came to the British camp with a present of birds, musk, etc. His real purpose, however, was something entirely different an account of which was given in Ochterlony's letter to the Secretary to the Government at Calcutta in the following words:

"After having presented these articles, and requesting my acceptance of them as of no value, but as curiosities, the produce of the barren hills he commanded, he requested a private conference, in which he stated at great length, and as he said by desire of Amar Singh Thapa, a detail of the seize of Kangra, and attributed their final retreat, not to the superior conduct or bravery of Ranjit Singh and his forces, but to an unmerited confidence in the most solemn promises of Ranjit Singh, which to the last moment had deceived them by assurances that he had no intention to interfere in the engagement which Sansar Chand had entered into of delivering that fort on a particular day; that Amar Singh was most anxious to retrieve the credit he had lost by being the dupe of this treachery and to punish it, and wished to obtain my permission to make a second attack on the fort of Kangra and to obtain my advice on the subject. I told him that Kangra was a place which did not in any shape belong to us, or come under our protection, and that of course Amar Singh might act as he pleased on the subject; but if he asked my private opinion as to the expediency, I thought there was little chance of his succeeding in an enterprize which before cost him more than three years' labour when only defended by Sansar Chand, and that he must be aware that the place was now plentifully stocked with provisions and would not only be defended by a strong garrison within but by a numerous force without.

"He wished to insinuate from his reply that Amar Singh

²⁴ Colonel D. Ochterlony to J. Adam, Secretary to Government in the Secret, Political and Foreign Department, dated 18 December 1813.

thought himself equal to cope with any troops Ranjit Singh would bring if assured of our non-interference; but at length plainly said that Amar Singh considered us only here with an intention to advance hereafter and possess ourselves of the 'Punjab'. I assured him that this idea was most erroneous, and that whilst Ranjit Singh observed, as he had hitherto done, his engagements with the British Government such an event was impossible, and that Amar Singh might easily see that the Government could have no wish to extend its power or increase its revenue by the simple fact of our affording a gratuitous protection to the Sikh Sardars on this side of the Sutlej.

"Though he did not speak his sentiments in plain terms, I could easily perceive that he did not give due credit to my assertions, and that the fact I alluded to as well as my denial of any future attempt on the Punjab were, the one considered only in furtherance of a greater object, and the other attributed to a deep policy which sought to conceal it; but he pretended to acquiesce and relinquished the subject."²⁵

In May 1814 Amar Singh Thapa sent a letter to Ochterlony "intended for transmission to the Governor General." It was difficult to understand his motive in sending these mediatory proposals through Ochterlony because at that very time Major Bradshaw was on the frontier of Nepal in Butwal and much nearer to the Raja's capital and the seat of the British Government. Ochterlony thought it to be an example of the utter lack of reasoning on the part of the Gorkha Chief, about whom he wrote: "It is, however, very difficult to assign motives for the actions of men who seem hardly to possess the faculty of reason, or doubt its existence in those with whom they have a point to carry; and what we have experienced from Amar Singh in the late disputes does very little credit to his understanding and carries the fullest conviction of his falsehood and rapacity."²⁶

Ochterlony returned the 'Kharita' from the Raja of Nepal after copying it for transmission to Calcutta and thus officially dismissed the correspondence with Amar Singh Thapa in this connection.

But things were taking a serious turn in Butwal. On receiving

²⁵ From Ochterlony to J. Adam, dated 20 December 1813.

²⁶ From Colonel D. Ochterlony, Agent to the Governor-General, Ludhiana to J. Adam Esq., Secretary to Government in the Secret, Political and Foreign Department, dated 26 May 1814.

information of the expulsion, with considerable loss, of the thanas established in the resumed lands of Butwal, and of the reoccupation of those lands by the Nepalese, the new Governor General had decided to take severe measures against the Gorkhas. For immediate action, he proposed to stop "all commercial intercourse between the British possessions and the Nepalese territory." This prohibition was to extend to the countries lying between the Jamuna and the Sutlej as well with the cooperation of the hill rajas. The Governor General did not "apprehend that any objection would be made by these Chiefs, whose enmity to the Nepalese would probably induce them to enter cordially into the plan, and into any other measures which might afterwards be determined on, and on the spirit and nature of whose connection with the British Government entitled it to demand, their aid in support of the rights and interests of that Government." These instructions, however, were to be kept with the utmost secrecy till Mr. Rutherford, one of the servants of the Company, had withdrawn all his employees and the Government property under his charge safely outside Nepalese territories.

In June Amar Singh Thapa again approached Ochterlony to forward a letter from him to the Governor General in order to settle the disputes between the Nepalese and the British Governments. But no reply on the part of the Governor General to Amar Singh Thapa was considered necessary. The letter was supposed to be dictated by the Court of Kathmandu. It contained the same arguments with which that court had already tried to justify its annexations and it repeated the durbar's rejected offers of a compromise by holding the disputed lands in Butwal on lease from the Company. The Governor General did not want to revive a subject which had already been exhausted from the British point of view. Nor did he consider it proper to use Amar Singh Thapa as the channel of a negotiation, which had hitherto been conducted either by direct correspondence between the two Governments or by the Agents of each Government regularly constituted for the purpose.²⁷

The Company's Government was now intent on war and had

²⁷ From J. Adam Esq., Secretary to Government to Col. D. Ochterlony, Agent to the Governor-General, Ludhiana, dated 3 August 1814.

discarded any peaceful solution altogether. Ochterlony was asked to obtain detailed information "on the military force under Amar Singh Thapa, its strength and disposition and the description of troops of which it was composed, its means of uniting and acting in a body, and other points of this nature.....such as the passes into the hills, the roads, bridges, rivers and streams with all the particulars requisite for military purposes."²³ The Government also wanted "to receive accurate information relative to the political divisions of the country, the number and names of the ancient principalities, the names and present situation of the chiefs expelled by the Gorkhas, and the best means of rendering their aid useful in the prosecution of the measures which it would probably be necessary for Government to adopt for the overthrow of the Gorkha power."

Colonel Ochterlony, however, was personally against restoring the hill rajas and waging a war against the Nepalese on their behalf. His recent experiences at Jind made him think that the petty hill rajas, if released from their present masters or restored to their ancient possessions, would, by their own petty and internal disputes, furnish an endless source of trouble and vexation to the Company's Government. He considered himself able to effect in the hills what the Gorkhas had already achieved, but he thought that the result, "so far from holding out an expectation of remuneration", would only mean "an increase of expense, trouble and vexation, in perpetually arbitrating jarring and discordant interests." He summarised his own views on the subject as follows:

"If the Court of Nepal could be brought to see the impolicy of a contest with the British power, and relinquish such points and places as are so situate as to invite disputes, it would seem easy to throw a boundary line of petty states which should be independent of both Governments and prevent all future collision. In this quarter at least it is demonstratively practicable by the Punjor Valley remaining as it is now understood, to be limited by the proprietors of the soil. To the eastward the Kaardeh Valley might be made a separate and distinct division and allotted as a provision to the family of the exiled raja of Nahan, and the valley of Dehra, between the Ganges and the

²³ J. Adam to Ochterlony, dated 3 August 1814.

Jamuna might in like manner be given to the heirs (if there are any) of the late prince of Shrinagar."²⁹

The Governor General in Council overruled these objections. Ochterlony had thought that occupation by the Company's troops of these hill districts and the restoration of the former chiefs under the Company's protection and guarantee would cause embarrassment, inconvenience and expense and, moreover, would necessitate arbitrating in the differences which would be perpetually arising among them and calling for the Company's authoritative interposition in their affairs. But the Governor General held that "the principal advantage contemplated in the establishment of such an order of things as would impose on the British Government the office of arbitration would be the preservation of tranquillity, so conducive to the success of any commercial objects which our improved intercourse with those mountainous districts might open to the enterprize of our merchants and the security which would be afforded against the preponderance of any individual chief, which might lead to the union of the different chiefs under one hand, or the extension of the power of an ambitious Prince by conquest or intrigue over the possessions of his neighbours to such a degree as to expose the British Government again to the insults and aggressions of a power so constituted and animated by such principles.

"The inconvenience and embarrassment likely to result from undertaking the office of arbitrating all the differences arising among a number of petty and independent Chiefs was by no means absent from the view of the Governor General. His Lordship felt that the obligation to arbitrate, which necessarily implies that of enforcing our award, must in such cases always render the power which incurs it liable to be called on for the active exertion of its force and unprofitable expense. But in contemplating the restoration of these chiefs it did not appear to the Governor General that any necessity would exist for burthening ourselves with this troublesome and thankless office, and it was never intended that the British Government should lend itself by any express or implied engagement to undertake it. Supposing the advantages of such a degree of paramount authority as is implied in the exercise of a general arbitration,

²⁹ Ochterlony to J. Adam, dated 29 August 1814.

with the faculty of enforcing the award, to be desirable, it appeared to his Lordship that we should, in the common course of events, have it at our command whenever we might see fit to exercise it. The natural effect of our exertions for the restoration of these Chiefs and of the political influence and ascendancy which our success will bring with it, will be to make them look to us for advice, and assistance in their difficulties, which we shall be at liberty to afford or withhold at our option; and we shall thus, it may be presumed, without the inconvenience of positive obligation, possess all the essential advantages of a declared right to interference".⁸⁰

This policy was dictated mainly by military reasons. The Governor-General held that it would be impossible for Ochterlony to occupy by detachments and parties from his own force, the posts and strongholds from which he could expel the Gorkha troops and the possession of which would be required for the support of further operations, or which it would be impracticable to dismantle or destroy. In these cases the zealous and cordial aid of the inhabitants of the country, excited by the presence of their natural chiefs, would be of essential advantage, and apparently indispensable. It would, however, only be secured by the expectation on the part of the chiefs of recovering their former power, and on that of the inhabitants of permanent emancipation from the rule of the Gorkhas.² The Governor General had already decided not to offer terms of peace to the Gorkhas, after hostilities should have actually commenced, which would restore to the Gorkhas any portion of their possessions from which they might be driven by the events of war. The annexation of the conquered country to the possessions of the Company appeared to be, on consideration from all points of view, to be inexpedient. Therefore no practicable and convenient mode of disposing of these territories remained except their restoration to "the chiefs who formerly ruled them, who were supposed to possess the good will of the people, whose attachment to the British Government might be more reasonably looked to than that of any other power by which they could be held, and whose means of injuring the Company, even supposing a different disposition

⁸⁰ From J. Adam, to D. Ochterlony dated Camp on the Ganges near Karah, 30 September 1814.

could never be formidable.³¹

But at the same time the Company was also deliberating upon the expediency for the British Government of appropriating to itself Garhwal, Dehra Dun and Kumaon. They wanted to control these areas, not so much with a view to collecting revenues as for the security of commercial communications with the country of Tibet where the Shawl wool was produced. Thus the question of the territories east of Jamuna was left undecided, and later except for Tehri-Garhwal the whole of it was absorbed into the Company's possessions as a non-regulated district.

On the other hand, the chiefs who were restored to their former possessions, were asked "to execute engagements binding themselves to allow to the subjects of the Company and to their goods and merchandize a free right of passage; to render military service to the British Government when required within the hills; to afford every aid, comfort and supply to the British troops during military operations; and in general terms to remain faithful and attached to the British Government".³²

But the Governor General held that the matter in dispute between the states no longer referred to the original differences on the boundaries, but, on the other hand, involved "interests of the greatest magnitude", i.e. "the interests, dignity and honour" of the Company's Government. It was, therefore, the purpose of the Company to adjust terms of peace and not mere settlement of points of difference with regard to the boundaries. For this purpose Amar Singh, if he was authorized to do so, could send an agent to the Resident in Delhi, where his communications might be received. But Ochterlony was specifically directed not to interrupt the progress of his operations and to reject decidedly any proposition of a similar nature made to him by Amar Singh Thapa.³³

We now come to the disputes about Butwal and Seoraj which ultimately led to war between the two countries. These two Zamindaries had always been held by the Rajas of Palpa in the hills. There was however, some sort of suzerainty exercised over them off and on, by the Nawab Vizir. After the cession

³¹ J. Adam to Ochterlony, 30 September 1814, Para. 15.

³² J. Adam to D. Ochterlony, 30 September 1814, Para. 24.

³³ From J. Adam to Colonel D. Ochterlony, Camp Moradabad, 11 December 1814.

of Butwal to the Company by the Vizir, a settlement was made by the Collector of Gorakhpur with the representative of Raja Prithvi Pal Singh, the hereditary Raja of Palpa, who himself was at that time a prisoner at Kathmandu. A regular commitment was entered into that a rent of thirty-two thousand rupees per annum should be paid to the British Government for their lands. No objection was raised to this arrangement by the Gorkha Government. On his return from Kathmandu, the Raja of Palpa confirmed the act of his representative and acknowledged his obligations to pay the rent of Butwal to the British Government. He was shortly afterwards called back to Kathmandu, presumably for his agreeing to pay the rent of Butwal to the British Government instead of to the Gorkhas, and was put to death after a short period of imprisonment. His family retired into Gorakhpur, provision being made for them by the British Government while their Lands in Butwal were managed by its officers. At this period no notice was taken of Sheoraj "which was certainly in the possession of the Gorkhas prior to the cession of the territory by the Nawab Vizir".

In 1804 a claim was brought forward by the Government of Nepal to the management of the lowlands of Butwal, stating that they were entitled to these lands, as representing their former tributary, the Raja of Palpa. At the same time proclamations were issued by the Gorkha Officers in Palpa, declaring the authority of the Raja of Nepal to be established in Butwal and a formal transfer of the land there, formerly held by the Raja of Palpa, was made to the Raja of Gulmi, another hill chief. Some military preparations were also reported in the hills.

On this the Governor General in a letter to the Raja of Nepal remonstrated against these proceedings and "required him to abstain from all acts of aggression and to withdraw his troops from the menacing position which they occupied on the frontier". At the same time the Governor General asked the Raja to liquidate the arrears of the revenue of Sheoraj and to make arrangements for its regular payment in future, calling on him at the same time to produce the proofs of his claim to the possession of Sheoraj.³⁴

³⁴ Letter from the Governor General to the Raja of Nepal, dated 18 August 1804.

In reply to the Governor General's letter, the Raja denied any right on the part of the Company's Government to interfere in Sheoraj, which had admittedly been in the possession of the Gorkhas for a number of years before the cession of the territory by the Nawab Vizir in 1801. The Raja also claimed to have succeeded to all the rights of the Raja of Palpa and therefore claimed to manage the lands in Butwal on precisely the same terms as were contracted between the Company's Government and the Raja of Palpa.

Sir George Barlow had now taken up the reins of the Company's Government. He definitely rejected the proposal of the Nepal Government to farm Butwal, because he did not want an independent sovereign to become a zamindar of the Company as well, in which case there would be no sanction except war for the due realisation of the rent. He informed the Nepal Government that the taluk of Sheoraj would be transferred to them on condition that Butwal was restored to the Company. No reply was made to this proposal by the Napalese. A reminder was sent to the Raja of Nepal in January 1809 calling on him to withdraw his troops from Butwal and allow the establishment of the British authority there, and that otherwise more serious measures would have to be taken.

The reply from the Raja of Nepal expressed his deep regards and friendship for the Company, adding that his Government had shown great moderation in not pressing their rightful claim to Palee and Nichool, situated on the opposite side of the Tarai. Any discussions of the Butwal lands was carefully avoided, but a request was made by the Raja that the questions relating to the disputed territories be made the subjects of local investigation, by officers to be appointed by each Government, with a view to their final adjustment. The matter was again lost sight of and was reviewed in 1811 when the Magistrate of Gorakhpur complained of encroachments by the Gorkhas in lands adjoining Butwal and Sheoraj. The whole question was reconsidered and it was decided to repel by force the recent encroachments or any attempt at new ones, leaving the former questions for amicable settlement. The Vakil on behalf of Nepal in Calcutta was not informed of this decision but was merely told that the Governor General accepted the Raja's offer that officers appointed by each Government should be deputed

to the spot, to investigate and settle the outstanding disputes. The Gorkhas, accepting this mode of procedure, sent their Commissioners to Butwal where they were met by Major Bradshaw, Commissioner on the part of the British Government. The Nepalese Vakil at Calcutta, Kishan Pandit and his brother, Raghunath Pandit, the Guru of the Raja, also joined the enquiries in Butwal.

The evidence on the Company's side produced by Major Bradshaw consisted of the Company's engagements with the manager of Prithvi Pal Singh, confirmed by himself; receipts of the Vizir's Amils; verbal statements of some Kanungos; the letter of the Raja of Nepal to Marquis Wellesley received in October 1804 (claiming to manage the zamindari of Butwal in right of Prithvi Pal Singh and agreeing to pay the settled rent) and a letter addressed to the Governor General by Amar Singh Thapa (the father of Bhim Sen) and Durbhanjan Pande, the Nepalese officials in the Palpa area, declaring that they were instructed to assume the management of the zamindari, and promising to pay the revenue to the officers of the Company.³⁵

On the other hand the Nepalese produced two ikramamahs executed by Prithvi Pal Singh; two letters written to the Raja by Marquis Wellesley, soliciting the aid of the Raja of Nepal to apprehend Vizir Ali, who had fled towards Butwal after the massacre at Benares, thus indirectly admitting the Raja's sovereignty in Butwal; a letter from Lieut. Williamson in 1812 asking the Gorkhas to withdraw to Butwal from lands then recently occupied by them; reports by the chowdhries of Sheoraj about a local arbitration between a zamindar, later on claimed to be a subject of the Company, and the Nepalese officers with respect to his zamindari, and the oral testimony of a number of persons to the effect that Butwal was held under a rent-free tenure by Raja Prithvi Pal Singh.

The two ikramamahs deserve to be examined in detail. The first was dated in the Sambat year 1854 (1797-8 A.D.) and the other in Sambat 1855, both antecedent to the cession of these territories by the Nawab Vizir to the East India Company. The first document acknowledged that the Raja of Palpa derived from the Raja of Nepal the hills and territories of Palpa with

³⁵ "Narrative of the War", Secret letter from Lord Moira, 2 August 1815.

the exception of Palee and Nichool. The absolute dependence on, and vassalage of the Raja of Palpa under the Raja of Nepal was professed. But it was alleged by Major Bradshaw, that the original of this ikrarnamah included the words "and the other low lands belonging to the Hakim" after Palee and Nichool, which were omitted in the Persian translation of the original furnished by Kishen Pandit.

Further it was argued by Bradshaw that even admitting the acknowledgment about Butwal being held by Prithvi Pal Singh from the Raja of Nepal "such a declaration, whether voluntary, or as was more probable, obtained by compulsion, would not affect the rights of the Nawab Vizir over Prithvi Pal Singh in his capacity of zamindar of Butwal, which Prithvi Pal Singh was not competent to transfer to any other sovereign". The second ikrarnamah stipulated that Vizir Ali should not be permitted to enter his territory or excite disturbance, but that an endeavour should be made to seize and give him up, and included the passage "and if from the country of Sheoraj to the border of the hills of Narayanee, or in the territory which has been given to me by the Huzur, I afford him a place of refuge, etc." It was claimed by the Nepalese that this implied the sovereignty of the Nepalese Government over Butwal which lay between Sheoraj and the Narayanee hills.

On the above evidence Major Bradshaw asserted that the right of the Company to the taluk of Butwal was fully established.

As regards Sheoraj, Major Bradshaw alleged that out of the sixteen years antecedent to the cession of Gorakhpur, by the Nawab Vizir during which the Nepalese had held Sheoraj, the revenues of ten years had been paid to the officers of the Vizir's Government, although lately they had not been realised. The Nepalese Commissioners could not disprove this assertion, but required that the British Government should prove their own rights in the matters, and not merely allege the fact of forcible seizure of revenues by the officers of the Nawab Vizir. A reference was made to the Vizir's records, through the Resident at Lucknow, but no regular document could be discovered there. The net result was that the Kanungos of Bansi, servants of the East India Company, repeated on oath that Seoraj had paid revenues in certain years (not regularly) to the Vizir before

the cession in 1801, and the Chowdharis of Sheoraj (servants of the Nepal Government) repeated on oath also that no such revenues were ever paid.

At this state, Bradshaw concluded the proceedings without the consent of the Nepalese Commissioners and reported to his Government that the investigation had proved the rights of the British Government to both the taluks of Butwal and Sheoraj. The Nepalese Commissioners felt humiliated at this high handed procedure on the part of Bradshaw, who, instead of functioning as one of the two Commissioners, had behaved arrogantly and had assumed certain prerogatives as if he were the sole judge of the issues between the two Governments. However, Kishen Pandit, realizing that whatever evidence he produced, the enquiry would be declared terminated by Bradshaw in order to establish the British Government's right to the taluks, suggested a compromise, namely that the Raja of Nepal should admit the sovereignty of the British Government in Butwal and the other lands below the hills, on condition that the British Government should grant to the Government of Nepal a tract along the foot of the hills of three Koss (6 miles) in width.³⁶

Here it would not be out of place to enter the diary of these investigations, in order to show how Bradshaw's mind was working. On January 15, 1813, Major Bradshaw was given his instructions for the above investigation. On the same date another letter was addressed to the Adjutant General notifying the determination of the Government to send Major Bradshaw to adjust the boundary disputes with the Raja of Nepal and suggesting the expediency of being prepared to expel the Nepalese if they should refuse to withdraw or delay in withdrawing from the territories which might be proved to belong to the Company. On February 23 the Adjutant General addressed letters to Major General Woodard and Major Richardson instructing them how to act in case Major Bradshaw met with obstruction in the recovery of the Company's rights from the Nepalese in Butwal and Sheoraj. Major Bradshaw arrived at Benares on February 22nd and at Gorakhpur on March 15, where he was informed that the Nepalese Commis-

³⁶ "Narrative of the War", Secret letter from Lord Moira, dated 2 August 1815.

sioners had already arrived at Butwal. Major Bradshaw reported his arrival at Butwal on the 31st March. In the letter of instructions, dated April 9th Major Bradshaw was asked to obtain a free passage through the Nepalese territories for traders to the countries beyond the mountains and to establish a closer commercial intercourse between the British and the Nepal territories.

On April 8, Major Bradshaw reported particulars of his meeting with the Nepalese Commissioners, giving a description and character of those persons. He added the substance of his munshi's conference with them regarding an arrangement for speedily and amicably settling the present disputes between the two states, by the Company's sovereignty being acknowledged over the territory of the Tarai, and the Nepal Government being allowed to hold the same on a lease. At the same time he sent a detailed account of the nature, strength and disposition of the Nepalese forces in Butwal and Sheoraj. On April 11, he reported the translation of the description of the place by a Sepoy who had journeyed to Amar Singh Thapa's residence.

On April 17, Major Bradshaw complained of delay and procrastination on the part of the Nepalese Commissioners in spite of his remonstrances. He suggested that two companies of Sepoys should be sent from Gorakhpur to Lotun, and reported to the Commander-in-Chief the strength and description of the Nepalese in the Tarai and the garrisons at Nuwakot and under Amar Singh Thapa. In a despatch dated 30 April, the Governor General in Council approved of his proceedings and regretted the delays which had occurred. He was also desired to proceed in the investigation as far as he could and in case it was not concluded at the period when it was necessary to withdraw from the hills, he was asked to retire after signifying to the Commissioners that the enquiry was only suspended during the rainy season and that it would be resumed in November next. He was also to warn them that all encroachments by the Nepalese during this period, would be repelled by force and that their proposition that the sovereignty of Butwal should be acknowledged to belong to the Company and that it should be held on lease by the Raja of Nepal could not be acceded to. On May 9 Major Bradshaw transmitted a map of the disputed territory furnished by the Commanding Officer of his escort.

On May 23 Major Bradshaw informed his Government that the investigation had terminated in favour of the British Government and that a compromise was offered by the Nepalese Vakil for a small tract of territory below the hills.

On June 18, the Company's Government sent its considered answer to the above communication from Major Bradshaw expressly stating that the right of the Honourable Company to the taluks of Butwal and Sheoraj had been established, and that notification to this effect would be made to the Raja of Nepal with a demand for the surrender of the territories in question which would be supported by arms if necessary. The Government also thought that it would be inexpedient to permit the Nepalese to retain any portion of the lands to which the right of the Company had been established. On the same date the Adjutant General was asked to request the Commander-in-Chief to take into consideration the military arrangements which might be required to recover and maintain Butwal and Sheoraj by force of arms if necessary.

On June 4, Major Bradshaw was asked to proceed to the frontier of Saran and Tirhut to investigate the disputes in that quarter. Late in August, he started on his new job after suggesting the expediency of establishing a local corps for the protection of the Tarai, to be paid in lands and not in cash. On arriving in Saran, he demanded the surrender of the twenty-two villages of Nunnore, prior to any investigation. After some demur on the part of the Nepalese Vakil, this demand was complied with, and the villages were occupied by Major Bradshaw on condition that they would be returned if the investigations proved the Nepalese claims to them. But the Company's Government now resolved not to enter into any fresh investigations and to annex the villages outright to the Company's possessions. Notwithstanding the pledge that appeared to be implied on the part of Major Bradshaw, when he received the twenty-two villages, Lord Minto in his letter to the Raja of Nepal, dated June 18, 1913, demanding the surrender of Butwal and Sheoraj, had intimated his intention of deputing Major Bradshaw to Bettia, with a view to the adjustment of disputes in that quarter. The Nepalese Government, therefore, expected that an investigation, similar to that which had taken place at Butwal, would be instituted in Saran; and this expect-

ation was encouraged by the tenor of Major Bradshaw's communications with the Commissioners and the two Pandits. As a matter of fact Major Bradshaw had been informed in a despatch, dated 9 April 1813, that it was probable that a similar enquiry to that held at Butwal would be necessary in Saran. The Company's Government, however, dissatisfied that the Nepalese did not submit to the decision of Major Bradshaw in the Butwal investigations, refused to proceed with a similar enquiry in Saran. It is not certain to what extent, if any, the Company's decision was based on the fact that the main argument of the Company's Government about the twenty-two villages, namely that they had been in the Company's possession for thirty years, might be used against its decision in the case of Sheoraj which had also been admittedly in the possession of the Nepalese for over thirty years.

On 4 March 1814 Major Bradshaw was instructed to invite the Nepalese Commissioners to a final meeting where he was asked to make a formal demand for the renunciation of Nepalese pretensions to the twenty-two villages of Nunnore and for the surrender of the lands on the Saran frontier, which were still in their possession. On the same date the Adjutant General was asked to recommend to the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief the measures necessary to establish British authority on the Saran frontier.

On 2 April Major Bradshaw invited the Nepalese Commissioners to meet him at his tent for the purpose of finally discussing the question of the twenty-two villages according to the instructions he had received. In reply, the Commissioners refused to meet him or hold any more communications with him on the basis of the fresh instructions from the Company's Government. They also revoked the conditional transfer of the twenty-two villages and demanded that Major Bradshaw should immediately leave the frontier. They themselves immediately afterwards returned to Kathmandu.³⁷

The Governor General then sent a letter to the Raja of Nepal, informing him that the conduct of his Commissioners had rendered all further proceedings in the nature of an enquiry

³⁷ For details see letter from Major P. Bradshaw to the Political Secretary, dated 8 April 1814, *Bengal Consultations*.

or an investigation fruitless, and that the British Government would be obliged to resort to those means, which it possessed, of maintaining its rights established by a patient and laborious investigation. The Raja was asked to withdraw his officers from the lands in dispute and to renounce his claims to them. At the same time 3 companies of regular infantry and three companies of the Bettia local corps were sent to support Major Bradshaw, who was asked, after allowing sufficient time for the receipt of an answer from the Raja of Nepal, to proceed, in the event of it being either a refusal or an evasion of the Company's demands, at once to resume the disputed lands still held by the Nepalese and to declare the twenty-two villages of Nunnore to have been re-annexed to the dominions of the Company. In his reply, the Raja of Nepal refused to surrender the disputed lands and asserted that the rights of his own Government had been established by the result of Young's investigations.

All the disputed lands in this area were, however, peacefully occupied by the Company's troops without any interference from the Nepalese.

In Gorakhpur a detachment of seventeen companies of sepoy with two guns was formed under the command of Lieut. Colonel Richardson to occupy and hold Butwal and Sheoraj. On 4th May a letter was received from the Raja of Nepal in reply to the peremptory demand of the Governor General to hand over Butwal and Sheoraj to the British. He expressed his sincere wishes to maintain the friendship of the British Government and submitted that no settlement was effected by Major Bradshaw and expressed his intention of deputing an Agent to go to Calcutta to bring about the adjustment of all pending disputes. However, before this reply was received, the taluks had been occupied by the Company's troops. In the last week of April, Mr. Martin, the assistant at Gorakhpur, directed the persons whom he proposed to establish as Police officers in the taluks of Butwal and Sheoraj to advance and to establish their thanas at the places already determined. The Nepalese Officers resisted this procedure, and the thanadars retired to British territory. At this the Magistrate of Gorakhpur requisitioned the troops that had been sent to Lotun for this purpose and they marched into the disputed lands without opposition.

The Nepalese troops retired as the Company's troops advanced. The police thanas were then established at the places fixed for them, under the protection of the troops.³⁸

These thanas were established in the middle of May when the rains make the Tarai an extremely unhealthy place for troops, few people except the local inhabitants, the Tharus being able to withstand the terrible malarial fever. It was thought that the Nepalese would acquiesce in the forcible occupation of these two taluks after having seen something of the Company's military powers. Also "the possibility of attempts being made to surprise and drive out the Company's thanadars after the troops should be withdrawn did not appear to counter-balance the certain injury to which the health of the troops would have been exposed by remaining in the Tarai during the approaching inclement season of the year". The troops were, therefore, ordered to be withdrawn to Gorakhpur. However, before they had been entirely withdrawn, an unsuccessful attempt was made by the Nepalese to take over the thana of Sheoraj.

On 29 May, three of the thanas in Butwal were attacked by a large force of Nepalese, headed by Munraj Faujdar, an officer of the Nepalese Government. There was some bloodshed. Among the slain was the thanadar of Chilwa. The whole of Butwal was then occupied by the Nepalese, and the troops in the thana of Sheoraj were withdrawn by the Magistrate of Gorakhpur, from a conviction of his inability to maintain them without the support of larger troops.

Serious steps were now contemplated by the new Governor General. Military measures were at once decided upon. On the 14th June, the Governor General addressed a letter to the Raja of Nepal urging him to reflect on the moderation and good faith of the British Government, on "the evasion and deceit" which characterised the conduct of his own government during the whole course of the affairs, and specially on the atrocity of the murders with which the attack on the thanas of the British Government had been consummated. He added that it would

³⁸ "Narrative of the War", Secret letter from Lord Moira, dated 2 August 1815. Also letter from the Adj. General to the Political Secretary, dated 12 May 1814.

afford him the greatest pleasure to see the Government of Nepal exonerate itself from the disgrace of so odious a transaction, by the public and exemplary punishment of the officers who had committed the outrage. He also stated, in order to overawe them, that if the Nepalese would have war, it should be a war in which they must stake the existence of their principality, that he feared that the Company must regard the state of Nepal as having wantonly made war on the British Government an experiment which no power in India had tried without bringing down destruction upon itself. To this letter, the Raja of Nepal could have answered with the case of the murder of "Lachman Gir" — a Nepalese Suba when the British Government had absolutely protected its perpetrators. The expressions used to describe the conduct of the Nepalese were also unfortunate.

However, the reply of the Raja of Nepal received by the Governor General on the 12th August, 1814 was submissive considering the provocative insults thrust at him in the Governor General's letter. He did not mention the case of Lachman Gir as an excuse but merely charged Major Bradshaw with taking possession of lands clearly belonging to the Government of Nepal, and cited other acts of violence especially the murder of a Nepalese thanadar by the British and requested that Major Bradshaw be instructed to restore the twenty-two villages and other lands occupied by him, adding that otherwise his Government must take measures for the security and protection of the country of Nepal, for which it was its duty to provide.

Correspondence with the Raja of Nepal was then stopped. And the first step towards war was taken by the Governor General by prohibiting all commercial intercourse between the British and the Nepalese.

Chapter 12

AN ACCOUNT OF THE NEPAL WAR

WAR having been determined upon, the Governor General himself planned the military operations and political arrangements preparatory to the commencement of the campaign. The factors which had to be taken into account were summarised by him as follows:

"The immense extent of the Nepalese frontier, the exposed condition of our own, offering no natural or artificial obstacles to an invading army, the singular construction of the Gorkha Empire, composed of the territories of a variety of petty states, subdued at periods more or less remote by his arms, and reduced to a greater or less degree of subjection, the uncommon strength, of the country, the character of the people, and the novelty of the service to our troops, accustomed to an entirely different species of warfare from that which was now to be undertaken, all conspired to render the formation of the plan of the war a subject of most serious and anxious deliberation".¹

The first step was to obtain information regarding the strength and resources of the Nepalese, their natural and artificial means of defence, the military features of the country, its political condition and relations with other powers etc.; the equipment for the Company's troops, and the means of securing their comfort and efficiency in an arduous and novel service and in a country and climate to which their habits and constitutions were unused.¹

The information collected included: (1) The Accounts of Captain Kinloch, Col. Kirkpatrick and Captain Knox. (2) *Routes in the Nepal country*, Colonel Crawford. (3) Memorandum: regarding particulars of topographical information required (circular letter from the Secretary to Government, dated 30 July 1814). (4) Information regarding Nepal sent by D. Scott,

¹ "Narrative of the War", Secret letter from Lord Moira, 2 August 1815.

Magistrate of Rungpur, dated 12 August 1814 (including a statistical account of the districts of Nepal, their revenues, numbers of jagirdars, military establishment, number of cultivators, etc. (5) Topographical information about Nepal with a sketch map of the country and notes regarding camp equipage, commissariat, artillery required, etc. by Hyder Young Hearsey, dated Bareilly, 9 September 1814, and a letter from him to the Secretary to Government, dated Bareilly, 24 August 1814. (6) Topographical information, etc. about Nepal sent by Mr. William Moorcroft, Superintendent of the Company's stud at Hajee-pur, dated 8 September 1814. He also forwarded miscellaneous information gathered from other people who visited Nepal. See his letters dated 14 September, 23 September, 1 October, 8 October, and 12 October 1814. (7) Letters from Mr. T. Rutherford to the Secretary to Government 23 September, 5 October, 6 October, 7 October, 23 October, 1 November and 13 November 1814. The letter of 7 October contains a list of the principal zamindaris in Kumaon, Dotee and Garhwal. (8) *Memoir on Garhwal and Kumaon*, prepared by Captain Raper at Headquarters, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief enclosed in a letter from the Adjutant General to the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, dated Kanpur, 20 October 1814. (9) Memorandum of information received from various persons respecting the roads leading into the hills, etc. enclosed in Mr. R. Martin's — the Magistrate of Gorakhpur's letter to the Secretary to Government, dated 16 November 1814. (10) Summary abstract of the principal routes into the valley of Nepal enclosed in the Adjutant General's letter to Major General Marley, dated 6 November 1814. (11) Letter from Mr. Fraser to the Secretary to Government, dated Hardwar, 20 October, including memoranda on Kumaon and Garhwal. (12) Dr. Buchanan's report on the Lepchas, Tibetans and Chinese and their relations with Nepal.

The importance of this preliminary survey may be judged by the following instructions from the Adjutant General to General Marley:

"The peculiar character which War assumes in a country at once mountainous and woody, will readily suggest to your experience the peculiar precautions and measures required to conduct it with success. Of those, the Commander-in-Chief

will only remind you; that the principle are, the most accurate information of the nature of the country, the diversity of its surface, its rivers and streams, the influence which the seasons have on them, the passes, defiles, and the windings through which they communicate with each other. This knowledge must not rest, as already stated on information previously acquired or casually derived from guides and the inhabitants of the country, but must be obtained, particularly before any movement of consequence is made, by sending intelligent officers, accompanied by the best guides, to examine themselves the routes by which it is proposed the army should pass or any particular movement be made. An unceasing vigilance and alertness in every quarter of your camp, position or time of march; the preoccupation of heights which command them, or of defiles by which they may be approached; a constant attention to the communications in your rear, and with any detachments which you may have made. When compelled to dislodge the enemy from the defiles, heights or entrances into valleys which he may have occupied in strength, the Commander-in-Chief recommends your engaging and distracting his attention by false attacks, and endeavouring at the same time to find out some avenues or paths (which are always to be found in mountains, however steep and rugged) by which he may be turned. In these situations, the able and patient application of your artillery, your shells in particular, will be found of the most effectual use.”³

The plan of operations was next decided upon. It was decided to assemble four separate divisions of troops in different quarters, composed not only to be adequate to oppose and overcome the force which might be brought against them but also to cooperate by their simultaneous offensives in helping the general purpose of the war although acting separately at the beginning. They were to invade Nepalese territory as soon as the season admitted of active operations.

The principal division was to be assembled on the frontier of Saran, and was destined to act directly against the Nepalese capital by the route of Makwanpur. Another division was to be assembled at Gorakhpur to occupy Butwal, and Sheoraj and then advance to the hills of Palpa. This would, at least, create a diversion in that quarter, but it was thought that it

³ Letter from the Adjutant General to Major General Marley, Commanding a division of the army proceeding against Nepal, dated 6 November 1814.

might also develop into a serious attack on the main lines of communications from Kathmandu to all the Western territories. This would also weaken the Nepalese if their central possessions were to fall (or fell) into the hands of their enemies. A Third division was to be assembled at Saharanpur to occupy Dehra Dun and other valleys in Garhwal and to seize the passes through which the Ganges and the Jamuna leave the mountains. If this could be successfully accomplished the Nepalese forces in the extreme west of their dominions could be entirely cut off from the rest of their empire. Cut off from their base, it would be much easier to defeat the Nepalese in the hills between the Sutlej and the Jamuna. The third army could also cooperate with the operations in the West or proceed to occupy Kumaon, whichever promised greater opportunities. The fourth division was assembled at Ropar and the task of fighting Amar Singh Thapa the great military commander of the Gorkhas was entrusted to it. It was also desired to prepare a force for the occupation of Kumaon, as soon as the Nepalese forces in other quarters should have become sufficiently occupied to prevent their reinforcing that province. In the eastern areas, another force was organised whose primary objects were purely defensive; "not however to the exclusion of efforts of a more active nature, which should tend to the better security of the frontier which it was destined to defend".

These military preparations were buttressed by a series of political arrangements calculated "to engage in the Company's cause the expelled chiefs of the ancient hill principalities reduced by the Gorkhas, and thus to draw to the Company's side their former subjects". The Governor General believed that the Gorkhas were held in detestation by the inhabitants of the conquered territories and that they would avail themselves of a favourable opportunity, such as the invasion of the Gorkha dominions by a British Army, to rise against the Gorkhas and exert their utmost efforts for the subversion of their power. The attachment which they were supposed still to retain towards the families of their hereditary chiefs, encouraged a belief that their zeal would be invigorated by an expectation of the restoration of the exiled families. It was intended to employ the influence of their feelings in aid of the British arms,

by engaging solemnly to exclude for ever the power of the Gorkhas, and to re-establish the ancient lines of chiefs under the guarantee of the British Government, on the only condition that the exertions of the people and their chiefs should be contributed in the way by which they could best promote the objects of the War.

The Governor General did not want territorial acquisition between the Sutlej and the Jamuna, beyond the eventual occupation of such posts as might be temporarily necessary, towards the consolidation of a line of barriers for the security of the Company's frontiers. On the part of the hill chiefs, all that was considered necessary was: (a) free passage and immunity for the merchants of the East India Company and its Indian territories and their goods, (b) military service, (c) assistance in the supply and accommodation of British troops during military operations and (d) general observance of fidelity and attachment to the British Government. All practicable means were placed at the disposal of Colonel Ochterlony to enable him to avail himself of the services of the hill chiefs and their former subjects, in the event of their showing a disposition to join him. He was also authorised to make advances of money to the chiefs to supply them with arms and ammunition.

While the political and military duties were entrusted to Colonel Ochterlony, a special political assistant was attached to the third army. For this post W. Fraser, the assistant to Metcalfe, the Company's Resident at Delhi, was selected. The principal points to which his attention was directed were "To endeavour to excite the inhabitants of the districts of Garhwal, to cut off the retreat of the Gorkha army through the mountain passes, and to encourage them to serve energetically with the British Army, by holding out promises of emancipation from the Gorkha rule; to collect information about the district and the routes of the wool trade with Tibet; to obtain information regarding the expelled Raja of Shrinagar and the members of his family being reinstated in the whole or part of the ancient possessions of his family; to assume the management of any country conquered by the third army; and to aid Major General Gillespie in his negotiations and com-

communications with the chiefs and inhabitants of the country in which he was to act.³

In Kumaon, the Governor-General did not want to re-instate Lal Singh, the representative of the old Rajas of Kumaon, in the government of that district. Fraser's chief informant about Kumaon was Harak Deo Joshi, an old Brahmin who had taken a prominent part in the politics of Kumaon before and after the Gorkha conquest. He told Fraser that there existed in obscurity nearer heirs to the Raja of Kumaon than Lal Singh, and that the Government of the English would be far more acceptable to the inhabitants of the district than either the restoration of Lal Singh or the granting of Kumaon as a jagir to Bum Shah — the Gorkha Governor of the district — a proposal suggested to buy off Bum Shah from his loyalty to the Gorkhas. Afterwards Gardner, the second assistant to the Resident at Delhi, was placed in charge of the political arrangements in this quarter. He was directed to gather further information about Kumaon and to ascertain the grounds of the supposed disposition of Bum Shah towards the Government of Nepal, on which was founded the expectation that he might be induced to attach himself to the interests of the Company and surrender to it the province under his charge. He was, therefore, instructed to discover a secure channel of communication with Bum Shah.⁴

In the event of an arrangement being made with Bum Shah for the transfer of the province, it was intended that Gardner should advance into Kumaon, accompanied by a force sufficient for its unopposed occupation and assume the Government in the name of the East India Company. If, however, it became necessary to reduce it by force of arms, Gardner was to accompany the force to be employed for that purpose as soon as it could be assembled, in a capacity similar to that assigned to Fraser in Garhwal, and that he should take over the civil government as soon as the province was conquered by the British troops.

Political arrangements in the Gorakhpur area were entrusted to Major General Wood, who was in command of the forces

³ Letters from the Secretary to Government to C. T. Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi, dated 30 September 1814, and 22 October 1814.

⁴ Letter (of instructions to Gardner) from the Secretary to Government to C. T. Metcalfe, dated 23 October 1814.

there. His instructions were similar to those addressed to Colonel Ochterlony and their basis was the restoration, as in ancient times, of the hill chiefs of those territories which might be conquered by the British troops, under the Company's guarantee for the perpetual exclusion of the Gorkha power and influence. Major General Wood's attention was particularly directed to the situation and circumstances of the exiled Raja of Palpa and his family residing in Gorakhpur. He was also desired to signify distinctly to Raja Ratan Singh (the representative of the old chiefs of Palpa) that the lowlands of Butwal would be excepted from the general restoration, as it would be necessary for the interests of the Company that it should remain in the exclusive possession of the British Government. He was also authorised, if he deemed it expedient, to encourage Raja Ratan Singh to enrol and embody a number of his followers, with a view to their being employed in the kind of warfare for which such troops were adopted and in which their services would prove useful. For this purpose, he was empowered to make such disbursements to the Raja, as should enable him to bring forward and arm his followers and Major General Wood was authorised to take them into the pay of the British Government at proper and reasonable rates.

Political negotiations and arrangements of the army under Major General Marley were entrusted to Major Bradshaw, who was to advance with this division into Nepal as the Political Agent. He was asked to declare the Tarai to be permanently annexed to the Company's dominions as soon as those districts should be occupied. He was told that the Government proposed to assist Raja Uday Pratap Singh, who was then residing as a refugee in one of the villages of Raja Bir Kishor Singh of Bettia, in the recovery of the principality of Makwanpur. The Raja had joined Major Bradshaw's camp and had professed the utmost desire to employ the active exertions of himself and his former subjects on the side of the Company's armies. Major Bradshaw was also directed to use the Raja's services, in drawing from the Gorkha army such of the inhabitants of Makwanpur, as might be in the Gorkha ranks. The Raja, it was hoped, would thus be instrumental, both in drawing off a portion of the enemy's force, and in adding to the Company's army a species of troops that would be eminently useful, in guarding

passes, conveying supplies, and in procuring and communicating intelligence. Major Bradshaw was also instructed to encourage Raja Tej Pratap Singh of Ram Nagar if the Raja chose to do so, in trying to re-establish his authority in the hilly district of Tanu, which had formerly belonged to his ancestors. And last he was directed to communicate with "Ram Bhum Pande" and his brother, the nephew of the late Damodar Pande, who was the leader of the party which secured the dethronement and expulsion of Raja Ran Bahadur Shah of Nepal and who lost his life on the return of Ran Bahadur to power. Major Bradshaw was authorised to conciliate and encourage these persons, under an assurance of protection and rewards proportionate to the services they might perform. Their proposal for dethroning the reigning Raja of Nepal and elevating another member of the family was, however, not to be entertained.⁵

In the extreme East it was considered eminently desirable to establish good understanding and correspondence with the Raja of Sikkim, the Deb Raja of Bhutan and the Government of Lhasa. Scott, the Magistrate of Rungpur was directed to open negotiations with all these states. He was instructed to invite the Raja of Sikkim, who was closely connected with the Lamas of Lhasa, to attempt the recovery of his late possessions from the Gorkhas, favoured by the approaching invasion of that country by British Troops. Scott was authorised to assure the Raja of Sikkim, and through him any other Chiefs who might be roused to overthrow the Gorkha overlordship, of the support of the British Government, as far as might be practicable, and that a stipulation for their future independence would be inserted in any treaty of peace which the British Government might make with the Nepalese. Scott was also directed to inform Lhasa and Bhutan about these negotiations with Sikkim, but the communication to these states were to be made without the formality of a regular mission. These political duties were shared by Scott and Captain Lather, in the area east of the river Kosi, and both of them were directed to correspond with Major Bradshaw on all points relating to the duties res-

⁵ Secret letter from Secretary to Government to Major Bradshaw, dated 26 November 1814.

pectively assigned to them.⁶ Captain Lather was also directed to communicate with the Kirats in Eastern Nepal and to attempt to alienate their loyalty to the Gorkhas. He was to ask for help in this matter from Raja Uday Pratap Singh and his Diwan.⁷

There were two Sovereign and powerful states which were also interested in British and Nepalese relations, namely those of Ranjit Singh and of China.

Colonel Ochterlony was directed, while inviting the help of Raja Sansar Chand against the Gorkhas, to afford to Ranjit Singh the most distinct and satisfactory assurances, that the British Government in availing of the co-operation of Raja Sansar Chand was actuated by no views directed against the interests of the former chief. He was also desired to impart to Ranjit Singh previously to his march from Ludhiana, the general object of his movement, and to convey to him such assurances as would satisfy his mind, not only of the friendly disposition of the British Government towards him, but also that the proposed military operations of the British Government would not affect his interests adversely. It was highly improbable that Ranjit Singh would take advantage of the British troops' absence from Ludhiana, to interfere with the Chiefs on the Eastern bank of the Sutlej. Nor would he think of supporting the Gorkhas if the early operations of Colonel Ochterlony's division were to be successful. Also Colonel Ochterlony had in his possession letters and other evidence from the side of Amar Singh Thapa when actual proposals had been made, on more than one occasion, for the assistance of the British army in a Gorkha attack on Kangra which was under the protection of Ranjit Singh and from where he had recently driven back the Gorkha Army.⁸ This would certainly place such mistrust and antagonism between the Sikhs and the Gorkhas as to prevent any collaboration or consorted planning on their part.

⁶ Letter from the Secretary to Government to D. Scott, Magistrate of Rungpur, dated 2 November 1814, and enclosing Dr. Buchanan's report about the history and the peoples in Eastern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet.

⁷ Letter from the Secretary to Government to Captain Lather, dated 26 November 1814.

⁸ Letter from Lieut. Colonel Ochterlony to the Secretary to Government, dated 20 December 1813.

It was known that the Nepalese had treaty relations with the Imperial Government of China. The distance from Kathmandu to Peking prevented any Chinese representative staying permanently in Nepal. The Treaty of 1792, however, stipulated the submission of Nepal to China and the Nepalese were also bound to send a mission to China every five years to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Peking Government. The Governor General had thought it necessary to send information of the coming war in Nepal to the East India Company's Officers in Canton, and ask them what probable consequence would, in their opinion, follow a course of warfare between the East India Company in India and the Nepalese Government. The Officers in Canton did not think it expedient to inform the Chinese of the coming conflict. They thought that "unless particularly instructed from Peking, the officers of the Canton Government, would be unwilling to enter into any discussion, on a subject that did not immediately interest or concern themselves, because no idea of benefit to their country, by preventing differences with any power, would induce any of the officers of the Chinese Government (at least those they had as yet met with) to engage in a question, that might ultimately involve them in some responsibility. At the same time, they thought that from the total ignorance of the Chinese Officers of the situation and circumstances of other countries, it would prove rather a difficult task to make them comprehend the arguments to be employed on the occasion. They stated that they did not apprehend any real prejudice or injury to their interests in China from a British Nepalese war, adding that they were "persuaded that a knowledge and conviction, that the Honourable Company have principally the means of retaliating any measure of injustice or injury, was the best, if not the only security for the preservation of the Company's trade with China". In an interesting passage about Chinese Imperial policy they say:

"If there are Chinese Officers resident in Nepal, it is not improbable that their representations may have a tendency to allay rather than to excite, the apprehensions of the Peking Government; and more particularly so, should the Chinese forces have been united to those of Nepal. Your Lordship is probably aware of the latitude taken in detailing the exploits of the Chinese armies — So much so, that a defeat or reverse

could scarcely be acknowledged; and in the event of the British armies proving completely successful, the Chinese Commander will be very ready to avail himself of any favourable disposition, on the part of your Lordship, to make specious representation to his Government and such as will enable him to adjust all existing differences."

At a later time it was thought possible that the Chinese might interfere in the war. There was a rumour that the Raja of Nepal had applied to the Chinese Government for support; and there seemed some possibility that the advancing British army might be met by a Chinese Officer, stating that Nepal was under the Emperor's protection and asking the British troops to desist from any invasion of Chinese territory. In this event, Major General Marley was to reply that under the uncertainty that existed, whether such an intimation came from a Chinese officer or was an artifice of the Nepalese, he could not suspend operations, and that, deeply as he would lament doing any unintentional injury to any Chinese troops, whatever opposed him in the field would be considered as a Gorkha force and treated accordingly. Major General Marley was then to refer him to Major Bradshaw for any further communication, who was to add, that if the sender of the message were really a Chinese officer empowered to make such a communication, he had nothing to do but to stand aside, and let the chastisement of the Gorkhas take its course. He was also to convey to him the most distinct assurances, that the British had no design of appropriating any territory in that quarter and that their sole purpose was to punish the insolent aggressions of the Nepalese. He was also instructed, if information reached him of a Chinese force having joined the Gorkhas or entered their territory, to address its leader to the same effect, but not to seek a communication with the officer Commanding on the Chinese frontier, should he have remained within his own boundaries.⁹ But such a contingency never arose.

Everything was now ready for the commencement of military operations, which were preceded by proclamations to the inhabitants of the areas in which the operations were to be

⁹ "Narrative of the War", Secret letter from Lord Moira, dated 2 August, 1815.

conducted. Their general tenor can be seen from the proclamation to the Chiefs and inhabitants of the hills between the Sutlej and the Jamuna. In all there were four such proclamations, namely to the inhabitants of Garhwal, Kumaon, the Choubisia Raj and the territory between the Sutlej and the Jamuna. On the 1st of November the Governor General also sent a communication to the powers in alliance and friendship with the East India Company, stating the causes of the War between the British Government and the State of Nepal.¹⁰

¹⁰ See *Bengal Political Proceedings*, 27 December 1814.

Chapter 13

THE NEPAL WAR

THE first campaign of the Nepal war was commenced by the seizure of the Timley Pass into the Dehra Dun Valley, on 20 October, by Lieutenant Colonel Carpenter, who was detached for that purpose by Major General Gillespie. Dehra Dun itself was occupied by Colonel Mawley on 22 October.¹

About five miles from this place, on a hill of no great height, was the fort of Nelapani or Kalanga, where the Gorkha Commander Balbhadra Singh had resolved to stand his ground. It was mostly built of stone masonry strengthened in places with a double stockade, was only assailable on one small front, and contained a garrison of between 500 and 600 men. Colonel Mawley reconnoitred the place on the 24th, and finding it too strong for a *coup de main* returned to Dehra to await Sir Robert Gillespie's arrival. This was in accordance with his instructions.

On the 27th, Major-General Gillespie reached Dehra Dun where he received Colonel Mawley's report. Deciding to attack at once, he formed on the 29th five columns for the assault, and issued instructions for their guidance.

The first column was placed under Lieutenant Colonel Carpenter and consisted of two companies of the 53rd British Regiment, and five companies of native infantry. The Indian troops totalled 588 non-commissioned officer, rank and file.

The Reserve column was placed under Major Ludlow. It consisted of 100 dismounted Irish draggons and 991 Indian troops.

The second column was under Captain J. W. Fast and consisted of 351 Indian troops.

The third column was placed under Major Kelly: It had 519 Indian troops, and 20 Indian pioneers.

The fourth column was under Captain Campbell and consisted of 273 Indian soldiers.

¹ *History of Bengal Artillery*, Francis W. Stubb, Volume II, page 3.

It will be noticed that all except the two companies of the 53rd Regiment in the first column, and the 100 dismounted dragoons in the reserve were Indian soldiers.

Next day, Lieut. Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow, without meeting any opposition, took up a position on the level ground in front of the fort. Working parties were employed during the night under Lieut. G. R. Blane, of the engineers, with Lieutenants Elliott and Illis, of the Pioneers under the direction of Major Pennington, in constructing a battery nearly 600 yards from the fortifications. This was done, and by daylight ten pieces of bronze ordnance (two 12 pounder guns and two 5½ inch howitzers, horse artillery, four 6-pounder battalion guns and two 5½ inch mortars) which had been brought up on elephants, opened their fire. The other three columns, moving by different routes were to combine, at a given signal, with Colonel Carpenter in a simultaneous attack on the fort. This signal was the firing of five guns from the battery — an arrangement almost certain to lead to misconception not only because the batteries were at work from daylight, but also because sound among hills is so easily interrupted, but there is reason to believe that it was fired an hour or more before the time which had been specified. All accounts agree in ascribing this change to the General's impetuosity. Prinsep (Volume 1, page 88) says that the time was changed because the fire from the batteries had not produced as much effect as was intended. The guns being light field pieces, this is certainly very probable. Colonel Kennedy states that a party of the garrison, who had got through the jungle upon the flank of the battery, were dispersed by a few rounds of grape, and that the general considered the opportunity a favourable one for immediate attack. The account of this incident by Colonel Kennedy is interesting, as it was prepared from notes made at the time and shortly afterwards when he was examined by a court of enquiry, which sat at Meerut to investigate the cause of the failures at Kalanga. Between the battery and the fort there was a village of thatched huts. Pioneers with scaling ladders, under Lieutenant Elliot and Ensign Ellis, accompanied the columns of Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow, which were now ordered forward. The dismounted dragoons of the Royal Irish Regiment were led by Captain Brutton, an Officer of approved gallantry, and were

first in the attack. Passing round by the left, and pressing on with their wonted alacrity they left the rest behind, and, being thus without support, the garrison sallied out and attacked them. A close hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Gorkhas with their shields and Kukris, getting within the point of the sabre, had the advantage, and in a few minutes the dragoons had to give way, having lost four killed and fifty-eight wounded. The casualties included Captain Brutton and two other Officers who were wounded severely. Several accounts, following Prinsep, attest that the General had fallen at the head of the dragoons. Colonel Kennedy's account, which gives details of the incident and is borne out by the despatches, is as follows:

"The infantry part of the columns came up under a heavy fire from the walls; attempts were made to plant the ladders, but a gun placed at an open wicket of the fort, so as to enfilade this part of the front, swept down many. Ensign Ellis was killed, Lieut. Elliott was badly wounded; they then retreated. The ladders were left among the huts, which caught fire about this time".

"Nothing was yet heard of the other columns. Gillespie, on receiving the report of the failure, ordered forward three companies of the 53rd which had just arrived and the battery, under Captain Coultman, with two horse artillery guns under Lieut. Kennedy to blow open the gate. Lieut. Napier Campbell accompanied them, and the men of the 53rd manned the drag ropes. After a difficult ascent they came to a stockade intersecting the road, with sixty or eighty yards of the nearest bastion, in getting over which the order of march was somewhat broken, and a sharp musketry fire was opened on them. The General, accompanied by the Colonel of the dragoons and his staff, came up with them here, and they went forward, leaving Lieut. Campbell with one of the guns to cover the advance. Passing through the village, the huts still burning, and much impeded by the dead and wounded of the preceding column of attack, they came to a turn in the road in full sight of the gate of the fort, some fifty or sixty yards off.

"The gate consisted of a cut in the wall, with some loose stones piled up about four feet high, and above them were two strong bars of wood. Through this was pointed a gun loaded with all manner of missiles, and a number of matchlocks were pointed at them over the wall; but now hardly a shot was fired as they advanced up the lane, partially screened by the smoke. The general and his staff, led, followed by the men of the 53rd Regiment, steadily dragging on the gun. Under his orders

Lieutenants Blane and Kennedy ran on ahead to select a position for the gun, which was brought up to about thirty or forty feet of the entrance, as far as it could go. It gave its message, but the reply was read too plainly by those who should have gone forward to the assault. They wavered, and the fire of the matchlocks and arrows told with effect upon the leading sub-divisions. In vain did the general repeat his orders for the men to charge. The wooden bars across the entrance were broken by the fire of the gun, and a party of stout Gorkhas rushed out. General Gillespie was frantic. Major Ludlow appeared at this juncture with several officers and sepoy, and was desired to attack to the right, where it was supposed there was an entrance; and the horse artillery men were ordered to arm themselves with the musketry of the dead. The supply was not a scanty one. When this was done, the general, with his sword in one hand and a double-barrelled pistol in the other, turned to Lieut. Kennedy and the rest, exclaiming, come on, my lads; now, Charles, for the honour of the County Down.

"Only a pace or two forward, and he fell with a bullet through his heart. The body was taken to the rear by Sergeant Hamilton (another County Down man), Sergeant Mosley of the dragoons, and some horse artillery men. The order to retire was then given, but in the confusion it was not heard in front, and the gun and gunners were nearly lost. Captain Campbell fortunately appeared with his column at this time, and assisted in getting it away and covering the retreat."

Afterwards Colonel Mawley, on whom the command devolved, fell back again to Dehra Dun. Later under orders from Brigadier-General Ochterlony, in whose command this division was temporarily included, he cut off the supplies and water from the fort of Kalanga and in the night of the 30th the remains of the Gorkha garrison, now reduced to less than 150 men (inclusive of some women and children) evacuated it and made their way with some loss through the investing force, leaving behind them their dead and wounded. Before the Company's troops took possession of this fortress, it had cost them in two assaults, 75 killed and 680 wounded.

The failure of the first attack on the Napalese Army produced disheartening effects on the operations of the war on the Dun and other fronts. The troops were particularly discouraged after the failure of the second attempt on the 27th November at Kalanga, even after a practicable breach had been made in the wall. The Governor General felt constrained to observe that

the extraordinary circumstances of the second failure in an attempt to carry a place, certainly of no great strength, or extent, destitute of a ditch, laid open by a breach up which a carriage might have been driven, and defended by a garrison whose only means of resistance consisted in their personal gallantry, necessarily exercised in his mind feelings of the utmost anxiety and uneasiness. His feelings were shared by most other officers at Calcutta.

After occupying the Dehra Valley the Company's army proceeded to Nahan which was abandoned by the Gorkhas on the approach of British troops. The Gorkhas withdrew to the fort of Jaithak which was situated on a lofty hill of that name. The Gorkha forces were commanded in this quarter by Kajee Runjor Singh Thapa, the son of Amar Singh Thapa, and were estimated to amount to two thousand two hundred fighting men, after they had been joined by reinforcements.

Major General Martindell having established magazines and depots at Nahan, resolved on a combined movement, in order to seize two important positions, situated respectively on the western and eastern sides of the Gorkhas. By achieving this, he expected to be able to cut off the Gorkhas from their principal watering places and to intercept the communications of the garrison with the surrounding country, from which they drew their supplies. Two detachments were accordingly formed, under the command respectively of Major Ludlow of the sixth, and Major William Richards of the Thirteenth Indian Infantry. The latter after a fatiguing march by a circuitous route, arrived at the point of his destination on the morning of the 27th December, and seized the position which he was ordered to occupy. Major Ludlow's column, however, did not arrive at its position till long after the appointed time. Its movements were perceived by the Gorkhas, who took every advantage of the discovery. Major Ludlow at first had the most flattering hopes of complete success. He succeeded in driving the Gorkhas from advanced position and compelled them to retire into their stockade. But the Gorkhas now took advantage of an ill-timed dash of the Company's troops and after an arduous conflict, in which the Company lost heavily, the column was obliged to retreat. The failure of the attack conducted by Major Ludlow induced Major General Martindell to

send orders to Major Richards to return to camp from the position occupied by him in which he had sustained during the whole day the repeated and vigorous assaults of the Gorkhas, who were enabled, after Major Ludlow's defeat, to turn their whole force against the other detachment. At the close of the day, after the whole of his ammunition was expended and the troops had been obliged to employ stones in their defence, Major Richards received the orders to retire which were executed under cover of a gallant charge made by the Light Company of the first battalion of the Twenty-Sixth regiment. A retreat by night through an unknown and difficult country, and in the face of an enemy flushed with success, was necessarily attended with much confusion and heavy loss. The Governor General thought that the order of withdrawal had been an error of judgment. His views were that the well-conceived project of seizing two points, either of them material towards carrying on a siege, had failed at one of the positions destined to be occupied. Possession of the other was gained, and gallantly held with little loss, till the unfortunate order for evacuating it was received by Major Richards. The unfavourable issue of the enterprize in the other quarter seemed to the Governor General only to have added greater importance to the maintenance of the acquired post; and the despatch of a reinforcement, with supplies of provisions and ammunition, appeared to him a more natural procedure, than the sending of orders to the detachment to retreat, without knowing the extent of peril to which such a manoeuvre might expose it.²

After this reverse Major General Martindell determined to attempt no further operations against the Gorkha positions until the reinforcements which had been promised to him arrived. "The unfortunate issue of his first operations before Jaithak, seemed to have induced him to regulate his subsequent conduct by an excess of caution". He seized an advanced position in front of Nahan and opposite to the principal stockades of the Gorkhas. He wanted to reduce successively that stockade and two others in the rear, from the last of which he would be able to batter the front itself. The first stockade was levelled by the fire of the eighteen pounders but Major General Martindell

² "Narrative of the War", para 226.

gave up his plan when he considered the difficulties opposed both by nature and art, to the success of any attempt to carry the stockades, and more especially the height on which the fort was situated, to be insurmountable and decided finally that there was no other method of reducing the Gorkhas except a close blockade. The original plan of attack was thus abandoned and a blockade was established. The Governor General was extremely dissatisfied with the conduct of operations by Major General Martindell, and anticipating the immediate fall of Malaon and the surrender of Amar Singh Thapa, actually dispatched instructions to Major General Ochterlony³ directing him as soon after the events as might be consistent with the arrangements necessary to be made for the securing of the new conquests to proceed to Nahan and assume the command of the division of this army and the conduct of the operations before Jaithak. Before these orders could be carried out the convention with Amar Singh Thapa brought hostilities to an end.

We now turn to the history of the operations where the Company's arms were uniformly successful.

Colonel Ochterlony entered the foot hills of the Himalayas in the direction of Nalagarh which surrendered on 5 November 1814. This was followed by the surrender of Tara-garh, a small hill post in the neighbourhood. They were garrisoned immediately by small parties of troops and a depot was established at Nalagarh, which kept the communications with the plains open and undisturbed.⁴

It was thought that Amar Singh Thapa, the Gorkha Commander in this area, would not insist on defending the area and would attempt to retire towards the Kali river. But Amar Singh Thapa determined to make a stand in these regions. He moved with his whole force from his headquarters at Irkee, and took up a position on a lofty and almost inaccessible ridge of mountains, where he stockaded himself, with his right resting on the Fort of Ramgarh, and his left on a high and fortified

³ Letter from the Secretary to Government to Major-General Ochterlony dated 20 May.

⁴ Letter from Col. Ochterlony to the Adj. Gen., dated Nalagarh, 6 November 1814.

hill. The ridge on which he was posted extended to the right beyond Ramgarh, but was defended by several forts of considerable strength, and abounded in formidable positions easily secured by stockades. In the rear of this range, and running in a direction nearly parallel, was another lofty and rugged ridge of hill on which stood the forts of Malaon, Ratangarh and Surajgarh. Between these ridges flowed the river Gambar, which falls into the Sutlej near Bilaspur; and in the rear of the Malaon ridge, and close at its base, runs the Gamura river. The Raja of Bilaspur, whose district lay on both sides of the latter, was as an ally, of the greatest importance to Amar Singh, as nearly all the supplies for his army were drawn from Bilaspur territory. Irkee which had been his former headquarters, supplied the rest and his communications with the other positions were by this route. Both lines, therefore, were important. Amar Singh's position at Ramgarh proving to be unassailable from the front, an attempt was made by Ochterlony to attack and turn the left, with the intention of first carrying the hill of Kot, which was occupied, but not stockaded, and from thence to occupy successively the rest of the posts upon the ridge.

Lieut. Colonel Thompson, with the reserve, was, on 13 November ordered to occupy the village of Kadri. The road to this post being impracticable, it was necessary first to construct one for elephants and coolies, to convey two 6-pounders, two mortars and two howitzers, which Major Macleod succeeded in getting, along with the ammunition and stores, to that place on the 20th. The battery, when it opened fire, was found to be too distant to produce any good effect and when an advanced position was being taken up, the Gorkhas attacked in great force and the party sent forward was repulsed with considerable loss.

Rightly judging, therefore, with the late instances of failure at Kalanga and Jaithak, that no further risk should be run, Ochterlony changed his point of attack and occupied himself, meanwhile in harassing the enemy as much as possible, and improving the roads for guns, as well as embodying irregular troops, which to the number of 4,463 men, he was authorised to add to his force. He had on the 24th of November moved his

headquarters round to Nahar on the north-north-east side of the Ramgarh ridge.

Ochterlony, who had now been promoted a Major General, decided to place himself between the principal position of the Gorkhas and Bilaspur, in order to cut off the supplies. He gained over the local raja to his side and with his aid constructed a road from Khandri to Mahar. Amar Singh promptly countered this by abandoning all his posts on that ridge to the left of Ramgarh and changing front to the rear upon that point, which he still retained as his right. General Ochterlony, therefore, marched on 16 January 1815 with the reserve across the Gambar river to a position on the road to Irkee, and near the Southern extremity of the Malaon range, Lieut. Col. Cooper was left with a battalion and the battering train, at the former post of Nahar. Colonel Arnold, with the rest of the brigade, had orders to move either upon Bilaspur or Malaon or upon Mangu Ka Dhar according to circumstances. Amar Singh as the General had foreseen, in consequence of this, quitted his position for Malaon, leaving only small garrisons in Ramgarh and the other posts on that range. Colonel Arnold then proceeded to occupy the stockades evacuated, an operation retarded by the inclemency of the weather and the difficulties of the ground. This portion of the force then took post at Ratangarh, between Malaon and Bilaspur, thus accomplishing the object of turning the enemy's flank and intercepting his supplies.

Meanwhile Lieut. Colonel Cooper, as soon as these movements permitted marched from Nahar, and ascended the Ramgarh ridge. Captain Webb with his company, accompanied this detachment. The 18 pounders under Lieut. Tenant were brought up with incredible labour, and a battery was opened upon Ramgarh which soon surrendered. Jorjori capitulated at the same time. Taragarh (a second place of this name) was taken on the 11th, and Chamba on the 16th of March, after breeches had been made by the guns. All these places were small stone forts. The posts on this ridge having been thus successively reduced, the detachment took up the position which had been assigned to it before Malaon on the 1st of April.

The accompanying sketch will give some idea of the different

Gorkha posts, from Surajgarh fort on the South-east to that on the Malaon on the North-West. General Ochterlony, having obtained from Lieut. Lawrie of the engineers, an active and highly intelligent officer, the necessary information as to locality and grounds for the outlines of his plan, ordered the attack to take place on the 15th of April. Two objective points were selected — Raila between Dah and the stockade on the first Deonthal hill and the second hill called Deonthal — while a diversion was to be made by an attack from the north-west and north-east, upon Malaon itself. In all, seven columns were ordered to take part in the operations, as follows :

1. The first column commanded by Lieut. Fleming was to march from Palta by night, and on reaching Raila, was to show a light as a signal to the other columns.

2. Lieut. Liddle with two companies and two 6-pounders and Captain Hamilton with another detachment, were to move from Lag hill on the 14th and unite at Jainagar, whence, on the morning of the 15th they were to move upon Raila.

3. Major Innes with a grenadier battalion and two-pounders was to move from head-quarters at Battoh on the morning of the 15th on Raila.

4. Lieut. Colonel Thompson with the 2nd battalion of the 3rd Indian Infantry and two 6-pounders under Lieut. Cartwright was to move from Battoh, on the morning of the 15th upon the second Deonthal ridge.

5. Captain Lawrie was to move at the same time from Kali upon the same point.

6. Captain Bowyer was to leave Kali at the same time as Captain Lawrie, and, after crossing the Gamura river to diverge to the right and endeavour to penetrate the Malaon Cantonment from the rear.

7. Captain Showers was to move from Col. Arnold's post at Ratangarh at the same hour, and endeavour to penetrate the Malaon Cantonment, between the Kakri Stockade and the fort.

Besides these, Lieut. Dunbar, with a small body of regular and irregular sepoy, was intended to act as a support for the last two detachments.

On the 15th, Raila was occupied without much opposition. Nearly the whole of the fighting fell to the columns under

Lieut. Colonel Thompson and Captain Showers, the casualties in each numbering 216 and 103 respectively. Captain Showers was killed, and his men, disheartened, retired precipitately on the Lag Village. The artillery at Ratangarh arrested the pursuers and the Company's troops were able to reform and act offensively. The position at Deonthal was carried after a severe struggle; and next morning the Gorkhas came on again, to the number of nearly 2000 under Bhagti Thapa and fought with their usual daring and perseverance, directing their efforts principally against the guns. The artillery men were nearly all wounded. The contest lasted for more than two hours. Amar Singh stood with his younger son and colours, close by, encouraging his men; but a small reinforcement arrived from Raila and the death of Bhagti Thapa terminated the attack in which the steady behaviour of the Company's troops made it no discredit for the Gorkhas to have failed.

Major General Ochterlony, without resting to think of his success, immediately commenced to construct a road for heavy artillery to Deonthal. On 9 May, a battery was completed near a redoubt under Narayan Kot; next day, twelve pieces — 12-pounders and howitzers opened fire and on the following day the 18-pounders, which had been brought up from Ramgarh, were placed in position. Amar Singh had steadfastly refused to listen to the solicitations of his followers, and submit. But now the news of the fall of Kumaon, and the desertions which, since the 16th of April had reduced his followers to not more than 200, left him no choice and a convention was entered into, by which he and his son Kaji Ranjor Singh Thapa then defending the fort of Jaithak against Major General Martindell's force, were to be allowed to return with their followers and private property to Nepal leaving all the rest of the hill country, from the Kali to the Sutlej, in the hands of the British.

As soon as these arrangements were concluded and the forts of Malaon and Jaithak surrendered, the divisions employed in this area were broken up and the troops were sent to their allotted stations, extra establishments were discharged, all extraordinary staff was reduced and all expenses connected with the prosecution of active operations were suspended. Except for small garrisons left at Malaon, Subhtu Nahan and Dehra Dun, all the regular troops returned to their stations and the

whole of the irregular troops employed under Major-Generals Martindell and Ochterlony were disbanded. The Gorkha deserters, were, however, embodied into a new Regiment and kept in service.

All these defeats, however, did not break the will to resistance of Amar Singh Thapa. Before the battle of Deonthal, he sent a memorable letter to the Nepal durbar advocating a policy of continued struggle. This letter gives us a true picture of the mind of this resolute Gorkha general and tells us of the fears and anxieties of an Indian Chieftain about the intentions and the power of the East India Company. This letter reproduced below from an English translation deserves to be quoted in full :

“A copy of your letter of the 23rd December, addressed to Ranjor Singh, under the red seal, was sent by the latter to me, who have received it with every token of respect. It was to the following purport : ‘The capture of Nala Pani by the enemy has been communicated to me from Garhwal and Kumaon, as also the intelligence of the enemy’s having assembled his force and marched to Nahan. He now occupies the whole country from Bara Parsa to ‘Subtura Muhotree’. My army also is secretly posted in various places in the jungles of the mountains. An army under a General has arrived in Gorakhpur from Palpa; and another detachment has reached the borders of Bijapur. I have further heard, that a general officer has set out from Calcutta to create more disturbances. For the sake of a few trifling objects, some intermediate agents have destroyed the mutual harmony, and war is waging far and wide. All this you know. You ought to send an embassy to conciliate the English, otherwise the cause is lost. The enemy, after making immense preparations, have begun the war, and unless great concessions are made, they will not listen to terms. To restore the relations of amity by concessions is good and proper. For this purpose, it is fit, in the first place, to cede to the enemy, the departments of Butwal, Palpa and Sheoraj, already settled by the Commissioners and the disputed tracts towards Bara. If this be inefficient to re-establish harmony, we ought to abandon the whole of the Tarai, the Dun and the Lowlands; and if the English are still dissatisfied on account of not obtaining possessions of a portion of the mountains, you are herewith authorised to give up along with the Dun, the country as far as the Sutlej. Do whatever may be practicable to restore the relations of peace and amity, and be assured of my approbation and assent. If these means be unsuccessful, it will be very difficult to pre-

serve the integrity of my dominions from 'Khunka Irista' to the Sutlej. If the enemy once obtain a footing in the centre of our territory, both extremities would be thrown into disorder. If you can retire with your army and military stores, so as to pursue any other plan of operations that may afterwards appear eligible, it will be advisable. On this account, you ought immediately to effect a junction with all the other officers in the western service, and retire to that part of our territory which (including all in your rear as far as Nepal) you may think your self capable of retaining'. These are your orders. In the first place, after the immense preparations of the enemy, he will not be satisfied with these concessions; or, if he should accept of our terms, he would serve us as he did Tipu, from whom he first accepted of an indemnification of six crores of rupees in money and territory and afterwards wrested from him his whole country. If we were to cede to him so much country, he would excite another disturbance at a future opportunity, and seek to wrest from us other provinces. Having lost so much territory, we should be unable to maintain our army on its present footing; and our military force being once reduced, what means should we have left to defend our eastern possessions; while we retain 'Beshehur', (probably Rampur Bushahr) Garhwal is secure: if the former be abandoned, the Bhaterras of Rewari (probably Rewain in Tehri Garhwal) will certainly betray us. The English having thus acquired the Dun and Rewari, it will be impossible for us to maintain Garhwal; and being deprived of the latter, Kumaon and Doti will also be lost to us. After the seizure of these provinces, Acham, Jumba, Duln, Delekh will be wrested from us in succession. You say "that a proclamation has been issued to the inhabitants of the eastern Kirats". If they have joined the enemy, the other Kirats will do so likewise and then the country from Dudkosi on the East to Bheri on the West cannot long be retained. Having lost our dominions, what is to become of our great military establishment. When our power is once reduced, we shall have another Knox's mission, under pretence of concluding a treaty of alliance and friendship, and founding commercial establishments. If we decline receiving their mission, they will insist; and if we are unable to oppose force and desire them to come unaccompanied with troops, they will not comply. They will begin by introducing a company, a battalion will soon afterwards follow, and at length an Army will be assembled for the subjugation of Nepal. Thus you think, that if for the present the Lowlands, the Dun and the country to the Sutlej were ceded to them, they would cease to entertain designs upon the other provinces of Nepal. Do not trust them, they who counselled you to receive the mission of Knox, and permit the establishment of a commercial factory will usurp the Government of Nepal. With regard to the

concessions now proposed, if you had, in the first instance, determined upon a pacific line of conduct, and agreed to restore the departments of Butwal and Sheoraj, as adjusted by the Commissioners, the present contest might have been avoided. But you could not suppress your avarice and desire to retain these places, and having murdered the revenue officer, a commotion arose and war was waged for trifles. At Jaithak we have gained a victory over the enemy. If I succeed against Ochterlony, and Ranjor Singh with Jaspu Thapa and his officers prevail at Jaithak, Ranjit Singh will rise against the enemy. In conjunction with the Sikhs, my army will make a descent into the plains, and our forces crossing the Jamuna from two different quarters, will recover possession of the Dun. When we reach Hardwar, the Nawab of Lucknow may be expected to take a part in the cause; and on his accession to the general coalition, we may consider ourselves secure as far as Khunka. Relying on your fortune, I trust that Balbhadra and Rewant Kajis will soon reinforce the garrison of Jaithak; and I hope ere long to send Pant Kaji with eight companies, when the force there will be very strong. The troops sent by you are arriving every day; and when they all come up, I hope we shall succeed both here and at Jaithak.

Formerly, when the English endeavoured to penetrate to Sindulee, they continued for two years in possession of Bara Pursa by your force or fell victims to the climate, with the exception for a few only who abandoned the place. Order should now be given to all your officers to defend Choundindi and Chomdund in Bijapur, the two Kirats and the ridge of Mahabharat. Suffer the enemy to retain the lowlands for a couple of years: measures can afterwards be taken to expel them. Lands transferred under a written agreement cannot again be resumed; but if they have been taken by force, force may be employed to recover them. Fear nothing, even though the Sikhs should not join us. Should you succeed now in bringing our differences to an amicable termination by the cession of territory, the enemy in the course of a few years would take possession of Nepal, as he did the country of Tipu. The present is, therefore, not the time for treaty and conciliation. These expedients should have been adopted before the murder of the revenue officer, or must be postponed till victory shall crown our efforts. If they will then accede to the terms which I shall propose, it is well; if not, it will by my business, with the favour of God and your fortune and country, to preserve the integrity of my country from Khunks to the Sutlej. Let me entreat you, therefore, never to make peace. Formerly when some individuals urged the adoption of a treaty of peace and commerce, I refused my assent to that measure; and I will not now suffer the honour of my Prince to be sullied by concession

and submission. If you are determined on this step, bestow the humiliating office on him who first advised it: but for me, call me to your presence. I am old, and only desire once to kiss your feet. I can recollect the time when the Gorkha army did not exceed twelve thousand men; through the favour of Heaven and renown of your forefathers, your territory was extended to the confines of Khunks on the east. Under the auspices of your father, we subjugated Kumaon and through your fortune we have pushed our conquests to the Sutlej. Four generations have been employed in the acquisition of all this dignity and dominion. At Nala Pani Balabhadra cut up three or four thousand of the enemy; at Jaithak, Ranjor Singh with this officers overthrew three battalions. In this place I am surrounded, and daily fighting with the enemy, and look forward with confidence to victory. All the inhabitants and chiefs of the country have joined the enemy. I must gain two or three victories before I can accomplish the object I have in view of attracting Ranjit Singh to our cause. On his accession and afterwards the advance of the Sikhs and Gorkhas towards the Jamuna, the Chiefs of the Deccan may be expected to join the coalition, as also the Nawab of Lucknow and others. Then will be the time for us to drive out the enemy and recover possession of the low countries of Palpa as far as Bijnor. If we succeed in regaining these, we can attempt further conquests in the plains. There has been no fighting in your quarter yet. The Choundindi and Chomdond of Bijapur, as far as the ridge of Mahabharat should be well defended. Countries acquired in your generation, under the administration of the Thapas, should not be abandoned, for the purpose of bringing matters to an amicable adjustment, without deep and serious reflection. If we are victorious in the War, we can easily adjust our differences; and if we are defeated, death is preferable to reconciliation on humiliating terms. When the Chinese army invaded Nepal, we implored the mercy of Heaven, by offerings to the Brahmins and the performance of religious ceremonies; and through the favour of one and the intercession of the other, we succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Ever since you confiscated the Jagirs of the Brahmins, thousands have been in distress and poverty. Promises were given, that they should be restored on the capture of Kangra, and orders to this effect, under the red seal, were addressed to me and Nya Singh Thapa.

We failed, however, in that object and now there is a universal commotion; you ought, therefore, to assemble the Brahmins and promise to restore to them their lands and property, in the event of your conquering and expelling the English. By these means, many thousands of respectable Brahmins will put up their prayers for your protection, and the enemy will be driven forth. By the practice of charity, the territory acquired in your

generation may be preserved, and through the favour of God, our power and dominion may be still further extended. By the extension of territory, our military establishment may be maintained on its present footing, and even increased. The numerous countries which you propose to cede to the enemy yielded a revenue equal to the maintenance of an army of four thousand men, and Kangra might have been captured. By the cession of these provinces, the fear of your name and splendour of your court will no longer remain. By the capture of Kangra your name would have been rendered formidable; but though that has not happened, a powerful impression has nevertheless been made on the people of the plains, by the extension of our conquests to the Sutlej. To effect a reconciliation by the cession of the country to the west of the Jamuna would give rise to the idea that the Gorkhas were unable to oppose the English, would lower the dignity of your name in the plains and cause a reduction in your army to the extent of four thousand men. The enemy will, therefore, acquire possession of Bushahr, and after that the conquest of Garhwal will be easy; nor will it be possible, in that case, for us to retain Kumaon; and with it we must lose Doti, Acham and Jambu. The enemy may be expected to penetrate even to Bhoree. If the English once establish themselves firmly in possession of a part of the hills, we shall be unable to drive them out. The countries towards the Sutlej should be obstinately defended. The abandonment of the disputed tracts in the plains is a lesser evil. The possession of the former preserves to us a road to further conquests. You ought, therefore, to direct Guru Raghunath Pandit and Dalbhanjan Pande to give up the disputed lands of Butwal, Sheoraj, and the twenty two villages in the vicinity of Bara, and if possible, bring our differences to a termination. To this step I have no objections and shall feel no animosity to those who may perform the service. I must, however, declare a decided enmity to such as, in bringing about a reconciliation with the English, consult only their own interests and forget their duty to you.

If they will not accept the terms what have we to fear? The English attempted to take Bharatpur by storm; but the Raja Ranjit Singh destroyed a European regiment and a battalion of Sepoys. To the present day they have not ventured to meddle with Bharatpur, and one fort has sufficed to check their progress. In the lower country of Dharam (perhaps Burma) they established their authority; but the Raja overthrew their army and captured all their artillery and stores and now continues in the quiet possession of his dominions. Our offers of peace and reconciliation will be interpreted as the result of fear, and it would be absurd to expect that the enemy will respect a treaty concluded under such circumstances. Therefore, let us confide

our fortunes to our swords, and by boldly opposing the enemy, compel him to remain within his own territory; or if he should continue to advance, stung with shame at the idea of retreating after his immense preparations, we can then give up the lands in dispute and adjust our differences. Such, however, is the fame and terror of our swords, that Balabhadra, with a nominal force of six hundred men, but scarcely amounting to five hundred, destroyed an army of three or four thousand English. His force consisted of the old Gorkha and Borkha companies (which were only partly composed of the inhabitants of our ancient kingdom) and of the people of the countries from Bheri to Garhwal, and with these he destroyed one battalion and crippled and repulsed another. My army is similarly composed; nevertheless, all descriptions are eager to meet the enemy. In your quarter, you are surrounded by the veterans of our Army, and therefore, cannot apprehend desertions among them: you have also an immense militia, and many Jagirdars who will fight for their own honour and interests. Assembling the militia of the low lands and fighting in the plains is impolitic: call them into the hills, and divide them into details. The enemy is proud and flushed with success, and has reduced under his subjection all the western Zamindars, the Ranas and Rajas of Karnal and the Thakurs, and will keep peace with no one. However, my advice is nothing, I will direct Ram Dass to propose to General Ochterlony the abandonment on our part of the disputed lands, and will forward to you the answer which he may receive. All the Rajas, Ranas, and Thakurs, have joined the enemy, and I am surrounded. Nevertheless we shall fight and conquer; and all my officers have taken the same resolution. The Pandits have pronounced the month of Baishakh as particularly auspicious for the Gorkhas, and by selecting a fortunate day we shall surely conquer.

I am desirous of engaging the enemy slowly and with caution, but cannot manage it, the English being always in a desperate hurry to fight. I hope, however, to be able to delay the battle till Baishakh, when I will choose a favourable opportunity to fight them. When we shall have driven the enemy from hence either Ranjor Singh or myself, according to your wishes, will repair to your presence. In the present crisis it is advisable to write to the Emperor of China, to the Lama of Lasha, and to the other Lamas; and for this purpose I beg to submit the enclosed draft of a letter to their address; any errors in it will, I trust, be forgiven by you, and I earnestly recommend that you lose no time in sending a letter to the Emperor of China and a letter to the Lama."

This letter brings out the self-confidence of the Gorkha Com-

mander as also his superstitions about astrology and the spiritual powers of Brahmins. This also gives an appreciation of the conditions, then prevailing in India and how Indian Chiefs reacted to the spread of the Company's dominions. I will, however, now turn to the story of the Nepal War in Kumaon. Edward Gardner the second assistant to Metcalf at Delhi had been placed in charge of the political negotiations in Kumaon at the commencement of hostilities. He informed the Governor General that Kumaon was very poorly garrisoned by Gorkha troops and that some of the Zamindars were very favourably disposed towards the British Government. The Governor General was agreeable to his suggestion that an expedition should be sent immediately into Kumaon. Even if partially successful it would create a useful diversion on the side of Garhwal and distract the attention of the Gorkhas, by adding to the number of points at which they would be assailed at the same time. The success of such an enterprise would materially conduce to the interruption of the communications between Amar Singh Thapa near the Sutlej and the Nepalese territories towards the East, and would contribute and augment the impediments to the retreat of the latter's forces, if he determined on such an operation. It was not practicable at that time to allot a sufficient regular force for the projected move in Kumaon. Lord Moira, however, thought that a body of irregulars well commanded, and eventually to be accompanied by guns, would, with the co-operation of the inhabitants, be sufficient to overcome any opposition likely to be offered by the Gorkha force in Kumaon. At that time two bodies of irregular troops were being enrolled for service in Kumaon, one by Captain Hearsey, and the other by Lieut. Colonel Gardner. The latter was commanding the irregular cavalry and was authorised to raise a corps of Pathan or Mewati infantry, to the extent of 1,500 men. He was also chosen to carry out the military operations contemplated in Kumaon and was instructed generally to work under the orders of his brother, the Honourable Edward Gardner.⁵

Some delay arose in collecting and preparing this force, and it did not enter the hills before February 15. Having occupied

⁵ Secret letter from Secretary to Government to the Honourable Edward Gardner, dated 14th December, 1814.

the Chilkia Pass, Lieut. Colonel Gardner advanced along the bed of the Kosi river, the Gorkhas withdrawing towards Almora as the British troops advanced. Gardner, then, established himself in a commanding position on a hill called Kampore, in front of which he found the Gorkha troops, who had previously retired before him, reinforced from Almora by nearly the whole strength of the garrison, and strongly stockaded. Gardner could not rely on his irregulars to attack the Gorkhas frontally and decided to turn their position, and by a sudden movement of a part of his corps, combined with a demonstration of an intention to assault their position, either place himself between them and their capital or force them to break up and retire, in order to prevent the completion of that manoeuvre. He waited for the arrival of another one thousand irregulars from the plains, on whose arrival he carried into effect his plan with success and with little opposition. The Gorkhas, seeing their danger, on the arrival of part of the Company's troops on their rear and flank, broke up and abandoned their stockade and withdrew to Katar Mal, which also they abandoned on the approach of Lieut. Colonel Gardner's main troops about the end of March. The Gorkha troops finally took up their positions on the main ridge of the town of Almora.

While Gardner advanced on Almora from Chilkia, another small party advanced up the Burohne pass and "created in some respects a useful diversion". But at the same time Captain Hearsay with his battalion occupied the Timely pass and advanced up the Kali river. The purpose of this movement was to hold Kumaon in the grips of a pincer movement, and effectively to encircle the Gorkha troops in a narrowing cordon. Captain Hearsay occupied Champawat, the capital of Kali (East) Kumaon, and laid siege to a strong fortress near it, called Kutalgarh. At this time Hasti Dal Shah, the Gorkha Governor of Doti crossed the Kali or Sarda at a point somewhat higher up than Captain Hearsay's position and threatened to descend on him with superior numbers. With recklessness learnt from campaigns in the plains, Captain Hearsay advanced to attack him, leaving behind part of his force to prosecute the siege of Kutalgarh. In the engagement that followed Captain Hearsay was wounded and captured and his force was routed. Hasti Dal Shah then immediately attacked the remainder of the

Company's force before Kotalgarh and nearly destroyed it. Having eliminated any further danger in this quarter, he advanced with his forces to help the Gorkha garrison at Almora.

The operations in Kumaon assumed greater importance with the failure of the two divisions in Gorakhpur and Saran. The Gorkhas had been relieved from all apprehension of an attack on their capital and were now in a position to send reinforcements to their Western armies. The occupation of Kumaon, and the consequent prevention of any reinforcement reaching Amar Singh Thapa in the west became more and more the main aim of the War from the Company's side. A detachment of about two thousand regular troops was sent to Katar Mal and Colonel Nicolls of the British Fourteenth Foot and Quarter Master General of the British Crown's troops in India was selected for this important command. Colonel Nicolls arrived at Katar Mal on the 8th of April. As soon as the regular forces joined him, he sent out a detachment under Major Patton, to Gananath, a high ridge situated to the North West of Almora. This was the direction, according to his information, in which a body of the Gorkha troops under the command of Hasti Dal Shah had proceeded. Major Patton, having come up with the Gorkhas instantly attacked them in their position and forced them to retire with considerable loss. Hasti Dal Shah, himself, was mortally wounded and many other Gorkha officers were either killed or wounded.⁶

This defeat and the loss of their principal military commander depressed the spirits of the Gorkha troops in Almora. Colonel Nicolls, resolving to take advantage of this opportunity, decided to launch his attack on Almora at once. On the 25th April at 1 p.m., he advanced with the first battalion, Fourth Regiment and flank battalion towards the principal stockade of the Gorkhas upon the North end of the Sitoli ridge. At first he intended to establish the heavy mortar in battery within six or eight hundred yards of the stockade and took up ground for that purpose. But finding that his troops were confident and the Gorkhas disheartened, he ordered immediate assault on the stone breast works and successfully occupied all the breast

⁶ Letters from Col. Nicolls to the Adj. General, dated 23, 24 and 25 April 1814.

works upon the Sitoli ridge. The British troops followed this with the occupation of the stockade leading to Kalmatia and the Raja's palace and thus isolating the garrison within the fort of Almora, and cutting off all its retreats.⁷

These advantages were quietly retained till eleven p.m. when the northern British post, under Lieut. Costly, was carried by the Gorkhas. This invaluable position was, however, shortly afterwards recovered by the British and retained against two or three charges of the Gorkhas. The losses on both sides were considerable.

Throughout the night skirmishes continued. The Gorkha troops from the fort made a sortie to the advanced British post, but were repulsed.

Mortars had already been brought and laid in front of the fort. The small mortars opened fire about six p.m. (25th April) and one of the large ones started at twelve midnight. Next morning the advanced post in the town of Almora was pushed to within seventy yards of the fort, and several eight inch shells having been thrown into the fort, the Gorkha garrison was compelled to remain concealed. At this time a large number of Gorkha and Kumaoni soldiers were seen quitting the fort and the advanced British parties considered the fort to have been evacuated. They proceeded up to the street which bounds it on the East side, in order to get to the door by which so many had quitted it. But the garrison suddenly showed themselves and a hot fire compelled the British troops to retreat, leaving many dead and wounded.

At nine p.m. (28 April) a flag of truce with a letter from Bum Shah and another from Captain Hearsey, who had been brought a prisoner to Almora by Hasti Dal Shah, were forwarded to Colonel Nicolls requesting that suspension of arms might be mutually agreed to on the basis of terms offered to the Choutra Bum Shah several weeks ago by the Hon. Edward Gardner, which was agreed to by Colonel Nicolls with the concurrence of Mr. Gardner.

This convention brought hostilities to an end in Kumaon and the Gorkhas withdrew to the East of the Kali.

⁷ Letter from J. Nicolls to the Adj. General, 25 April 1814.

An English translation of this convention is given below :

"In the year 1872 Sambut on Thursday the 4th of Baishakh, the following convention has been written by the Choutra Bum Shah, Kaji Chamu Bhandari, Captain Angad Singh Sardar and Jasman Dan Thapa; and Lieut. Colonel Gardner on the part of the General Col. Nicolls and the Hon. Edward Gardner acting for the Governor General; in which the Choutra Bum Shah and the Gorkha Sardars on the part of the Raja of Nepal agree;

"That the fort of Almora, and the province of Kumaon, with all its fortified places shall be evacuated. The garrison with their property (namely private effects) ammunition (namely ball, powder and flints, with all musquets and accoutrements and eleven guns) shall be allowed to march across the Kali unmolested, by a convenient road, being supplied with provisions and carriers who are to be collected and sent to such part as may be pointed out. The fort of Lalmaudi shall be evacuated this day, and possession given to the British troops".

In the Gorakhpur area, Major General John Sullivan Wood joined the division placed under him on the 15th November 1814. The necessity of directing the principal efforts to the main and difficult object of a march upon Kathmandu, restricted the forces to be placed at the disposal of Major General Wood. The obstacles opposed by the very difficult nature of this part of the Nepalese territories, composed of the provinces of Palpa and Gorkha proper, would have, under the most favourable circumstance, rendered an invasion of them from the Gorakhpur frontier a doubtful and hazardous measure. The aim of Major General Wood's division was therefore, not to embark on a plan of invading the Nepalese territories, but to create a diversion in favour of the main army under Major General Marley. His first object, his instructions laid down, was to clear the Tarai of any parties of Nepalese who might have remained in them, and thoroughly to re-establish British authority in those lands; after which he was asked to move upon the town of Butwal, which would pave the way to Jansang, the principal military station of the Gorkhas in Palpa, and the headquarters of Amar Singh — the father of Bhim Sen. He was then to occupy Palpa and thus intercept the great line of communication from east to west in Nepal.⁸

⁸ Secret letter of instructions from the Adjutant General to Major General Wood, dated 23rd September, 1814.

On arriving at Gorakhpur, Major General Wood reported that on account of the difficulty and delay in procuring carriage and bearers, he would be unable to advance towards the frontier at the time originally contemplated. Considerable aid in the form of elephants and bearers was obtained from the Nawab Vizir. Major General Wood then advanced and having occupied the Tarai, he planned to attack the town of Butwal. During his march towards Butwal, he received information which induced him to change the point of attack, and to resolve on forcing a pass to the west; which he thought would afford a favourable route into Palpa, and enable him to turn the forts by which the Butwal pass was defended. Through the ignorance or treachery of his guides, General Wood found himself unexpectedly close to a stockade of the enemy, at a post named Jeetgarh, which commanded the pass. A good deal of fighting took place, and it was possible that the post might have been carried. But General Wood thought that he would not be able with the force at his disposal to hold the hills beyond the pass, without the possession of which Jeetgarh could not be maintained. He, therefore, directed the troops to withdraw and abandoned the enterprise.⁹ He then turned towards a pass to the eastward of Butwal, but, thinking the Gorkhas to be numerically superior to him in that quarter, gave up this plan as well. He then proceeded towards the west to make a diversion, when information of Gorkha raids into the Company's territories forced him to retrace his steps. His apprehension of the great numerical superiority of the Gorkhas, made him relinquish all offensive operations, and he directed his attention merely to the protection of the Company's territories, in spite of his correspondence with Lord Moira directing him to fall into a purely defensive system. The Governor General then withdrew the seventeenth Regiment of Infantry from this corps and sent it to reinforce the division under Major General Marley, and Gardner's Irregular Horse was sent to him for the purpose of helping him.

A curious step was now taken of destroying the crops on the ground and preventing the country, which would have become the granary of the hills, from being cultivated the following

⁹ Letter from Major General Wood to the Adj. General, 4th Jan., 1815.

season, in the event of the war being protracted to another campaign. Lord Moira was at first reluctant to embrace this policy which not only distressed the enemy but also caused great individual suffering. Later, he accepted, this policy because of "the importance of depriving the enemy of the resources which they might draw from the Tarai of Butwal and Sheoraj, and the declared inability of Major General Wood to prevent them from availing themselves of those resources". After another march towards Butwal (a reconnoitring movement as he styled it), General Wood withdrew towards Gorakhpur before the commencement of the rainy season. After making the necessary arrangements for the defence of the frontier during the rains, the division broke up and the rest of the troops except those destined to be stationed in the positions assigned to them, retired to their peace time cantonments.

There had also been great prevalence of sickness in this division, twelve hundred men being at one time in hospital. The division was unable to achieve any success and was disbanded even before the end of the Nepal War.

I now come to the operations of the main division which was to attack Kathmandu. It was assembled in Dinapore. It was placed on a footing of very superior efficiency, in every branch of its equipments and establishments. Major General Marley, who was to command this division, was directed to cross the Ganges as soon after the 15th November as possible, and to push forwards a reinforcement to Major Bradshaw to enable him to establish British authority in the Tarai of Tirhut before the approach of the main army. This would render any material detention of Major General Marley's division in the Tarai unnecessary and enable him to proceed at once to effect the main purposes of the expedition, which were the occupation of Hetunda and the forts of Hariharpur and Makwanpur as the first steps to an advance into the valley of Nepal proper, and the capital Kathmandu.¹⁰

Major General Marley detached the six companies of the Ramgarh Battalion, under the command of Major Roughsedge, to reinforce Major Bradshaw; who, taking advantage of his sup-

¹⁰ Instructions to Major General Marley, commanding a Division of the army proceeding against Nepal, dated 6th Nov., 1814.

erior numbers, surprised the Gorkha position at Burhuwa on 25 November. The Gorkhas were taken completely by surprise because they had no idea that the two states would be at War without a formal declaration and especially when the Nepal Government had sent Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya, a special emissary, to discuss a peaceful solution of all disputes. Almost the entire Gorkha force was destroyed including its commander, Parasuram Thapa; and the Nepalese emissary and his papers were seized by Major Bradshaw. The occupation of Burhuwa gave the immediate possession of the Tarai of Saran to the British, which was followed up by Major Roughsedge's occupation of the Tarai of Tirhut as well.

Major General Marley arrived on the frontier on the 11th December. He could perhaps have advanced into the hills without great opposition as the strength and equipment of his division was far superior to any forces that the Gorkhas could bring against it. General Marley, however, resolved not to advance till he was joined by the battering train, which, could not reach Bettiah till the end of December. In this he was going against his instructions in which it was specially stated that the battering train was to be placed in a position in his rear, which could enable him to bring it up if necessary; and it had not been intended that it should accompany his first advance into the enemy's country.¹¹

This delay proved injurious to the British cause from every point of view, and had the inevitable consequence of encouraging the Gorkhas to undertake enterprises, whose successes relieved them of their apprehensions and elevated their spirits. What was still worse, according to Lord Moira was the fatal influence of these events on the mind of Major General Marley, paralysing the operations of the British Division, and, ending, in total failure of every one of its objectives.

Major General Marley took up a position, on the 12th of December, at Pachrauta near Lotun, in the rear of and about twenty miles from Baragarhi. Major Bradshaw had already established two advanced posts at Parsa and Samandpur, nearly forty miles as under, and twenty-five miles each from Pachrouta,

¹¹ Letter of instruction from the Adj. General to Major Marley, dated 6th November, 1814.

with an intermediate post at Baragarhi, practically equidistant from the two. Major General Marley made no attempt to afford any support to these outposts, already too long exposed to attack. "It is impossible for me", said Lord Moira in his report on the War "to acquit Major General Marley of the grossest neglect, in not satisfying himself on the subject (i.e., the propriety or expediency of this arrangement) and correcting it if faulty, or at all events in not taking measures for rendering them of strength sufficient to resist an attack, or for ensuring them support in such an event". The rest of the month was spent by Major General Marley in devising a plan for ascending the hills in three columns, but not in giving the enemy any reason to think that he intended to fight. Stubb blames not only the commander but also the commanding officers of both these posts. "With strange infatuation", he says, "or prompted perhaps by a contempt for an enemy they had never met in fight, but whose courage had already been elsewhere displayed, Captain Sibley and Blackney (who held these posts) omitted to secure themselves in their position".

From such neglect the natural consequences ensued. Both posts were attacked on the morning of the 1st of January and driven back with heavy loss: 258 casualties at Parsa, 125 at Samandpur. Captains Sibley and Blackney were both among the victims of their own rashness and the incapacity of the commander. There were no artillery pieces at the last named place. At Parsa, Captain Sibley hearing of an intended attack, had applied for a reinforcement; but it arrived too late. His position was badly chosen, and exposed him to attack on all sides. The artillery men, one by one, were all either killed or wounded.

After this reverse Major General Marley gave up all idea of penetrating into the hills. Though reinforced to a strength of 12,000 men, including a battering train of four 18-pounder guns, two 8-inch howitzers and two 5½ inch mortars, which had arrived under Major George Mason, and urged to action by the frequent letters of his commander-in-chief, he could come to no decision in his own mind but one, and that he carried out. Lord Moira had already determined to remove him from his command, but it was terminated more unexpectedly. Histories

tell of armies running away from their generals, but there is, no record of a general running away from his army as General Marley did. Oppressed by a sense of responsibility which he could not bear, he left camp before daylight on the 10th of February without notifying his intention, or making over his office to anyone. The operations of the main division thus ended in complete fiasco.

One cannot help contrasting General Marley's conduct with that of the Gorkha Chief, Bhagat Singh, who was recalled by his sovereign because he had not, with inferior forces, attacked the fortified post of Baragarhi. General Marley lived in India drawing the high pay of his rank and holding for many years the post of Commandant of the Allahabad garrison. He died a full general at Barrackpore, June 14th, 1842. Bhagat Singh was obliged to attend the Raja's durbar at Kathmandu in women's clothes.

I now come to the operations in the area east of the Kosi river which shows that the Gorkhas had no intention of invading the Company's territories. They seem to have fought a defensive war; the initiative throughout lying with the British.

Captain Latter, who was in command in this area occupied considerable portions of Morung, and keeping the force under him for defensive purposes, recommended an attack on the fort of Nagari to the Raja of Sikkim. This fort was held jointly by a Gorkha and a Sikkim garrison. The Dewan of the Raja of Sikkim, who resided there, proposed by a sudden attack to overpower the Gorkha garrison and seize the fort. Owing to a premature attempt, however, this plan failed; and the Gorkha garrison, after suffering some loss, succeeded in shutting itself up in the fort, which was immediately blockaded by the troops of Sikkim. Captain Latter did not deem it prudent to advance a body of his troops to such a distance from his principal positions; but he furnished the Sikkim troops with ammunition and a small supply of money and provisions, and encouraged them to prosecute the blockade. They were, however, not able to force the garrison to surrender, when the approach of the rains obliged them to relax, in the strictness of the blockade.¹²

During the rainy season of 1815 and the months immediately

¹² "Narrative of the War", para 273.

following it, Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya tried to re-establish amicable relations between the Nepal durbar and the East India Company's Government. At length the draft of a new treaty was dictated by the Company which Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya informed the Company's Agent would be ratified by the Nepal durbar.

The basis of the new treaty was that the Gorkhas should accept the military disaster to their arms in Malaon and to subordinate their national will before that of the Governor General. The price of defeat which the Governor General demanded was heavy. It included not only the cession of the disputed lands in the Tarai but also of all lands below the hills from the Sarda or the Kali to the Kosi. Further the expulsion of the Gorkha arms from Sutej hills, Garhwal and Kamaon was to be permanent. And above all the Governor General insisted on forcing a British Resident on the Nepal durbar. These terms, however, were unacceptable to the proud Gorkha Commanders and another campaign was called for to break their will to resist.

The refusal of the Raja of Nepal to ratify this treaty which had been concluded between the agents of the two states in December 1815 at Segoli, led the Governor General in council to order that the preparations which had been recently countermanded, should be immediately and vigorously resumed in every department. Major General Sir David Ochterlony was entrusted with the military operations as well as the political negotiations to be henceforward entered into with the state of Nepal. The main purpose of the resumption of military operations was to force the Nepal Durbar to accept the treaty of Segoli, and General Ochterlony was instructed to stop hostilities if the treaty were duly ratified in the earlier stage of military operations.

He was also directed "to advance on the Makwanpur valley, with a view to its occupation, the reduction of its forts, and the complete establishment of the British troops on the northern heights of Makwanpur, and in the entire tract of the valley between the Rapti and the Baghmati before any attempt was made to cross into the valley of Nepal proper".

General Ochterlony advanced with a portion of the force under his command, through the great Sal forest of the Tarai, to the

fort of the "Buhiaki" pass that led directly into the valley of Makwanpur. He camped at Bhulowee and set out planning and reconnoitring the hills and the passage into them. On the morning of the 14th February, he received information that there was a pass over the Churiaghati range unguarded and practicable, though difficult. "The first part of the information proved correct; but the second was reported—on an erroneous estimate of our resources, powers and means": reported Major General Ochterlony, "and that it has been effected, is to be ascribed to great good fortune, as well as to the most persevering labour, the greatest exertion, and most persevering fortitude".

On the 14th in the evening, after dismissing the Nepalese Vakils with whom he was negotiating for peace, he ordered the third Brigade under Colonel Miller to parade before the camp about eight o'clock. This brigade marched off at a little after nine, leaving all tents standing, and Colonel Burnet was asked to move up with the Fourth Brigade to occupy the ground as far as his numbers would permit in order to conceal from the Gorkhas any change or movement in the camp. The third Brigade marched during the whole night reaching the bottom of the hill which was to be occupied at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 15th. The hill proved to be extremely difficult to negotiate and was not ascended by all the troops till after sunset. The pass was then made practicable for the passage of the elephants without their guns, which were drawn up behind them by hand.¹³ On the same day (15th Feb.) Lieut. Colonel Burnet advanced with his Brigade towards the main Churiaghati pass, which was abandoned by the Gorkhas on learning of Colonel Miller's movements on their flank.

Major General Ochterlony having secured the pass, advanced towards the town and the fortified heights of Makwanpur. On his arrival, he found that the Gorkhas had a strong party posted on a steep hill opposite his left flank and another considerably to the right on the same ridge. Early in the morning of the 28th Feb., the former of these positions was evacuated by the Gorkhas and was quickly occupied by a party of three companies and a small detachment of the Kings' Eighty-seven foot. At half

¹³ Letter from Major General D. Ochterlony to the Adj. General, dated 19th Feb., 1816.

past twelve in the day, the Gorkhas, some two thousand strong, started an attack with great fury on this post. For some time they forced the British to retire, but about half past five, after repeated assaults on the British positions had been unsuccessful, they were forced to retire in confusion chiefly by a charge of the second battalion of the Eighth Indian Infantry in the direction of their guns.¹⁴

This fortunate success of British arms determined the issue. The Gorkhas, who had thought their mountains impregnable, were disillusioned, and as was inevitable, organisation and human skill, thought and knowledge triumphed over mere bravery and uncultivated minds. The rejected treaty of peace was ratified by the Nepal durbar and earnest appeals were made to Ochterlony to get the late ratification accepted by the Governor General. The War was, therefore, put an end to by the ready and willing acceptance of the treaty by General Ochterlony and the Governor General.

The general character of the Nepal war has been summed up by Fortescue as follows:

"It is a pity that there is not fuller material for the study of this, our first mountain campaign in India, the story of such campaigns is always the same. The enemy is brave and elusive and knows well how to turn to the best account the advantages offered to him by the ruggedness of his country."

"The ways by which it may be entered are few, difficult and easily defended; there are scant supplies for an army to be obtained, and even water is not infrequently hard to find. The invader also is only at the beginning of his troubles when he forces an entrance. He may do so at comparatively small cost of life, but, even then, his casualties are likely to be larger than his enemy's and he must leave a chain of posts along the whole length of his communication. By this means alone can a regular transmission of supplies and stores be assured to the army; by this means alone is retreat made secure; yet these posts themselves must be victualled, and they are really a succession of vulnerable spots always liable to petty injury and, if there be the slightest neglect or lack of vigilance, to very serious damage. The wear and tear of transport is terrible, and wet and cold, which are inseparable from mountains, cause much sickness among the

¹⁴ Letter from Sir D. Ochterlony to the Acting Adj. General dated 29th February, 1816.

troops. Carrying of hospital stores and the evacuation of the sick add to the strain upon the lines of communication. All these difficulties may be overcome; and yet the commander is little nearer to the accomplishment of his main task, the imposition of his will upon the enemy. He may reach the hostile capital and occupy it, yet the hostile resistance remains unsubdued. He cannot bring his enemy to action except upon the enemy's own terms; and if he falls back upon the crude methods of rough and ready attack, he is sure to lose heavily and to accomplish practically nothing. If on the contrary he proceeds slowly and cautiously, he is still not immune from petty but humiliating reverses which irritate him, frighten his political superiors and dishearten his troops. The operations are interminably slow and tedious, and their monetary cost is so great that the financial authorities clamour for stopping the war at almost any price. In fact, these mountain campaigns are as arduous as they are thankless, and as troublesome as they are inglorious."

"It was fortunate, therefore, that in 1814 there was a Governor General who had had experience of guerilla warfare, and at least one commander who saw his way clearly and was strong enough to insist upon it. The isolation of some of the best of the Gorkha troops in the Sutlej was an advantage promptly seized by Moira and never let go. The initial reverses at Kalanga were vexatious, but the object of cutting off Amar Singh's forces from Nepal was a sound one, and was attained in time to be ultimately decisive. Yet, but for the presence of Ochterlony, Amar Singh, having obtained a new base of supply at Bilaspur, need have troubled himself little about his communications with Nepal; and Ochterlony's great difficulty was to make his presence felt. From the first he made it his rule that Gorkha stockades must be dealt with always at long range, otherwise his force of men would be rapidly consumed by costly assaults. Hence he would attempt no serious operation without siege-artillery. To drag these cumbrous pieces over so appalling a country was heavy work and slow, but it was sure and did not cost lives. It was, however, not the less anxious, for there remained always the double problem of covering and holding good positions for batteries. As regards the working parties, he was in the fortunate situation of having on the Sutlej a very large supply of civil labour at his disposal, which enabled him to use his military force exclusively for military duties. Had he been obliged to employ half of a brigade upon fatigue duty and the other half to protect it, he would probably have failed to make his operation successful. As to artillery positions and other tactical points, he fought his enemy with his own weapons, pouncing upon the ground that he desired, and then fortifying it with all possible haste, so that the Gorkhas found themselves obliged to attack

stockades, whereas the essence of their system of warfare was to defend them. Even so, however, Ochterlony did not escape serious loss to some of his detached parties."

"The final advance of the central column to Makwanpur through the turning of the Churiaghati pass seems to have been in its kind a masterpiece. The Gorkhas were evidently undone by excessive confidence. They had made the main passes practically impregnable with endless stockades, in fact, on the ascent to Makwanpur Fort there was a stockade at every turn of the road. Relying upon this resource they had neglected the less frequented routes, though had they watched them, they might have overwhelmed Ochterlony's column by the simple process of rolling down stones upon it. Ochterlony must have been apprehensive from the outset over this movement, otherwise he would not have accompanied the column himself; and the pass was so much more difficult than he expected that he evidently suffered agonies of anxiety until he heard that the Gorkhas had evacuated the Churiaghati pass. Had they not been seized with panic, they could have made an end of Ochterlony and his men, who had no supplies, and were entangled in a defile which invited annihilation. Small wonder if the general ascribed his success to 'great good fortune as well as to the most persevering labour, the greatest exertion and the most persevering fortitude'. Indeed the behaviour of the troops, weary, rugged and hungry, was beyond all praise; but the secret of their endurance is betrayed by one of them who records that 'our general walked every yard of this critical march encouraging his men.'¹⁵ Success, after all, justifies any enterprise; and Ochterlony deserves honour for this desperate venture not less than for his calm and deliberate methods in his operations on the Sutlej. His name is known to few, his honest boyish face to even fewer; yet but for him the Gorkha war might have ended in failure and disaster, which would have shaken the British Empire in India to its foundation."¹⁶

¹⁵ *Memories of John Shipp*, pp. 147-48.

¹⁶ *History of the British Army*, J. W. Fortescue, Vol. XI, pp. 159-62.

Chapter 14

LOYALTY OF THE GORKHAS TO THEIR COUNTRY

THE foregoing account of the Nepal War would not be complete without an appreciation of the Gorkhas' loyalty to their country. The spirit of belonging to the country animated each and every one of the numerous Gorkha Commanders and a unique thing in contemporary Indian history is witnessed in the case of the Gorkhas and that is lack of treachery on the part of any of the Gorkha chiefs or Commanders towards their country's cause both in days of success and of humiliation. This was the main reason why the Nepal War cost so much in men and material to the Company's Armies.

The integrity of Gorkha character is shown by their Commanders who were offered most tempting propositions for themselves and their families by the Company's Government, and who yet stood steadfast in their loyalty to their country and its rulers, and preferred to live in poverty in Nepal rather than in the plenty showered by the enemy of their national state. Perhaps this was the main reason which prevented the complete military collapse of a primitive country faced with the Britain of 1814 and saved Nepal from complete absorption by the East India Company. In his instructions to Gardner, the Governor General apprised him of the supposed disposition of Bum Shah towards the Government of Nepal, on which was founded his expectation that he might be induced to attach himself to the Company's interests and surrender to it the province under his charge.

Under the supposition that the enquiries regarding the views and disposition of Bum Shah were such as to encourage the attempt to open negotiations with him, it was thought necessary to consider the nature and extent of the conditions to be offered to him. In the Governor General's letter of the 30th September, 1814, the establishment of his independent authority

over Kumaon was stated as a possible case. Subsequent information, however, relative to Kumaon, and a more mature consideration of the important position and of the resources of that district, induced Lord Moira to contemplate its annexation to the dominion, of the Company, as a part of the compensation which the Company's Government would be entitled to demand for the expense of the War. Thus the provision to be assigned to Bum Shah was to be limited to the grant of a suitable Jagir, either in Kumaon or in some other quarter. It was also surmised that it might be expedient that Bum Shah should not be allowed to remain in Kumaon, where his former influence might be hurtful to the interests of the new Government, unless from his personal character and a correct view of his true interests, he might be likely to be converted into an useful instrument in maintaining and supporting the Company's authority in that country.¹ According to the Company's information Bum Shah had been excluded from political influence and power in Nepal which had led him to turn his talents to the pursuit of commercial advantages, and Hasti Dal Shah, a brother of Bum Shah and the Governor of the adjoining province of Doti, was also a malcontent chief of Nepal. Captain Hearsey's information was that the amount of the "stipend" received by Bum Shah from the Gorkha Government was twelve thousand rupees per annum. 'This afforded a rule for estimating the extent of the reward to be bestowed on Bum Shah for the services to the Company that he might perform'. It was thought probable, that the advantages of his situation would be greater than the amount stated and it was proposed to offer to him a sum, exceeding in a reasonable proportion, the actual amount of his profits. It was also thought necessary to include in this arrangement some of the relations or dependents of Bum Shah, for whom a separate provision was contemplated. An alternative plan was also discussed namely to drive out the Gorkhas from the province of Doti, which territory would have afforded the means for providing for Bum Shah and his family, without further charge on the British Government.²

¹ Letter from J. Adam, Secretary to Government to C. T. Metcalfe, Esqr., Resident at Delhi, 23 October 1814, *Secret Consultations*, 1814.

² *Ibid.*

A preliminary communication with Bum Shah was held through a person in the employ of Rutherford, the Superintendent at Moradabad.³ This person carried a letter in the Newaree character, inviting Bum Shah, in general terms, to communicate his wishes and views, either by writing or word of mouth. To this he brought no reply; but was charged with a Persian letter, merely relating to the proclamation then recently issued by the Government, and evidently written without any particular object, except that, perhaps, of making it appear that the man was not the bearer of any private message to himself.

This man was detained four days at Almora, during which period he was but once admitted to Bum Shah, and that at night time, when he received the paper in the man's possession, and, entered into no particular conversation with him, except merely making use of the expression, "why this delay". To what this observation was intended to apply is not quite clear, but the fact of Bum Shah's receiving a paper of the above description, concealing its contents from his coadjutors, and allowing the bearer to return unharmed, were considered to be proofs of his being at least very lukewarm in the cause of the Nepalese Government; and according to Gardner, warranted the conclusions, that it would be no very difficult matter to detach him from its interests and induce him, for an adequate consideration to be cooperative with the Company and favour its invasion of Kumaon.

Therefore, on 22 November 1814, Gardner addressed two letters to Bum Shah in the Kumaonee language. These letters were sent through a couple of men, inhabitants of the hills, who were dependable and who had been instructed to proceed separately and by different routes to Almora and to be particularly careful to deliver them with all caution and secrecy. The contents of the first of the two letters were:

"I have lately arrived in this quarter on the part of the British Government, and have, if you are disposed to listen to them, communication to make, nearly affecting your interests and of consequence for you to hear. As the mode of intercourse, however, may perhaps at present be somewhat difficult, I have made this communication through the bearer, a man of

³ Letter from Gardner to J. Adam dated Moradabad, 16 November 1814.

the hills. If it be practicable, you can answer me freely by letter; if the contrary, you could perhaps despatch to me some private and confidential servant or agent, authorised to hear what I may have to propose, and to make answer generally on your part. To such a person I could communicate the substance merely of my object, until we could establish a more confidential and direct correspondence or effect a meeting; which, if you are disposed to enter into any discussions, the present is the moment to bring about".⁴

These letters, Gardner admitted in his letter to the Government of the 6th December 1814, "were not explicit upon any particular point; but it was scarcely possible, from their general tenor, that Bum Shah could have understood them in any sense except that purported by the British Government". They reply sent by the Gorkha Governor to the proposal asking the price of his leaving the cause of his national Government is a remarkable and rare document in Modern Indian History, and deserves to be quoted in full. After recapitulating the contents of the two letters sent by Gardner, he added:

"What you observe regarding the state of the roads and the difficulty of intercourse, has not originated with me; and although you mention having something of consequence to impart to me, as you have entered into no particulars, it is not possible for me to speak openly on that subject."

"You have alluded to what I had before written to Mr. Rutherford, and observed, that from that correspondence you were led to believe that I was willing to listen to what you might have to say. My communications with that gentleman were merely lamenting that the strict and ancient friendship which had subsisted between the two states should have been disturbed by trifling altercations between the zamindars on the borders, concerning certain lands on the frontier of Palpa and Butwal. It is probably on this subject that you required me to send you a confidential person on my part. If this be the case, and the object be to restore the former ties as they existed between the state I serve and the British Government, I will despatch a trustworthy person, who is in readiness to proceed as soon as I shall

⁴ Translation of two letters despatched to Bum Shah at Almora, under date 22 November 1814, No. 1.

For the above letter and the three preceding paragraphs see the letter from Edward Gardner to J. Adam, dated Casheepore, 22 November 1814, and included in the *Secret Consultations—Bengal*, under date 25 January 1815.

have heard from you, which I request may be as early as possible.”⁵

This letter clearly shows that the Gorkha Commanders were not men whose natural allegiance could be bought or sold. The interpretation put on Gardner's letters by Bum Shah shows that either the Gorkha Governor could not even think of ever playing the traitor to his country or that he tried to point out to the Honourable Mr. Edward Gardner the enormity of the latter's moral crime by interpreting the seducing letters in the sense that their object was “to restore the former ties as they existed between the State I (Bum Shah) serve and the British Government”. Thus, without causing any offence, he told the British representative that the interests of the Government he served would not be bartered away by him.

The conduct pursued by Bum Shah sufficiently proved to the satisfaction of the Governor General that “no active or material aid would be derived from his influence in favour of the Company's cause. The Governor General, under these circumstances, did not consider it necessary to hold out to him those advantages, which he was disposed to offer to him “under a different impression”.”⁶

The matter was then dropped.

Similar attempts were made to tempt the loyalty of the great military Commander Amar Singh Thapa, who led the best troops of the Gorkhas in the newly acquired territories between the Sutlej and the Jamuna. Lord Moira, in his narrative of the War, says “Information had reached me, that afforded reason for believing that Amar Singh Thapa, notwithstanding his apparently zealous devotion to the cause of his country, was secretly disaffected to the ruling administration of Nepal, and that he might be induced to withdraw from the service and surrender the Gorkha army and possessions within his Government and com-

⁵ Translation of a letter from Bum Shah addressed to Gardner under date the 28 November, and received the 6 December 1814, enclosed in Gardner's letter to J. Adam dated Moradabad 6 December 1814, *Secret Consultations—Bengal*, dated 25 January 1815.

⁶ Letter from J. Adam, Secretary to Government to Edward Gardner, Camp Belwallah 14 December 1814, *Secret Consultations—Bengal*, 25 January 1815.

mand, if assured of protection and liberal provision from the British Government I accordingly furnished Major General Ochterlony with Secret instructions to encourage any overture which might be made by Amar Singh to the effect above stated, and with authority to promise, in the name of the British Government, an asylum in our provinces, and a permanent provision for Amar Singh and his family on the condition of his surrendering with his army, and putting us in possession of the country which he occupied.”⁷

Moir’s information was incorrect. It is not known what sources he had for entertaining the idea that the Gorkha Commander would surrender his trust to the enemies of his Government for his own personal considerations. Amar Singh however, carried on a continuous correspondence with Ochterlony “for the re-establishment of the relations of amity between the two Governments.”⁸

When Ochterlony had already commenced his march to Nalagarh, he received a letter from Ranjor Singh (the son of Amar Singh), stating his readiness to repair to Delhi. At the same time, Ranjor Singh sent a letter with similar contents to Metcalfe at Delhi. “These concurrent communications from Ranjor Singh led the Governor General to suppose, that the former would speedily depute an Agent to Delhi, with the view either to negotiate an accommodation of the differences between the two States, or to effect an arrangement for his own and his father’s interests”. Any propositions with a view to the former

⁷ *Narrative of the War*, Secret letter from Lord Moira to the Secret Committee, dated 2 August 1815.

⁸ I. Translation of the substance of the letters from Amar Singh Thapa to the Governor General and to Colonel Ochterlony (enclosed in a letter from Colonel Ochterlony to the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, dated December 1814).

II. Translation of a letter from Amar Singh Thapa to Colonel Ochterlony and one from Colonel Ochterlony in reply (enclosed in a letter from Colonel Ochterlony to the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, dated 15 December 1814).

III. Translations of a letter from Amar Singh Thapa to Colonel Ochterlony received 16 December 1814 and Colonel Ochterlony’s reply (enclosed in a letter from Colonel Ochterlony to the Secretary in the Political Department, dated 16 December 1814). See *Secret Proceedings—Bengal*, 25 January 1815.

object would be inadmissible to the Governor General, because he had already determined to expel the Gorkhas from the neighbourhood of the Sikhs, and the original disputes had lost their significance in the importance of the imperial policy followed by Moira. But he desired Metcalfe to receive and communicate any proposals put forward by the Gorkhas. Personal accommodation appeared to the Governor General to be the much more probable object of any such deputation, and he did not doubt "that whatever might be the ostensible purpose of the mission of a Vakil, it would have that (private accommodation) for its concealed and real one". He, therefore, furnished Metcalfe with instructions suited to such a supposition: "The disposition formerly entertained by the Governor General, to give a favourable ear to any overtures from Amar Singh Thapa or his son, of a nature to secure their separation from the interests of the Nepalese, is undiminished, and has even been increased, by the apparent backwardness of the inhabitants of the hills between the Jamuna and the Sutlej to rise against the Gorkhas: a circumstance which, at the same time, affords more ready and ample means of fulfilling any expectations which Amar Singh or his son may entertain, as the price of their defection from the Government of Nepal. Their (the inhabitants') real disposition must shortly be brought to the test; and if they shall still maintain their present undecided line of conduct, the Governor General will consider the British Government to be exonerated from the obligation of fulfilling the promise made by the proclamation, that promise resting distinctly on the condition of active assistance. In this event, then, the Governor General would have no hesitation in guaranteeing the whole of that tract, with the exceptions hereafter mentioned to Amar Singh or his son Ranjor Singh Thapa, as an independent sovereignty, on the condition of his separating himself from the interests of Nepal and entering into engagements with the British Government", corresponding in principle with those proposed to be concluded with the restored Chiefs.⁹

In case the people of the hills rose against the Gorkhas, it was proposed that in addition to such lands as would probably,

⁹ Letter from the Secretary to Government to C. T. Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi, dated 21 November 1814, *Secret Consultations*.

under any circumstances, be at the disposal of the British Government, to confer on Amar Singh and his family a jagir in some other quarter, or a pension in money. However, the military operations were not to be suspended pending the negotiations.

On the receipt of the above instructions, Metcalfe intimated to Kaji Ranjor Singh his readiness to receive an Agent, should he think it proper to depute one. This was intended to solicit proposals from the Kaji for his demands on the British Government as the price of his family's surrendering the army and the country entrusted to their care by the Nepalese Government.

Ranjor Thapa sent the letter to his father, who must have been surprised to get this clandestine communication from the Resident at Delhi, with whom he had kept up little correspondence. Amar Singh having apprised Ochterlony of the receipt of this communication, entered into a correspondence with him which terminated in his intimating his intention of sending an Agent immediately to Delhi, and from thence to the Governor General. Lord Moira was anxious to know the tenor of Amar Singh's propositions and instructed Ochterlony that if it should appear that, notwithstanding the deputation of the Vakil, Amar Singh was desirous of a personal communication, he was at liberty to meet him, and his conduct was to be guided by his knowledge of the Governor General's views and sentiments on the matter.

In his reply received on 15th December, 1814, Amar Singh Thapa had definitely stated that if a stop were put to "the disputes and differences, it would be highly proper; otherwise whatever may be the pleasure of the two Governments must be right, and their servants have no choice left". This should have dispelled any notions entertained by the Company's servants for securing the disaffection of Amar Singh from his loyalty, but about this time W. A. Brooke, the Agent at Benares, informed the Governor General that a Brahmin named Basdeo had paid him a visit on behalf of Ranudoz Singh Thapa, the son of Amar Singh Thapa and the principal minister for civil affairs of the Raja of Nepal and Keeper of the "Red Seal". Basdeo informed Mr. Brooke of his having received a letter from Ranudoz Singh, desiring the Brahmin to communicate to

the British Agent in Benares the wishes of himself and his father of joining the British troops, and putting them in possession of Nepal, on condition of his being continued, in the possession of lands which he held from the Nepal Government, yielding a revenue of thirty thousand rupees per annum, and a monthly allowance of two thousand rupees, after the English were in possession of Nepal and that the Raja be continued in the Government.¹⁰

The Governor General, on receipt of this communication, instructed Brooke "to direct Basdeo to inform Ranudoz Singh that the Governor General was willing to meet his proposal and to recommend to him to open a communication with Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw who was desired to receive any overture of the nature contemplated from Ranudoz and engage in the name of the British Government, to fulfil the terms proposed by Basdeo, on his performance of the conditions specified". At the same time Lord Moira "signified to Ochterlony his readiness to pledge the faith of the British Government, to the following terms, on condition that Amar Singh surrendered his army, and the country in his possession, and his son performed the promises conveyed through Basdeo—1stly to establish the Raja of Nepal in the Government of the whole of that country east of the Gogra, with the exception of such parts, the Company might be bound to secure to them. 2ndly, to confirm to Amar Singh and his family the lands held by them, to the value of rupees 30,000 per annum; and 3rdly, to settle on him and his family an annual sum of rupees 24,000 or even to exceed that sum, in such proportion as might be deemed reasonable with reference to their services and condition."¹¹

The Brahmin Basdeo was asked to proceed to Kathmandu to deliver to Ranudoz Singh the message imparted by Brooke. Basdeo, shortly afterwards returned to Benares accompanied by another Brahmin named Neelkanth Joshi, with a letter to the

¹⁰ Extract from a letter from W. A. Brooke to the Principal Private Secretary to the Governor General, *Secret Consultations—Bengal*, 25 January 1815.

¹¹ Letters from the Secretary to Government to Colonel Ochterlony and to Major Bradshaw, dated Camp Saharanpur, 29 December 1814, *Secret Letter,—Bengal*, 25 January 1815.

Governor General's address from the Raja, and letters jointly addressed by Bhim Sen and Ranudoz Thapa to Brooke, with the professed object of opening a negotiation for peace.

In the Sutlej Sector of the front, Ochterlony also addressed a letter to Amar Singh on 29 December 1814, intimating that he had received the Governor General's authority to communicate on the subject of any propositions which Amar Singh made. In his reply Amar Singh made no reference whatever to the supposed views of his son, as connected with his own, nor did he express any inclination to renew negotiation on the part of his Government. He, on the contrary, declared his firm intention, as well as that of the other Gorkha Chiefs, to oppose the British to the last extremity. Ochterlony naturally supposed that this letter would terminate their correspondence; but on the following day he received another letter from Amar Singh, stating his wish to send a confidential person, who was accordingly received by Ochterlony, to whom he read a paper bearing the Red Seal of the Raja, purporting to be instructions to Amar Singh for negotiating peace. The terms proposed were the cession to the British Government of the lands in Butwal lying on the left bank of the Tarai, and the twenty-two villages of Nunnore. Ochterlony informed Amar Singh's Agent, that these terms would be communicated to the Governor General, but held him no hope that they would be listened to, and discouraged a proposition that the Agent should be deputed to Delhi.¹²

Rejecting these terms, Lord Moira was still inclined to think, that notwithstanding the confident style of Amar Singh's language, he must consider his situation to be one of some peril, and that he would be disposed, especially if it should be rendered more difficult by the success of Ochterlony's operations, to make terms for himself; Lord Moira, therefore, adopted a suggestion of Ochterlony's for eventually placing him in possession of the remote district of Rampur Bushahr lying between the Sutlej and the borders of Garhwal under the snowy mountains, with some adjacent tracts of lands. "There seemed reason to suppose," says Lord Moira in his "Narrative of the WAR", "that although Amar Singh had not availed himself of the openings given him to bring

¹² *Narrative of the War*, Lord Moira's Secret letter, dated 2 August 1815, Para 205.

forward any proposition relating to personal objects, he would not scruple to accept an offer made distinctly to him."

Ochterlony, on the success of the movement which compelled Amar Singh to take up his position on the heights of Malaon, renewed his communication with him, through the medium of Ranudoz Singh, the Chief's son, in the hope that it might lead to a negotiation concerning his personal views, but no such result ensued, and after Malaon "all correspondence with Amar Singh, referring either to peace between the two States or to his private interest, ceased".

The effect of all these efforts at tampering with the loyalty of Amar Singh was the reverse of what was expected by the British. Instead of softening towards the British side, Amar Singh's will was strengthened in opposition to it. His strong disapproval of British political methods is to be seen in his letter to the Nepal durbar advising distrust against the British. This letter has already been quoted in the previous chapter.

Chapter 15

THE PEACE OF SEGOULI

THE Nepal War was not desired by the Gorkhas. The durbar never thought that the Company would really go to the extent of preparing for and organising a mountain war in order to secure for itself a few villages in the Tarai. The Gorkhas never thought that the Company, though it had said emphatically that the Gorkhas were to be expelled from Butwal and the twenty-two villages of Nunnore, really meant business. There is an element of expediency or waywardness in British policy which is most disconcerting to her opponents. No doubt the British are realists and their policies are based on expediency and British interests, but that realism and that expediency is subtler than most of her opponents imagine. Its roots are much deeper than what can be surmised from the surface.

However, one thing is certain and that is the Gorkhas consistently wanted to patch up a peace with the Company throughout the years of the Nepal War.

Even before the British troops started on their offensive against the Gorkhas, Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya, a Vakil on the part of the Raja of Nepal, approached Major Bradshaw on the Saran frontier asking his permission to proceed to Calcutta for the purpose of congratulating the Governor General on his arrival from England and of increasing the reciprocal friendship between the two States. Major Bradshaw informed him that he must await the decision of the Governor General before permitting him to proceed. On being apprised by Major Bradshaw of the arrival of the Vakil and the ostensible object of his mission, the Governor General directed Major Bradshaw to signify to him, and also to the Raja, that in the actual relations between the two States, no amicable intercourse, of the nature implied by the despatch of the Vakil with presents could be maintained with the Government, nor any Nepalese Agent admitted into the British territory, without full powers to adjust

all depending differences on a permanent and satisfactory basis. Major Bradshaw was also desired to inform the Agent that he was at liberty to return to Kathmandu.¹

Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya then unsuccessfully tried to get a passport from the Magistrate of Tirhut. He afterwards retired to Burhurwa, where he remained until the capture of that post by Major Bradshaw in November. He was made a prisoner and his papers fell into the hands of the British. With Major Bradshaw's permission the Vakil addressed a letter to the Raja, reporting the circumstances of his capture and suggesting at the direction of Major Bradshaw that Bhim Sen Thapa should meet Major Bradshaw and negotiate peace which was the only means to save the State.²

The Nepalese accused the British "of seizing and plundering Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya who had the character of a Vakil, contrary to the laws and usages of nations, and to the observances of courtesy usual between Governments, even in a State of war". The sum of their charge was that "Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya, whom they styled the constituted Vakil of the Raja, while awaiting on the frontier the authority of the Governor General to proceed to the Presidency of the Governor General's headquarters, was attacked by the British troops and plundered of the presents destined for the Governor General, and of his letters and credentials, as well as of his private property". And from this act it was argued that the British Government had thrown obstacles in the way of the preservation of good understanding which it was the object of Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya's mission to effect and that the British Government's treatment of that person, had discouraged the deputation of Vakil by Nepal. Lord Moira, however, argued that the Upadhyaya lost his diplomatic character on being refused admittance into British territory, and that he had wilfully exposed himself to capture by remaining in the frontier post.³

The Nepal Government still wanted to preserve peace and

¹ Letter from the Secretary to Government to Major Bradshaw, dated 11 October 1814.

² Letter from Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya to the Raja of Nepal, No. 62 in Enclosure Number 1, Intercepted correspondence in *Papers relating to the Nepal War*, p. 344.

³ *Narrative of the War*, Secret letter from Lord Moira, 2 August 1815.

friendship. In their reply to Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya's letter they said that it was necessary that peaceful negotiations should establish the ancient relations between Nepal and the English, and they wanted the Upadhyaya to conduct the negotiations in conformity thereto, so as to afford satisfaction to the English. The Raja, it was said, did not conceive that out of so trifling a cause (i.e. petty frontier disputes) such a War would arise, adding that he had no wish but for peace. Even General Bhim Sen Thapa was prepared to meet and negotiate with the British if that was necessary.^{3a}

But peace terms could not be discussed on the basis of the Tarai lands in dispute. The British Government had decided "that the extinction of the Gorkha power west of the Kali was an indispensable condition of any pacification". The ground for this was "the importance (to the Company) of effecting a material reduction in the strength and resources of the enemy (the Gorkhas).⁴ This object, however, could not be conceded by the Nepalese except after a complete military defeat. No result came out of the Raja of Nepal's communications with Brook, the Agent at Benares, for negotiations for peace. Similarly the attempts made by the Nepal Government to negotiate peace through the Agency of Amar Singh Thapa in the Sutej area were foredoomed to failure because the British Government now wanted almost one third of the Gorkha empire and not merely a few square Kilometers of Tarai in Gorakhpur or Saran, and no Nepalese Government could concede these demands except after a decisive military defeat.

About this time Guru Gajraj Misser, who had been the Guru of the late Raja Ran Bahadur Shah of Nepal, and who was leading a retired life at Benares, intervened to restore friendly relations between the two Governments. Before the actual commencement of hostilities, the Nepal Government had sent him money and presents, entreating him to exert himself to compose

^{3a} Copy of a letter from the Raja of Nepal to Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya dated the 15th Aghun 1871, Sambat (11 December 1814) in reply to Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya's Arzee. Enclosed in a letter from M. Bradshaw dated 25 December 1814, *Papers relating to the Nepal War*, pp. 376-77.

⁴ *Narrative of Negotiations*, Secret Letter from Lord Moira, 5 August 1815, Para 7.

the differences, but he had then returned the gifts and had declined to interfere. Being animated, however, by a desire to save the Raja from the consequences which he saw impending over him, Guru Gajraj Misser, afterwards solicited the British Government's permission to proceed to the frontier. On reaching Major Bradshaw's camp, he formed a plan with Ram Bum Pandit, the nephew of the late Damodar Pande, to effect a revolution in the administration in Kathmandu preliminary to the restoration of peace. This was, however, discountenanced by the Governor General.

At this time a pressing invitation came from the Raja of Nepal and Bhim Sen Thapa for the Guru to proceed to Kathmandu. And on being relieved from apprehensions of his personal safety and encouraged by the general respect in which he was held, Gajraj Misser went to Kathmandu, accompanied, at his particular request, by Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya.⁵ News of the successes of British arms at Almora and Malaon reached the Durbar about this time and a general desire for peace was shown by the chiefs and the administration of Nepal.

Guru Gajraj Misser returned from Kathmandu accompanied by Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya on the 28th May, 1815 and produced before Major Bradshaw who had by then been promoted Lieut. Colonel a paper under the Raja's Red Seal empowering him to bring to an adjustment all matters in dispute between the two States. Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw, on instructions from the Governor General, placed the proposals of the British Government for peace before the Nepalese plenipotentiary. These proposals included—firstly, restoration of the relations of peace; secondly, renunciation by the Gorkhas of the disputed lands; thirdly, cession of the low lands from the Kali to the Teista; fourthly, cession of Nagri and Nagarkote to the Raja of Sikkim; fifthly, renunciation of all claim to a connection with the territories west of the Kali; sixthly, stipulation for the recognition of any treaties which the British Government might make in the course of the war with chiefs or tribes, subjects of Nepal; seventhly stipulation for the security of the Raja of Sikkim; eighthly, exclusion of the subjects of European and

⁵ *Narrative of negotiations*, Secret letter from Lord Moira to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 5 August 1815, para 14.

American States; ninthly, reception of resident Agents from each Government; and lastly revival of the commercial treaty of 1792. On learning of these demands, Guru Gajraj Misser "distinctly informed" Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw that he "did not possess authority to comply with such extensive demands, and that sacrifices of such magnitude were not contemplated by any party at Kathmandu, as justly resulting from the events or actual state of the War". Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw then intimated to the Guru that he was not authorised to proceed with the discussions in such a case.⁶

It was then proposed to submit these proposals to Nepal through Bum Shah, and Mr. Gardner was instructed to secure the good offices of Bum Shah for the purpose. At the same time through misconception of his orders, Bradshaw told the Guru that he had been directed not to renew negotiations with him. This was regretted by the Governor General and it must have embarrassed the Nepal Durbar. The peace was going to be a dictated peace but the will of the Nepal Durbar had not yet been broken sufficiently to submit to a thorough and irreparable dismemberment of their state.

In Kumaon frequent meetings took place near the Kali between Mr. Gardner and Bum Shah. Rudra Bir Shah (the brother of Bum Shah) also took part in the negotiations. In the course of these negotiations, which were also authorised by the Nepal Durbar it appeared that no greater latitude had been given to the choutras than to Gajraj Misser. Even on the question of the cession of the Tarai, Rudra Bir Shah expressed an unqualified rejection of the proposition, declaring that it was what would never be consented to in Nepal, and was a subject, in fact, he had received no orders or authority to treat of.

The negotiations were then entirely broken off by the choutras. The Governor General then proposed that the Tarai should be ceded to the Company, and the Company would grant jagirs there to such chiefs as the Raja of Nepal might name on the same terms as other jagirs in the Company's territories. But this concession also proved fruitless.

⁶ Letter from Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw to the Secretary to Government, 18 June 1815, summarised in *Narrative of negotiations*, dated 5 August 1815.

At last on the 22nd July, 1815, the Governor General addressed another letter to the Raja of Nepal regretting the limited powers of negotiation delegated to Guru Gajraj Misser and to Bum Shah Choutra. He told the Raja that the British Government was not accustomed to making demands which it did not mean to persist in. He also earnestly asked the Raja to weigh well the peril to which he exposed himself by a further resistance of the "just" demands of the British Government. Delay, he said, would compel his Government to take measures which would be fatal to his (the Raja's) Government.⁷

So far the negotiations had broken down on the question of the Tarai and no discussion had taken place of the different demands made by the Company's Government. In August Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw informed the Secretary to the Government that the Nepalese Vakils had produced documents under the Raja's seal granting them full powers to negotiate with the representative of the British Government.⁸ The Guru's instructions showed that "with regard to the conquests by the British Government of the country towards Kumaon in the west and the Tarai, whatever may be the result of your negotiation, will be approved by me. Do not entertain any doubt on that head."⁹

This letter from the Raja also informed the Guru that the authority given to Bum Shah for negotiations was annulled. In his letter to the Guru, Bhim Sen Thapa putting down some facts for his guidance wrote: "To you what instructions can I send to negotiate by this or that rule. The sentiments of the Bhara-dars to the west are these: 'If for the sake of peace, you will give up to the British Government our territory, hill and plain, east of the Sutlej to Kumaon, we will not be parties to such a policy. Rather than with our own hands and voice surrender that territory, we consent to sacrifice our lives in it. But the sentiments in this quarter are, that with regard to our territory west of Kumaon and the Tarai, which have lately fallen into the hands of the British Government, whatever you shall do or say,

⁷ Letter to the Raja of Nepal from the Governor General written on the 22 July, 1815, *Papers respecting the Nepal War*, p. 812.

⁸ Letters from Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw to the Secretary to Government, dated 31 July, 6 August, 10 August and 23 August, 1815.

⁹ Letter from the Raja of Nepal to Guru Gajraj Misser dated Wednesday 5 Sudi (20) Savan, 1872, 3 August, 1815.

we will advocate the same before the Raja and obtain a confirmation of it'.¹⁰

In his fresh instructions to Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw, the Governor General reduced his demand for the entire Tarai from the Kali to the Teista. He instructed Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw that the proposal of granting jagirs to Nepalese chiefs was to be the basis of the new discussion about the Tarai. Lord Moira also authorised him, if he were satisfied that the demand for the whole of the Tarai would obstruct the negotiations, to abandon the demand for the cession of the Tarai in Morung east of the Kosi, and some other places in the Tarai of which the Gorkhas had not till then been dispossessed by the Company's troops.

The proposed treaty, amended slightly as regards the cession of the Tarai, was presented to Guru Gajraj Misser and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya on the 12th September, 1815. The Guru deferred its discussion till the 16th when he proposed to meet Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw alone. On that day the Guru disclosed that his powers did not embrace the unqualified surrender which had been demanded. Nepal, he said, could never exist as a power after the loss of the low lands; and "believing this to be a fact equally well established in the opinion of the British Government", he confessed that "he had always felt that the Tarai, however contended for, would ultimately be relinquished to the Raja. He knew the aversion with which every person in Nepal, of the Gorkha dynasty, who was of consequence sufficient to have any weight in the general voice, regarded the cession of territory, and was aware of the odium which would be incurred by him, who should be the instrument of it".

He said that he had persuaded the Raja and his ministers to make all suitable demonstrations of submission to the British Government, and he had hoped that he would be able to find means short of the sacrifices demanded of the Nepalese, which would suit the views of both the Governments and lay the foundations of a solid peace between them. It was for this purpose that he had accepted the powers and responsibilities

¹⁰ Letter from Bhim Sen Thapa to Guru Gajraj Misser, Wednesday the 5 Sudi, (20) Savan, 1872, 3 August, 1815, *Papers respecting the Nepal War*, p. 825.

of the Nepalese Vakil, with powers, though not unlimited, yet as full as his court was accustomed to grant to its most confident Agents.¹¹

It was then understood by the two agents that there was no basis for further discussion of the draft treaty. The Guru, however, forwarded the draft treaty to Kathmandu to await the Raja's answer. Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw quite rudely limited the time for the receipt of the Raja's answer to 21 days.

The Governor General was disappointed at this result. Instead of that frank declaration which he had been intrusted to make of the Governor General's satisfaction at the tone of the Raja's letter, and of the disposition which his Excellency had consequently adopted, to render the terms of peace less rigid than previously intended, it appeared to Lord Moira, that Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw had held towards the Guru, a demeanour and a language, if not absolutely repulsive, at least calculated to check any confidential advances on the part of the Gorkha negotiator. Under this conviction, the Governor General thought that instead of resting on Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw's discretion, it would be better to dictate the precise terms of the proposed new treaty which were to be communicated by Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw to the Guru and of which the acceptance or definitive rejection by the Court of Kathmandu was required.¹² Also a letter was sent by the Governor General to the Raja of Nepal informing him "of the desire already expressed, to render the indispensable conditions of peace as little injurious as possible to the interests of Nepal and of individual Chiefs". He also stated to the Raja that the draft treaty was the unalterable resolution of the British Government and that the decision, with all its momentous consequences, belonged to him; and warned him that the British Government combined with a sincere desire to make peace, a perfect confidence in the issue of renewed hostilities.

The Raja's reply expressed that his anxiety to restore the friendship between the two states, would dispose him to con-

¹¹ Letter from Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw to the Secretary to Government, Camp Segauli, 19 September 1815.

¹² Letter from Secretary to Government to Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw, dated 23 September, 1815.

sent to such sacrifices as he was able to bear. In the hope, therefore, of experiencing the generosity of the British Government, he had asked Guru Gajraj Misser to request that the severity of the conditions of peace might be mitigated. The Guru was prepared to sign the peace on condition that its terms would be mitigated afterwards.¹³

The Nepal Durbar, however, was not inclined to accept the draft treaty without material alterations. The party of Amar Singh Thapa, the great military Commander, was against peace. His arguments could not be easily dismissed by any thoughtful person in Nepal. He still held much the same views about the affairs of his country as he had while defending his positions in Malaon. Having lost their dominions, he asked, what was to become of their great military establishment. He insinuated that those in favour of submitting to the peace proposals would usurp the Government of Nepal with the help of the Resident and the British army that would come with him. "When our power is once reduced, we shall have another Knox's mission, under pretence of concluding a treaty of alliance and friendship, and founding commercial establishments. If we decline receiving their mission, they will insist; and if we are unable to oppose force, and desire them to come unaccompanied with troops, they will not comply. They will begin by introducing a company, a battalion will soon after follow, and at length an Army will be assembled for the subjugation of Nepal."¹⁴ Such had been the tenor of Amar Singh and his sons' letter to the Raja of Nepal, while he was sticking to his precarious hold east of Malaon. His views were still substantially the same.

Amar Singh Thapa now opposed the article in the proposed treaty, relative to the pensions for certain Bharadars. He placed the matter in an odium and affirmed that those who should receive such pensions would render themselves liable to the suspicion of becoming the partisans and agents of a Foreign

¹³ Translation of a letter from the Raja of Nepal to the Governor General dated (28th November 1815) received 8 December, 1815, *Bengal Secret Proceedings*, 12 January 1816.

¹⁴ Letter from Amar Singh Thapa and his sons' Ram Das and Arjun Thapa to the Raja of Nepal, dated Rajgarh, 2nd March, 1815. Letter intercepted by the British troops "Papers respecting the Nepal WAR"—533 *et seqq.*

State. He insinuated that these Chiefs would become the paid spies and fifth columnists of the British Power. At this Bhim Sen sent a confidential agent named Uma Kant to get that article modified on the principle of exchange of the money pensions for relinquishment of territory.¹⁵ Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw told the Agent that the Governor General would be favourably disposed to agree to alterations in the best interests of both the States, but demanded the ratification which however, did not arrive within the time stipulated, and the Governor General proceeded to make preparations for resuming military operations against Nepal. The military as well as the political powers were thereafter entrusted into the hands of Sir David Ochterlony, who after full preparations started his campaign early in February 1816.

The Raja of Nepal in the meantime had asked Guru Gajraj Misser to return to Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw's camp at Segauli, and tell him that the court of Kathmandu was not in a position to put its signatures to the treaty unless the Tarai between the Kosi and the Gandak was restored to Nepal in exchange for the proposed pensions. Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw told the Guru that the withholding of the ratified treaty had terminated the negotiations as far as he was concerned, and referred him to Sir David Ochterlony, on whom the conduct of all political negotiations and affairs between the British and Nepalese Governments had now devolved.

Sir David Ochterlony, on being apprised of the return of the Guru without the treaty, transmitted to him the letter from the Governor General to the Raja of Nepal. This letter, in the form rather of an ultimatum, demanded the immediate ratification of the proposed treaty and solemnly warned the Raja of the fatal consequences to himself, his family and his country which would result from any further delay.¹⁶ He also intimated to the Guru that his further residence in the British Camp was unnecessary and that he might withdraw either to Kathmandu or to Benares. The Guru, however, remained in the British Camp where he was

¹⁵ Letter from Lieut. Colonel Bradshaw to the Secretary to Government, dated 28 December 1815.

¹⁶ Letter to the Raja of Nepal written 13th January, 1816, *Papers respecting the Nepal War*, pp. 984-85.

shortly afterwards joined by Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya, who had lately repaired to Nepal with the Governor General's letter. The ratification was still withheld, mainly on the question of the lands in the Tarai. The Nepalese insisted on the exchange of the pensions for a specified part of the Tarai or the payments being made to the Raja instead of being divided among the Bharadars. To the latter proposition Sir David Ochterlony observed, that it was immaterial to the British Government how the money was appropriated; and to the former, that if the treaty were ratified, he was assured the wish of the Court of Kathmandu would be met by the British Government as far as possible; but that the ratified treaty being still withheld, his instructions precluded him from continuing the negotiations. He accordingly dismissed the Nepalese Vakils and directed them to depart from his Camp. On the same evening he started on his successful march to Makwanpur.¹⁷

At camp Hetounda, Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya brought a letter from the Raja of Nepal to General Ochterlony informing him that Kaji Bakhtawar Singh, brother of General Bhim Singh Thapa, had been asked to wait upon him and arrange terms of peace between the two Governments, and requesting a suspension of hostilities till the Guru also repaired to his Camp.¹⁸

Major General Ochterlony informed Kaji Bakhtawar Singh that it was not in his power to discontinue hostilities, or to wait for the return of the Guru. He added, however, that if he had brought with him the ratified treaty as it originally stood, with the seal and signature of the Raja of Nepal affixed to it, a conference would doubtless follow.¹⁹

On the 24th General Ochterlony was informed that the ratified treaty was in the possession of Kaji Bakhtawar Singh. The treaty was brought to General Ochterlony on the 4th March, 1816 who accepted it after demanding and procuring in writing

¹⁷ Secret letter from Bengal to the Court of Directors, 21 February 1816.

See also Minutes of a conversation that took place between Major General Sir D. Ochterlony K.C.B. Shree Guru Gajraj Misser and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya dated Camp Bichakor 14 February 1816.

¹⁸ Translation of a letter from the Raja of Nepal, dated 5 Phagun, (18 February 1816).

¹⁹ Translation of a letter from Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony to Kaji Bakhtawar Singh, dated Hetounda 21 February 1816.

an assurance from the Kaji and Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya that every hope which might have been formerly held out of a change in some articles was formally and explicitly retracted. Hostilities then ceased.

General Ochterlony reported to the Governor General that he was persuaded to accept the original treaty because of "the advanced state of the season, the diminished state of the British Commissariat to what they were originally intended to be, the unhealthiness of the country, the impossibility of getting supplies through the pestilential regions, and a recollection of what men are capable of doing when driven to desperation."²⁰

The ratified treaty was joyously accepted by the Governor General. The news of the conclusion of peace appeared to the Governor General's Council of such importance that they despatched the Honourable Company's Cruiser Malabar to England, without delay, for the express purpose of conveying that intelligence.

In India, the work of peace was taken in hand. The army corps were withdrawn to their stations and the Company's Government considered itself fortunate in being relieved of a heavy burden on its finances through having embarked upon an unprofitable enterprise. Edward Gardner was chosen for the post of the Resident at Kathmandu, and the Raja of Nepal was informed that "Gardner would, on his arrival at Kathmandu, offer for his acceptance some propositions of a favourable nature, provided the conduct of the Raja's Government, intermediately shall be such as to satisfy the Resident of its sincerity and good faith."²¹

The Raja of Nepal sent a polite letter to the Governor General after the conclusion of peace. The tenor and expressions of the Raja's letter were extremely friendly and satisfactory to the Governor General. The conclusion of peace was undoubtedly the act of Bhim Sen Thapa and his party, who possessed the executive power of the State; and, although from the constitution of the Nepal Government, their measures were liable to be thwarted, and thence rendered fluctuating, it would certainly

²⁰ Letter from Sir D. Ochterlony to the Secretary to Government, dated 5 March 1816.

²¹ Letter from Sir D. Ochterlony to the Secretary to Government, dated 5 March 1816.

have been in the interests of Bhim Sen's party to maintain and support a measure of such vital importance, of which they were the authors, and on the success of which their political reputation, and the predominance of their influence and power would mainly depend. The Governor General hoped that by judicious and conciliatory conduct on the part of the Resident, and the careful avoidance, in the early stage of their intercourse, of every measure calculated to excite jealousy or apprehension, the relations between the two countries would be improved in due time.

The net result of the War was the expulsion of the Gorkhas from the banks of the Sutlej, thus separating them from the Sikhs, another militant Hindu power in the Punjab. This removed the danger of a possible Hindu coalition threatening the Northern and the Western frontiers of the Company's territories. As a matter of fact there was no chance of such an alliance as the Gorkhas and Sikhs had hardly much in common, and the idea of an Indian nation had not yet come to the sub-continent. Secondly, the Nepal War was meant to bottle up the Gorkhas inside the hills. They were expelled from the whole of the Tarai lands, which they gradually regained as rewards for services, rendered to the Company in later years. Thirdly the Company received the districts of Kumaon, Garhwal and Simla hills which enabled it to build sanatoria there for its European officers. Fourthly, the Company now had a resident of its own at the Nepal durbar who kept a careful and controlling watch on all the moves and intrigues of the Nepal durbar.

These were the advantages accruing to the Company's Government from the two wars in the mountains of Nepal. There were, however, many people who disapproved of the war and found fault with the Governor General for having undertaken a perilous task. They contended that but for Ochterlony and his good luck the war might have ended in disasters; a result which would have been humiliating for the Company in the extreme. It does seem now that warfare and political settlement in the hills is an art in which the British have seldom been successful and that but for one lucky occupation of a mountain pass, Nepal might have proved as great a liability to the British as Kabul was in later years. The peace of Segouli, however, led to the

gradual process of turning Nepal into a confirmed and devoted ally of the British.

Let us now look at some of the adverse criticisms of the Nepal War.

The advisability of the Company's making and carrying on war against Nepal was seriously doubted in England, and the policy of Lord Moira was severely criticised. It was said that the war was forwardly undertaken without necessity. Lord Moira defended himself by saying that he had "to act up to the engagement bequeathed to him" by Lord Minto. But his defence that the British Government's turning out the Nepalese civil officers from the disputed lands (without having come to any agreement with the Nepal Government about them, for which the latter were entirely willing) as having "very little appearance of hostility or of exasperation on the part of the Gorkhas" is unconvincing. And his statement that the "Raja's answer" to his ultimatum "was haughty, evasive and even menacing" is not substantiated from the records.

Secondly it was asserted that without incurring the expense of invading the enemy's territory, the Company could easily have occupied and held the disputed lands. This was a question of expediency and must naturally be left to the discretion of the men in power at that particular time. The Governor General's Council had unanimously voted for war in 1814, and ultimate success justified their decision.

Thirdly, it was said that the management of the war was not judiciously conceived. The advantages of an army's acting in a compact body were stressed and the divisions of the British troops into four army corps was said to have led to its ineffectiveness. Lord Moira pointed out that this general principle was not applicable in all cases. The only criterion for determining whether the plan of campaign be sound or not, he said, was the justness of its adaptation to the country in which it was to be carried out and to the object ultimately contemplated. Nepal is a country of (ridge upon ridge) of mountains, and as all its rivers run at right angles to the Indian frontier, it was difficult for a number of corps to carry out a combined movement to a common point. The difficulty of feeding troops in such a country where the supplies could not be transported in

any other manner than on the shoulders of men, made it impracticable for armies to act in very large numbers. Lord Moira also argued that it was not certain that the War would have ended favourably if it had been possible to push a corps, irresistible from its numbers, to the Gorkha capital. Having occupied Kathmandu—if that were the single operation contemplated—the British forces could not remain there permanently; and at the same time no other definite enterprise would present itself to be undertaken. Whatsoever provisions the Gorkhas might not have been able to destroy before they abandoned the city would soon have been consumed. There was then the impossibility of covering by any chain of posts, the progress of convoys from the British frontier through an unbroken series of woody hills. There was also the malarious season when all intercourse between the hills and the plains was to cease. Withdrawal from Kathmandu would have had the appearance of failure even if the Gorkhas did not harass the retiring forces. The only practicable plan of operations was, therefore, to fix upon a river (namely the Kali) “the banks of which were of a strength to be guarded by a moderate force against any efforts of the Gorkhas, and to make that river a line of separation from the snowy ridge to the plains, by which one could cut off from the enemy’s empire all that lay west of such a boundary”. The real object in the invasion of Nepal was “to effect such a decisive diminution of the enemy’s immediate strength and future resources as would disable him from ever repeating his aggressions”. With the occupation of all the lands west of Kumaon this purpose was essentially fulfilled.

Other criticisms of the policy of engaging in this aggressive war were that the advantages acquired in the field were not duly insisted on in the conditions of peace; that the invasion of Nepal was calculated to injure the Company’s interests at Canton; that the operations of the War were carried on with wasteful expenditure; that the revenues of the Company were injured by the War; that the pecuniary credit of the Company was unfavourably affected; and lastly that a heavy debt had been incurred. The other points except the last need little further discussion. Two crores and eight lakhs of rupees were borrowed at six per cent from the Nawab Vizir on account of the War. One

crore had been liquidated by the cession of conquered lands including Khairigarh. It was thought expedient to employ fifty-four lakhs in paying off the eight per cent old loan, leaving fifty-four lakhs only as an added burden. It was not thought desirable to get rid of this burden, which could have been paid out of the large cash balances in hand at the close of the financial year 1815. Lord Moira explained to the Directors of the Company that "a demand which you have the means of answering, and which you only forbear to discharge from considerations of your own advantage, cannot be regarded as a weight."²²

²² Letter from Lord Moira to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, dated the 26 August 1816.

any other manner than on the shoulders of men, made it impracticable for armies to act in very large numbers. Lord Moira also argued that it was not certain that the War would have ended favourably if it had been possible to push a corps, irresistible from its numbers, to the Gorkha capital. Having occupied Kathmandu—if that were the single operation contemplated—the British forces could not remain there permanently; and at the same time no other definite enterprise would present itself to be undertaken. Whatsoever provisions the Gorkhas might not have been able to destroy before they abandoned the city would soon have been consumed. There was then the impossibility of covering by any chain of posts, the progress of convoys from the British frontier through an unbroken series of woody hills. There was also the malarious season when all intercourse between the hills and the plains was to cease. Withdrawal from Kathmandu would have had the appearance of failure even if the Gorkhas did not harass the retiring forces. The only practicable plan of operations was, therefore, to fix upon a river (namely the Kali) “the banks of which were of a strength to be guarded by a moderate force against any efforts of the Gorkhas, and to make that river a line of separation from the snowy ridge to the plains, by which one could cut off from the enemy’s empire all that lay west of such a boundary”. The real object in the invasion of Nepal was “to effect such a decisive diminution of the enemy’s immediate strength and future resources as would disable him from ever repeating his aggressions”. With the occupation of all the lands west of Kumaon this purpose was essentially fulfilled.

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exiled him and made him retire to a religious life at Benares. The princess Tripur Sundari, in spite of much cruel treatment by her husband, accompanied him into exile. However, unable to tolerate his vagaries, she returned to Kathmandu and established herself as the Regent for Girvan Juddha Vikram Shah the infant son of Ran Bahadur Shah by another wife, as already related in an earlier chapter. Her husband determined to profit by her success, gave up his religious garb at Benares and returned to Nepal to claim his own. The faithful princess received him back, but in 1804 he was assassinated in open court by an officer whom he had in a rage ordered to be executed. Tripur Sundari Devi did not immolate herself on the funeral pyre of her husband because of her responsibilities as the Queen Regent. She continued to be Regent on behalf of the boy King till 1816 and on behalf of the latter's infant son, Rajendra Vikram Shah, till her own death in 1832.¹

About her and her relations with Bhim Sen Thapa, Sir W. W. Hunter says that "it was this remarkable woman, faithful as a wife, politic and patriotic as a princess, who ruled Nepal as Queen Regent during the whole period from 1816-1832. The actual government was in the hands of the Prime Minister Bhim Sen Thapa—the most famous of the line of soldier-statesmen who have *de facto* governed Nepal from the Gorkha conquest in 1768 to Sir Jung Bahadur in our own times. Bhim Sen, while still a youth, had followed the exiled King and Queen Tripur into their exile at Benares, and had helped in the short lived restoration of his royal master. On the assassination of the latter in 1804, Bhim Sen became Prime Minister and retained the office with an iron grip for thirty years, until his turn came to perish miserably in 1839."²

The confidence which the Queen Regent placed in the able minister led to the undisputed supremacy of Bhim Sen in the Counsels of the nation and of the Thapas in all the responsible jobs at the disposal of the Court. The Resident was looked upon with distrust by almost all the factions at the Court and

¹ Summary from Report dated Kathmandu, July 24, 1837, written by Dr. A. Campbell, under Hodgson's direction, in the *Secret and Political Proceedings*.

² Sir W. W. Hunter, *Life of Brian Honghton Hodgson*, p. 98.

Chapter 16

RELATIONS BETWEEN NEPAL AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM 1816 TO 1836

AFTER 1816 Lord Hastings wanted to have peace on the Northern frontiers of the Company's dominions in order to prosecute military operations in the Central and the Southern parts of the Indian peninsula. The main instructions given to Edward Gardner, the first Resident at Kathmandu, were that he must keep Nepal quiescent in future.

Gardner had been a successful Commissioner in Kumaon. The informality of his manners and his acquaintance with the language of the people had served him greatly in the task of restoring peace to Kumaon which had been the scene of many furious battles during the past 25 years. Lord Moira, now Lord Hastings, chose him for the new post in Kathmandu in order to carry out his policy of avoiding further conflicts with the Nepalese who had been hemmed in on three sides by the Company's acquisitions and whose power of future offensive action had been crippled.

Gardner's duty was to maintain the *status quo* and in this task he was greatly helped by Bhim Sen Thapa, who was in sole charge of affairs at Kathmandu for the entire duration of the first Resident's service in Nepal.

Soon after Gardner's arrival at Kathmandu the Raja, who hardly took any part in the superintendence and guidance of state matters, died. He left behind an infant son who had been born to the young raja in 1814. The Maharani Lalit Tripur Sundari Devi, was appointed the Regent for the infant prince.

Maharani Lalit Tripur Sundari Devi was the wife of Ran Bahadur Shah. She was born in a princely family of Nepal and by inheritance and her own abilities was a remarkable woman. Ran Bahadur Shah, who was a cruel and weak prince, was forced to abdicate in 1799. The sirdars and the Brahmins, disgusted with his continued oppression, at length, virtually

He formulated the lines of what later became the traditional policy of Nepal namely: to keep the British totally in the dark as to whatever transpired within the mountains and to refuse all effectual explanations of differences amongst Nepalese chiefs themselves.⁵ Bhim Sen Thapa wanted to seal out the English in such a way that no one in Nepal except himself should have any communications with them. He impressed upon all the Nepalese Chiefs that intercourse with the Residency must inevitably lead to the formation of a discontented faction in the State, and that treaties expressly forbade such intercourse. Whilst under these pretexts he debarred one and all from the privilege of personal intercourse with the British, he had little difficulty in persuading the Nepalese as individuals, whether great or small, that he alone was fit to cope with the Company's Government in politics.⁶

When Hodgson took full charge of the Residency in 1833, he found these restrictions almost intolerable. He wrote to the Political Secretary to the Government of India that he was decidedly of the opinion that it would have been better to put an end to the ludicrous mockery of Chinese foreign policy which the Minister had endeavoured to play off against the Residency since its establishment.⁷ Bhim Sen Thapa had been telling the British that Nepal was by treaty allied to the Chinese Empire. He emphasised the obligations of the Nepalese by pointing to the treaty of 1792 with the Chinese Emperor under which Nepal had allied herself with China and had also agreed to send an embassy to carry her gifts to the Chinese Emperor every five years. Bhim Sen tried to avoid taking action or replying to important state documents forwarded by the Resident on the pretext that such state papers, e.g. those concerning the opening up of trade routes to China and Tibet through Nepal for the East India Company and the extradition of criminals flying from

⁵ Report, dated Katmandu, July 24, 1837, written by Dr. A. Campbell under the direction of Hodgson. The second part of the Report is contained in *Principal Transactions in the Secret and Political Proceedings*, 1837.

⁶ The second part of the same Report of 1837 captioned *Principal Transactions in the Secret and Political Department Records*.

⁷ Hodgson's letter to the Political Secretary, dated June 3, 1833, *India Political Proceedings*.

the Company's territories into Nepal—should be forwarded to Nepal through Peking. This, however, would have taken about three years and the result of forwarding proposals through any such agency would not have been otherwise than what Bhim Sen wanted it to be, namely that the proposals would be forgotten and buried before they reached Nepal. The entire show of alliance with the Chinese was devised in order to frustrate the attempts of the East India Company's Residents to bring Nepal into the subsidiary-State system of the Company's Government. To begin with, it was thought by Bhim Sen, Nepal would be absorbed in the trade system of the Company and later her legal jurisdiction would be encroached upon more and more and finally Nepal would be reduced to the helpless status of the countless other Indian States.

This policy of exclusion of British influence may best be illustrated by an example. On one occasion, the Indian Munshi of the Residency carrying a message of courtesy to the Raja was refused admission to the royal chambers. He was kept in a remote part of the palace and was required to give his message to a minor palace official.⁸ This particular incident had taken place when Sir Herbert Maddock was the Resident at Kathmandu and resulted in a protest being sent to the Kathmandu durbar. On assuming the office of the Resident Hodgson insisted that his Munshi must be admitted to the Raja's presence whenever he was sent by the Resident on express business direct to the Raja. Hodgson said that 'without the right of direct audience it was impossible for him to know whether the communications of the British Government to the Raja ever reached him personally or not. Bhim Sen had lost some of his powers by the death of Maharani Tripur Sundari Devi about this time, and his position at the court was not secure enough for him to refuse the pressure from the British Resident. Hodgson was thus able to establish his right of direct communication with the Raja, which in a short time led to his carrying on intrigues with the Sirdars of the court and his masterful interference in the internal affairs of Nepal.

Before proceeding further let us summarise the general situation of Nepal as regards her powerful neighbour to the South.

⁸ *Secret Consultations*, 1833, dated March 5, Letter No. 24.

After 1816 a lull occurs in the relations between Nepal and the East India Company. British dominion in the Indian continent had always been dynamic and had always been extending its spheres of direct and indirect control. In the case of Nepal, however, we find an exception. The Company had triumphed militarily over the Gorkhas in 1816. The next step was annexation or gradual assimilation to the status of the states with which the Company had subsidiary alliances. But nothing of this kind happened in Nepal. Nepal could not be left to itself by the East India Company nor was it absorbed into its subsidiary system. On the other hand Nepal was given more and more concessions after 1816. We have not far to seek for the reasons for this development. Nepal at that time was fortunate in having at the helm of affairs Bhim Sen Thapa who was implicitly trusted by Maharani Tripur Sundari, the Queen Regent. The greatest service that the Maharani Tripur Sundari rendered her country was her placing the entire administration in the hands of Bhim Sen Thapa and collaborating with this able minister in their common task of rehabilitating the country after a military disaster and a national humiliation. The policy of Bhim Sen Thapa was one of friendly neutrality towards the East India Company and of resisting to the best of his abilities any encroachments or advances made by the Company on the privileges of the already diminished sovereignty of Nepal. He had a healthy respect for the Company's military powers and knew that there could be only one conclusion to a clash of arms between the two powers. His aim, therefore, was to avoid any such calamity for his country's government without relinquishing any portion of the sovereignty of his country.

Equally important was the contribution of the Company's Residents in Kathmandu in maintaining for close upon three decades the peace established since 1816 between the two countries. Edward Gardner was the first Resident at Kathmandu, and was followed by Hodgson, the great orientalist, who was in some post or the other in the Residency from 1820 to 1842. From his very nature he was a peace loving gentleman, and it was mainly due to his expert handling of matters that saved the Company from Nepalese wars in Lord Auckland's and in Lord Ellenborough's Governor Generalships. Hodgson was one of

those humanitarian scholars, who could appreciate the fine qualities of a primitive people and could condone the crudities and short-comings of a simple, unsophisticated race. At the same time he could not aspire to any promotion in the Company's service because, with his delicate health, his doctors had forbidden him to live in any part of India except its hilly regions. He had no ambition to add another large state to the Company's dominions and thus deserve higher honours and larger emoluments. He often took a kind and indulgent view of provocations of the Nepalese Court and restrained the military ardour of the Company's Government in India. In his correspondence—political and secret—he never hinted at the possibility of the annexation of Nepal to the Company's dominions. In his own mind he was satisfied that the Company's best interests lay in having an independent principality towards the North of the Company's dominions and all his efforts were bent towards improving the relations between the two governments.

Also the two Governors-General who came after Hastings were both peace-loving gentlemen. In the history of the East India Company, we find periods of expansion in territory alternating with periods when the administration is organised and consolidated to bear its enhanced responsibilities. During Lord Hasting's regime, large tracts of the country were added to the Company's Empire. After him a period of comparatively static consolidation set in. This period covered the terms of office of both Amherst and Bentinck. This was followed by efforts at extension of the frontiers of the Empire under Auckland, and a second Nepal war was prevented mainly by the cool-headedness of Brian H. Hodgson, the scholarly Resident. In Ellenborough's time, Hodgson was turned out by the bellicose Governor General whose projects regarding Nepal, were frustrated merely by the accident of the recall of the Governor General himself.

But then we ask, what was the Resident, particularly Hodgson, who was left almost in complete charge of the Residency after Edward Gardner, who retired in 1829, doing at Kathmandu all these years? We find him looking mostly at the flora and fauna of Nepal and studying the people near him. He was also the largest and most munificent collector of manuscripts, ancient

texts and vernacular tracts that ever came to India.⁹ He collected a larger body of original documents on Buddhism, than had up to that time ever been gathered together either in Asia or Europe.¹⁰ He presented the manuscripts collected by him to the Asiatic society of Bengal, the College of Fort William, the Royal Asiatic Society, London, the India Office Library, the Bodleian Library and the Société Asiatique de Paris.¹¹

Hodgson's scholarly work may conveniently be divided into three departments. Firstly he, as Waddell says, was the father of modern critical study of Buddhist doctrine.¹² Burnouf hailed Hodgson's essays on Buddhism as full of entirely new ideas on the languages, literature and religion of the Buddhists of Nepal and Tibet, and as bringing to light, among other important discoveries, the capital fact till then unknown that there existed large collections of Sanskrit manuscripts in the monasteries of Nepal.¹³

Secondly he studied the aborigines of India, about whom he wrote extensively from 1845 to 1858. But his study of the various races in India had already been started in Kathmandu.¹⁴ Thirdly he is remembered as one of the greatest Himalayan naturalists. He studied the vegetable and the animal Kingdom of Nepal with a thoroughness that does him great credit, especially since he took up this work as a pastime only.¹⁵

Official duties occupied merely a fraction of his time and these were mostly concerned either with minor frontier disputes or extradition of fugitive offenders.

Interesting accounts of frontier disputes etc. can be found in the correspondence of the Residents with the Government of

⁹ *Catalogue of the Buddhist Sanskrit Mss.* by Cecil Bendall in the University Library Cambridge, Preface, p. VII.

¹⁰ *Introduction l' historic du Buddhisme Indien* par E. Burnouf.

¹¹ Sir W. W. Hunter, *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, See Appendix A, pp. 337-56.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹³ *Introduction l' historic du Buddhisme Indien*, p. 2.

¹⁴ Brian H. Hodgson, (i) *Essays on the Languages, Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, together with papers on the geography ethnology and commerce of these countries. Trubner, 1880, Volume 1; (ii) *Miscellaneous Essays Relating to Indian Subjects*, Trubner, 1880, 2 Volumes.

¹⁵ See Appendix D. Catalogue of papers by Brian H. Hodgson on mammals and birds in Sir W. W. Hunter's *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, p. 368.

Bengal. Almost in every year, the Resident had to intervene in boundary disputes between Nepalese subjects and outsiders on the long and intricate frontier of the two governments. I select for detailed description a typical case which is interesting in that the disputed tract of land lay between Nepal and the protected state of Sikkim which introduced many complications.

There was no boundary fixed between Nepal and Sikkim before 1815-16. In 1816 the Nepalese withdrew from Sikkim under the orders of Major Lather who was deputed to settle the boundary between these two States. The difficulty arose from the fact that he did not go to the hills himself, but instead sent Adjutant Weston and a padre to fix the boundary for him. The Vakils of the two states accompanied them, but in the end the Counsel of a certain Bhotia chief Mahapurkaree prevailed. The Company's representatives confirmed his decision and Lieutenant Weston gave letters to the Vakils of the two States fixing the boundary at the river Mechi.¹⁶

Some years afterwards a few disgruntled subjects of the Sikkim raja entered Nepalese territory and claimed the territory between Siddhi Khola and the Mechi as Nepalese and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the raja of Sikkim. The Nepal Government took up the claim and formally asked the Resident to explain to the Governor General the whole affair of the Mechi and felt confident that all the lands to the west of the Mechi would be made over to Nepalese officers.

This resulted in a boundary commission, being set up in 1834 with representatives from both Nepal and Sikkim and presided over by an officer in the Company's Army, Major Lloyd by name. The Nepalese Vakils Hari Bhagat and Udayanand—successfully tried to postpone the dispute for a year.

Next year the delay arose from the Sikkim side. At the same time Hari Bhagat died after having made a protest to Major Lloyd that the Nepalese Vakils had been at the spot for fifteen days and would have liked to retire from that unhealthy region because the Sikkim Agents did not seem likely to come down that year. However, Major Lloyd after some preliminary enquiries decided against Nepal, saying that the western branch or the Siddhi Khola was the larger and the lengthier to the

¹⁶ *India Political* 1836, dated 22 February 1836.

junction from its source than the eastern branch and that Lieutenant Weston had marked the Western stream as the boundary by heaps of stones which were standing until recently removed by the Sikkim refugees who, having previously built house there, were the first to assert that this interval of the streams belonged to Nepal.¹⁷

On this the Nepalese asked for a re-investigation because the durbar had chiefly relied for the proof of its claims on the disputed tract on Hari Bhagat who had died of malaria before the actual enquiry had begun. Secondly they wanted a postponement because the other agent had imperfect acquaintance with the details of the problem and had no instructions suited to the contingency of his associate's demise.¹⁸

This dispute about a small and unproductive piece of land was dragged on for about four years, without settlement till at last it was forgotten amidst graver preoccupations of the Nepal durbar. This illustrates the unwillingness of the Nepalese to concede any points to their opponents, this being the last resort of their diplomacy. They sedulously cultivated the habit of trying to postpone the settlement of any disputes which might be decided against their interests.

The Resident was also put to delicate tasks when offenders from one territory fled to the other and the local magistracy demanded their extradition. Sometimes these proceedings would involve intricate questions of law. Thus we find an Indian subject from Saran murdered in Nepal by Nepalese subjects. The Nepalese suba refused to hand over the culprits he had arrested and claimed exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand the magistrate of Saran wrote to the Resident to have the accused delivered to his custody so that they might stand their trial on the charges alleged against them. It was true that a regulation of the Company's Government provided for the trial and punishment of crimes committed in foreign dominions, but Hodgson maintained that Nepal was a sovereign independent state and that as she was able and disposed to exercise its jurisdiction

¹⁷ *India Political* 47 dated 14 March 1836. Memorandum by Resident relative to the Siddhi Khola dispute with Sikkim sent to the durbar 26 February 1836.

¹⁸ Hodgson's communication of the durbar's reply to Major Lloyd.

itself, this provision in the Company's regulations was no sufficient reason why the Nepal Government should be officially asked by him to cede its jurisdiction in this particular case.¹⁹ Here we find Hodgson relying on and applying the well established principle of international law that a criminal is liable to be tried by the civil authority exercising jurisdiction at the place where he commits the crime.

The same principle was extended by the Resident to cover dacoity cases as well. In 1834 an agreement was entered into with Nepal to the effect that in matters of dacoity the sole question should be where and not by whom the crime was committed. The two governments agreed that in future no reference should be had to the natural allegiance of the accused but to the territory alone within which the act was committed. And the principle of reciprocity was accepted by both the governments, namely that the Resident would make no claims on the durbar which he would not admit, if made by the durbar.

The Resident, however, had to complain quite often against acts of aggression committed by Nepalese subjects and officials on the bordering Indian districts. In most cases he did not press for the surrender of the alleged offenders but merely desired satisfaction to the injured and punishment of the offenders.

But things could be difficult at times. Let me just mention two cases. In the first, eleven slave girls belonging to a chief of Nepal took asylum in Tirhut, and the Nepalese demanded that they should be forced to return to their former master.²⁰ It was clear that a refusal would certainly be offensive to the prestige of the Nepalese durbar where slavery was recognised by law. But Sir Charles Metcalfe, who was the acting Governor General at that time, took a firm attitude and refused to surrender the girls maintaining that it was the object of the British Government to effect the gradual suppression of slavery and manifest its aversion instead of lending its support to the practice on all possible occasions.²¹

In the other case Hodgson had to abate the zeal of the Superintendent for the suppression of thuggee. The Superintendent

¹⁹ *India Political Letters*, 60, dated 2 May 1838.

²⁰ *India Political*, 1836, Letter No. 66, dated 2 May 1836.

²¹ *India Political*, 1836, Letter No. 67, dated 2 May 1836.

wanted that his European Assistant or the Indian subordinates of the latter should be allowed to cross the frontier and make search and arrest within the Nepalese dominions as they were privileged to do within the dominions of the Nawab Vizir of Oudh. Hodgson agreed with the Superintendent that India presented no retreat to gangs of malefactors comparable in security to the great tarai forests of Nepal and that the active and general pursuit of them might, before long, lead to their seeking refuge in Nepal forests in spite of the best efforts of the durbar to prevent it. But at the same time he added that subsequent to 1816 Nepal had never harboured dacoits from India and that in this respect the efficiency of the Nepalese Frontier Police was deserving of the highest applause. It was difficult for him, therefore, to suggest to the durbar the admission of the Superintendent's proposal without any specific complaints to urge against the durbar on this score. He confessed that the Superintendent's proposals brought forward no grounds for seeking to supercede within its own dominions, the functions of Nepal's own authorities. In the end he asked and worked for co-operation between the Durbar's Police and the anti-thuggee department of the Company's Government.²²

Occasionally the Resident also granted passports to officials and other men of importance from Nepal to visit the sacred places of Hinduism and Buddhism in the Company's dominions. Thus we find Hodgson granting exemption from the payment of pilgrim taxes to the followers of the Nepal chiefs visiting Gaya and Benares and reporting the departure of messengers, Vakils etc. to the courts of the various Indian states from Nepal either with or without notifying the Residency at Kathmandu of their departure.

The Nepalese kept a Vakil at Calcutta who represented them in all their dealings with the Company's Government at Calcutta and who also reported to the Durbar at Kathmandu whatever military or diplomatic information he could gather for his country's benefit. But in 1835 the Gorkha chiefs sent an unusually costly and handsomely equipped embassy to Calcutta. This was headed by General Matabar Singh a nephew of the

²² *India Political*, 1834. Specially Hodgson's letter to the Secretary to Government of Bengal dated 20 June 1836.

Prime Minister Bhim Sen Thapa. This was the first big embassy sent by the Gorkhas to the English, the second being that of Jung Bahadur to England.

The real purpose of the special mission under Matabar Singh was to persuade the Company's Government to return some of the districts ceded by Nepal under the treaty of Segouli. In the preliminary talks held at Kathmandu, Hodgson intimated to Matabar Singh that he had been disappointed from his experience of the implementation of commercial treaties already supposed to be subsisting between the two countries. He added that the Company's Government would never trust to anything with hopes of a *quid pro quo*, and that the Company had sufficient proof about the futility of all such purchases. He thus negatived the suggestion of the Nepalese that the Company should purchase the removal of their commercial grievances at the price of return of portions of the Tarai as a small token of satisfaction.²³

The Nepalese, however, thought that perhaps the Company's Government in Calcutta might prove more malleable than Hodgson. At last they hazarded an attempt, and sent Matabar Singh to Calcutta with rich presents for the Governor General, the President of the Board of Control and the King of England. They had at first proposed a journey to England wanting to communicate directly with the British Government. But on Hodgson's declaring officially that the idea of the Mission to England had better be abandoned, Matabar Singh and the others relinquished the idea of a sea journey. The Mission however,²⁴ was intended to over-reach the Resident's policy by a direct approach to the Governor General, if not to the Government in Westminster. The Nepalese were not satisfied with what the Resident had told them at Kathmandu and they wanted to learn for themselves the truth about British diplomacy and the proper methods of negotiating with them.

Towards the end of 1836, Matabar Singh proceeded on his journey to Calcutta with a huge retinue of 3,000 Gorkha soldiers

²³ *India Political*, 1836, Letter No. 41, dated 11 January 1836 from Hodgson to Political Secretary.

²⁴ *India Political*, 1836, Letter No. 36, dated 25 January 1836 from A. Campbell to the Political Secretary.

with him. He intended to submit the regiment to the inspection of the Governor General and his military advisers in order to create in their minds a healthy respect for the Gorkha Army in Nepal. It will be noticed that the Gorkhas have an exaggerated notion of their military discipline. Matabar Singh, Hodgson wrote to the political Secretary "might recur at Calcutta to those vague expectations expressed to him at Kathmandu". Hodgson also informed the Secretary that Matabar Singh proposed even to proceed to England if he expected to gain any points for his country by doing that. Hodgson added, "Matabar Singh at first attempted to make a merit of his adventurous voyage insinuating that according to Asiatic usage he could not come back from the King's Huzoor without loss of consideration unless he brought with him some token of good will. To this I ensured that Asiatic notions are well known not to be ours, that to go or not to go was purely a matter of his own fancy and that I could recognize nothing more in the journey than that."²⁵

But Matabar Singh's was a mission of peace; and he wanted to please the Governor General by unfurling before him the national flag of Nepal, a ceremony, he asserted, hitherto never performed before any one except the Raja of Nepal. A compliment so highly valued by the payers was suitably acknowledged by the Governor General. The Governor General, however, paid little attention to the proposals made by Matabar Singh which were not alluded to in the complimentary letter of the Raja of Nepal and informed the envoy that "it was the general custom of governments to take into its consideration such matters only as were laid before it by its agents at the different friendly courts at the desire of the sovereign or other persons acting with full powers for him".²⁶ In the end Matabar Singh had to return merely with an acknowledgement from the Governor General of "letters and presents destined for His Gracious Majesty the King and Sir J. C. Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control, and a pious hope from the Company's Government that Nepalese affairs would be prospering under the guidance of the minister General Commander-in-Chief, Bhim Sen

²⁵ *India Political*, 1836, Letter No. 41, dated 11 January 1836, from Hodgson to the Political Secretary.

²⁶ Excerpts are from *India Political*, 1835-36.

Thapa". Early in 1836 the Gorkha soldiers of the mission returned to their country, while General Matabar Singh and his two sons rejoined their escort after a visit to Puri and other places of pilgrimage. The march of the Gorkhas through the Company's territories had been uniformly orderly and disciplined and it was no small credit to the soldiery and the General who headed them that "an encampment of nearly 3,000 men on progress through a foreign country during a march of 40 days was not involved in disagreeable disputes, or affrays between the foreign soldiers and the inhabitants of the country".

This was the type of routine work that the Resident had to do at Kathmandu, looking after frontier disputes, getting proper punishment for escaped criminals and occasionally dealing with complimentary state-papers exchanged with the Nepal durbar.

Chapter 17

INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN NEPAL (1816-36)

IN the eighteen thirties, palace intrigues undermined the influence of the Prime Minister Bhim Sen Thapa and consequently forced the Resident to take an active part in the affairs of the Kingdom. For this it is necessary to look at the internal affairs of Nepal in order to understand the circumstances which compelled the Resident to take a hand in the intrigues of the durbar.

The political equilibrium was suddenly upset by the death of the Maharani Tripur Sundari Devi. Her death removed the guiding light in the royal family and deprived Bhim Sen Thapa of her staunch and unflinching support in his pacific policies. The ranis of the young Raja were more ambitious than their spouse. They goaded the weak prince to assert his authority in opposition to that of the Prime Minister.

During 1833-34 it gradually became apparent that the Raja could never be allowed by his scheming ranis to remain under the tutelage of Bhim Sen Thapa and to acquiesce in his being altogether deprived of patronage. In 1834, there was an incident which brought it before the public eye. In that year, the heir of the Pandes, whom Bhim Sen had ruined and exiled in the early years of the century, suddenly came to the durbar and petitioned the Raja for the restitution of the family honours and estates. This sudden revival of claims nearly extinct for thirty-one years, and after so complete an extirpation as the Kala Pandes had undergone at the hands of the very man now paramount in the State, struck all with astonishment. The boldness of the measure, together with the favourable manner in which the Raja received the petition, seemed to indicate some secret influence in the palace. As a matter of fact the Pandes had secured the support of the Raja's senior wife. From this date may be reckoned the commencement of a counter-revolution and

of those intrigues of the Kala Pandes which eventually succeeded in the overthrow of the Prime Minister.¹

The situation then developing in Nepal was summarised by Sir W. W. Hunter as follows:

"By the beginning of 1835 seven factions had developed at the Court of Nepal, all requiring to be carefully watched by the Resident, each from time to time coquetting for his support, and from time to time making appeals to the popular war-like sentiment in Nepal against the presence of a foreign representative at their capital. Hodgson had the delicate task of maintaining an attitude of dignified non-interference towards them all, which should not improperly pledge his Government on the one hand, nor give offence on the other. The principal *dramatis personæ* in the series of tragedies that followed may be briefly enumerated.

First, the faineant King ambitious of becoming actual ruler, at first with the help of Ranbir Singh the brother and rival of the Prime Minister, subsequently with the aid of the Pande faction hostile to the Prime Ministers' whole clan. After suffering many degradations, the poor King was finally deposed in 1847, and died a state prisoner.

Secondly, the King's chief wife, known as the senior Queen, who tried to assert her authority by the help of the Pandes. After furious outbursts in which she more than once quitted the palace in a rage, she died on her way into exile, as rumoured at the time from poison, but apparently from jungle fever caught on her flight towards the Indian plains in 1841.

Third, the King's second wife, known as the junior Queen, who hoped to rise to power by supporting the Thapas (the clan of the Prime Minister Bhim Sen) and by opposing the Pandes. After a long struggle she obtained her full political rights as Queen in January 1843, restored the Thapas with the gallant Matabar as Prime Minister, lost her power on his assassination in 1845, and was afterwards exiled to the Indian plains.

Fourth, the Chautariyas, or collateral branches of the royal race, with hereditary claims to high office, kept down during the long supremacy of Bhim Sen, they reasserted their rights as his powers waned, and secured the Prime Ministership for their clan more than once after his fall, but lost their leaders by exile and assassination, and finally went down in the great massacre of 1846.

¹ Excerpts from the Letters of the Resident at Kathmandu to the Government of India, from 1830 to 1840, by J. R. Tickell.

Fifth, the Thapa family, headed by the Prime Minister Bhim Sen who, after a six years' struggle to maintain his power since the death of the old Queen-Regent, was degraded in 1837, and cut his throat in prison to avoid torture in 1839. His rival brother Ranbir became a fakir, or wandering mendicant, to save his life. His gallant nephew, Matabar, after long exile obtained the Prime ministership through the influence of the junior Queen in December 1843, and was murdered in 1845.

Sixth, the rival family of the Pandes had been crushed for thirty years by Bhim Sen. Headed by Ranjang, the son of the Prime Minister murdered at the beginning of the century, they began to reclaim their rights in 1834. By the palace intrigues of the senior Queen, Ranjang obtained more than once the Prime Ministership and, after many murders, perished himself in the general slaughter and exile of the Pandes in 1843. His principal Kinsmen were beheaded. The aged Ranjang 'was brought to the place of execution, but being in a dying state, he was merely shown to the people and then removed to his own house, where he died naturally a few hours afterwards.

Seventh, the Brahmin party, in turn allied and opposed to all the foregoing factions of the military caste. Unjustly kept out of their hereditary appointments, the Brahmins emerged with Raghunath Pandit as their leader on the downfall of Bhim Sen. During the confusion which followed, the hostile factions allowed Raghunath Pandit to obtain the Prime Ministership till each could gather its own forces. The Brahmin (gentleman), however, discovered the times to be too perilous for a man of peace, and finding himself unsupported even by the poor King soon resigned the Premiership. He reappeared from time to time, especially as chief of a coalition ministry in 1840; always keeping out of harm's way, and content to retire to the safe seclusion of a religious life whenever danger threatened.

All these factions came in their turn to the front amid palace intrigues and massacres one after the other. Each did its best to establish its power by destroying its rivals, and, with the exception of the Brahmin party each when its time arrived shared the common fate of slaughter and ruin."²

These troubles and the outspoken talks of some of the factions who were in favour of leading a war against the Company called the attention of the Company's Government to the affairs of Nepal. It was from 1837 onwards that the Company's Government became apprehensive of a sudden descent by the Nepalese on its territories.

² Sir W. W. Hunter, *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, pp. 143, *et seqq.*

It was in June of the same year that Hodgson was asked by the new Governor General, Lord Auckland, to draw up a confidential account of the Nepalese. Hodgson reported:

"His Lordship is already aware that the Gorkhas are eminently national and united; that their union is recent, illustrated by splendid success in arms, and supported by the unsophisticated simplicity of the Highland character. They have neither arts nor literature, nor commerce, nor a rich soil to draw off their attention from arms; and they have that lusty hardihood of character and contempt of drudgery which make war especially congenial.

I have often said, and now repeat, that when in 1816 we drew a line round the territory of these men, leaving them no outlet save upon ourselves, we should either have crippled them effectually or have insisted on a change in their institutions, giving the surplus soldiery employment in our own armies. We did neither, we did nothing then or subsequently; and we now see the fruits of our mistakes or indifference. Rulers are too apt to fancy that, when they make a great effort, the crowning work has been achieved once and for all; and calmly and justly as Lord Hastings characterised the people and the war before and pending its progress, no sooner was it over than he intently stole to that conclusion.

In the twenty years that we have been here since the war, we have seen nothing but drills and parades, heard nothing but the roar of cannon or the clink of the hammer in arsenal or magazine. Soldiers have been and are heads of the law and finance at Kathmandu, and administrators of the interior. Soldiers have been and are everything, and they are and have been headed by a plenary Viceroy (Bhim Sen) of that old stamp which must support its habitual aggression at home by pandering to the soldiery, and teaching them to look to aggression abroad.

It is a remarkable fact, moreover, that since we had first to do with this Durbar in 1792, we have had to deal exclusively with a man having, by the essential tenure of his station, one hand against his prince and the other against his neighbours.

The Raja or head of the outs is young himself, has two young wives and seven young children. Reasonable indulgence and addiction to pleasure of various kinds may be expected from them, though not from their old and iron minded opponent. And if a young court once gave way to recreation, there would soon be a diversion of funds inconsistent with the past and existing sacrifice of all things to an inordinate and useless Army."

After describing the various factions Hodgson proceeded:

"But is there no probability of a contest between the parties, and would not their cutting each other's throats be a sufficient security for us. I do not expect any strife in the shape of civil war, though the chiefs may, *more majorum*, draw their swords on each other. Nor do I deem it a safe presumption that a civil war, if it occurred, would benefit us. Civil wars have rather a tendency to feed than to quench martial spirit and power; and if one broke out here, I should expect it to be diverted *per fas et nefas* upon us before it had raged three months. But there is probability of its occurrence. The unsophisticated character and eminent nationality of the Nepalese soldiery, as they have ever stayed domestic war in past times, so they doubtless will in the future. There is no instance of it in the turbulent history of the people and, cypher as the Raja has been and still seems to be, and omnipotent as the Minister has been and still seems to be, no one here doubts that if the former willed the death of the latter, the Minister's head would be as speedily off as was that of Damodar Pande (the Bhim Sen of his day) in 1802. I, therefore, neither expect civil war, nor think it could possibly advantage us if it occurred. In all human probability it would speedily afford occasion for the turbulent and reckless to assault us, come what might of the struggle.

So long as order prevails so long I think we could, if we deemed it expedient, by coming forward distinctly to countenance the weaker party at present, give it the preponderance. But I would not advise such a proceeding unless the Minister were clearly seeking to drive things to extremity with us, because he felt that quiet must undo him at home. This sort of crisis excepted, I would continue looking on merely as heretofore until the expected change occur; or, until having occurred, it produce no amendment or promise of amendment. If the change come not soon or come without improvement, I would take the first fair occasion of a reckoning with Nepal. If the change seems to tremble in the balance, wanting but a simple manifestation in our parts in favour of the legitimate head of the state, that manifestation should be made by-and-by, and under a distincter probability of quiet efficacy than now exists. In the mode there need be no interference so called. For we are certainly entitled to have our general views and purposes fairly stated in Durbar, and a Civil letter from the Governor-General to the Raja saying that his Lordship had for some time past expected the agreeable news of his Highness majority, would, under many probable phases of party, suffice."³

³ Excerpts from the Letters of the Resident at Kathmandu quoted in

This hint from the Governor General when it was duly conveyed to the Raja released him from any fears of the Company's interference in his rough handling of the Prime Minister. And for the next few years the main feature of administrative practice in Nepal, as of any other country in Asia of the Nineteenth century came to the forefront, namely that the King's word was law, and we find that within a few days from the receipt of the Governor General's letter, Bhim Sen Thapa was deprived of his high office and placed in prison. In the scramble for power that followed, the durbar almost lost all its prestige and capacity for action and the Company, in order to secure its own interests in the case of any collapse or mutual destruction of the factions in Nepal, posted a large army at the frontier nearest to Kathmandu. This army was to step in if chaos was let loose in Nepal or if some foolhardy sirdars, having attained to the Prime Ministership, attacked the Company's territories. This force would have taken possession of Nepal in due course, but the Afghan War starting about the same time forced the Governor General to act entirely on the defensive on the Nepal border, and saved that Kingdom from being absorbed in the Company's dominions.

In a letter, dated September, 1838, Hodgson wrote to his father: "The Gorkhas are behaving as childishly as hostilely, and I fear I shall be unable to keep the peace, though I have now discretionary power over three divisions of the army, amounting to nearly 20,000 men (only 16,000 in his letter to Ellenborough) with which we are to make a *Cordon Sanitaire* to endure pending the absence of the Kabul force from India. I fear the cordon may be broken, despite my cares to preserve it; since it must be seven hundred miles long and liable to attack at any point by an active and enterprising enemy."

The Nepal durbar was all chaos and confusion in 1839. A general picture of the mess things had got into after the deposition of Bhim Sen is given in a letter, dated 14 April 1839, from Hodgson to the personal secretary to the Governor General:

"Even now, though Ranjang is not yet confirmed in the Premiership, and perhaps may not, after all, be so, yet under his predominate secret influence many severities are inflicted and

more apprehended and the great body of chiefs is extremely disgusted and discontented. The senior Rani's irregular and violent ambition is said to find a ready tool in Ranjang for the accomplishment of her particular purposes, on condition she prove herself (as she professes to be) equally pliant in regard to his particular ends. She wants revenge on his numerous enemies; and the Raja, though he dreads with reason both the one and the other, and thus continues to withhold the confirmation in the Premiership from Ranjang, yet gradually gives way to his imperious spouse, seduced by extravagant promises of the mighty things which Ranjang is to achieve against the Company, when once he has the complete direction of affairs. Meanwhile every step he makes to power is marked by actual or threatened retaliation and severity at home, and by secret instigations of every species of covert hostility abroad.

He appears not in any matter, but he really guides all through the senior Rani, and he it is who so often marred the Raja's better purpose when his Highness was ready to lay aside severities at home and intrigues on the plains.

All persons of mark now look to the Company's Government, and earnestly hope that the Governor General will ere long be led to address the Raja in such terms as may frighten him into justice at home and abroad and redeem him from the toils of the Rani and (Ranjang) Pande, whose unjust and irregular ambition threaten equal mischief to the state in its domestic and in its foreign relations.

Several times the Raja has been made to hesitate and draw back from his mediated injustice The Junior Rani dreads that her children will be sacrificed to the jealousy of the senior Rani, their eyes being put out or their lives made away with by foul practices, and she is mediating some possible means of appeal to the Resident.

The court physicians have destroyed themselves because banishment proved no protection to them, and they were loaded with irons and otherwise oppressed after they had been again spared and even sent to their destination. The court has therefore the blood of these Brahmins upon its head, and all persons anticipate misfortunes to the Kingdom therefrom. Bhim Sen's brother has turned fakir to escape from perpetually renewed alarms and Bhim Sen considers himself safe only because his nephew Matabar is beyond the durbar's power, and would join the English and open the way to their armies to Kathmandu if Bhim Sen were presently made away with. The durbar earnestly desires to get back Matabar Singh and also Ranudat Shah to Nepal and the Governor General should take good care that

neither of them yet returns, for whilst they are below, the durbar will never dare to come to extremities with the Company.

The Raja's temper is spoilt and soured, so that the most respectable chiefs are repeatedly subjected to coarse abuse or to actual or threatened extortions, upon pretence of bribery and malversation in office under the long administration of the Thapas. Meanwhile secret intrigues with the plains with a view to excite discontent among the Company's subjects and conspiracy amongst its dependent allies are going on as actively as ever.

There are now at Kathmandu secret envoys from all the following states, Gwalior, Satara, Baroda, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Kotah, Bundi, Rewa, Panna, and the Punjab (Dhyan Singh); and the intercourse thus set afoot the durbar is determined to maintain. Meanwhile partly from dread of the consequences of such perverseness and partly in order to be ready fully to meet the expected opportunity of open rupture, hostile preparations of all sorts continue to be actively made.

Between fear and hate the durbar suffers not itself to have a moment's rest, but so little is it governed by prudence in its proceedings that at the very moment when it would fain break with the Company, it scruples not to misuse and alarm in an extreme degree the great majority of those chiefs who alone could second its wishes in the event of war. A rash and violent woman aiming at uncontrolled sway governs the durbar, and all men of experience anticipate the worst that can happen unless renewed dread of the Company should speedily recall the Raja to safer counsels and more resolution in abiding by them."

However, the intrigues at the durbar continued unabated and things took a very serious turn when the senior Rani, in her insistence on wreaking her vengeance on the old and now deposed Prime Minister, brought forward through the Pandes a new set of accusations against him. "The old man thus beset, courageously defended himself, demanding why, if such charges (namely that Bhim Sen had poisoned Girvan Juddha Vikram Shah and his widow in 1816) had been really made, they had not been produced against him on his first arrest in 1837, denounced the papers as forgeries, and called for confrontation with his accusers. But his defence and his appeals were alike unheeded; not a voice was raised in his behalf throughout the durbar. The chiefs sat by in dejected silence, and the Raja giving way to, or feigning, a burst of indignation, denounced

him as a traitor and had him hurried off in chains to a prison his ears were assailed from day to day with threats of renewed torments till, totally worn out by accumulated tortures the wretched man anticipated further malice by committing suicide. On July 20th he inflicted a wound in his throat, with a Kukri, of which he died nine days after.⁴ "Thus has perished", Hodgson wrote about him, "the great and able statesman who for more than thirty years had ruled this kingdom with more than regal sway, just two years after his sudden fall from power in 1837, prior to which event the uniform success of nearly all his measures, had been no less remarkable than the energy and sagacity which so much promoted that success. He was indeed a man born to exercise dominion over his fellows alike by the means of command and persuasion. Nor am I aware of any native statesman of recent times, except Ranjit Singh, who is, all things considered, worthy to be compared with the late General Bhim Sen of Nepal."⁵

The enormity of this crime was felt keenly even by the senior Rani and the Pandes. They could not disclaim responsibility for the suicide of the ex-Prime Minister who by taking his own life had vindicated his innocence to the populace and the nobles. It was at this time, when the durbar was deeply conscious of its weakness, that Hodgson pressed for certain concessions which had long been denied him. Now the durbar found itself unable to oppose the Resident, who was already in touch with most of the factions in Nepal after the fall of Bhim Sen. At length, Hodgson wrung an agreement from the Nepalese, which was conceded with much ill grace by the latter. The agreement goes on to recite that "according to the Resident's request and for the purpose of perpetuating the friendship of the two states, as well as to promote the effectual discharge of current business, the following items are fixed:

1. All secret intrigues whatever, by messengers or letters, shall totally cease.
2. The Nepal Government engages to have no further inter-

⁴ Excerpts from the letters of the Resident at Kathmandu to the Political Secretary.

⁵ Letter from Hodgson to the Deputy Secretary to the Governor General dated Kathmandu, 30th July, 1838.

course with the dependent allies of the Company beyond the Ganges, who are by treaty precluded from such intercourse, except with the Resident's sanction and under his passports.

3. With the landholders and men of position on this side of the Ganges, who are connected by marriage with the royal family of Nepal, intercourse of letters and persons shall remain open to the Nepal Government as heretofore.

4. It is agreed to as a rule for the guidance of both Governments, that in judicial matters, where civil causes arise, there they shall be heard and decided; and the Nepal Government engages that for the future British subjects shall not be compelled to plead in the Courts of Nepal to civil actions having exclusive reference to their dealings in the plains.

5. The Nepal Government engages that British subjects shall hereafter be regarded as her own subjects in regard to access to the Courts of Law, and that the causes of the former shall be heard and decided without denial or delay, according to the usage of Nepal.

6. The Nepal Government engages that an authentic statement of all duties leviable in Nepal shall be delivered to the Resident and that hereafter unauthorised imposts not entered in this list shall not be levied on British subjects.⁶

This, however, was merely a success on paper. Nothing definite resulted therefrom. The Nepal Government had appended their signatures to a document, the stipulations of which they had not the least intention of adhering to. On the other hand they wanted to turn out the Resident and encroach on the Company's territories as far as they could safely do. On April 12, 1840, fifty Gorkha bravados suddenly appeared at the great fair held in Ramnagar Forest, thirteen Kilometers within the Company's territories. After forcibly levying the bazaar dues, they established their permanent headquarters in the neighbourhood, called on the villagers of ninety-one British Indian villages to come in, and told them that their territories were henceforth part of Nepal, to whose government alone the revenues must be paid. They then stationed Gorkha soldiers in each of the villages thus seized, and threatened to deport to

⁶ Sir Charles Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Volume II, No. LVI.

Nepal for punishment any local official who dared to convey information of the transaction to the British authorities.⁷ In fact a large tract of country, thirteen Kilometers broad, by forty kilometers in length had been entirely cut-off from the British dominions.⁸

On receiving a protest about the Ramnagar incident from the Resident, the durbar almost lost their head and staged a disorderly military mutiny before the Residency. It is recorded by Oldfield, who had access to all the documents of the Residency, that on June 23rd, 1840, the next day after the military disorders, a message was conveyed to the mutinous army from the Raja and his senior Rani. The message was worded as follows:

"The English Government is powerful, abounding in wealth and in all other resources for war. I have kept well with the English so long, because I am unable to cope with them. Besides, I am bound by a treaty of amity, and have now no excuse to break it, nor have I money to support a war. Troops I have, and arms and ammunition in plenty, but no money. This is the reason why I have reduced your pay. I want treasure to fight the English. Take lower pay for a year or two, and when I have some money in hand, then I will throw off the mask and indulge you in war."⁹

This proclamation shows the fundamental enmity between Nepal and her southern neighbour. And it seems that the main reasons for the disorderly conduct of the troops was their zeal for a war with the Company. And even the Raja seems to have waited only for a suitable opportunity to engage his troops in war against the Company.

Lord Auckland on hearing of these details asked Hodgson to intimate to the Nepal durbar that "the Company's Government had viewed the continued usurpation of British territory with extreme displeasure and demanded an immediate redress". Hodgson was also authorised to declare "that the Government of India would speedily feel itself compelled, if such satisfaction would not be fully afforded, to march its troops to the frontier

⁷ Sir W. W. Hunter, *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, pp. 183-84.

⁸ Narrative of events in Nepal in 1840, prepared by Lieut. C. H. Nicholls, Assistant Resident, dated September 30, 1853, para 7, *India Office MSS*, quoted by Sir W. W. Hunter in *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, p. 184.

⁹ Oldfield, *Sketches from Nepal*, Volume 1, pp. 318-19.

to vindicate its honour, and to relieve its subjects from the intolerable violence to which they were exposed.”¹⁰

With the confidence of armed troops behind his arguments, Hodgson adopted a strong attitude towards the durbar. The villages in Ramnagar were restored to the Company at the point of the bayonet and for some time the Company's Government thought of declaring war on Nepal on this pretext, Lord Auckland sought Hodgson's advice as to the advisability of waging war against Nepal and of annexing the entire country. He asked the Resident whether he would advise the setting up of another Gorkha administration with more restricted internal authority or of absorbing the beautiful hills outright in the Company's dominions.¹¹

These plans for another Nepal War, which Auckland had entertained in August 1840, were to be postponed by the difficulties of the Afghan affair. Because of the continued troubles in Afghanistan, Lord Auckland decided to limit his objectives in Nepal to bringing about a change of ministers at Kathmandu. At the beginning of November he officially authorised the Resident “to promote to the utmost degree, consistent with prudence, the object of procuring the removal of the present Ministers of Nepal, and the appointment of a friendly and honest administration in their place.”¹²

Hodgson now took an active part in more than one change in the Cabinet and in the office of the Prime Minister. About the end of 1840, raising up the issue after a disorderly military tumult in Kathmandu had threatened the Residency, Hodgson forced the Maharaja to turn the Pandes out of office and to entrust the Highest administrative responsibilities jointly to the Brahmin Raj Guru and the Chautariyas, a family of royal collaterals. The influence of Hodgson in bringing about this change may be appreciated from the following translation of a Yad-

¹⁰ J. R. Colvin, Private Secretary to the Governor General to Brian Hodgson, dated 18 July 1840, Volume XI of *Auckland MSS*, p. 232.

¹¹ Letter from the Private Secretary to Lord Auckland to B. H. Hodgson, dated 28 August 1840, *Auckland MSS*, Volume XIII.

¹² Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India (confidential), dated November 2nd, 1840, to B. H. Hodgson, quoted by Sir W. W. Hunter in his *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, p. 191.

dasht or memorandum from the Maharaja of Nepal to the address of the Resident, dated 2 January 1841:

"The Governor General Lord Auckland has written stating that it was necessary and proper to dismiss from office the individuals who had disturbed the friendly feeling existing between the British and Nepal Governments at heart, and that until the two individuals who had so behaved have been dismissed, there could be no real friendship on the part of my Government.

"According therefore to the note received from you, I have inquired into the matter, and have decided upon dismissing those persons who have disturbed the good understanding existing between the two Governments, as shown in the subjoined list."

The memorandum concludes with lists of the 'Individuals Appointed' and 'Individuals Discharged' in parallel columns.¹³

At the same time the Brahmins, royal collaterals and chiefs of Nepal, ninety-four all told, handed over a solemn sealed document or ikrar-nama to the Resident taking upon themselves the responsibility of seeing that no more mutinies of Nepali troops threatening the Residency in any manner, would henceforth take place in Kathmandu. This document runs as follows:

"We the undersigned Gurus, Chautariyas, Chiefs etc. of Nepal, fully agree to uphold the sentiments as written below, viz. that it is most desirable and proper that a firm and steady friendship should exist and be daily increased between the British and Nepal governments; that to this end every means should be taken to increase the friendly relations with the Company, and the welfare of the Nepal Government; that the Resident should ever and always be treated in an honourable and friendly manner, that if, nevertheless, any unforeseen circumstances or unjust or senseless proceeding should at any time arise to shake the friendly understanding which ought to exist between the two Governments, or to cause uproar or mischief at Kathmandu, we should be responsible for it."¹⁴

¹³ From Hodgson's Private Papers, which Sir W. W. Hunter had full access to, quoted in his *Life of Brian H. Hodgson*, pp. 193-94.

¹⁴ Translation of an Ikrarnama signed by the Gurus, Chautariyas, Chiefs of Nepal dated Saturday, 95 Poos Soodi, 1897, or 2 January 1841, *Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Volume II, 1876, pp. 178-79, ed. 1876.

The Yaddasht and the Ikrar-nama were the efforts of the Nepalese durbar to avert the war which the Resident had threatened to inflict on them if the cabinet in Nepal were not changed so as to be acceptable to him. They succeeded in maintaining peaceful relations with the Company mainly because Lord Auckland could not afford to divert any troops from the Indus expedition to Kabul. And Hodgson was also a peace-loving man, and he did not want any war when through the Yaddasht and the Ikrar-nama, the controlling power in Nepal's affairs had been conceded to him.

Chapter 18

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S RELATIONS WITH INDIAN STATES IN 1836

It would be profitable at this stage, to leave the chronological account and go on to search for the springs of power and diplomacy in Eastern Courts.

To discuss these matters as they concerned Nepal, we should first of all understand the relationship between the East India Company and the various Indian states as it existed in theory and practice about this time. As we are concerned with the other Indian States only so far as their relations with the Company are contrasted with those with Nepal, it is proposed to deal very briefly with the Company's policy towards the Indian States from 1816 to 1840.

In the decade after the Maratha Wars of 1816-18, the East India Company found itself the supreme military power in India. No other Indian State or group of states together could wage a successful war against the Company's forces. The Company could have extended its territories almost at will, but it did not do so. The Company's hands were too full at that time. It had hardly begun to digest the big slices of territories acquired during the Governor Generalship of Hastings.

It was a time when Company was very ably served by Munro, Malcolm, Elphinstone and Metcalfe and all of them had spent part of their career in the court of an Indian prince. However, there was still no common policy governing the relations between the Company and the Indian States. Conventions and practices of a sort were gradually growing and the Company and the States themselves were not quite certain as to their relative positions on the chess-board of the Indian political world.

In general the Company had to deal with two main classes of States in India. It had made treaties of subsidiary alliance with a number of states, spread over in all parts of India. These

states were mostly those which were practically surrounded by the Company's dominions. These included the Maratha States, Hyderabad, Mysore, the Rajput States in Central India and Rajputana and Oudh. These were called protected States or internal states by Metcalfe. There was also another class of states which had scrupulously tried to keep themselves out of the Company's subsidiary system. These included Kabul, Sindh, Lahore, Nepal, and Ava. These Metcalfe called 'States which were not protected', or external states. Thus we may divide the states into two classes namely those altogether beyond the Company's external frontier and those encircled by the Company's dominions or more or less included within the sphere of its paramount influence.

For a number of years a controversy was waged by the Residents in the different courts about the policy of interference in the internal affairs of the Indian States. Most of them had come from the army and the great fact they recognised in all the subsidiary courts was the utter military weakness of the princes concerned. It was, therefore, natural that they advocated a policy of interference in the internal affairs of the states leading ultimately to their annexation and absorption in the Company's system. This meant that the Company merely waited for suitable opportunities to do away with the rule of the Indian princes and that the aim of the Company's forces was to paint the map of India red from end to end. This policy was put frankly by Dalhousie in the following words:

"I take this opportunity of recording my strong and deliberate opinion, that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy the British Government is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves."

On the other hand, a policy of non-interference was advocated by some of the Company's seniormost servants. They held that the relations between the Company and the States were regulated by solemn treaties, which were binding on both the signatories. The Company had no right, in their opinion, to interfere in the internal government of the Indian States, of its own accord and without the voluntary concurrence of the state concerned.

Some of them, and Metcalfe was one of these, held that this general enunciation of the binding nature of the Company's treaties with the Indian States must be modified. With respect to general policy, Metcalfe gave as his considered opinion that the Company ought not to interfere. He wrote, "Our interference is odious. It is very uncertain that it will be useful. It is often extremely mischievous. Its sure effect is to paralyse a weaker state, destroy its independence, and render it unfit to govern itself. If we interfere at all, we are bound to interfere for good. If we interfere for good, we must interfere minutely and extensively. If we do so, we must take the administration into our own hands and there is an end to the Foreign State. Between leaving it to govern itself and the entire assumption of government, I see no medium that can be relied upon".

The controversy of interference versus non-interference became intense mainly over the so-called internal states. It was generally held at that time that the external states were *de facto* sovereign states, although it was quite clear that the element of interference would soon become a pernicious (though ostensibly well intentioned) influence even in those states. As regards the protected or internal states within the Company's sphere of supremacy, interference had taken place on a number of occasions but had not yet been claimed and proclaimed by the Company as a universal and uniform right by virtue of the treaties of subsidiary alliance or otherwise.

As a diplomatic agent Metcalfe himself had had a part in carrying into effect both interfering and non-interfering policies, and he thought that a policy of interference should be followed only in cases of absolute necessity. In other words he would not interfere in the internal affairs of a state if it could be avoided. When compelled by necessity to interfere, he would do so with extreme caution, so that the state concerned might not as a result be permanently affected in any injurious manner. If he was forced to interfere at all, he did so only in so far as was indispensable in the accomplishment of his object, but once begun the interference was carried out in a decided and effectual way, so as to leave no stone unturned in gaining his object. Nevertheless Metcalfe would pursue a policy of interference only as far as was warranted by the situation, and then too only as

a last resort. On the whole he wanted to place great limitations on the policy of interference which the Company had followed from the earliest times. The following cases necessitating interference were suggested by him:

1. General disturbance produced by internal disorder but extending beyond the limits of the disturbed state and affecting other states.

2. Prolonged anarchy with its evil consequence of the inhabitants losing hope of the State's being able to settle its own affairs.

3. Habits of depredation affecting other states which last would be a just cause not only for interference by the Company but also for war and conquest if the Company chose to assert such a right.

4. Unjust usurpation devoid of legitimate claim or opposed to the choice of the people and without reference to the Company's supreme authority.¹

Let us next have a look at the actual relationship subsisting between the Company's Government and the different Indian States. I propose to take the year 1835-1836, the year that the Nepalese sent an embassy to Calcutta.

First of all, let us take the external States. In the secret and political proceedings of the Government of India we find that correspondence mainly relating to trade was carried on with Captain Burnes who was then in Iran. On the Indian mainland itself the Agent in Sind was instructed to receive the Amirs under British protection. He was also told that the government of Bombay would supply troops if necessary. At the same time military preparations were taken in hand in case diplomatic pressure failed to moderate Ranjit Singh's demands on Shikarpur.²

In the same year, assurances were exchanged between the Sikh ruler and the Company's Government that they would promote and strengthen the existing friendship. Also a letter had been despatched to Shah Shuja offering a few consolatory remarks and wishing good health and comfort to him.³

¹ *India Political* 2, dated 11 February 1836.

² *India Secret*, 1836.

³ *India Political*, 1835, Letter to the Political Agent at Ludhiana, dated 27 April.

With Nepal a desultory correspondence was carried on about the death of the Nepalese Vakil at Calcutta and the appointment of a new Vakil. In his letter of 9 April, the Raja of Nepal expressed the hope that the Governor General's successor would continue to improve the existing relations of friendship between the two States, and the reply was that nothing would be wanting on the part of the Company's Government to strengthen and increase the ties of existing friendship.

On 27 June 1836, we find a letter addressed to the Dalai Lama and the Raja (?) Lama of Tibet, intimating that an envoy had been sent to the Court of Bhutan, and that it would be satisfactory to the Company's Government to learn that the envoy had been honoured with an invitation to Tibet. About the same time a letter was sent to the Raja of Sikkim thanking him for his friendship to the Company's Government on account of which he had made an unconditional grant of Darjeeling with a small tract about it for the purpose of being used as a sanatorium by the servants and the subjects of the Company. But the Governor General regretted that he was unable to comply with the Raja's requests for the cession of Debgwim in return.

Correspondence with the rulers of the internal states shows to what extent these protected states looked to the Company for guidance, approval or censure. But before proceeding further we must not forget the lack of communications and the delay in correspondence that occurred in those days. For instance a circular was despatched to the ruling princes on February 24, 1835 and replies were received to it from Travancore on March 4, from Udaipur on April 12, from Karoli on May 11, from Kishengarh on May 11, from Rewa on May 18, and from the Sindhia on July 8.

The Raja of Travancore expressed his satisfaction that the Governor General took as full an interest in the prosperity of his country and the reforms he had introduced there as the last Governor General did and he requested that his affairs might be favourably recommended to the President of the Board of Control.⁴ To the Raja of Jodhpur a strictly worded letter was sent by the Governor General informing the Raja that his conduct in giving shelter to bands of assassins and in the infraction of the

⁴ *India Political*, 1835, (June 24).

existing treaty has led to the sequestration of his share of the Sambur district and that matters would be restored to their former footing on the payment of the Company's war expenses and on the Raja's giving proofs of future good conduct.⁵ The Raja of Kishengarh wrote to the Governor General that he invariably received kind treatment from Fraser who was at that time the Resident, and solicited the Governor General to direct Fraser's successor, whoever he might be to show him the same kindness.⁶

The King of Oudh on 15 February, asked the Governor General's help to remove the "Padshah" Begum from the Turra Buksh palace which she was occupying at that time.⁷ On 5 May the King of Oudh, replying to the former Governor General's letter of warning of the 5th February, communicated, the Nawabs' resolution to act in matters relating to the government of his country in strict conformity with the advice of the Resident and the Company's Government.⁸ From Indore, Krishna Bai, mother of the late Malhar Rao Holkar, sent a letter to the Governor General soliciting the aid of the British Government in putting down the oppression and misrule of Hari Rao Holkar and in restoring the legitimate heir to the musnad.⁹

From Alwar the Maharao sent complimentary letters to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the Governor General at Calcutta.¹⁰ The Raja of Bundee communicated his desire to proceed on a pilgrimage to Gaya and Puri and sent for approval his proposed arrangements for the conduct of his affairs during his absence.¹¹ The Maharaja of Rewa reported that he had derived much satisfaction from the assurance conveyed to him by the previous Governor General that the new Governor General would continue towards him the same friendly feelings which his Lordship entertained, and expressed a hope that he would always receive advice calculated to promote his welfare. The letter of the Governor General, he said, encouraged him to place his reliance on the Company's Government.¹² The Raja of Nagpur on April 8, acknowledged the Governor General's letter appointing Cavendish as resident at the Court of Nagpur and

⁵ *India Political*, 1835 (May 18). ⁶ *India Political*, 1835 (May 11).

⁷ *Ibid.* (February 15). ⁸ *Ibid.* (May 5). ⁹ *Ibid.* (August 9).

¹⁰ *Ibid.* (July 16, August 17). ¹¹ *Ibid.* (August 21). ¹² *Ibid.* (April 8).


assured the Company's Government that due respect and civility would be evinced towards the Company's representative.¹³ The Raja of Jaisalmer merely requested that letters should be addressed to him in Hindi in future, which was complied with.¹⁴ On May 1, the heir apparent to the Moghul throne at Delhi requested that his stipend might be placed on its original footing and that measures might be taken by the government to counteract the efforts and intrigues of a certain party in the Palace designed to deprive him of his right to succession.¹⁵ In reply the Governor General assured him that there was no chance of the success of any intrigues calculated to deprive him of his right to succession. On June 20, a letter was sent to the Moghul King at Delhi saying that the expressions of confidence by his Majesty were highly gratifying and that the Company's Government would, as heretofore, continue to promote the royal comfort and dignity.¹⁶ From Udaipur came a tribute of Rs. 3 lakhs,¹⁷ while serious things were occurring in Satara. The correspondence of the Raja of Satara was censured, and the Residents at Gwalior, and Nagpore and the Governor of Bombay were warned of the conspiracy that was being hatched at Satara. Also a European regiment was placed at Bombay for emergency purposes.¹⁸ In that very year Jaipur was being directly administered by the Company, because of the murder of the Resident and the supposed hand of the durbar in the murder.¹⁹

The above gives us a fairly complete picture of the actual relationship between the Company's government and the various Indian protected and unprotected states. We may place Nepal among those external states, which to a large extent were to escape the interference of the Company for the purposes of annexation. This Nepal escaped thanks to Hodgson and Jung Bahadur, one a pacific Resident and the other a strong and shrewd Indian administrator.

¹³ *Ibid.* (May 10). ¹⁴ *Ibid.* (May 1). ¹⁵ *Ibid.* (May 1).

¹⁶ *Ibid.* (June 20). ¹⁷ *India Political*, 1836 (15c/29-2-36).

¹⁸ *Ibid.* ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, (January 1, 2, 3, 11).



Chapter 19

THE COMPANY'S POLICY TOWARDS NEPAL

IN this chapter an effort is made to discuss the relations between Nepal and the East India Company in the realm of power politics and diplomacy. This would necessitate reviewing part of the ground covered in Chapter XVII. But the events are here presented from a different point of view. After recounting how the course of events developed as it did, it is now proposed to discuss why the events took some particular turns and not others.

Maharani Tripur Sundari died in the year 1832, after which Rajendra Bikram Shah on the promptings from his ranis began to interfere more and more in the affairs of the country. He had gradually grown to dislike the Prime Minister during his years of tutelege, and when the influence of the queen Regent was removed by her death, he was forced to become vindictive towards the aged and experienced statesman. Bhim Sen Thapa had followed a policy of peace and non-interference towards the Company. Rajendra Bikram, on the other hand, wanted to reverse it and to revive the glorious days of the Gorkha conquest even if only to discredit the Prime Minister. The martial qualities of the Gorkha race had first been discovered by Prithvi Narayan Shah and he had succeeded in founding a great Kingdom on the Himalayas. Even in the war with the East India Company compared with their opponents the Gorkhas had proved themselves very good soldiers; and on the whole they had shown a good mastery of military science. The new king had his own youthful dreams and plans. But at the same time his great weakness was his youthful immaturity and inexperience, a factor which coloured every political move he made.

But in Asia there existed no institutions to control and guide the absolute powers of the sovereign monarch and within a few years of his taking an active part in state affairs, Rajendra Bikram Shah turned out the old Minister, put him into prison

under a charge of poisoning the heir apparent, and installed a new ministry under Ranjung Pande. The Pandes came back to authority and power in the country after nearly 30 years. They completely reversed the pacific policy of the Thapa Prime Minister towards the Company. They devoted themselves eagerly to the revival of the old policy of expansion and to inflame the restlessness of the soldiery and the vanity of the young raja. They got a good response from the nation whose restlessness and ardour had been constrained for 26 long years by Bhim Sen Thapa. At the same time the Pandes wanted to punish the Thapas for the treatment meted out to themselves in 1805. The extreme length of the exile of the Pandes and the horrible events which had led to it when Bhim Sen Thapa had first assumed the reins of office, brought back partly leaders so utterly ignorant of affairs and so blindly devoted to revenge, that the blunders of their foreign policy and the very ferocity of their internal policy inclined the main body of the hereditary councillors and leaders of the armies to look up to the British Resident for moderation and security. During the greater part of this crisis at least six Nepalese statesmen were "in alliance" with Hodgson, who was then beginning to take an active part in the internal affairs of Nepal. The extreme youth, vanity and inexperience of the Raja afforded the Pandes good opportunities of exercising a pernicious influence in the State but in like manner, the Resident was able to stem that influence by taking advantage of the Raja's indecision and timidity.

In 1814, the Nepalese held a very threatening and commanding position along the whole length of the Company's Northern Frontier. But the treaty of Segouli had amply secured the Company against the Nepalese danger, who were thenceforward confined on three sides by the Company's territories and on the North by the Himalaya mountains, so that they were completely enclosed and were left with little power of acting forcefully in any direction beyond their own territories.¹ The Nepalese now wanted to resume their activities. They had failed in persuading the Company's Government to return Simla to them in spite of

¹ *Report from Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company, 1833.*

Matabar Singh's costly embassy. Now only the argument of force remained. Simla was a great prize for the Nepalese. It would have linked the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal to the Sikh Kingdom of Ranjit Singh. Matabar Singh who had slipped away from Nepal in order to save his life, was said to have been sent to Lahore by the Pandes, partly to get rid of this nephew of the deposed Bhim Sen Thapa from Nepal and partly to negotiate an alliance with the Sikhs. But the Company's Officers intercepted the party when about to cross the Sutlej near Ludhiana. The embassy was immediately disavowed by the Nepalese durbar, and Matabar Singh was detained at Simla by the Company.

The Company's government also came to know of the correspondence that the Pandes and the Brahmins were trying to establish with the Indian Chiefs in Bundelkhand and Rajputana, Ranjit Singh in the Punjab and the Tharra-waddee in Burma, and such reports were even published in the Press.²

Rumours about impending Nepalese attacks caused considerable uneasiness in the military and diplomatic quarters in India. There were rumours about an invasion of Kumaon, Sikkim, and other frontier districts of the Company.³

The result was that an army of 20,000 men under General Oglander was placed at the disposal of the Resident at Kathmandu for the protection of the Company's Northern frontier while the Company's main armies were passing through the Indus to the first Afghan War. This manifestation of the Company's military strength and a stern warning by the Governor General that the advance of the Nepalese troops and the estab-

² With Bundelkhand—*Astatic Journal*, Volume 56(ii) p. 199.

With Rajputana—*Ibid.* 57(ii) p. 126.

With the Sikhs—*Ibid.*, Volume 57(ii) p. 100, XXXVII, ii. (New Series) p. 34.

With Burma—*Ibid.*, Volume 55(ii) pp. 19, 155; 55(ii) pp. 166, 222; 57(ii) p. 293.

³ Rumours about the invasion of:

Kumaon—*Ibid.*, Volume 37(ii), pp. 12, 114.

Sikkim—*Ibid.* 55(ii) p. 152, 55(i) p. 180.

Champanan—*Ibid.* XXXIII, (ii) (New series) pp. 9, 98.

And others in—*Ibid.*, XXXIII(i) (New series), p. 74.

lishment of stockades and posting of battalions on the Company's immediate frontiers would be considered as acts of hostility had their salutary effect upon the militant Gorkhas.

But Auckland was not prepared for a second Nepal War before settling the affairs of Kabul. The Resident at Kathmandu was instructed, therefore, to preserve a stern attitude towards the durbar but not to precipitate a War. This he secured by siding with the Thapas in the internal politics of Nepal and thus diminishing the power of the Pandes as much as he possibly could from his advantageous diplomatic position.

Both Lord Auckland and Hodgson agreed that protracted contest, ending in the absorption of Nepal in the Company's dominion would hardly be a suitable settlement of the vexatious questions then existing between the two states.

The main objects of the Company's policy at this period were firstly, to procure atonement for numerous and grave wrongs done to it, viz. intrigues with the Company's subjects, allies and neighbours from Herat to Ava and Lhasa, aggressions on the Company's territories whence nearly a hundred villages had been forcibly occupied, harbouring of malefactors (e.g. decoits and thugs) and denial of justice to British Indian merchants travelling in Nepal several of whom had been maltreated. The other objectives were to procure the indispensable security of a change of individuals as well as a change of policy in the Nepal cabinet and also to stabilise the station and influence of the new cabinet thus formed with the Resident's backing. Hodgson thought that he could reach a satisfactory solution of these problems 'through the chiefs' more cheaply and speedily than through conquest. He was, as he asserted, in no way inimical in personal feelings to a state with which his whole public life had been associated.⁴

Towards the end of 1841 Auckland wanted to withdraw the precautionary force at Segouli to its own cantonments at Dinapore and Benares, if it could be safely done without disadvantage to the Company's position at Kathmandu. Multiplication of small military stations was proving very expensive to the Company and crippling its disposable force as well. And above all their withdrawal upon urgent occasions in other

⁴ *Ellenborough papers*, Letter from Hodgson, dated 11 October 1840.

quarters gave an impression of weakness. The Governor General, however, left the time and manner of the withdrawal in the hands of the Resident. He wanted Hodgson to do it handsomely and graciously. The reconciliation effected by the Resident between the Raja and the Company's government and the substitution of new for old advisers to the prince had, in the opinion of Auckland, fulfilled the main objects of the Company's policy.⁵

The First Afghan war now brought new complications. It came after a period of over sixty years and was so disastrous that for the first time the Company's troops returned from a campaign without the triumphs of victory and the prestige of an unqualified success. The tale was passed on from mouth to mouth throughout the bazaars of Northern India. People who had come to believe in the military powers and the inexhaustible luck of the Company began to have misgivings about the future of the Company's Raj. The retreat from Afghanistan had its repercussions in the Company's relations with Nepal as well. The Nepalese did not attack mainly because they were engaged in furious domestic feuds themselves and were being exasperated by the ferocious and sadistic irresponsibility of the heir apparent.⁶ The presence of Matabar Singh in the Company's territories had also a very sobering influence upon the policy of the durbar towards the Resident. The parties in power in Kathmandu feared an alliance between Matabar Singh and the Company designed to dislodge them from power and influence at the Nepalese court. Lord Ellenborough himself inclined to the opinion that Matabar Singh might be sent back with advantage.⁷

We have it on Hodgson's authority that those at Kathmandu who knew General Matabar Singh thoroughly and all others who had opposed his return now approved of it after they had witnessed the disorderliness and indiscipline of the preceding six years. The East India Company proposed to release Matabar Singh on condition that he would maintain good relations with the Company if he came to wield authority when he returned

⁵ *Ellenborough Papers*, Letter from Hodgson, dated 24 October 1840.

⁶ *Nepal Ko Itihas*, Ambika Prasad Upadhyaya, p. 124.

⁷ Letter from Hodgson, dated 12 September 1842.

to Kathmandu. The Raja whose sentiments were actively anti-British was said to have been seeking Matabar Singh's release so that he could remove the most talented Nepali soldier from the tutelage of the Company and employ him against it.⁸

Auckland had left his Nepal policy almost entirely in the hands of Hodgson. During his administration we find the Governor General mostly in agreement with the Resident at Kathmandu and adopting the measures recommended by him. For instance, Hodgson wrote on October 11, 1840, "Let me hope that the Kharita from the Governor General will not be omitted; that it will be briefly and sternly phrased stating that but for my unauthorised forbearance in extending the prescribed period of grace the punishment due to two years perpetual offending had no longer been delayed and warning the Raja that if the evil practices of that period be resumed, if they do not cease, the doom of Nepal is sealed". This letter shows that matters rested with the Resident and not the Governor General so far as Nepal was concerned.

With the coming of Ellenborough an energetic policy was decided upon by the Governor General himself. The main lines of the relationship between the Company's Government and the native princes were now determined from Calcutta, and the Resident at a particular court was required, like an ambassador at a foreign capital, to work merely as a mediary between his own government and the government he was accredited to. He was to work as a messenger of the Governor General from whom alone he could receive orders for any definite moves at a foreign court. For all ordinary work he was to follow strictly the instructions given to him by the Governor General. In other words the Company's government would not henceforward allow its residents at the Indian courts to usurp the Governor General's powers of initiating or suspending policies that might lead the Company's Government to war against the chiefs.

Ellenborough wanted to establish a cautious and "let well alone" relationship between the Indian frontier states on the one side and the Company's government on the other. The safety of the Company's possessions had no other sanction

⁸ Letter from Hodgson, 12 September 1842.

except that of a superior military power and a more advanced civilization which tried to inculcate a sense of efficiency throughout the administrative set-up. The higher officials of the Company and the commanders of its armies, with a few exceptions had very little knowledge of the people, their customs, prejudices and antipathies. This was also true of the residents in the courts of the various Indian princes. But amid all this ignorance, and lack of sympathy on the part of the multitude of the governed, there was the supreme and undeniable fact of the superiority of the troops under the Company's banners. A cautious policy, however, never unveils the mailed fist all at once. It was to be the last and ready resort not of the weaker but of the stronger party.

In his letter of May 8, 1842 to Hodgson, Ellenborough wrote that "he had been led to indulge in the hope that the communications between the States would henceforth have been of the most amicable character". At the same time he strongly disapproved of the resident's participation in the intrigues of the court to which he had been accredited as being a violation of the accepted laws of nations and also of his explicit instructions. Hodgson, however continued to follow the existing policy for another six months and repeatedly pleaded the continuation of the policy which he had been allowed to pursue unhampered by the preceding Governor General. His dispatches from Kathmandu show the obstinacy of a scholar who was fully convinced of his own reasoning and its conclusions and who could not understand how some one else could think differently from him. He relied on his experience, his knowledge of local conditions and his hold over some of the prominent chiefs at Kathmandu to justify the authority which he had tried to assume for himself. At last Ellenborough decided to call him to Calcutta for a personal interview and it seems that he had partly made up his mind not to send the resident back to Kathmandu. Hodgson pleaded reasons of health for not coming down to see Ellenborough forthwith. The Governor General had severely criticised him for his personal conflict with the Raja and the heir apparent and his taking part in the intrigues of the chiefs. The Resident's justification was that if the Company was compelled to come to a rupture with Nepal not by

an open Nepalese attack on the Company's dominions but by the faithlessness and insolence of the court at Kathmandu—the British should find the ministry and its allies a most powerful coadjutor ready to join the Company's forces "at the forest edge or the first range".⁹ In fact, Hodgson did not deliver to the durbar Ellenborough's circular letter of instructions to residents, of April 1842, informing the Raja that the Company's relations with Nepal were to be restored to their former basis of strict neutrality. This was delivered by Major Lawrence in December 1843, and was the first task he performed on taking charge of the residency at Kathmandu.¹⁰ It was not strange then that Ellenborough decided to recall Hodgson. Throughout the year 1843 Hodgson tried his best to persuade Ellenborough to let him remain at his post in Kathmandu. He sent the Governor General the 'Kharita'¹¹ from the Raja of Nepal brought to him by some of the Nepalese chiefs requesting the resident's longer stay.

This Kharita is dated the 7th of Savan 1900 Sambat, and after the usual recitation of compliments to the Governor General adds:

"Mr. Hodgson has recently mentioned to me his intention to retire from the service and return to Europe the coming cold season. Since that day I have been perpetually reflecting upon Mr. Hodgson's perfect knowledge of the customs and institutions of my kingdom and of the Parbatiya language, and likewise upon his long and zealous, kind and patient labours in the late troubled times whereby the designs of evil persons inimical to both governments were foiled and peace and friendship with your State preserved.

The more, I think upon these valuable qualifications and exertions of Mr. Hodgson, the more am I pained at the idea of his departure. It is, therefore, my earnest request and hope for the benefit of my kingdom that Mr. Hodgson may be persuaded by your Lordship to remain a while longer with me. Let me constantly hear of your Lordship's welfare etc. etc."

Hodgson even wrote to Ellenborough that a mission headed

⁹ Letter from Hodgson, dated 17 June 1842.

¹⁰ Letter from Major Lawrence, dated 10 December 1843.

¹¹ The 'Kharita' is a document similar to "letters patent" of English constitutional law.

by the son of the late Bhim Sen Thapa or by Kaji Jung Bahadur had been contemplated for the purpose of requesting Ellenborough to let the resident remain longer at Kathmandu.¹²

However, in the autumn of 1843 Lord Ellenborough decided to send Major Henry Lawrence (afterwards Sir Henry Lawrence) as Resident at Kathmandu and, as a mark of disfavour, asked Hodgson to take up the duties of Assistant Sub-Commissioner at Simla. Hodgson considered himself to have been very shabbily treated by Ellenborough and resigned from the service.¹³

Major Lawrence was expressly directed by the Governor General to carry out his new policy. First, there was to be no interference in the internal matters of any frontier state unless such state directly or indirectly affected the interests of the Company's Government and its subjects. This policy was to be carried out "with-out risk and without offence".¹⁴ The relationship between the resident and the durbar was to be correct, formal and as far as possible within the accepted maxims of the law of nations. It is interesting to analyse how far strict international usage could be permitted to the resident. The position of the Indian princes in international law has always been indefinite. The entire relationship between the princes and the Company's Government was in a continuous flux. It was changing from year to year with the experience of the residents and the acknowledgement by the princes of their subordinate position in a mighty Indian Empire controlled and organised by the East India Company. The possessions of most of the princes had been left in their hands, because of a policy of expediency and the compulsion of prevailing historical cir-

¹² Letter from Hodgson 1 October 1843; 6 October 1843.

¹³ For the details of Ellenborough's order through his Secretary to the Resident at Nepal, that "he would be relieved in his situation of Resident at the court of Nepal at the earliest period at which the season and the exigencies of the public service might have permitted such relief to take place". See *Life of Brian H. Hodgson* by Sir W. W. Hunter, pp. 201 *et seqq.* Sir W. W. Hunter also deals about the question of disobedience to superior orders by Political Agents, and the problems confronting practical administration when a strong-willed man at the seat of the Government wants to pursue some course of action entirely different from what the responsible man at the spot thinks prudent and advisable.

¹⁴ *Ellenborough Papers*, Letter from Hodgson, dated 20 June 1843.

cumstances. None of them alone or in a confederacy could challenge the hold of the Company's armies. But the Company had already enough on its hands and was in no haste to annex the territories ruled by its subsidiary allies. The main concern of the Company's government was to ensure through the vigilance of its residents that no Indian prince was trying to form an alliance with others of his class in opposition to the Company's rule in India, or was bringing his troops to a pitch of efficiency and discipline comparable to that of the Company's own troops. It was, therefore, essential that the Company should provide the subsidiary troops for the defence of the territories of its subordinate allies and humour the chiefs into having regiments of their own, which would vie in their brilliant colours, and in the laxity of their medieval discipline. It was again this very policy of securing and guaranteeing the military superiority of the Company's armies that no Europeans—civilians, engineers or soldiers—were allowed by the Company to be engaged by the Indian Princes in their services and as a matter of further precaution all communications between the States had to be carried out through the residents. These stipulations did not apply to frontier states. However, in their case, it was the duty of the resident to keep a keen eye on all those who entered or left the capital on important missions and to intercept with the help of the district officers in the adjoining British territories any messengers from whom they could get information.

What then was the exact content of the policy of non-interference? Did it mean that so long as the security of the Company's possessions was in no way threatened, the Company would not meddle in those affairs of the Indian princes, which were of a purely local character? In this particular as well, Nepal's position was different from that of the other Indian States. Nepal was a frontier state on the Himalayas and the Company's main interest was to keep a watch on any power that could advance towards India from that direction. Fortunately for Nepal there was no military danger from any power from beyond the Himalayas. Therefore, the Company was not keen on annexing Nepal provided she kept her turbulent nobles and soldiers away from the Company's territories especially as the policy of the Company was being guided, as it had

always been, on the sole principle of self-interest and not on that of glorious conquest for conquest's sake or for the fascination of seeking a continuous geographical boundary in the North extending from the Simla hills to those at Darjeeling and containing an unbroken chain of sanatoria for British Officers living in the malarious plains of the Gangetic valley. The resident was to be the watchman on military and diplomatic duty with little concern for the internal intrigues of the durbar. Major Henry Lawrence gives us a good glimpse of this policy in one of his letters to the Governor General. He reported that the usual absurd squabbles were said to be going on in the palace but that as he had repeatedly declared that he did not wish to hear of them, he had latterly had no official information on such subjects.¹⁵

The main point of difference in actual practice between the policy pursued by the Company's government towards its subordinate allies and Nepal was its method of suggesting the Prime Minister to the Princes. This in effect meant that the man carrying on the administration of the State was a direct nominee of the Company. This was especially so in the major states where it was necessary to keep the internal policy of the State in proper subordination to that of the Company's government in India. If the Company nominated and sustained him in power, the Prime Minister of an Indian State would be extremely careful to keep on good terms with the resident because the mainstay of his influence with the prince and the durbar would always be the confidence which the resident would repose in him. This policy was partially pursued in Nepal as well during the disturbing years of 1840-42. Thus in all the transactions opposed to the Raja's prejudices in which Hodgson had been engaged for a considerable number of years, he, on his admission, had been supported by a vast majority of the chiefs.¹⁶ Again referring to General Matabar Singh, who at that time was detained by the Company at Ludhiana, and who stood a very good chance of being made the Prime Minister at Kathmandu, Hodgson asked the Governor General to let him pro-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter from Henry Lawrence dated 28 June 1844.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Letter from Hodgson, 21 May 1842.

ceed to Nepal if his good feelings towards the British government could be reasonably calculated on.¹⁷ And again most of the intrigues in which the resident took part were designed to put in power a strong cabinet in Nepal, opposed to the anti-British Pandes and yet sufficiently nationalistic to claim the allegiance of and contain the military aspirations of the Gorkhas.

With the arrival of Ellenborough, the appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister was left altogether in the hands of the durbar itself so far as Nepal was concerned. The old partisan spirit of Hodgson was abandoned and the resident became an agent of the Company's government kept at Kathmandu to look exclusively to the affairs of trade and external relations of this little mountain principality. This indifferent attitude was somewhat vexing to the rival factions at the court itself. For example, Major Lawrence reports that on his contemplated resignation of the office of Premier, Matabar Singh was "much vexed at my refusal to interfere or to support him".¹⁸

This correct attitude became the fixed policy of the Company's government and it was clearly pointed out to the durbar at Kathmandu that any change in the person of the resident or even the Governor General would hardly affect the general lines of this policy. For example a Yad-dasht or memorandum to the Raja of Nepal from the Governor General announcing the appointment of Lord Hardinge the new Governor General in 1844 requested his highness to "observe.....that in all matters the new Governor General will carry out Lord Ellenborough's views". As an interesting detail which gives us a clue to the understanding of an Indian durbar it might be added that the same Yad-dasht emphasised the fact that the new Governor General was his predecessor's brother-in-law and most intimate friend. This fact was certain to dislodge the misgivings breeding in the fertile gossip of the Indian courts on the sudden recall of the Governor General.

Reverting to our principles of policy we find, secondly, that the desire of the Company's government was to secure greater facilities for the trade and commerce of its own subjects in the territories of the neighbouring Indian princes. Nepal ad-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Letter from Hodgson, 12 September 1892.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter to Ellenborough from Kathmandu, 28 June 44.

joined the Company's territories in British India which possessed some semblance of the rule of law. There were restrictions on trade and there were monopolies and special privileges but every merchant knew exactly where he stood by the law of the land. On the other side of the frontier was Nepal with its primitive autocracy and its paternal system of administration without any fixed code of commercial law. Impediments to the trade of Indian merchants would arise unexpectedly and frequently. The Indian merchants would not suffer quietly the difficulties put in their way by a mountain raja, and they would be more intransigent because the resident would be close at hand to hear their complaints. The Indian merchants knew that the Company whose subjects they were, was far superior in strength to Nepal, with whom they were obliged to have dealings; perhaps a sort of haughtiness in them degenerated into disrespect for the authority of Nepalese customs and bazaar regulations and on the other hand the fiery mountain temper of Nepalese officials would frequently get to mercurial heights at the insolence of the petty traders from the plains. In short there were occasions without number when Indian merchants were ill-used, their possessions partly or wholly confiscated, they with their families peremptorily ordered out of Nepalese territories or even seriously maltreated. It was the business of the resident, therefore, to look after the interest of these traders, keep them within his protection and at the same time not allow them to defy the reasonable customs and laws of Nepal.

It must be noticed about these merchants that they were all of them 'Indian merchants' and mostly they were engaged in carrying on a harmless trade in cotton goods, wool, mountain herbs, copper, borax, grain, etc. But on the other hand some of these merchants or the Brahmins attached to them were in the service of the Company's Government and some in that of the Nepal durbar. In a way trade was a convenient cloak for the rudimentary intelligence system of the two countries. The first knowledge to reach the durbar of the happenings outside Nepal would mostly come from these merchants who arrived at Kathmandu with gossip fresh from bazaars at Gorakhpur, Patna, Benares, Darjeeling or Bettiah. The resident was fully informed by the Company's government but he would

communicate to the durbar only so much of the news as his government directed. The Nepalese officially kept their agents or 'gumastas' at Calcutta and Benares but there was communications only on special occasions and for special purposes. For most of its news of the outside world the durbar and even the Prime Minister depended upon the bazaar causerie and their own intelligence in shifting the true from the false and extracting the facts from the natural exaggerations of verbal transference.

It was in a great measure due to this diversion from the proper channels of commercial activity that troubles arose which were partly political and partly monetary. Gradually, however, with the curtailment of mutual suspicion and the greater confidence in each other's words, this commercial intelligence system sank into insignificance. But throughout the East India Company's existence this system and its consequent troubles were always in evidence. In fact minor cases seem to have been so common that they were overlooked in the despatches where almost always a general reference was made to them.

Third in our enumeration of principles must come the case of frontier robberies and incidents. Perhaps here again an incursion into psychology might be permitted. There is a class of people who have a natural aptitude to snatch and grab whatever they can from helpless but wealthy individuals. In a frontier scantily guarded and consisting mainly of malarious districts with the fearful 'awl', luxuriant vegetation and inaccessible mountains close at hand, this 'professional' class of dacoits found the best conditions for carrying on its notorious business. But the persons involved in these frontier incidents were not all dacoits and did not all have plunder as their motive. The Gorkhas, respectable and soldierly as most of them were, suffered from a profound inferiority complex ever since their defeat in Nepal War. They chafed under the superior military skill of the Company's troops in pitched battle and as their natural martial instinct could get no healthy outlet in wars of conquest and campaigns of long duration and great hardship, they turned towards a more morbid expression of the soldiers' dash, surprise attacks, military manoeuvres and martial sports.

What was healthy and natural in warfare degenerated into petty frontier robberies. What would have been valour in the battle field decayed into dacoities sometimes attended with cruelty as well. It was under this delusion that many Nepalese officials overlooked the practices of their subordinates, who made a regular practice of descending into the villages on the British side of the frontier and troubling the harmless peasants and their wealthier landlords. It was understandable to the higher officials as well. Although their dignity did not permit them any indulgence in such activities, yet in their heart of hearts they felt the pleasure which a weak person enjoys on seeing his strong antagonist start at pin-pricks.

At the same time there was some confusion in the minds of Nepalese higher officials about the attitude of the Company's government towards political refugees from their country. The subordinate Kajis and the Prime Minister at Kathmandu demanded in vain the extradition of political criminals from British India. The Company's Government, taking its stand on the principles of international law, refused to hand over the political refugees to an administration which would certainly be very harsh in its treatment of those who plotted its violent overthrow. In Nepal there was no difference between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. There was no other law except that of the sword for political offenders. It was due to these circumstances and to the policy of harbouring within its borders important political personages from frontier states just to keep a tight rein on its neighbours' unfriendly tendencies that the Company's government guaranteed the security of political refugees from Nepal. But the Nepalese government could hardly appreciate the difference between political refugees and criminal absconders. It made constant trouble about the extradition of criminals from British India who had made their escape into Nepal. There were many efforts made to effect a settlement of this and kindred problems. But each change in the government of Nepal required a ratification of the old agreements by the new party in power, and each time troubles would arise anew and the resident would have to explain the principles of international law agreed to by all the civilised nations of the world; if proper agreements were not made he would either

have to hold threats over their heads or try his powers of persuasion to effect a compromise, rather than risk a breach of relations with Nepal.

In short, then, we may thus summarise the policy of the Company's Government towards Nepal—firstly to keep a friendly and natural attitude towards the internal policy of the State, secondly to demand and obtain justice for the British Indian merchants trading in the Nepal Valley, and thirdly to reach a settlement about the mutual extradition of perpetrators of crimes of violence without involving this problem with the question of the political refugees from Nepal.

Chapter 20

JUNG BAHADUR'S EARLY CAREER¹

MAJOR LAWRENCE, the Resident, and Lieutenant Smith, the Resident's assistant, thought in the year 1844 that the Gorkhas could not carry on a prolonged struggle against the Company's forces. The internal squabbles and the lack of any scientific training in the principles of strategy and tactics had rendered the Gorkhas harmless for any aggressive designs on the Company's dominions. But these hardy mountaineers could be a great nuisance, and it would be extremely difficult for the Company's forces to occupy and control the entire mountainous country of the Gorkhas. However, some energetic officers of the Company like Lawrence advocated a policy of ultimate annexation, because in their view the temperate climate of Nepal would be very healthy and refreshing to strained nerves and broken healths, and the country could provide admirable sanatoria close to the Presidency of Bengal. Sir Charles Napier also cast a jealous eye upon Nepal,² and wanted Dalhousie to conquer the country.

Nepal, however, was saved from the zealous armies of the Company not because the generals in the Company's service abandoned their plans but solely because Nepal had produced within her own frontiers at this time a great leader and a great diplomat. The annexations of Sind, the Punjab and Lower Burma were not followed by the annexation of Nepal. Even Dalhousie—the great consolidator of the Company's dominions—did not set out to achieve the natural geographical boundary of the snow Himalayas in the North. He, together with the

¹ This Chapter is mainly based on Captain O. Cavenagh's, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*.

² "Were I emperor of India for twelve years, she should be traversed by rail roads and have her rivers bridged; her seat of government at Delhi, or Meerut, or Simla, or Allahabad. No Indian Prince should exist. The Nizam should be no more heard of, Nepal would be ours" *Life of Sir Charles Napier* by Sir William Napier.

other Governors General let Nepal alone. Nepal enjoyed this immunity from outside interference mainly because the control of the State and the army passed into the efficient hands of General Jung Bahadur Thapa as from the 17th September 1846.

Jung Bahadur was born of a family of soldiers. Both his grandfathers had served under Amar Singh Thapa in Garhwal and the Simla hills from 1800 to 1816. He was not born into an aristocratic family, and, therefore, he had to make his own way upwards from the lowest ranks of the military hierarchy. His father was only the official head of an administrative district in Nepal. Jung Bahadur was the second of eight sons, and at the age of fourteen he was made subedar in a regiment under the command of his father and stationed somewhere towards the North Western frontier of Nepal.

He soon became tired of the routine of military life in a frontier hamlet, and one day in stealth he crossed the river Kali that separated the territories of Nepal from those of Kumaon which had been ceded to the Company in 1816. But at heart he was a soldier and his main hobby was to study the military equipment and the organisation of the Company's armies. In his sojourn in British India he seems to have visited a number of the garrison towns of the Company. It was during these youthful days that he saw the soldiers in the Company's army and compared them in efficiency and other military virtues with his own Gorkhas. It is quite possible that Jung Bahadur made up his mind about the military superiority of the Company's armies during this period of his life.

It seems that he passed through Bareilly, Rampur, and Moradabad on his way to Hardwar. At Hardwar, he found that the little cash he had carried with him from his father's house had almost disappeared. There were only two courses open to him. He had to choose between returning to his old post and facing an angry father and an angry Government on the one hand and starting a life of adventure outside his own country on the other. For some time he played with the idea of offering his sword to Ranjit Singh in whose service were to be found some of his own relations who had fled from Nepal. About this very time, however, a party of Gorkha pilgrims including some of his father's friends discovered him at Hardwar; and they persuaded him to

return to his parents and to his own country. On his return he was quietly restored to his former rank in the Gorkha army. It seems that the news of his desertion had never been communicated to Kathmandu, where the authorities always took a very serious view of all such cases.

He was related to Bhim Sen Thapa from whom he expected to get promotions in the military appointments. The fall of the old Prime Minister destroyed his hopes of advancement and, ambitious man as he was, he consequently relinquished his petty command in the Nepal army. For some years in the prime of his life he was an emissary at-large gathering experience and information for his future work. He travelled up and down the country, visited the numerous valleys and their peoples in the different parts of Nepal. He also visited the capital on numerous occasions in order to get into touch with the various currents of political opinion and therein measure the chances of his being appointed to some mission outside Nepal or to some responsible and superior military command.

Bhim Sen Thapa was deposed from the Prime Ministership and his place was taken by Ranjung Pande in 1837, whose policy was to declare war against the Company's government at an opportune moment. One of his projects was to descend into the Gangetic Valley at the head of a large Gorkha army and to re-occupy the Tarai lands ceded by his predecessor. It was about this time that the Gorkhas occupied a number of villages in British Indian territory near Ramnagar in Bihar. The Company's Government, however, forced the Nepalese to abandon these villages by sending a large expeditionary force to the frontier. This was the occasion, when on the intervention of Hodgson, Ranjung Pande was dismissed from office and Chautariya Fateh Jung was installed in his place. The Chautariyas were descended from the royal Shahi family and had great influence and power in the country.

It was during the Prime Ministership of Fateh Jung that the senior Maharani died and her son and the heir apparent Surender Vikram Shah started on his career of irresponsible oppression of the people. The entire populace was terrorised by the cruel barbarity and the morbid humour of this sadistic youth. Raja Rajendra Vikram Shah could not find his way to suppressing the

vagaries of the young prince, thinking that such a step would inevitably increase the power of the faction led by the junior Maharani. At length the nobles and the people of Nepal took the matter into their own hands. Some 675 responsible people were called together in a meeting presided over by the Prime Minister, Fateh Jung, and his brother Dharmadhikari Guru Prasad. They made the King sign a proclamation placing most of his sovereign powers into the hands of the junior Maharani. This document is of great constitutional importance and shows to what an extent public opinion could assert itself even in an Asian absolute monarchy.

The junior Maharani wanted to place her own son on the throne. The only way she could do so was to debar the heir apparent, Surendra Vikram, in some way or the other, from the throne. For this purpose, she decided to bring back the Thapas to power, thinking that they would be willing to get rid of Surendra Vikram for her sake. This was why she sent for General Matabar Singh, who was then residing in Simla, more or less interned by the Company's government; and placed in his hands the Prime Ministership of Nepal. General Matabar Singh was Prime Minister from December 1843 to May 1845, when he is said to have been shot dead under orders from the junior Maharani. Matabar Singh's position was an extremely delicate one. He had to carry on the administration of the country working under three different authorities, namely those of the junior Maharani, the King Rajendra Vikram Shah and the heir apparent Surendra Vikram. For some time Matabar Singh tried to please all three of them, but in following a policy of subservience to all, he found to his cost, that he had increased the enmity of every one of them against him. After his death Gagan Singh, a favourite of the junior Maharani, was made the Prime Minister, and the second place in the administration was occupied by Jung Bahadur who was raised from the rank of Kazi to that of General with three regiments and the command of an army. On the 14th September, 1846, General Gagan Singh was shot dead whilst sitting in his own room. The instigators of this crime could not be caught or traced. But the news of the shooting upset the junior Maharani—who was also the legally instituted regent. She took a very serious view of the whole

affair and going to the fort herself ordered all the prominent people in Kathmandu to assemble there and handover the culprits. Meanwhile General Jung Bahadur and his brothers with his three regiments called upon the Rani, as the acknowledged head of the state, to institute a strict enquiry relative to the assassination of his colleague, stating that in the event of its being permitted to pass unrevenged his own life would be in danger.

What happened in that assembly is a gruesome incident in the history of the internal affairs of Nepal. About 150 sirdars were massacred in the melee that followed. The Pandes had already been almost exterminated by Matabar Singh on assuming the office of Prime Minister. The massacre of the Kot now removed the remaining members of the once powerful Pande faction as well as of the blue-blooded Chautariyas. Jung Bahadur alone was now left to rule Nepal as he liked without interference from rival groups and factions. After great altercation between Rajendra Vikram Shah and the junior Maharani, the latter had her own way and Jung Bahadur was appointed by her to be the Prime Minister and Commander-in-chief of Nepal. The arsenal, the Treasury and the different departments of State were placed under his charge, and he did not lose a single minute in consolidating his power. He ordered all the regiments at the capital to assemble at the parade grounds. The place was surrounded by his own infantry with loaded muskets and the artillery was kept ready with lighted port fires. He harangued the troops in a long speech and promised them that though they had lost their former commanders (whose bodies had been placed in a ghastly heap before them) they would find in him a sincere and steadfast friend. He told them that the regent Maharani had vested full powers of State in him and appealing to their loyalty to the monarch he called upon them to obey his orders. The soldiers agreed to follow him and their leaders acclaimed him because consequent upon the casualties amongst the officers, Jung Bahadur had announced numerous promotions. The different regiments returned to their cantonments without a murmur and scarcely a word was uttered for their dead commanders. Jung Bahadur had firmly established his position, because ever after this harangue he retained the

implicit confidence and loyalty of the army in Nepal.

Order was restored in the capital, but the Maharani's wish had remained unfulfilled. She hinted to Jung Bahadur on numerous occasions that she would like to see the two sons of the senior Maharani killed. She even told him in plain words that she would like him to put both the princes to death in order to secure the throne for her own son. Jung Bahadur, however, took little notice of her entreaties till at last the desperate Maharani handed over to him in her own writing an order for the death of the two princes. By this time Jung Bahadur had established himself firmly in the affections of the soldiery as well as the civil population. And now he assumed a strict attitude towards the Rani especially because he had in his possession the strongest evidence against her. He wrote to her that her order was improper and illegal and that it would have been criminal of him to have complied with it. He added that the Maharani was the regent, but that his duty did not end in his being loyal to her alone. He protested that he owed greater loyalty to his country and to the State, and that it was his duty to work for the best interests of the state. This reply by Jung Bahadur was the beginning of his establishing a Prime Ministership independent of the royal control, working for the best interests of the people and itself owing loyalty primarily to the State and not to the person of the sovereign. It was now that the foreign policy of Nepal passed entirely into the hands of the Prime Minister.

It was after this incident that a plot inspired by the Maharani to kill Jung Bahadur was foiled by the latter who, in real danger of his life, refused to sanction the continued residence of the Maharani at Kathmandu mainly on the ground that she had conspired against the life of the heir-apparent. She was asked to go to Benares, where arrangements were made for her and her two sons. Rajendra Vikram Shah, the Raja on whom she still exercised a great influence, accompanied her in spite of repeated requests made by Jung Bahadur for his remaining in Nepal (23rd November 1846). For some time it was thought that the Raja would return, but his continuous absence for months was construed as an act of abdication and his son Surendra Vikram Shah was nominally installed as the Raja on

the 12th May, 1847. During the same year an attempt by Rajendra Vikram to invade Nepal and win over the soldiery was overcome by the shrewdness of Jung Bahadur, who captured the Raja and placed him under strict surveillance and without any political power at Bhatgaon. It was during this expedition of Rajendra Vikram Shah that the soldiers once again showed their complete loyalty to Jung Bahadur. The Raja had sent two of his men to kill Jung Bahadur with a letter under his own seal and addressed to the general public of Nepal and in particular to every soldier in the army that Jung Bahadur was to be killed, and that they should help the bearers of the letter in the commission of their errand. This letter and its bearers, were caught by Jung Bahadur's men and the letter was brought to his notice. He called the army and to the assembly of the soldiers read out the letter demanding his death. He told them that the person mentioned in Rajendra Vikram's letter was standing before them, and that any one wanting to kill him could step forward and do the job if he thought that he was doing the right thing. The soldiers were overcome by their love for their commander and they acclaimed him as their true leader.

This episode confirmed the great affection which the army had for Jung Bahadur and to a great extent explains the confidence that he placed in the loyalty of the army, when leaving Nepal for a political visit to London.

Chapter 21

JUNG BAHADUR'S VISIT TO ENGLAND

JUNG BAHADUR was installed as Prime Minister on the 17 September 1846, and in 1850 he undertook a diplomatic journey to England leaving his brothers to look after the administration of the country during his absence. This shows that in less than 4 years he had consolidated his power and firmly earned for himself the loyalty of the soldiery.

He was the first Indian, of a princely rank, to cross the seas and see the West with his own eyes. Nepal was a Hindu Kingdom and the customs of the Hindus did not allow any one within their fold to undertake a sea voyage. There had been other Indians, the Vakils of Tipu and the Peshawas and later Ram Mohun Roy, who had visited Europe; but India had never before sent there any one of her sons who shouldered such heavy responsibilities as Jung Bahadur did. He was virtually the autocrat of a large territory and he went to Europe mainly for reasons of State and in order that from the knowledge gathered in his tour, he might define a suitable line of foreign policy for his own country.

The main purpose of his visit was to acquaint himself with the actual extent of the power and strength of the British in their own homeland. In other words he wanted to find out the underlying causes of the military strength and the diplomatic skill of the British people and in particular of the East India Company. He knew that what the Indians found themselves confronted with in their own country was merely a fragment of the British power that had its foundations firmly laid in the industrial and cultural advancement of the British Isles. He knew that he would have to go to the head of the fountain to find out the basic qualities of its waters. To understand the East India Company's methods and doings in India, one would have to meet and evaluate the strength of the British people

beyond the seas. It was precisely this task which was essayed by the Nepalese Prime Minister.

Incidentally a voyage to England would certainly increase his own power and prestige in Nepal. The common people and the nobility would certainly be led to think that the minister who had been honoured by an audience with the Queen of England, would seldom be in want of assistance in the hour of need from the Company. This was quite in keeping with Indian constitutional practice, as the emperor or overlord was expected to come to the rescue of any of his tributaries and allies who had personally offered homage to him. Personal friendship meant a great deal to the Indian mind.

In 1835 also the Nepalese had thought of sending a mission to London under General Matabar Singh Thapa, but the idea was dropped because of the coldness shown by the Governor General and the fact that the party in power in Kathmandu did not trust the General. Then the Nepalese had asked for the restoration of some of the territories ceded by them in 1816, especially the hilly regions to their west, which would give them a common frontier with the Sikh power in the Punjab. In 1850 the demands had changed. The Sikhs had already been completely defeated and their country had been occupied by the Company. What Jung Bahadur wanted now was to employ some European engineers to supervise his gun and cannon making foundries. This the Company's government in India could never have allowed, and Jung Bahadur did not mention it to the Governor General. He demanded this concession from the President of the Board of Control and was gravely dissatisfied on its being categorically refused, although on paper he had merely asked that he should be permitted to engage the services of one or two engineers for the purpose of improving the irrigation channels in Nepal.

Secondly he asked the President of the Board to add another article to the treaty existing between the two states incorporating the principle of the reciprocal surrender of all criminals, without reference to the nature of the offence committed by them. This in effect would mean the extradition of political offenders as well as of criminals and debtors. Thirdly he demanded that in the event of the durbar, having reasons to be dissatisfied with

the conduct of the British Resident, it should have the power of corresponding direct with the Company's government in London. He was, however, asked to discuss these matters with the Company's Directors. Captain Shepherd speaking on behalf of the Directors declined to entertain propositions submitted in so irregular a manner, and evaded giving any blunt reply by telling him that they would be ready to give any proposals coming from him due consideration in the event of their being submitted through the prescribed channel of the Indian authorities. He was also told that it would be impossible for the Directors and the President of the Board of Control to discuss political matters connected with India without ample information having been first obtained from the Governor General in Council. Jung Bahadur felt greatly chagrined at this reply because he would now return without having obtained any substantial concessions for his country.

Jung Bahadur started on his voyage early in 1850. He was accompanied by Cavenagh—a military officer in the Company's army—who had been placed at his disposal by the Governor General in order to look after the comfort of the Nepalese embassy on its maiden voyage and to arrange visits etc. for them while away from their own country. In Calcutta, Jung Bahadur visited the Mint, the Arsenal at Fort William, the cap manufactory at Dumdum and the Military Orphan Press. He also attended a ball given by the European community in Calcutta to the 70th Regiment and another at Government House. He was exceedingly pleased at the Governor General's holding a great durbar on the 11th March, 1850, for his reception. The ambassador embarked on the P & O Steamer "Haddington" at 9 o'clock on April 9. The steamer touched at Aden and Galle and the embassy was taken overland to Alexandria from Suez. At Malta, the Nepalese saw battleships for the first time in their lives. These had just then returned from the Don Pacifico squabble with Greece and as a few of them were dry-docked, the Nepalese could see their huge sizes and armaments. Their ship being in quarantine, they were not allowed to land at Malta or Gibraltar, but at both the naval stations, Jung Bahadur, as the Minister of a foreign state, received the salute prescribed for his rank. He was persuaded

not to go to France because he could not pass through that country without meeting the President of the French Republic before he met the Queen of Great Britain and that would have been discourteous to Queen Victoria to whom he was accredited.

On 25 May the ship docked at Southampton and a special train was arranged to take the embassy to London, where they stayed at No. 1 Richmond Terrace paying £500 for the season. The day following their arrival in London, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors paid a visit to the Nepalese minister and invited him to visit the India Office on Thursday next. They also asked him to dine at the London Tavern on any day convenient to him.

Jung Bahadur went to St. James' Theatre on the evening of the day of his arrival in London and two days afterwards he drove to Epsom with Cavenagh to see the races on Derby day. On 30 May he paid a formal visit to the India Office and was received by the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and the members of the Court of Directors who presented him an address of congratulations. In the evening he attended the performance at the opera, where he did not seem to have cared much for the music but was evidently attracted by the ballet.

Another evening he drove to Lady Palmerston's "at home" after visiting the Opera. Jung Bahadur was received with much courtesy by the host and was introduced to the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Lawrence, the ambassador from the United States. Wellington was pleased by Jung Bahadur's remark that he had been honoured by making the acquaintance of the distinguished soldier whose fame had spread throughout the world and had reached even his remote country.

On 5 June he was invited by the Marquis of Londonderry to attend the review of the 2nd Life Guards, which pleased him immensely. He extended a dinner invitation to all the men but the offer was declined. That evening he attended a grand military banquet given at Holderness House, where he returned thanks for the toast of the Nepal Government. Earlier in the afternoon Lord Hardinge had called on the Minister, offering to afford full information on all military questions. Jung Bahadur at once enquired of him whether the terms of the treaty with Nepal could be relaxed so as to admit of his employing

European engineers and artificers for the purpose of Superintending his foundry. He was told, however, that this point could never be conceded by the Company. On the 7th he called on the President of the Board of Control, and on the 8th he paid a visit to the Bank of England where he was astonished to find that £28,000 was the cash needed for daily use.

On 15 he dined with the Directors of the Company at the London Tavern, where a toast was proposed for the prosperity of the Kingdom of Nepal coupled with the name of the ambassador. In his reply Jung Bahadur said that he had been greatly impressed by the strength and power and wealth of Great Britain and assured his hearers that they might depend upon Nepal remaining their faithful friend and ally.

On the 19th he had an audience with the Queen. He was received at the palace by several members of the Ministry as well as the household, and he was given precedence next after the Spanish Ambassador. He was struck with the brilliancy of the scene but what astonished his Indian mind more was the courtesy and want of vanity in the sovereign of such a powerful country as England.

On 24 he went to hear a debate in the House of Commons and on 27 he went personally to Buckingham Palace to enquire after the attack on the Queen. The next day found him on his way to Woolwich where he wanted to review the artillery. On the 29th he paid a formal visit to the East India Company's Offices and submitted his proposals for a new treaty to the Court of Directors, who declined to negotiate with him directly and asked him to forward these matters through the Governor General in Council in India. He was greatly chagrined at this because one of the main reasons for his voyage to England was to side track the Company's Government in India and secure favourable terms for his own government and country from the Court of Directors in London. He had carefully concealed this aspect of his mission to England from the Company's Government in India, and from his ideas of oriental diplomacy he had expected great results from his personal visit to the Directors and the Queen of England. In the East important results could be hoped for from the courtly courtesy of visiting ambassadors. It would have been humiliating to the dignity of the court to

which an envoy was accredited to refuse to negotiate with him and not to give a very favourable consideration to the proposals put forward by him. In fact all important diplomatic dealings were carried on by such embassies and the usual form of communication between princes on important matters was to grant a *Kharita* or "letters patent" to the envoy saying that he was the trusted counsellor of his liege prince and that he was sent on important mission which he would place before the court he was accredited to, and finally, that whatever he said should be taken as coming from the prince who had sent him. This procedure was necessitated by the dangerous nature of communications and methods of transport in those days when it was always feared that any document on which the secret intentions of any state were put in black and white might fall into unfriendly hands and thus compromise the position of the prince who had put his signatures and seals to it. There were hardly any secret codes, and the agents that the princes kept at one another's courts were not considered to be the proper channels for important communications. This was, however, different in Europe, where foreign envoys enjoyed complete security of person and correspondence and where instructions were sent by their governments to them under their own seals which were very seldom tampered with.

Jung Bahadur was not conversant with this practice and he did not realise that Indian affairs were not so important to the British Government in Westminster as to necessitate full information about them being available at hand and to need a minute control being exercised over them from London. He found himself moving in a different diplomatic world whose manners and conventions were quite unknown to him. His inexperience and the realisation of his own military weakness in India made him submit to this peremptory rejection of his proposals, and all he asked for in his disappointment was an official reply to his official communication. He then proposed to leave the country as soon as a ship could be conveniently booked for him and his retinue. Only this far did he allow his feeling of frustration to become apparent to his hosts, and he was wise in not taking it too much to heart.

However, Jung Bahadur watched the life in the court of St.

James's and the activity in the diplomatic and commercial worlds of Westminster and London with the keenest interest. Some of his visits in London are interesting enough to be noted here. One of his fondest wishes was to meet the Duke of Wellington about whom he had heard so much both in his own country and in London. Cavenagh wrote a letter on his behalf soliciting an interview from the Duke, who was somewhat surprised at this request. He wrote back that it was not part of the Duke's duty to receive Ambassadors at Her Majesty's Court but he named the hour which he hoped would suit the Ambassador. But Jung Bahadur kept the Duke waiting for full half an hour. This enraged the Duke, who had seldom been kept waiting even by crowned heads, as he himself growled out to Captain Cavenagh.

Jung Bahadur was also keen on attending the concerts and levees at the palace, and he also accompanied Lord Alfred Paget, the Commodore of the Thames Yacht Club, down the river to witness the Regatta. The government did not want the Nepalese soldier-statesman to go back to his country with the idea that court life in England was nothing but one long round of luxury and frivolity. They wanted him to go and visit the great mining, manufacturing and ship building districts in the interior, which would give him a wholesome and correct mental estimation of British power. They were specially keen on showing him British industrial strength before he left their shores for France where he was certain to review larger armies than any seen in India or England and which might make him under-rate the British. It was with this idea that he was taken to Woolwich where he studied carefully some of the models of the capstans and anchors employed in drawing guns up steep heights. He was obviously thinking of his own country's needs and his mind must have thought about picking up hints here and there in Europe which might prove useful to him in after life. He was also asked to visit the Plymouth dockyards in the Company of Admiral Lord John Hay. He went on board His Majesty's ship "Albion," and was greatly impressed by the size of the gun turrets and the ammunition fired through the guns. Later a visit to Birmingham was arranged for him, and he was also taken to Edinburgh to see the castle, Holyrood Palace, the University and the College of Surgeons.

At last he started back on his journey on the 20th of August. He had learnt a great deal from England and in talks and in his behaviour he had shown that he was not to be easily surpassed in manners and conversation by those whom he had met in Europe. In spite of the informal atmosphere in the Court at Kathmandu, he proved himself to be a successful courtier. One evening in London he was asked by one of his fair questioners as to what he thought about English ladies. This would be a tricky question to any diplomat in Europe, but Jung Bahadur replied immediately that his stay in England had been so short that it would be presumptuous of him to express any opinion, adding that one thing was certain, namely that they held the gentlemen in complete subjection and that the latter could not live without them. Another lady asked him whether he did not consider the dress of the English gentlemen, as compared with oriental costumes, very sombre and ugly. He observed that the dress he wore was that of a soldier; that English military uniforms although perhaps not so gorgeous as his own, were handsome; and that as in many cases they were decorated with medals, he would gladly give all his jewels for one such decoration because he knew that they had been and would have to be, gallantly won. Also on the occasion of his meeting Lord Gough he remarked that he owed his name of "Mighty in War" — Jung Bahadur—to his birth but that his Lordship had won his by valour. These instances show that he was really a very remarkable man who could adapt himself to the courtly wit of London as well as to the exigencies of military life in Nepal.

In France he paid his respects to the President Louis Napoleon at the Elysee and the reception accorded to him was kind and courteous. Perhaps at the time of meeting him the ambitious nephew of Napoleon remembered the part played by Frenchmen in Indian history and perhaps he even thought with a pang in his heart that but for a few avoidable mistakes, France would have claimed an oriental Empire in India and that Indian princes would have first come to Paris instead of to London. Who knows if the nephew then thought of the unclaimed plans of his great uncle for a descent on India, outshining Alexander in the extent and success of their military exploits. Jung Bahadur however, requested the President for a review of troops which

was gracefully granted, and Louis Napoleon was himself present on his inspection of the French troops. He was also taken to the Invalides where a garland of immortelles from the tomb of Napoleon was presented to him by General Petit. Jung Bahadur was immensely delighted at this and said that he would have it preserved in a case as a most precious memento of his visit to the great warrior's tomb.

It is to be noticed that Jung Bahadur and his Nepalese followers were taken to be and treated as tributaries of the British. They were asked that all their requests to the French government must come through the British Embassy and directed to the French Foreign Office.

This caused great inconvenience to the members of the mission who themselves felt humiliated at being treated as tributaries of the British. But the treaty of Segouli bound the Nepalese not to have diplomatic relations with European powers except through the agency of the Company's Government in India. The Nepalese had never realised the extent and effect of this total separation from the countries of the west. Now for the first time Jung Bahadur realised what amount of sovereignty had been passed over to the British by the treaty of 1816 when he saw for himself the European world and the powers in it—especially France—who were not inferior to the British in their intrinsic military strength, civilisation and culture. For the first time after Tipu Sultan, an Indian Chief, had tried to acquaint himself with European countries other than Britain, and found himself in an embarrassing and tempting situation. It would certainly have been an extremely difficult position to be in France for any Indian Prince having or designing to achieve full sovereignty outside British control. However, Louis Napoleon was fully convinced of a Franco-British entente and was not likely to sow the seeds of hostility towards the British in the minds of his oriental visitors. And the British Government had taken precautions not to allow Jung Bahadur to meet and discuss political matters with the French because the only French interpreter of the Nepalese mission was Captain Cavenagh—a trusted servant of the East India Company. And although from all the state officials of every class in France the greatest kindness and courtesy were experienced, Cavenagh filled Jung Bahadur's ears

daily with tales of extortion and illiberality which he alleged marked the proceedings of hotel keepers and railway companies to the last.

The mission took a ship at Marseilles for Alexandria, where they changed to a smaller boat for Cairo. In Cairo, Jung Bahadur did not forget to pay a visit to the Pasha. Taking ship again at a port in the Red Sea, the Nepalese visited Dwarka and Rameswaram on their way to Calcutta. From here they hurried to their homeland entering Nepalese territory on the 29th January 1851. The journey had taken them almost a complete year, within which they had seen more of the world than any other Indian chiefs of their own times. They returned to Nepal wiser and soberer. Wiser because they now fully realised the comparative military and industrial strength of Britain, and soberer because this realisation made them abandon for good plans for an attack on the East India Company's dominions if ever they had any.

Chapter 22

NEPAL'S WAR WITH TIBET AND THE SEPOY WAR

JUNG BAHADUR, on his return from England, launched a series of administrative and military reforms. The main purpose of all these reforms was to secure greater efficiency in the administrative machinery in the sense that the ultimate control of even distant Zila Hakims or district officers was now centralised and all of them were made personally and individually responsible to the Prime Minister. These reforms were disliked by many and three persons, two of whom were also related to Jung Bahadur, conspired together to murder him. They were Badri Nar Singh, Kahbad Kshattri and Jai Bahadur. It was also said that Upendra Bikram, a brother of the Raja, had been the prime mover in the plot. Jung Bahadur, however, came to know of the conspiracy in time and the culprits were banished from Nepal. In 1853 they were forgiven and were allowed to return to Nepal.

It was about this time that the Nepalese-Tibetan relations were becoming strained. The Tibetan officials in Lhasa and other Tibetan market-towns were very harsh on Nepalese merchants. The treatment of even petty officials towards the Nepalese merchants was oppressive and contemptuous throughout Tibet. Representation was made at Lhasa on behalf of the Nepal Government to get some amelioration in the treatment meted out to its subjects in Tibet, but the Lhasa officials were lazy and paid no attention to these remonstrances. The Nepalese Government then approached the Chinese envoy at Lhasa, but he also proved to be powerless to set things right. At length Jung Bahadur decided on war against Tibet. He had become convinced of the utter helplessness and disorganisation of the Chinese Empire from the accounts of the quinquennial Mission from Kathmandu to Peking which was last sent in 1852. Jung Bahadur rightly assumed that the Chinese were not in a position to send any military help to Tibet, and that if any such force was sent by

the Chinese Emperor, the Gorkhas would be more than equal to any Sino-Tibetan combination on their own frontiers. It is proposed not to enter into any details of the fighting that followed. The War started in March 1854, and came to an end in March 1856. It is interesting and instructive, however, to find that this opportunity of a Tibeto-Nepalese war was at once availed of by the British Resident and the long outstanding question of the repatriation of criminals was settled finally to the satisfaction of the East India Company's authorities. This was embodied in a Treaty, dated the 10th February, 1855. This treaty bound the two governments to act upon a system of strict reciprocity. Debtors and civil offenders were not to be delivered. The expenses of apprehension, detention and surrender were to be borne by the government making the requisition. Persons attached to the Residency who were subjects of the Company were to be tried solely by the Resident. But ordinary merchants from the Company's territories and Nepalese subjects working at the Residency were subject to Nepalese courts. The main Article (4th) stipulated that any person, who should be charged with having committed, within the territories of the Government making the requisition, any of the following offences and who should be found within the territories of the other, should be surrendered; the offences named being murder, attempt to murder, rape, maiming, thuggee, dacoity, highway robbery, poisoning, burglary and arson.¹ This treaty secured all the points which the Residents had been trying to obtain from the Nepal durbar ever since 1816.

Coming back to the Tibetan War, it would be sufficient for our purposes to say that the Gorkhas were generally victorious and the Tibetans had to sue for peace, which was signed at Thapa Thali—the Residence of Jung Bahadur—near Kathmandu.

In the preamble to this treaty, signed on the 24th March 1856, we find that both the representatives of Tibet and Nepal re-asserted their profound respect and honour for the Emperor of China. The treaty itself contained ten provisions. Firstly Tibet agreed to pay 10,000 silver coins every year to Nepal. Secondly Nepal promised to come to the aid of the Tibetans in case they

¹ *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, C. H. Aitchison, 1892, Volume II, p. 186.

were attacked by any power. Thirdly, there were to be no customs duties on goods carried by Nepalese traders into Tibet. Fourthly, the two countries agreed to restore conquests and release the prisoners and booty captured in the war from each other. Fifthly, the Nepalese agreed to appoint an envoy (Bhardar) instead of an Agent (Naik) at Lhasa. Sixthly the Nepalese Government was allowed to bring food-grains etc. for her servants employed in Governmental work at Lhasa, Seventhly, mixed tribunals were set up to decide cases arising from quarrels between Nepalese and Kashmiri subjects on one side and the Tibetans on the other. Any fines realised by such courts from Tibetans were to remain the property of the Tibetan Government but the fines realised from Nepalese and Kashmiri subjects would be handed over to the Nepal Government. Eighthly, murderers who escaped from one country to the other would be repatriated reciprocally. Ninthly, the officers of the two governments were bound to do their utmost to recover property stolen from merchants of the other country in their own jurisdictions. Tenthly, an immunity clause was inserted to protect the subjects of either country who had taken part in the fighting against their natural allegiance.

This treaty was signed on behalf of the Raja of Nepal by Jung Bahadur, the Raj Guru and a number of high military officers, and on behalf of Tibet by the Secretary to the Dalai Lama and a number of Tibetan abbots of monasteries who had come to Kathmandu to negotiate the terms of the peace.

This treaty placed the relations between Tibet and Nepal on a solid footing of inter-commercial activities with a decidedly advantageous position secured for the Nepalese traders throughout Tibet. This was a great success for Jung Bahadur's foreign policy and his popularity increased immensely with the general public and the soldiery. But a curious step was taken by him shortly afterwards. About the end of July in the same year (1856) he ostentatiously retired from public affairs and entrusted the work of Prime Ministership to his brother Ram Bahadur.

This voluntary abdication from the post of the supreme and unquestioned power aroused great perturbation throughout Nepal. People became particularly anxious at the capital. The officers in the army and the civil dignitaries including the Raj

Guru could not understand why Jung Bahadur took this step. Was it to increase his popularity by a show of renunciation or did he intend to depose the reigning sovereign and occupy the throne for himself and his descendants? People were getting apprehensive that this dramatic step had not been undertaken by a man of Jung Bahadur's energy, shrewdness and ambition merely for nothing. They approached him repeatedly to come back to his post of Prime Minister and he refused every time. At length, one day the officers and the people of Kathmandu went to him and offered him the throne of Nepal. They all had thought that perhaps it was the throne of Nepal that Jung Bahadur was after. This brought a categorical denial of any such intention from the erstwhile Prime Minister. He told the populace that it would be most improper on his part if he should contemplate displacing the self-same person from the throne of Nepal whom he had himself placed there. He pleaded ill-health as the cause of his precipitate abdication and assured the assembly that he would take up the reins of the administration again when his health improved.

The Raja in due course of time was informed of this act of loyalty and self-sacrifice by Jung Bahadur. He was persuaded to call Jung Bahadur, praise him, grant him the districts of Kaski and Lamjung and honour him by the hereditary title of Maharaja of Nepal, and the post of Prime Minister.

Ram Bahadur, the acting Prime Minister died on the 25th May 1857. He was the first Prime Minister of Nepal since the times of the Kala Pandes to die a natural death, and that he owed to the protecting hand of Jung Bahadur behind him. Jung Bahadur once again became the Prime Minister of Nepal. He assumed the supreme responsibility in Nepal just in time to reaffirm his respect for the British arms and his country's friendship with the Company's Government during the sepoy war.

At first the Company's Government were not prepared to accept the proffered help from Nepal. The higher military authorities in India and the Governor General were against it, but the Resident at Kathmandu and Hodgson, who was then residing at Darjeeling, were enthusiastically in its favour.²

² See Hodgson's correspondence and talks with the Governor General on this subject reproduced elsewhere.

Matters came to a head with the threatened rising in Gorakhpur. The military force there consisted of 2½ Companies of the 17th Indian infantry, whose headquarters were at Azamgarh and a Squadron of the 12th irregular Cavalry.³ The 17th refused to obey orders on the 6th June, and things began to look dark. However on the 9th came the news from Major Ramsay, the Resident at Kathmandu, that he was sending 200 Gorkhas from Palpa. This small Gorkha detachment reached Gorakhpur on the 30th June. This step was taken by Ramsay anticipating his Government's approval. On 26th June he presented to Jung Bahadur a formal letter from Lord Canning accepting Gorkha help in crushing the revolt in Oudh. Immediate steps were taken by Jung Bahadur on receipt of this letter and a force of 6 regiments (3000 men) was despatched from Kathmandu to proceed to Gorakhpur by way of Nichlaul. This force defeated the rebel sepoys in Jaunpur and Azamgarh with the support of British troops.

Further help was sought from the Gorkhas as the disturbances spread to the entire province of Oudh. The reoccupation of Oudh was considered to be the first objective for the army in India. Canning in coming to this decision affirmed that "paradoxical as it may appear, I think it of more importance to re-establish our power in the centre and capital of Oudh, which has scarcely been in our possession two years than to recover our older possessions. Every eye in India is upon Oudh as it was upon Delhi. Oudh is not only the rallying place of the sepoys—the place to which they all look, and by the doings in which their own hopes and prospects rise or fall—but it represents a dynasty; there is a king of Oudh seeking his own. Oudh and our dealings with it have been in every native's mind for the last two years. The attention of all native chiefs is drawn to see whether or not we can retain hold of what we have taken."⁴ Another reason why Oudh was so important was that next to Hyderabad, Oudh had been the biggest Muslim State in India. Again quoting the Governor General, "then there is the most formidable of all lurking places of danger and revolt, Hyderabad especially Mohammedan and deeply sympathising

³ *Gazetteer of Gorakhpur* (1909), p. 188.

⁴ Letter from Canning to Campbell, 8 January 1858.

with Oudh, because fearing, however unreasonably, the same fate". The recovery of Oudh would be of the greatest value to the Company, while the penetrating into Rohilkhand, leaving Oudh untouched, would be little thought of".⁵

The second auxiliary force from Nepal was used against the sepoys in Oudh. It was suggested at one time to use it farther away from Nepal, but it would have been most difficult to explain to Jung Bahadur that the Company's Government "was obliged for a time to pass by anarchy and insurrection, where they were most formidable, and raging immediately under his own hills and take him off to other distant parts where no such serious struggle awaited the Company's armies".⁶

Jung Bahadur himself led his disciplined Gorkhas and four batteries of artillery and reached the Company's frontier on Bettiah on 21st December 1857. This force proceeded to Lucknow via Gorakhpur. An advance division of this army under General Kharak Bahadur engaged in an action which took place on the 5th March 1858. This engagement was fought at the Kundoo Nadi against Nazimuddin Husain and resulted in the capture of the enemy's only gun and the loss to him of nearly 600 killed, with casualties to the extent of one killed and sixteen wounded on the Gorkha side, two of the wounded later dying of wounds.

The division had 13 guns, and 7 regiments of infantry; the total force numbering 3,800 men. An account of this engagement shows how easily the Gorkhas dispersed the sepoys. The following is taken from an account of this engagement by Captain C. P. Lane who was attached to the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, Gorkha Forces: "After passing 'Musafir Khana' about 1½ mile on emerging from some mango groves upon an open plain, we perceived the enemy in our front occupying the banks of 'Kundoo Nullah'. The brigade was formed into line, and the guns advancing opened fire on the enemy, which was replied to by one gun in position on the opposite side of the nullah, and a smart fire of Matchlockmen posted among the ravines on this side. The gun was soon silenced by the excellent practice of our guns under the immediate superintendence of Lieutenant Gibb.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 30 December 1857.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 29 December 1857.

"The order for the general advance of the brigade was then given, one regiment being told off to remain in support of the guns; the brigade, taking ground to the left, slightly turned the enemy's flank and advancing rapidly across some open ground under a heavy fire at once became engaged with the enemy amongst the ravines. From these they were soon driven with considerable loss across the nullah into the heavy jungle on the opposite bank, and closely pursued by our men, were shot and cut down in larger number.

General Kharak Bahadur seeing the enemy in full flight, keeping two Companies for the protection of the guns, granted permission to the remainder of the regiment in reserve to join in the pursuit.

The pursuit was continued for some distance, when the men becoming much scattered from the denseness of the jungle, I deemed it expedient to advise the recall being sounded. The troops returning to the bridge on the Lucknow road took in possession the gun left by the rebels."

This division was shortly joined by the rest of the Gorkha army and the entire force (consisting of about 9000 men and 24 field guns) reached Lucknow on the 11th March. They took up position in the British line on the 12th and moved close to the Gomati canal on the 13th.

Sir Colin Campbell asked Brigadier General MacGregor, the special Commissioner attached to Jung Bahadur, to request him to pass the canal and attack the suburbs of the town in his front and considerably to the left of Bank's house, which readers familiar with the story of the siege of Lucknow will easily remember. In this position Jung Bahadur covered the left flank of the British forces. The Gorkhas were thus most advantageously employed for several days, "during which, from the nature of the military operations, Sir Colin Campbell was obliged to mass all the available strength of the British force towards the right, in the joint attack carried along both the banks of the Gomti".⁷

On the 16th Jung Bahadur was requested to move to his left up the Canal, and take the position in reverse from which the British position in Alambagh had long been threatened. The position was taken the same day by Jung Bahadur, and Sir Colin

⁷ Letter from Campbell to Canning, dated Lucknow 22 March.

Campbell in his telegram dated 18th March to the Governor General said, "Jung Bahadur has done good service in taking the line of works from which the position of Alambagh was so long threatened, seventeen guns falling into his hands." The city was now completely in the hands of the British troops and the Gorkhas were thankfully asked to return to their mountains.

On 28th March Sir Colin Campbell reported Jung Bahadur's departure from Lucknow. He added in his letter to the Governor General: "I desire to take this opportunity to express my thanks to His Highness for the assistance rendered to me during the late operations by him and his gallant troops. I found the utmost willingness on his part to accede to any desire of mine during the progress of the siege and from the first His Highness was pleased to justify his words that he was happy to be serving under my command. His troops have proved themselves worthy of their commanders, and it will doubtless be a happiness to them hereafter that they were associated with the British Arms for the reduction of the great city of Lucknow".

From Lucknow Jung Bahadur proceeded to Allahabad where he was met with due honour by the Governor-General. He returned to Nepal via Benares. He was there confronted with the problem of refugees from the plains of Hindustan who had sought refuge in the tarai of Nepal. Some Moghal princes, Nana Saheb, Bala Rao, Azimullah Khan and others had come to the Nepal tarai with their women folk and children. Some of them died from the malaria of the forests, but the families of all these rebel leaders were looked after by Jung Bahadur. He even asked some of them to reside with his own family at Thapa Thali in Kathmandu. These rebels had also brought some British prisoners to the Tarai. They were released and sent back to the Company's territories by Jung Bahadur. Of the sepoys no one was handed over to the British without it being properly ascertained that he had killed some British woman or child. The rest were given political asylum in Nepal. This was in keeping with the 4th Article in the treaty of reciprocity for handing over criminals signed in 1855 between the two states.

The net result of the Gorkha's help to the Company in the sepoy disturbances of 1857 was the return of the tarai lands to Nepal. These tracts were formally handed over to the Gorkhas

by the Treaty of 1st November 1860. The preamble to the treaty recited that :

“During the disturbances which followed the mutiny of the Native army of Bengal in 1857, the Maharajah of Nepal not only faithfully maintained the relations of peace and friendship established between the British Government and the State of Nepal by the Treaty of Segowli, but freely placed troops at the disposal of the British authorities for the preservation of order in the Frontier districts, and subsequently sent a force to co-operate with the British Army in the re-capture of Lucknow and the final defeat of the rebels. On the conclusion of these operations, the Viceroy and Governor-General, in recognition of the eminent services rendered to the British Government by the State of Nepal, declared his intention to restore to the Maharajah the whole of the lowlands lying between the River Kali and the district of Gorakhpur, which belonged to the State of Nepal in 1815, and were ceded to the British Government in the year by the aforesaid Treaty. These lands have now been identified by Commissioners appointed for the purpose by the British Government, in the presence of Commissioners deputed by the Nepal Durbar; masonry pillars have been erected to mark the future boundary of the two States, and the territory has been formally delivered over to the Nepalese Authorities”.

Before finishing this narrative of the relations between Nepal and the East India Company, it would be proper to ascertain the principles on which Jung Bahadur based his policy towards the Company's Government. These principles are complementary to the Company's policy towards Nepal and both should be studied side by side. I have, already discussed the Company's policy as formulated by Ellenborough.

It is only left now to discuss Nepal's attitude towards the East India Company. The same policy with slight variations was followed by all the important Prime Ministers of Nepal, because that was the policy dictated by the political and military position of Nepal. In its essentials it was the policy followed by Bhim Sen Thapa with great success for a period of more than twenty years from 1816 to 1837. A change had come in the troubled years between 1839-42, but that was a passing phase only. Matabar Singh tried to go back to the policy of Bhim Sen and he had partly succeeded in doing so when he met his death. On Jung Bahadur's coming to power, one of his first tasks was

to settle the relationship between Nepal and the Company's Government on principles which would be agreeable to both the States.

The greatest drawback of Nepalese Ministers was their ignorance of the real bases of the seemingly unconquerable power of the Company's troops. In the Nepal War and in the years 1839-42 the old fashioned ministers had tried old fashioned methods to oust the Company's authority from before their paths. They were men of the medieval world and their minds could not apprehend the new weapons of civilization and destruction. Jung Bahadur had some knowledge of the troops trained by the Company's Officers and he had seen the artillery available to the Company's regiments. He had seen the drilling in the barracks and the discipline in the battle-field of the Company's soldiers. He was quick to realise that the real strength of the Company lay in its fire-arms and he attached the greatest importance to the art of making canon and the use of grape-shot in dispersing a body of soldiers on a level plain and the use of mortars for the siege of a fortified or hilly place. A hurried look at the Company's establishment in India could never give a correct appraisal to the onlooker. The British people came from over the seas and their real strength lay not so much in India as in their home country, which supplied their Indian dominions with manpower, brains and war material. The secret of the Company's power lay in the higher civilization of Europe and the more advanced techniques of making artillery. It was to search these things out that Jung Bahadur visited England. He would then know the British as they were in fact, and this knowledge would lead him to greater power in his own country and in India. Cavenagh in his reminiscences relates the reasons given by Jung Bahadur himself for his visit to England. Firstly it was to offer homage to "the sovereign of that nation whose statesmen and warriors had rendered the name of Great Britain glorious throughout the East".⁸ Secondly Jung Bahadur wanted to amke "himself acquainted with the actual extent of British power and the true cause of its greatness".⁹ Another reason suggested by Cavenagh was "the hope that in firmly uniting the

⁸ *Reminiscences*, p. 251.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

bonds of friendship between the states, he would also materially strengthen his own position, from the feeling, which, notwithstanding the policy of non-interference professed by the Indian Government would pervade all classes in Nepal, that the minister who had been honoured by an audience with the Queen of England, would never want assistance in the hour of need". This last was never acknowledged by Jung Bahadur but there is very little doubt that the minister's prestige increased considerably after his European voyage.

This voyage is interesting because it was the first Hindu mission to cross the seas since the 12th and 13th centuries when a wave of Hindus was still in direct communication with the Hindu Kingdoms of Java, Sumatra, Bali and Cambodia. There were religious troubles and social barriers before things could be reconciled with the minister and his two brothers at Kathmandu. But politically and militarily Jung Bahadur had returned a wiser and soberer man. He had seen the naval dockyards at Southampton, the arsenal at Woolwich and the manufacturing cities of Lancashire and the central counties of England. He had enjoyed seeing the opera in London and he was surprised to find Queen Victoria waiting patiently for hours to shake hands with her subjects at court functions. From England he got many of his ideas of reform, and he came back firmly convinced of the real military strength of Great Britain. He had asked the court of Directors and the Board of Control to allow him European engineers at Kathmandu, but from both he got a polite but most unmistakable refusal. The British Government would not, like the Company's Government, let Nepal come up to the standard of their own troops in military equipment because it was clear that any military preparations in Nepal would be directed solely against the Company's sovereignty in India.

So a cardinal fact was now well established in Jung Bahadur's mind; only by a miracle would the Company be defeated in a campaign by an Indian Prince or any combination of them, and Jung Bahadur was a great realist in military matters. His policy was now decided for him. The recent defeat of the Sikhs had convinced him of the accuracy of his analysis and conclusions. The Sikhs had been the greatest of the Indian soldiery of those

days. If they could not stand against the Company's troops with their great numbers and innumerable cannons surely no other Indian prince would now dare to match his troops with the Company's. Jung Bahadur, therefore, became a friend of the Company's Government and tried his best to win the trust of the Company. Still he was suspicious and he could not trust the fate of his country with the Company's Officials after he had witnessed the annexation of the Punjab, Oudh, Jhansi and Nagpur. The causes leading to their annexation were different, but in the eyes of the Nepal durbar they showed only a desire of expansion on the part of the Company's government. To avert a similar fate for Nepal was the greatest preoccupation of Jung Bahadur. He refused to improve the road leading to Kathmandu because he did not want to make it easy for the Company's troops to march into his country with ease and confidence. His help in the Sepoy War was due in part to his fear of the Company's Government. He did not believe that Nana Saheb and Hakim Azimulla Khan could achieve much, and he thought that neutrality on his part might be supposed to be concealed hostility by the Company and he would have to reckon with a strong and triumphant Company's Government after the rebels had been crushed. The best way out of all this was to offer his troops to the Company and thus put them under some obligation towards Nepal. It was hoped that this friendly attitude could dissuade the Company's Government, in future, from plans of annexation for Nepal.

This policy also determined that Jung Bahadur would no longer countenance intrigues against the British Government with Kathmandu as their centre. The junior Sikh Maharani had taken refuge at the Kathmandu durbar after the second Sikh War. She still cherished the hopes of a Sikh revival and of again ruling in Lahore as the widow of Ranjit Singh. Jung Bahadur, however, did not share her views and he discouraged the Rani from organising disaffection in the Punjab. He is reported to have told her that such efforts would be doomed to failure because of the distance of Kathmandu from Lahore. The Sikhs had an army and a treasury of their own and even then they had been conquered by the Company's artillery and trained officers. After the second Sikh War the Maharani had

neither the army nor the money to recruit one, and her only hope lay in the Sikh national sentiment. These were the facts that Jung Bahadur placed before the widow of Ranjit Singh and tried his best to dissuade her from stirring up trouble in the Punjab. At the same time he had adopted his policy of whole-hearted co-operation with the Company's Government after his return from Europe and he could not allow the Maharani to threaten the British position in the lands of the Sikhs from her sheltered vantage-point in Nepal. It seems that the opinion of the durbar in the years 1857-58 was against the Company and it was due mainly to the prestige and the influence of Jung Bahadur that Nepal intervened decidedly on the side of the Company's Government with most of its available forces.

But Jung Bahadur's policy had no abject submission in it. He wanted to have the most amicable relations with the British but only from a distance. Throughout his life he could never abandon his suspicions of the Company's might and of the military plans that might be breeding at the Army Headquarters in Calcutta. He would never allow the resident to have any correspondence or talks with people in Nepal except through the Prime Minister. For the Company's resident at Kathmandu, Nepal was synonymous with its Prime Minister. No Nepalese was allowed to enter the residency without the knowledge and the permission of the Prime Minister and the resident was expected not to talk or show undue friendliness towards any of the nobles at the durbar. In some ways the policy of Nepal was similar to that of the Chinese Empire which wanted to have as little intercourse with the Europeans as possible. The Nepalese considered themselves an independent Hindu Kingdom and wanted to preserve their identity. They did not like to be disturbed in their traditional social system or rules of administration and they had no intention of disturbing those beyond their frontiers. The only way to do this was to seal themselves from the rest of the world. This became the policy which was tacitly agreed upon by both the Governments, because it satisfied the mutually divergent interests of the two powers.

Nepal, at the same time preserved some vestiges of a sovereign power. Thus the Rani of the Sikhs sought refuge successfully in Kathmandu, and Nana Saheb was also admitted to Nepal

after 1858. Jung Bahadur refused to deliver him up to the Company's Government or to expel him from his territories. This could not have been possible on the part of any of the subsidiary Indian allies of the Company. All the Company's Officers were demanding the head of Nana Saheb, but the Secretary of State for India or the Viceroy could not morally force Nepal to expel Nana Saheb when Kossuth and Mazzini were afforded refuge and shelter in London.

To conclude, the policy of Nepal towards the Indian Government was to keep on friendly terms with it through the minimum of diplomatic intercommunication between the two States, to withdraw all political interests of Nepal within its own borders and to have only so much of commercial, religious and cultural intercourse with the Company's territories in India as the state of undeveloped civilisation in Nepal unavoidably demanded.

Appendix 1

THERE are few documents which enable us to study the relations between Nepal and the East India Company from the point of view of the Nepalese Government. We have, however, a letter of instructions and an aide-memoire sent by the Nepal Durbar to their agent with the East India Company. These documents were confiscated from his person by the Company's authority, and thanks to this high handedness we have been able to secure a complete picture of the events and their implications as they appeared to the Nepalese just before the Nepal War.

These are valuable documents which give us an understanding of the origin and causes of the Nepal War as seen by the Nepal Durbar. From them we get a glimpse of the minds of the people who were ruling Nepal and of their fears and anxieties about the East India Company's designs of expansion.

These instructions were given by the Raja of Nepal to Chandra Shekhar Upadhyaya for negotiating with the Company's Agents and to put the point of view of the Nepal Durbar before them. Accompanying these instructions was a short account of the relations between the two States upto that time. It would be proper to study the latter document first, which is as follows:

"Phagoon Badi 9th 1861. Sumbut. Statement of everything that has passed between the Nepal Government and the English from first to last.

In the year 1825, Sumbut (1769 A.D.), Major Kinlock advanced towards this quarter with a military force, and encamping at Basagachee in Muckwanpore, established Amils throughout the whole of the Tarai. The climate, however of the Tarai was found to be very unhealthy, and proved fatal to many of his detachments.

Three years afterwards, in 1827 Sumbut (1771 A.D.), Dinanath Upadhyaya was ordered to go to Darbhanga, in order to make an arrangement with the English. He accordingly proceeded thither, and waited upon Major Kelly, the officer Commanding in the district, to whom he stated, on the part of this Government, that Thathen and the rest of the Tarai were dependent on Muckwanpore. That as the hill country of Muckwanpore had come into the possession of this state, the cultivated low lands also belonged to it by the same title, and that the Government was willing to pay whatever rent (Mal Wajeb) had been paid by the Raja of Muckwanpore.

Major Kelly referred him to the chief of the council of Patna, by whom he was informed that the Raja of Muckwanpore used to give annually as tribute an elephant, fourteen hants in height, each hant consisting of fourteen tumsooks. This Government accordingly consented to give the elephant, and gave tumsooks for what was due on account of the country.

In the latter part of the Sumbut year 1827, Major Kinlock and his force were recalled. The amount of the tumsooks given by this Government having been collected from the country was paid through Mr. Hardy, and the tumsooks returned. During three years an elephant fourteen hants high was regularly presented as tribute.

In the year 1829 Sumbut, an omission having occurred in sending the tribute, this state being desirous to maintain the relations of amity with the English, resolved to enter into a negotiation with the council of Patna on the same terms as had been usual with the Raja of Muckwanpore. Dinanath Upadhyaya was accordingly sent to Patna for that purpose, and was desired, after getting the tribute fixed, to take out a regular puttah.

The Nawab Hashiar Jung (Mr. George Vansittart) I believe was at that time chief of Patna.

Dinanath Upadhyaya shewed his documents, under the hands of the Nawab Mahabat Jung and Raja Ram Narain, fixing the height of the elephant to be presented as tribute at twelve hants and a half, and he desired that a reference might be made to records. He accordingly reduced the standard height of the elephant one hant and a half, and got it fixed to twelve hants and a half, of twelve tumsooks each; and in 1138 Fasli (1773) he got a puttah drawn out, and received his dismissal with a Khillat.

In the latter end of the year 1830 Sumbut, the Raja of Nepal meditated war in the Westward; but it seemed at the same time probable that war might occur in the east, with the Nimboos. At length he determined, in the first instance, to attack the Kirats, and after expelling the reigning Raja to establish his own authority in that country, and afterwards to turn his attention towards the west.

Kajee Ubee (Abhaya) Man Singh was accordingly sent with an army to subdue the Kirats. He established the authority of this State throughout the whole country west of the Kosi and in the month of Bhadon had reduced Bijapur on either side of the river.

The Raja of the Kirats fled into Moghal Dominions. He applied to Mr. Peacock for assistance, offering in return to establish a factory for the English in Bijapur, and to give the Company ten annas (10/16) of the revenue of his country, reserving only six annas (6/16) for himself, and proposing that the English should undertake the management of the country. Mr. Peacock declared his assent to these proposals, and told the Raja that he would refer them to Government, and procure the concurrence of the council in his wishes.

Having given the Raja these assurances, he wrote to Calcutta accordingly; but before he received an answer the Raja died. Mr. Peacock on this proposed that the Raja's son, who was only a boy, and the Dewan, should go along with him to Calcutta to wait upon the Governor, when he would procure assistance to enable the young Raja to establish his authority in his country.

The expelled Raja of the Kirats having, in applying to the English for assistance, offered to establish an English factory in his territories, and

to give up a ten anna share of the revenue, there would be little doubt that his overtures would be accepted, in which case it would be difficult for the Raja of Nepal to keep possession of the country.

Accordingly, in the beginning of 1831, Dinanath Upadhyaya was despatched to the Presidency. He went by the way of Rampur, and after paying his respects to the gentlemen at that place, proceeded to accompany Mr. Peacock to Calcutta.

Mr. Peacock at the same time took with him to Calcutta Bhuwan Sen Upadhyaya, the Dewan of Makwani Shah. Soon after their arrival at Calcutta, the son of Makwani died. Mr. Peacock after introducing Dinanath Upadhyaya to Mr. Hastings, and procuring him an opportunity of delivering his letters returned to Rampur.

Dinanath Upadhyaya remained five months in Calcutta. At that time a number of armed "Naguis" (Nagas) used to come in a body from Hardwar through the Tarai eastward, as far as Dinapur, and to ravage the Company's territories every year. When the troops advanced to drive them back they always retired and concealed themselves in the Tarai, where the troops were unable to pursue them. In this manner the country was laid waste. At length the English entered into an arrangement with the Raja of Nepal, that he should prevent the passage of the Nagas.

Every attention was shown to Dinanath Upadhyaya during his stay in Calcutta; and from that time a correspondence was regularly carried on between this State and the Governor General, and the frontiers of the Company's territories were populous and flourishing.

Shortly after this Mirza Abdulla Beg laid claim to the pargana of Rotihut, alleging it to be his jagir. The English interfered to prevent him from being dispossessed and the authority of this state established. Dinanath Upadhyaya was therefore, again sent to the Presidency to bring the matter before the council. The records were accordingly referred to, and it was resolved that the question should be settled.

Dinanath Upadhyaya remained some time in Calcutta. It happened that just then that the Governor General was obliged, on account of some important business, to go to the westward. On this he sent for Dinanath Upadhyaya and giving him one thousand rupees for his expenses, desired him to accompany him.

The Governor General's preparations having been already completed, Dinanath Upadhyaya was not able to set out five or six days after him, and as he went without stopping to Benares, he had left Patna before Dinanath Upadhyaya arrived there.

On this Dinanath Upadhyaya was about to follow him to Benares, when the insurrection of Chet Singh occurred, and rendered it impossible to proceed; he accordingly remained at Patna.

During his stay there, Mr. Mazwell, who was then chief at that city, died. No successor being immediately appointed, Mr. Ross performed the duties of the situation for some time. Dinanath Upadhyaya accordingly waited upon that gentleman, and stated to him everything that had passed relative to the business of his mission, namely that he had discussed with

the council at the Presidency the question respecting Rotihut; that letter had been sent to Mr. Mazwell, the late chief, requiring information on that subject; that he had been desired to accompany the Governor General, but having been unable to set out till five or six days after, could not overtake him. Under these circumstances, he begged Mr. Ross to point out what he should do.

Mr. Ross told him, in reply that he did not hold the situation of chief that as soon as the disturbance at Benares should be settled, the Governor General would be at leisure, and would come to Patna; that he has better defer his departure till then.

Dinanath Upadhyaya accordingly stayed at Patna. There was a great disturbance at Benares. The Governor General's lady remained at Patna under great anxiety. She sent for Raja Bahadur, the suba, and asked him by what means Bajigarh would be got possession of. The Raja answered that a friendly connection subsisted between the Company and the Raja of Nepal; that a Vakil from Nepal was then at Patna; that she had best send for him and apply for assistance as success might be obtained in the hill warfare by employing hill troops.

Dinanath Upadhyaya was accordingly called before the lady. She said to him: "Firm friendship subsists between the English and your master. Write information of these particulars to him, and require him to send speedily a force to Benares to help us. When Bajigarh shall be taken, the Governor General will be at home. If what is suggested above is done, firm friendship will continue between the two states, as long as the connection of the English with this country shall subsist, and the Governor General will be very much gratified. I will give you a letter from myself to your master."

Dinanath Upadhyaya accordingly received a letter from the lady, which he forwarded to Nepal, together with a report of the verbal communication above stated. The Raja was much pleased, and sent Dhoulal Singh Parukh, Bum Daree and other sirdars with an army to Muckwanpore.

Dinanath Upadhyaya delivered the Raja's reply to the lady, and informed her of the advance of the troops. She then desired that the army should halt for a few days at Muckwanpore till she should learn the state of affairs at Benares, when she would, if necessary, require its advance.

A few days afterwards intelligence arrived, that the fort of Bajigarh was taken and that the Raja had fled. The lady on this sent for Dinanath Upadhyaya and said to him: "As the capture of Bajigarh, with a view to which your master kindly sent troops to our assistance, has been accomplished, the army may now return. Do you remain here till the Governor General comes, which will be after settling matters at Benares. I shall not fail to bring to his notice the manner in which your master has evinced his friendship by the assistance which he sent to us."

Her discourse gave Dinanath Upadhyaya great satisfaction, and the army returned from Muckwanpore. Shortly afterwards the Governor General arrived at Patna, when Dinanath Upadhyaya taking the letters

which had been received from Nepal, went to wait on him at Bankepore, and submitted to his consideration the question respecting Rotihut.

At this time some wicked men at Chuprah told the Governor General, through Mr. Graham, that the Raja of Nepal had, at the suggestion of his Vakil, sent an army to assist Chet Singh, and that it had returned from Muckwanpore on hearing of the success of the English.

In consequence of this intelligence, the Governor General spoke to Dinanath Upadhyaya in very harsh terms. Dinanath Upadhyaya then stated all the circumstances. On this the Governor General desired that he would meet him the following morning at Mr. Barwell's where he intended to breakfast; Dinanath Upadhyaya accordingly went to Mr. Barwell's where he saw the Governor. Mr. Brooke was at that time chief of Patna and Mr. Carter was a member of the council. The Governor introduced Dinanath Upadhyaya to them, and said "that a warm friendship had been established between him and the Raja of Nepal; that the Raja had sent an army to his assistance, but that on hearing of the success of the English it had, at the suggestion of his lady, returned back; that Mirza Abdulla Beg had been appropriating to himself the tuppah of Rotihut, and though a jagirdar of the British Government did not obey his (the Governor-General's) commands, that orders had therefore been given that he should be removed, and that any complaint which he might make must not be listened to; that the Nepalese had transmitted a darkhast to the Presidency, where the question had been fully investigated and discussed by the members of Government, the result of which investigation proved that Rotihut was dependent on Muckwanpore and had nothing at all to do with Bihar; that the Raja of Nepal, therefore, had alone the power of confirming or resuming Jagirs in it, the Governor General having nothing to do with it. He accordingly ordered that a parwana should be written, and he explained all the circumstances of the case to the gentlemen in English. He then proceeded to Calcutta, and a parwana, to the effect above stated, was received, and the authority of this State established accordingly.

Mr. Hastings, after remaining a short time in Calcutta, proceeded to Europe, and Sir John Macpherson exercised the authority of Governor General till a new one should arrive.

In the end of Sumbut year 1847, Lord Cornwallis arrived as Governor General. Dinanath Upadhyaya on this repaired to Calcutta with letters. In that year information was received at Calcutta, that the Bhotias had been subdued by the Nepalese, and had consented to the payment of a tribute of fifty thousand rupees. Lord Cornwallis on this reflected, that China being an Empire of vast power and resources, and Lhasa and Tibet, its dependencies, having consented to pay tribute to Nepal, the latter must needs be a very powerful state, and that it would be advisable to cultivate its friendship. His Lordship accordingly sent a letter and presents to the Raja, congratulating him in warm terms on the above success.

After Lord Cornwallis, Sir John Shore was Governor General; and

during his government, also a friendly intercourse was maintained with Nepal.

The proceedings of the Nepal Government in several instances, shewed a disposition to strengthen the friendship between the two states. As one instance, Gangaram Thapa had plundered the house of a British Mahajan in the district of Purnia; a letter was received from the English stating this, upon which the offender was apprehended and punished. As another instance, three Faqirs, named Soobhouse, Churagh Ally, and Moosa Shah, who lived in the jungles between Basa and Moorung, plundered the whole country, and greatly harassed the inhabitants. The Governor General wrote to the Nepal Government, requesting that these persons might be apprehended and given up to him, and suggesting to the Nepal Government not to support persons who should attempt to sow dissensions between the two States. A sirdar and company was accordingly sent to apprehend the persons above-mentioned, they, however, got notice of the approach of the party to their camp and fled; some were wounded by muskets and swords, some fell, and the rest escaped. From that time to this no dacoity has occurred.

In 1825 Sumbut the Rohilla war occurred, and Rohillas entreated this state to send them assistance by the hills of Loll Dong Changbulla, and offering to pay the expense, and to give a nazar of some thousand rupees immediately, and in case of their being successful to pay a larger sum and to cede some territory. This letter was brought by their Vakil, Doone Singh. The English are well acquainted with the facts. To this proposals the Nepal Government answered that it was not covetous of money, and that it was mindful to ancient obligations of friendship.

In 1855, Wazir Ali having committed murder came to Butwal. This Government first wrote to him to desire that he would not raise a disturbance in the Nepal territories. Afterwards a reward of forty thousand rupees was offered by the British Government for his apprehension, besides a Jagir from the Nawab Vizir. A letter was written to the Nepal Government requiring his apprehension as an enemy to the Company. This Government accordingly at some expense, despatched a Kaji Sirdar with a party for that purpose, and sent information of the same to the English. The Bharadars also took measures to apprehend him: some enemy, however, gave him information, and he in consequence escaped. The Bharadars searched for him, but he had fled on Horseback beyond the Nepal boundaries, and had gone through the Company's territories to westward.

This state has not been wanting in good offices towards the English, and will not be so hereafter. The English are acquainted with everything that has been done by either party."

The other document consists of the instructions given by the Raja of Nepal to Chandra Shekher Upadhyaya and embodies the details of Nepalese proposals for a settlement of the frontier relations between the two states. This document runs as follows:

"You must be faithful to your duty, and exert yourself to the utmost to promote my views and interests.

1. On arriving at Calcutta you will obtain an interview with the Governor General. Friendship has always hitherto subsisted between this state and the English, and it is my will to communicate with them quite unreservedly. There has hitherto always been a firm friendship, and you are to make such assurances of a friendly disposition as you may think proper.
2. After the usual compliment, you will be asked for what purpose you were sent. To this you are to answer, that friendship has hitherto subsisted between the Nepal Government and the Company; that some questions had occurred, in consequence of which it had been thought right to send a proper person with letters to adjust matters, and to establish firmly the relations of friendship; that you have been accordingly sent for that purpose. You are to speak to the above effect in friendly and concillial terms.
3. Always bearing in mind that it is your business to conciliate and to establish friendship, you will proceed to observe, that heretofore there never used to be any differences between the English and the Gorkhas about their respective territories, the only object to each being to keep possession of its own; that the enemies of both have raised dissensions between the two states on slight grounds, with a view to promote disturbance and to injure both parties; that the Nepal Government cannot be unmindful of the ties which have long united the two States; that the British Government will surely not listen to the suggestions of ill-disposed and designing persons. You will state the above observations, with such others as you may at the time think proper.
4. With respect to the Butwal question, if it should be alleged that the state has committed unwarranted aggressions, you will state, that previous to the cession of Gorakhpur by the Vizir to the Company, the cultivated land and Tarai of Butwal, which is dependent on the hill country of Palpa, was comprehended within the Nepal dominions; that the Raja of Butwal offered at that time to furnish as many troops and as much money as might be required of the Zamindari should it be continued to him; that this proposition being acceded to, the Raja continued in the management of his Zamindari, acknowledging the authority of this Government. On this subject you will state what is proper.
5. I proposed that a Commissioner should be sent to settle the boundary disputes, but I did not approve of the decision which was passed by him. He said, "The hill country of Palpa is yours; the cultivated land and Tarai of Butwal which is dependent on it belongs to us, we have paid the Vizir for it, we will not resign it." I replied, "There is a detailed statement of the lands dependent on Gorakhpur, for which money was given to the Vizir. Men have raised a difference about one or two villages. It is not good to quarrel about trifles. It is proper that each should confine itself contentedly to its own limits, and not raise differences by wishing to possess itself of more. It is right that the question should be investigated in concert". Leaving the path of justice, and acting from the suggestions of his own mind, the Commissioner by fabricating such

documents as he chose respecting all the lands in the Tarai, the possession of which was never disputed by the Vizir, explained the quarrel between the two states. I said that it was highly improper thus to use a breach in the long established friendship between the two States. The Commissioner did not assent to this. It is necessary that this matter should be enquired into; you must say what is proper.

6. Bir Kishor Singh annually made encroachments on the territories of this state in the tuppah of Rotihut, and was always quarrelling with the Nepalese Officer. He tried to cause a breach in the friendship between the two States, by taking possession of what did not belong to him. As I considered it a matter of little moment, I did not think it at first worthwhile to mention it to Government. I only called upon Bir Kishor to discontinue the practices in question: he, however, disregarded this admonition, took possession of a large portion of land, and committed an atrocious murder in my territories. You will state that in consequence of a letter which I received from Mr. Hawkins at Patna, assuring me that Bir Kishor would be punished by the British Government I did not punish him myself, as I should otherwise have done. I, however, recovered possession of the twenty-two villages, which he had seized. Mr. Young was afterwards sent to investigate the question respecting these villages. By his inquiries, the right of this Government, and the aggression of the Zamindar of Bettia were fully established; the Bettia man could produce no documents whatever in support of claim. Mr. Young has probably reported this to Government. You will state these observations in a proper manner.

7. You will observe next that the English now assent to the decision of their Commissioner, Major Bradshaw; but if another person should pronounce another opinion, they would immediately assent to that, paying no regard to the former. Heretofore, the two States kept possession of what respectively belonged to them, and the right to the disputed land was not investigated. At length orders came to Major Bradshaw to proceed to Bettia. This Government received a letter from him, proposing that Commissioners should be sent from hence to meet him. Persons were accordingly appointed for that purpose. They had an interview with the Major, who made use of improper language towards them: in consequence of this they remained silent, and seeing no business brought forward, they came away. You will state these circumstances at length.

8. Afterwards Major Bradshaw proposed, that this Government should give up in trust to him the twenty-two villages, which we had occupied, until an investigation could be made; and that, on the investigation being actually commenced, the villages should again be placed in my hands. Considering it proper that some concession should be made for the sake of friendship, I said that I was willing to agree to this, if Major Bradshaw would conduct the business justly and impartially, but that I would not agree if he should disagree with the ties of friendship, and unjustly support Bir Kishor in aggression. With his declaration I delivered up to the Major the twenty-two villages. No examination of records afterwards

took place; nothing appeared in Major Bradshaw's proceedings but partiality and aggression: my Commissioners accordingly came away. In this instance, also, the conduct of the British Commissioners was reprehensible. It is incumbent on the British Government to ascertain the truth. You will state the above remarks in a proper manner.

9. I received a letter from the Governor General to the following effect: "The right of the British Government to Butwal is established; if, therefore, you do not relinquish possession of it, a military force will be sent to occupy it." Afterwards the Governor General wrote as follows: "A military force was sent by me to occupy the place and to establish thanas here. Instead of acting in a friendly manner, you put to death our men and displayed the thana, you committed an unjustifiable and atrocious murder". We were not the first to invade the possession of another and to commit violence and murder: it was the officers of the British Government who did this. My officer and people certainly did not choose to resign their rights. I had before, informed the British Government, by letter, of my determination to keep possession of what was my rightful property; but that Government, not choosing to regard this, forcibly took possession of the lands, killed the people, and established its own thana. My officers then, in their own defence, removed the thanas of the British Government in turn, and thus produced an affray in which some men were killed on both sides. I established thanas as far as my own territories extended. The British Government removed those thanas, intending to seize possession of the land: the British Government, is, therefore, the cause of the blood that has been shed. It is necessary that the Government should know exactly the true state of this question. The above is the substance of what you are to say on this point.

10. I wrote a letter to the Governor General, saying 'You have made encroachments on my territories; relinquish the lands which you have taken possession of.'—I at the same time proposed that a Commissioner should be sent. I also said, 'The land which is disputed is by right mine; you will not be satisfied without war.' I thus said freely everything which occurred to me, Bir Kishor departed from the relations of friendship and excited dissension, by encroaching on my territories and killing my subjects. I then claimed redress for the blood which had been shed. Afterwards, the officers of the British Government forcibly took possession of the whole of Butwal and Sheoraj, at a time when I was engaged in discussions with the British Government. After this, also, the British Officers committed aggressions and violence. Still, however, mindful of the long friendship which had subsisted between the two States, I only directed my officers to protect the territories entrusted to their care. I committed no aggression on the British territories. I should never interrupt a long-established friendship by seizing the possessions of another. It is my wish that the amicable relations between the two States should daily acquire greater strength. You will say this and whatever may be proper.

11. The Officers of the British Government have never been anxious to maintain friendship between the two States. You will send me every particle of information, whether important or not, which you may at any time obtain respecting the probability of War. You must at first assume a bold tone; afterwards in order to preserve peace, you may agree that some concessions shall be made on both sides. The claims of each party may be admitted in part, and peace be maintained. You must ascertain secretly what terms they will agree to. If the terms which they require are such as you have authority to accept, you must close with them at once: if they require to be considered by me, you must write me a full and detailed statement of all the particulars, and be guided by the orders which you will receive from hence.

12. Friendship has subsisted between the Nepal and the British Governments for upwards of fifty years, and this circumstances had contributed greatly to the success and welfare of each. The *Sutlej* has hitherto been the limit to the progress of the power of both states to the westward. If they were to unite, they could with ease carry their arms beyond that river, by which the British Government might obtain possession of territories yielding crores of rupees, while the Gorkha Government would be contented with a fair share. If the British Government will enter into this project, I am ready to set vigorously about the execution of it. It is desirable that a mutual friendship should subsist between the two States, conducive to their mutual advantage. It is not only useless, but injurious to both, to quarrel about a little bit of land: It is not my wish to do so. You will communicate the above proposal, with such observations as you may think proper: and if you shall have reason to suppose that the British Government feels a corresponding disposition, you will write to me fully on the subject.

13. If it should be observed, that a letter was received from me stating that I would pay the rent of Tilakpore and Benaikpore, but that I now refuse to pay it, alleging as the ground of my refusal the encroachments committed in my territories by the British Government, you must observe, in reply, that I previously received a letter from the Governor General accusing me of encroaching and committing aggressions in the Company's territories, and remarking that such proceedings were not proper while the relations of amity continued: that, on the receipt of this letter, I inquired into the subject, and found that this state had paid the rent to the Nawab Vazir, and had occupied the lands which the British Government afterwards got possession of; that it was not proper in the British Government to occupy lands which belonged to me: that I was unwilling, on account of a trifle, to cause a breach in a friendship of long standing, being anxious, on the contrary, that the relations of amity should be more strengthened: that listening to the suggestion of enemies, and unmindful of the obligations of old friendship, the British Government had committed aggressions, which made it necessary for me to defend my own territories.

14. Wazir Ali came into the Tarai of Butwal and Palpa, and offered his whole property to this Government, if it would grant him permission to remain there. He urged this request with great earnestness. There would have been no impropriety in granting an asylum to one who had sought it; but adverting to amicable relations between the two States, this Government did not accept Wazir Ali's proposal. Sir John Shore wrote from Calcutta, stating the circumstances of Mr. Cherry's murder, and saying that Prithipal Sen, Raja of Butwal, had given Wazir Ali an asylum within that Raj and was prepared to raise disturbances: that he (Sir John Shore) had demanded Wazir Ali, but the Nawab had refused to deliver him up: that the Nawab Vizir was much displeased at this, as would be known to me, and under these circumstances he suggested that I should send orders to the officers of this Government to endeavour to seize Wazir Ali. In consideration of the friendship between the two States, I imprisoned the Nawab of the Raj of Butwal, and sent a Bharadar with a Company to seize Wazir Ali, who immediately fled. The cultivated land of the Tarai dependent on Butwal belongs to this State: the British Government says that it belonged to the Vizir. If it did belong to the Vizir, why did not the Nawab obey the Vizir's orders? but, on the contrary, he gave Wazir Ali an asylum and was prepared to make war. This Government then removed the Nawab Pirthipal Sen, and took possession of that country which was held by Pirthipal Sen, under its authority. This will be in Pirthipal Sen's recollection. If the land in question had belonged to the Vizir he would certainly have resumed it, and punished the Raja; but it is notorious to the whole world that he did not do so. You will state the above particulars with any remarks which may be necessary.

15. You will conduct the negotiation with which you are entrusted in conformity to the instructions which you have now received, and to the dictates of your own discretion, and you will inquire particularly into all the circumstances which have happened, or which may hereafter happen, connected with the questions at issue: you will also find means to ascertain the sentiments of the other party. Further, you will endeavour to find out whether, by giving up a small portion of territory, the present contest can be put an end to, and such an arrangement concluded, as will prevent the occurrence of boundary disputes again. It is not good to make such a peace as shall leave trifling objects of dispute: it is better to suffer a little loss so that you at once make an adjustment which shall be lasting. I am disposed to conclude such an adjustment; but I must insist on retaining the territory dependent on Palpa, which is in my possession, and which is claimed by the British Government. You may engage to give up Tecna, Parka, Barragaon and Bara Rotihut; among the twenty-two villages, provided a final settlement shall be made of the whole of the boundary. Whatever you shall conclude will be ratified.

16. Chandra Shekhhar Upadhyaya's salary is to be three hundred rupees per mensem. He requires one Persian Munshi, whose salary will be sixty rupees; a jamadar and Harkaras fifty rupees; a Vakil to attend

the Darbar in Calcutta, one hundred rupees. These salaries have been fixed, and the persons appointed must accordingly commence their duties. Both your own salary and those of your suite shall be regularly paid up every year, as long as you are employed on the present duty.

17. If, in the course of your negotiation, any important question should arise, not comprehended within the above instructions, you will consider it with the utmost caution and deliberation. You must not be hasty; but deliberate with the greatest care on the best means of adjusting my present difficulties, and if placing my affairs on a prosperous footing, which will at the same time contribute to your own reputation. You will write me a full and detailed statement of your sentiments."

Appendix 2

PROCLAMATION to the Chiefs and Inhabitants of the hills between the *Sutlej* and the *Jumna* 1814:

"The British Government has long viewed with concern the misery and distress to which the inhabitants of the hills lying between the *Jumna* and the *Sutlej* have been reduced by the oppressive sway of the Gorkha power. While that power was at peace with the British Government and afforded no ground to doubt its disposition to maintain that relation, the acknowledged obligations of public faith demanded a corresponding conduct on the part of the British Government, and obliged it to witness in silent regret the devastation and ruin occasioned by the extension of the Gorkha arms over those countries.

Having now been compelled by a series of unprovoked and unjustifiable encroachments and violence on the part of the Gorkha power to take up arms in defence of its rights and honour, the British Government eagerly seizes the favourable occasion of assisting the inhabitants of the hills in the expulsion of their oppressors, the recovery of their national independence, and the restoration of the families of their legitimate and ancient chiefs. The inhabitants of the hills are accordingly invited and earnestly exhorted to co-operate with the British troops in the powerful exertions which the latter are prepared to make for enabling them to accomplish those laudable and patriotic objects. The Commander of the British troops is authorised and directed by his Government to promise in its name a perpetual guarantee against the Gorkha power, and to assure the Chiefs and inhabitants of the hills of its scrupulous regard for all their ancient rights and privileges. The British Government demands no tribute or pecuniary indemnification whatever for its assistance and protection. All that it requires from the inhabitants of the hills in return for those benefits is their zealous and cordial co-operation during the continuance of hostilities against the Gorkhas, and their services hereafter if circumstances should again demand the employment of a British force in the hills against its enemies and their own.

By order of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General."

Appendix 3

CONVENTION or Agreement entered into between Kajee Amar Singh Thapa and Major General Ochterlony, on 15 May 1815.

In consideration of the high rank and character of Kajee Amar Singh Thapa, and of the skill, bravery and fidelity with which he has defended the country committed to his charge, it is agreed :

1. That Kajee Amar Singh Thapa, with the troops now in Rajgarh, shall march out and retain their arms and accoutrements, the colours of their respective corps, two guns and all private property, which shall be duly respected and preserved, and every attention and delicacy observed in respect to the Zanana of the Kajee, and every person under his authority.

2. In consideration, also, of the gallant conduct of Kajee Ranjor Singh Thapa, it is agreed that he shall likewise march out of the fort of Jalthak with two hundred men, who are to retain their arms, colours and one gun, with the '*bharadar*' (Chief Officers) and their followers, about three hundred more in number, unarmed, with his own and their private property which shall be respected, and the sanctity of the zanana preserved.

3. Kajee Amar Singh Thapa and Kajee Ranjor Singh Thapa, with their property and followers, are at liberty to proceed by the route of Thaneswar, Hardwar and Najibabad to join the troops eastward of the river Sarju or Kali, or by whichever route they determine to proceed to that destination. Conveyance shall be provided for the transportation of their property to the confines of the Nepal territory.

4. Kajee Amar Singh Thapa and Kajee Ranjor Singh Thapa shall be at liberty to meet whenever they please.

5. All the troops in the service of Nepal, with the exception of those granted to the personal honour of the Kajees Amar Singh and Ranjor Singh, will be at liberty to enter into the service of the British Government, if it is agreeable to themselves and the British Government choose to accept their services, and those who are not employed will be maintained on a specific allowance by the British Government till peace is concluded between the two States.

6. Kajee Amar Singh Thapa, on his part, agrees to leave the fort of Malaon, whenever bearers and other conveyance are prepared for his private property.

7. Kajee Amar Singh Thapa also agrees to send immediate orders for the evacuation and delivery, to persons properly authorised, of the forts of Bhylee (Inkee), Subbatoo, Morree, Jaithak, Jagatgarh, Rowaheen, and all other forts and fortresses now held by the Nepal troops between *Jumna* and *Sutlej* rivers. The garrisons of all which forts, strongholds etc. shall

enjoy their private property unmolested, and the arms and warlike stores in each shall be left in deposit, for the future decision of the Right Honourable the Governor General; with exception to such among them as are related to Kajee Amar Singh Thapa by kindred, about eighty-three men, who shall be at liberty to retain their arms and accoutrements.

8. Kajee Amar Singh Thapa also agrees to send immediate orders to Kajee Bakhtawar Singh for the evacuation of the territory of Garhwal, to deliver over the forts etc. in that district to the Officers of the British Government, and to proceed to Nepal by the Kumaon route, with their garrisons, all public property including warlike stores, accompanied by a 'Chapراسي' with a pass on the part of the British Government. Separate Article:—Kajee Amar Singh Thapa wishes it to be understood that he shall give immediate orders for the instant surrender of the distant forts, in the hope that it may lead to an early renewal of the relations of amity which have subsisted between the two States for these sixty years, and by the advice of Beem (Bum) Shah and the *baradars* of Kumaon.

Appendix 4

EXTRACT from a letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 15th December, 1815, embodying an acknowledgment of the services of Major General Sir D. Ochterlony :

"But we have in an especial manner to notice the brilliant and decisive exploits of Major General Sir David Ochterlony, Commanding the 3rd Division of the Army, and of the Officers and troops under his orders, first, after compelling Amar Singh, the Gorkha Commander opposed to him, to retire to the Malaon range of hills, then successfully reducing the forts of the Ramgarh range previously occupied by that Chief, and next directing his attention to the means of investing Amar Singh's new position, so as to cut off his supplies and compel him to surrender or risk an action; secondly, in establishing himself by an able and well adjusted combination of movements in two positions on the heights of Malaon, by means of which he is said to have effectively broken the continuity of the enemy's chain of posts, to have forced him to confine himself to the fort of Malaon and its immediate outworks, and to have gained a position from which he would be able to carry on operations against the place; the complete repulse of the enemy in a most gallant attack on our principal post on the heights of Malaon, which produced all the results of victory by terminating in the surrender of Amar Singh. The fruits of these decisive and important successes against the principal leader and force of the Nepalese State, combined with the previous reduction of Kumaon, have been, says the Governor General, the entire extinction of the Gorkha power throughout the countries formerly in their possession to the westward of the Kali or Gogra river, involving the loss to them of more than a third of their dominions—a result which, in the opinion of Lord Moira, must either produce an early and honourable peace or enable us to pursue the war with eminent advantage.

So high is the estimation in which we hold the services of Major General Sir David Ochterlony, and so greatly do we appreciate them, both in their nature and effects, that it is in our contemplation to bestow on that gallant and excellent officer a substantial proof of the gratitude of the Company for the benefits they have derived from them

Appendix 5

THE internal condition of Nepal after the death of Maharani Lalit Tripur Sundari Devi is described in detail by Hodgson in his letter to the Political Secretary to Government dated February 18th, 1833. Hodgson had just then taken full charge of the Residency and the letter was intended to show his appreciation of the internal conditions in Nepal. The following is the text of the letter :

"A long minority followed his (Girvan Juddha Bikram Shah's) death, which minority has just expired, and during it all our intercourse has been with the Minister who, it seems, has grown so great by virtue of two minorities (with but a short interval between them), and thirty years of almost uninterrupted sovereign sway, that he cannot now subside into a subject and is determined to keep the Raja a cypher, as in his nonage, both with respect to power and to observance also as far as possible. Almost every office is filled with Bhim Sen's creatures; he and his family monopolise all the loaves and fishes. Mere children of his kindred hold high commands. The ancient families of the Pandes and others who, by the constitution of this state, are entitled to share its counsels and exercise its highest offices, are excluded almost wholly from the one and other, besides being treated with habitual contumely by Matabar Singh, Bhim Sen's overbearing and heedless nephew.

The Raja is hemmed into his palace, beyond which he cannot stir unaccompanied by the Minister, and then only to the extent of a short ride or drive. Even within the walls of his palace, the Minister and his brother both reside, the latter in the especial capacity of 'dry nurse' to His Highness.

Last year the Raja desired to make an excursion into the lower hills to shoot. He was prevented by all sorts of idle tales and obstructions. This year he proposed visiting his palace at Nayakot, the winter residence of his fathers : again he was prevented as before. Of power he has not a particle, nor seems to wish it. Of patronage he has not a fraction; and is naturally galled at this, as well as at being sentinelled all round by Bhim Sen's creatures even within his own abode, at being debarred from all liberty of locomotion, and of intercourse with the Sirdars and gentry of the country.

In segregating him from his own gentry very plain and gross means are used; in segregating him from us, it is necessary to be more decorous and indirectly to effect the object. Non-intercourse is called the established etiquette of the Court. All sorts of idle rumours and fictions are employed to alarm him in respect both to our personal qualities and public designs. If he would go into the Tarai, he is told that the Feringhis will seize the opportunity of taking the valley whilst the troops are in honorary

attendance upon him. Does he propose visiting Nayakot? He is informed that the Resident in his company will spy out the nakedness of the land.

The Feringhis (it is eternally rung into his ear) have seized and conquered all: they are the ablest and most designing of men; they have been kept eighteen years from devouring Nepal solely by the unparalleled vigilance and energy of Bhim Sen. All pleasant communications from and with the Residency are studiously thrown into the shade. All unpleasant ones, however trivial, are studiously glared upon the eyes of the Raja and of the other Chiefs, not a soul among whom nor any attendant of theirs or of the Raja's being suffered to come near the Residency and learn the simple verity. And in this state of things any fiction, however gross, relative to our characters or views may be made to tell more or less with the naturally proud and suspicious Sirdars, and with the hopeless little recluse who occupies the throne.

The Raja has been purposely so trained as to possess little energy of body or mind, so that had not his wife turned out an ambitious woman he would probably have submitted quietly to political nonentity, or but for her vigilance would have been spirited into his grave as soon as he had begot a successor.

But his wife is both spirited and clever, and she is incessantly upbraiding him for suffering himself to be mewed up in his palace and rendered a mere idol (*Mati Ko Deota*) for occasional exposure to the worship of the multitude. The Raja has already learnt from her to feel indignant at his personal insignificance and at this state of surveillance and restraint, and it seems probable that the continued operation of these expostulations, backed by hints from his nobles and chiefs, will ere long make his political nonentity especially in respect to patronage equally galling to him. Perhaps from prudence, much more likely from habitual dependence, the Raja has as yet most charily and slowly manifested signs of disgust, and his wife, irritated by his slowness, has, it is said, avowed to her friends her resolution to claim the rule of the Kingdom in his name as the mother of two male children, in case he cannot soon be moved to assert either his personal or political liberty.

During the Panjani¹ just terminated, there was however a sort of pause, and the Premier was reinvested with the ensigns of his office. Other trivial indications have appeared within the last twelve months, and if they could be relied on as evidence of a deliberate design to strip Bhim Sen of his power, the counsels which dictated this cautious mode of procedure must be acknowledged to be consummately prudent. For Bhim Sen and his family monopolise the whole military command of the Kingdom with

¹ It was the administrative practice in Nepal to confirm all Offices of State at the Panjani. In theory every office—including that of the Prime Minister—was only held from year to year, and appointment of an individual in any particular year followed his formal confirmation in the office by the Raja at the Panjani.

the exceptions of the province of Sali. Almost every office is filled with the Minister's creatures; and his long and exclusive direction of affairs has denuded the opposite party of all experience as well as all power and patronage.

Nevertheless no one knows better than Bhim Sen that, though the soldiery have been taught to look to him alone for pay and employ, they are too national not to abandon him at once for their prince, if the Raja (as his grandfather in similar circumstances actually did) possessed the nerve to make a direct appeal to them against the Minister. And however Bhim Sen may have fortified himself by alliances, he cannot but be sensible that the Gorkhali oligarchy possess a weight of adverse right which needs only to be put in motion by the Sovereign himself to crush him and his family to pieces. Lastly the members of Bhim Sen's family are not cordially united with him, except Matabar Singh and he is too headstrong to be trusted.

All these circumstances have combined to render Bhim Sen of late provokingly captious and suspicious towards us; lest, I suppose, the Raja should perchance be undeceived as to the figments palmed on him relative to our personal impracticability and political dishonesty. The Minister, in defiance of custom alike and of decency would not restrict still further the very little direct commerce ever maintained between the Resident and the Maharaja.

The Minister is a great man and an able one, whose talents and energy constitute our best stay. Everything consistent with rectitude and the maintenance of neutral policy should be willingly conceded to him. But there is too little justice in his monopoly of all power and all observance on the one hand, and on the other too much fraud in the use he makes of the utter ignorance of us to which he has reduced the opposite party, including the Prince and the mass of the gentry, to suffer us either in equity or in policy to allow him just now to raise fresh obstacles in the way of the very trivial intercourse we have ever maintained directly with the Court. With prudence and tact we may gradually and noiselessly recur to the model of Mr. Gardner's and the late Raja's intercourse, at least in matters of form, and must leave its adoption in matters of business to events and the pleasure of the Durbar.

Distressing indeed it may be to witness the subordinate condition of the sovereign and the almost degraded lot of the gentry; but the affair is their own, not ours. We can but follow their movements, and are only concerned not quietly to acquiesce in a yet more restricted intercourse without ourselves, because usage is against the further restriction, and because an unfair use would be made of it to our injury.

The spirit of the Royal and Ministerial parties may be conceived from the fact that the Raja, having fallen ill last rains, resolutely and against all possible exertions of influence refused to employ the court physician, from an avowed fear of being poisoned or otherwise made with, as he said his father and grandfather had been, by Bhim Sen's procurement. The quarrels of the faculty and the disgrace of the Court physician made

the matter public; and I am sorry to say the general opinion was that the Raja's allegation was true in all its parts both as respected himself and his father. The physician is a creature of the Minister's and has now held the office of Raj Vaidya for thirty years.

Parties animated by such sentiments towards each other as the above anecdote reveals must be warily avoided. Whilst we maintain a cordial intercourse with Bhim Sen so long as he can keep his seat *proprio vigore*, we must endeavour to act so as, despite the non-intercourse chicane, to convince all parties that we are sincerely and utterly indifferent and impartial, and are disposed to cultivate equally friendly relations with all or any which may stand forth as the constituted authority.

I have, etc.

(Signed) B. H. Hodgson, Resident.

Nepal Residency, February 18th 1833.

P.S.—This letter has been copied for obvious reasons with my own hand, and I need hardly say it should be placed for some time in special deposit, out of the reach of all clerks and office people.

Appendix 6

THE presents which were brought by the Nepalese Mission of 1836 for the Governor General and the President of the Board of Control, not detailed in the Official Records, consisted chiefly of magnificent furs and embroidered dresses, Khukaris (short thick swords) and some enormous tusks of elephants. There were also a leopard and a tiger, said to have been nursed by a woman. "There was also a rhinoceros brought as a present from Nepal but it escaped on the very first day of its arrival in Calcutta."

Asiatic Journal, Vol. 48 (ii) p. 148.

As regards the presents sent by the Governor-General to Kathmandu we have a complete list given in a letter from the Political Secretary to Hodgson numbered 84 of 1836. The list of presents runs as follows :

For the Minister :	(Price in Rs.)
A stuff gun with spare Rifle barrel	225 0 0
A five barrelled percussion cap Rifle	350 0 0
A percussion cap Rifle	500 0 0
Two double barrelled guns	1100 0 0
Two anatomical models	
Two mirrors	1500 0 0
Two work boxes with implements	
Twelve fancy boxes	
Six pieces Dacca muslin	400 0 0
For Matabar Singh :	
A diamond ring	1500 0 0
A gold neck chain	500 0 0
A small percussion or Bird Rifle by Purdy in case with 200 caps and apparatus	300 0 0
A mountain barometer and thermometer with tripod	120 0 0
A Universal Sun dial	70 0 0
A large double self registering day and night thermometer	40 0 0
A distorted picture	40 0 0
A pair of 9" concave mirrors	10 0 0
For the General's two sons—Two gold watches	
A model of a Ship at Sea	
Two accordians	

In the same letter are also given the expenses incurred by the Company's Government in entertaining and receiving the mission. These were :

Provisions	2,548	0	0
House at Calcutta per month	200	0	0
Presents to the mission after the review	2,500	0	0
Other Extra etc.	5,000	0	0
Coinage provided for the Regiment	1,440	0	0
Presents to the Maharaja	14,581	0	0
Total			28,249	0	0

This sum of money should be compared with the sums expended on presents delivered to Lahore Mission for Ranjit Singh which amounted to only Rs. 13,359. But the Nepalese had visited Calcutta and the Company had to provide for all the necessary expenditure of the mission, whereas most of the expenses of the Lahore Mission were borne by the Sikh ruler. Also the huge retinue of 3,000 which accompanied General Matabar Singh considerably increased its feeding and transport charges.

Appendix 7

MAHARANI Raj Lakshmi Devi had sent a written order to Jung Bahadur to assassinate the two princes born of the Senior Maharani, who had died a few years before. Refusing to carry out the illegal orders of the Maharani, Jung Bahadur sent a reply to her worded as follows :

"I received your Highness' letter. I consider it a grievous sin to carry out what you have been pleased to order me in this letter. It is my duty to inform you resolutely. And today I place before you that proper intimation. The proposition brought forward by you is wholly improper. Who would not assent that any attempt to secure or place on the throne a younger brother while the elder brother is alive is against the "Shastras" and our royal traditions. By this, your soul and your "dharma" will be stained and a horrible sin will be committed. This is why I have been obliged today to submit to you that I will be unable to carry out your orders. You are only the regent, and my duty also extends towards the country and the State. I must attend to these also. Therefore forgetting this, I am unable from personal considerations to carry out your orders. I am convinced that I must serve the country and the State. I therefore feel responsible to do what is proper and I inform you that if I get another order like this from you, you will be liable for the punishment which is awarded to those who attempt to commit such murder."¹

¹ *Nepal Ka Itihas*, Ambika Prasad Upadhyaya, p. 164.

Appendix 8

THE proclamation which the prominent people in Nepal made Rajendra Vikram Shah to sign and issue in January 1843 is as follows :

To all my people and subjects in Nepal. Let it be known to all that from today Maharani Raj Lakshmi Devi should be considered the Sovereign in Nepal and all should carry out her orders. I have willingly consented to this proposal. I am giving full powers in the administration to my wife voluntarily and agreeably. In these affairs I will do nothing against the consent and the order of my wife. I pledge myself to this. I also order you that you will never carry out the orders of the Yuvaraj Surendra, and whoever shall carry out his orders will be liable to punishment by the orders of my wife. From today the following will be under the charge of my wife : (i) Power to inflict imprisonment, cutting of limbs, transportation, death and loss of office over all subjects except members of the Royal family; (ii) Power to appoint officers of State, dismissing them, transferring, promoting and degrading them; (iii) Power to deal with foreign States like China, Tibet and Britania; (iv) Power to enter into treaty relations or war, with the above named foreign states as times dictate.¹

¹ *Nepal ka Itihas*, p. 127.

Appendix 9

TREATY OF COMMERCE WITH NEPAL, 1 MARCH 1792

TREATY authenticated under the seal of Maha Rajah Run Bahadur Shah Bahauder Shumshere Jung; being according to the Treaty transmitted by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Resident at Benares, on the part of the Right Honourable Charles, Earl Cornwallis, R.G., Governor-General in Council, and empowered by the said authority to conclude a Treaty of Commerce with the said Maha Rajah, and to settle and fix the duties payable by the subjects of the respective States of the Honourable English Company and those of Nepal, the said gentleman charging himself with whatever relates to the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Nepal Government to that of the Company; in like manner as hath the aforesaid Maha Rajah, with whatever regards the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Company's Government to that of Nepal; and the said Treaty having been delivered to me (the said Maha Rajah) by Mowlavy Abdool Kadir Khan, the aforesaid gentlemen's Vakeel, or agent; this counterpart thereof having been written by the Nepal Government, hath been committed to the said Khan, as hereunder detailed :

ARTICLE 1

In as much as an attention to the general welfare, and to the ease and satisfaction of the merchants and traders, tends equally to the reputation of the administrators of both the Governments of the Company and of Nepal; it is, therefore agreed and stipulated, that 2½ per cent. shall reciprocally be taken, as duty, on the imports from both countries, such duties to be levied on the amount of the invoices of the goods which the merchants shall have along with them; and to deter the said traders from exhibiting false invoices, the seal of the custom houses of both countries shall be impressed on the back of the said invoices, and a copy thereof being kept, the original shall be restored to the merchants; and in cases where the merchant shall not have along with him his original invoice, the custom house officers shall, in such instance, lay down the duty of 2½ per cent. on a valuation according to the market price.

ARTICLE 2

The opposite stations hereunder specified, within the frontiers of each country, are fixed for the duties to be levied, at which place the traders

are to pay the same; and after having once paid duties and receiving a rowannah thereon, no other or further duty shall be payable throughout each country or dominion respectively.

ARTICLE 3

Whoever among the officers on either side shall exceed in his demand for, or execution of duty, the rate here specified shall be exemplarily punished by the government to which he belongs, so as effectually to deter others from like offences.

ARTICLE 4

In the case of theft or robberies happening on the goods of the merchants, the Foujedar, or officer of the place, shall, advising his superiors or Government thereof speedily, cause the Zamindars and proprietors of the spot to make good the value, which is in all cases, without fail, to be so made good to the merchants.

ARTICLE 5

In cases where in either country any oppression or violence be committed on any merchant, the officers of the country wherein this may happen shall, without delay, hear and inquire into the complaints of the persons thus aggrieved, and, doing them justice, bring the offenders to punishment.

ARTICLE 6

When the merchants of either country, having paid the established duty, shall have transported their goods into the dominions of one or the other State, if such goods be sold within such State, it is well; but if such goods not meeting with sale, and that the said merchants be desirous to transport their said goods to any other country beyond the limits of either of the respective States included in the Treaty, the subjects and officers of these latter shall not take thereon any other or further duty than the fixed one levied at the first entry; and are not to exact double duties, but are to allow such goods to depart in all safety without opposition.

ARTICLE 7

This treaty shall be of full force and validity in respect to the present and future rulers of both governments, and, being considered on both sides as a commercial Treaty and a basis of concord between the two States, is to be, at all times, observed and acted upon in times to come, for the public advantage and the increase of friendship.

On the 5th of Rajeb, 1206 of the Hegira, and 1199 of the Fussellee style, agreeing with the 1st of March 1792 of the Christian, and with the 22nd of Phagun 1848 of the Sumbut era, two Treaties, to one tenor, were written for both the contracting parties, who have mutually engaged that from the 3rd Bysack 1849 of the Sambut era, the officers of both States shall, in pursuance of the strictest orders of both Governments, immediately carry into effect and observe the stipulations aforesaid, and not wait for any further or new direction.

(True Copy and Translation)

Sd/- J. DUNCAN,
Resident,
Revenue Department.

(A true copy)
Sd/- G. H. BARLOW,
Sub-Secretary.

Appendix 10

TREATY WITH THE RAJAH OF NEPAL, 1801

WHEREAS it is evident as the noonday sun to the enlightened understanding of exalted nobles and of powerful chiefs and Rulers, that Almighty God has entrusted the protection and government of the universe to the authority of Princes, who make justice their principle, and that by the establishment of a friendly connection between them universal happiness and prosperity is secured, and that the more intimate the relation of amity and union the greater is the general tranquility; in consideration of these circumstances, His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, Marquis Wellesley, &c., &c., and the Maha Rajah have established a system of friendship between the respective Governments of the Company and the Rajah of Nepal, and have agreed to the following articles :

ARTICLE 1

It is necessary and incumbent upon the principals and officers of the two Governments constantly to exert themselves to improve the friendship subsisting between the two States, and to be zealously and sincerely desirous of the prosperity and success of the Government and subjects of both.

ARTICLE 2

The incendiary and turbulent representations of the disaffected, who are the disturbers of our mutual friendship, shall not be attended to without investigation and proof.

ARTICLE 3

The principals and officers of both Governments will cordially consider the friends and enemies of either State to be the friends and enemies of the other; and this consideration must ever remain permanent and in force from generation to generation.

ARTICLE 4

If any one of the neighbouring powers of either State should commence any altercation or dispute, and design, without provocation, unjustly to possess himself of the territories of either country, and should entertain hostile intentions with the view of taking that country, the Vakeels

on the part of our respective Governments at either Court will fully report all particulars to the head of the State, who, according to the obligations of friendship subsisting between the two States, after having heard the said particulars, will give whatever answer and advice may be proper.

ARTICLE 5

Whenever any dispute of boundary and territory between the two countries may arise, such dispute shall be decided, through our respective Vakeels or our officers, according to the principles of justice and right; and a landmark shall be placed upon the said boundary, and which shall constantly remain, that the officers both now and hereafter may consider it as a guide, and not make any encroachment.

ARTICLE 6

Such places as are upon the Frontiers of the dominions of the Nabob Vizier and of Nepal, and respecting which any dispute may arise, such dispute shall be settled by the mediation of the vakeel on the part of the company, in the presence of one from the Nepal Government, and one from His Excellency the Vizier.

ARTICLE 7

So many elephants, on account of Mackwanpur, are annually sent to the Company by the Rajah of Nepaul, and therefore the Governor General with a view of promoting the satisfaction of the Rajah of Nepaul, and in consideration of the improved friendly connection, and of this new treaty, relinquishes and foregoes the tribute above-mentioned, and directs that the officers of the Company, both now and hereafter, from generation to generation shall never, during the continuance of the engagement contracted by this Treaty, (so long as the conditions of this Treaty shall be in force), exact the elephants from the Rajah.

ARTICLE 8

If any of the dependents or inhabitants of either country should fly and take refuge in the other, and a requisition should be made for such persons on the part of the Nepaul Government by its constituted Vakeel in attendance on the Governor General, or on the part of the Company's Government by its representative residing at Nepaul, it is in this case mutually agreed that if such person should have fled after transgressing the laws of his Government, it is incumbent upon the principals of both governments immediately to deliver him up to the vakeel at their respective courts, that he may be sent in perfect security to the Frontier of their respective territories.

ARTICLE 9

The Maha Rajah of Nepal agrees, that a pergunnah, with all the lands attached to it, excepting privileged lands and those appropriated to religious purposes, and to jaghires, &c., which are specified separately in the account of collections, shall be given up to Samee Jeo for his expences as a present. The conditions with respect to Samee Jeo are, that if he should remain at Benares, or at any other place within the Company's provinces, and should spontaneously farm his jaghire to the officers of Nepaul in that event the amount of collections shall be punctually paid to him, agreeably to certain kists which may be hereafter settled, that he may appropriate the same to his necessary expenses, and that he may continue in religious abstraction, according to his agreement, which he had engraved on brass, at the time of his abdication of the Raj, and of his resigning it in my favour. Again, in the event of his establishing his residence in his jaghire, and of his realizing the collections through his own officers, it is proper that he should not keep such a one and other disaffected persons in his service, and besides one hundred men and maid servants, &c., he must not entertain any persons as soldiers, with a view to the collection of the revenue of the pergunnah; and to the protection of his person he may take two hundred soldiers of the forces of Nepaul. He must be cautious, also, of commencing altercation, either by speech or writing; neither must he give protection to the rebellious and fugitives of the Nepaul country, nor must he commit plunder and devastation upon the subjects of Nepaul. In the event of such delinquency being proved to the satisfaction of the Governments, the aid and protection of the Company shall be withdrawn from him; and in that event, also, it shall be at the option of the Rajah of Nepaul whether or not he will confiscate his jaghire.

The Maha Rajah also agrees, on his part, that if Samee Jeo should take up his residence within the Company's provinces, and should farm out his land to the officers of Nepaul, and that the kists should not be paid according to agreement, or that he should fix his residence on his jaghire, and any of the inhabitants of Nepal should give him or the ryots of his pergunnah any molestation, a requisition shall be made by the Governor General who is security for the Rajah's performance of this condition, and the Maha Rajah will immediately acquit himself of the requisition of the Governor General, agreeably to what is above written. If any profits should arise in the collection of the said pergunnah, in consequence of the activity of the officers, or any defalcation occurs from their inattention, in either case, the Rajah of Nepaul will be totally unconcerned.

ARTICLE 10

With a view to carrying into effect the different objects contained in this Treaty, and of promoting other verbal negotiation the Governor General and the Rajah of Nepaul, under the impulse of their will and

pleasure, depute a confidential person to each other as vakeel, that remaining in attendance upon their respective Governments they may effect the objects above specified, and promote whatever may tend to the daily improvement of the friendship subsisting between the two States.

ARTICLE 11

It is incumbent upon the principals and officers of the two States that they should manifest the regard and respect to the Vakeel of each other's Government, which is due to their rank, and is prescribed by the laws of nations; and that they should endeavour, to the utmost of their power, to advance any object which they may propose, and to promote their ease, comfort, and satisfaction, by extending protection to them, which circumstances are calculated to improve the friendship subsisting between the two Governments, and to illustrate the good name of both States throughout the universe.

ARTICLE 12

It is incumbent upon the vakeels of both States that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of Government, without the permission of those officers, neither should they carry on any correspondence with any of them; and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer it, without the knowledge of the head of the State, and acquainting him of the particulars, which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerity of our friendship.

ARTICLE 13

It is incumbent upon the principals and officers mutually to abide by the spirit of this Treaty, which is now drawn out according to their faith and religion, and deeming it in force from generation to generation that they should not deviate from it: and any person who may transgress against it will be punished by Almighty God, both in this world and in a future state.

(A true translation.)

Sd/- C. RUSSELL,
Assistant Persian Translator.

Ratified by the Governor-General and Council, 30th October 1801, and by the Nepaul Durbar on the 28th October, 1802.

Appendix 11

TREATY of Peace between the Honourable East India Company and Maha Rajah Bikram Shah, Rajah of Nipal, settled between Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw on the part of the Honourable Company in virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Honorable Francis, Earl of Moira, knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indias, and by Sree Goorgo Gujraj Misser and Chunder Seekur Opedeea on the part of Maha Rajah Girmaun Jode Bikram Shah Bahadur, Shumsheer Jung, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nipal.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two States, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon :

ARTICLE 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal.

ARTICLE 2

The Rajah of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two states before the War; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands.

ARTICLE 3

The Rajah of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company in perpetuity all the undermentioned territories, viz—

First — The whole of the low lands between the River Kali and Rapti.

Secondly — The whole of the low lands (with the exception of Bootwul Khasa) lying between the Rapti and the Gunduck.

Thirdly — The whole of the low lands between the Gunduck and Coosah, in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourthly — All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah.

Fifthly — All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee, including the fort and lands of Nagree and the Pass of Nagarcote leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that pass and Nagree. The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gorkha troops within forty days from this date.

ARTICLE 4

With a view to indemnify the Chiefs and Barahdars of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the foregoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees per annum on such Chiefs as may be selected by the Rajah of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Rajah may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunnuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor General for the pensions respectively.

ARTICLE 5

The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connexion with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali, and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

ARTICLE 6

The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any differences shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Raja of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by whose award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.

ARTICLE 7

The Rajah of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE 8

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two States, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

ARTICLE 9

This treaty, consisting of nine Articles, shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieut-Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver to the Rajah the ratification of the Governor General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

Done at Segowlee, on the 2nd day of December 1815.

(Seal)

PARIS BRADSHAW, Lt. Col., P. A.

Received this Treaty from Chunder Seekur Opedeea, Agent on the part of the Rajah of Nipal, in the Valley of Muckwanpoor, at half past two o'clock P.M., on the 4th of March, 1816, and delivered to him the Counterpart Treaty on behalf of the British Government.

Sd/- DD. OCHTERLONY,
Agent, Governor General.

Appendix 12

MEMORANDUM for the approval and acceptance of the Rajah of Nipal, presented on the 8th December 1816.

Adverting to the amity and confidence subsisting with the Rajah of Nipal, the British Government proposes to suppress, as much as is possible the execution of certain Articles in the Treaty of Segowlee, which bear hard upon the Rajah, as follows :

2. With a view to gratify the Rajah in a point which he has much at heart, the British Government is willing to restore the Tarai ceded to it by the Rajah in the Treaty, to wit, the whole Tarai lands lying between the Rivers Coosa and Gunduck, such as appertained to the Rajah before the late disagreement; excepting the disputed lands in the Zilahs of Tirhoot and Sarun, and excepting such portions of territory as may occur on both sides for the purpose of settling a frontier, upon investigation by the respective Commissioners; and excepting such lands as may have been given in possession to any one by the British Government upon ascertainment of his rights subsequent to the cession of Tarai to that Government. In case the Rajah is desirous of retaining the lands of such ascertained proprietors, they may be exchanged for others, and let it be clearly understood that, notwithstanding the considerable extent of the lands in the Zillah of Tirhoot, which have for a long time been a subject of dispute, the settlement made in the year 1812 of Christ, corresponding with the year 1869 of Bikramajeet, shall be taken, and everything else relinquished, that is to say, that the settlement and negotiations, such as occurred at that period, shall in the present case hold good and be established.

3. The British Government is willing likewise to restore the Tarai lying between the Rivers Gunduk and Rapti, that is to say, from the River Gunduk to the western limits of the Zillah of Goruckpore, together with Bootwul and Sheeraj, such as appertained to Nipal previous to the disagreements, complete, with the exception of the disputed places in the Tarai, and such quantity of ground as may be considered mutually to be requisite for the new boundary.

4. As it is impossible to establish desirable limits between the two States without survey, it will be expedient that Commissioners be appointed on both sides for the purpose of arranging in concert a well defined boundary on the basis of the preceding terms, and of establishing a straight line of frontier, with a view to the distinct separation of the respective territories of the British Government to the south and of Nipal to the north; and in case any indentations occur to destroy the even tenor of the line, the Commissioners should effect an exchange of lands so interfering on principles of clear reciprocity.

5. And should it occur that the proprietors of lands situated on the

mutual frontier, as it may be rectified, whether holding of the British Government or of the Rajah of Nipal, should be placed in the condition of subjects to both Governments, with a view to prevent continual dispute and discussion between the two Governments, the respective Commissioners should effect in mutual concurrence and co-operation the exchange of such lands, so as to render them subject to one dominion alone.

6. Whensoever the Tarai shall be restored, the Rajah of Nipal will cease to require the sum of two lakhs of Rupees per annum, which the British Government agreed to advance for the maintenance of certain Barahdars of his Government.

7. Moreover, the Rajah of Nipal agrees to refrain from prosecuting any inhabitants of the Tarai, after its revertance to his rule, on account of having favoured the cause of the British Government during the War, and should any of those persons, excepting the cultivators of the soil, be desirous of quitting their estates, and of retiring within the Company's territories, he shall not be liable to hindrance.

8. In the event of the Raja's approving the foregoing terms, the proposed arrangement for the survey and establishment of boundary marks shall be carried into execution, and after the determination in concert of the boundary line, Sunnuds conformable to the foregoing stipulations, drawn out and sealed by the two States, shall be delivered and accepted on both sides.

(A true translation.)

Sd/- EDWARD GARDNER,
Resident.

(Seal)

Sd/- G. WELLESLEY,
Assistant.

Substance of a letter under the seal of the Rajah of Nipal received on 11 December 1816.

After compliments;

I have comprehended the document under date the 8th December, 1816, or 4th of Poos 1873 Sumbut, which you transmitted relative to the restoration, with a view to my friendship and satisfaction, of the Tarai between the Rivers Coosa and Rapti to the Southern boundary complete, such as appertained to my estate previous to the war. It mentioned that, in the event of my accepting the terms contained in that document, the southern boundary of the Tarai should be established as it was held by the Government, I have accordingly agreed to the terms laid down by you, and herewith enclose an instrument of agreement, which may be satisfactory to you. Moreover, it was written in the document transmitted by you that it should be restored, with the exception of the disputed lands and such portion of land as should, in the opinion of the Commissioners

on both sides, occur for the purpose of settling a boundary; and excepting the lands which, after the cessions of the Tarai to the Honourable Company, may have been transferred by it to the ascertained proprietors. My friend, all these matters rest with you, and since it was also written that a view was had to my friendship and satisfaction with respect to certain Articles of the Treaty of Segowlee, which bore hard upon me, and which could be remitted, I am well assured that you have at heart the removal of whatever may tend to my distress, and that you will act in a manner corresponding to the advantage of this State and the increase of the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

Moreover, I have to acknowledge the receipt of the orders under the red seal of this State, addressed to the officers of Tarai between the Rivers Gunduk and Rapti, for the surrender of that Terai, and their retiring from thence, which was given to you at Thankote, according to your request, and which you have now returned for my satisfaction.

(A true translation.)

Sd/- G. WELLESLEY,
Assistant.



Appendix 13

TREATY between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Maharajah Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Shah Bahadoor, Rajah of Nipal.

Treaty between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Maharajah Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Shah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, Rajah of Nipal, settled and concluded on the one part by Major George Ramsay, Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Most Noble James Andrew, Marquis of Dalhousie, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, one of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council and Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and on the other part by General Jung Bahadoor Koonwar Ranajee, Prime Minister of Nipal, in the name and on behalf of Maharajah Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Shah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, Rajah of Nipal, in virtue of the powers to that effect vested in him by the said Rajah of Nipal.

ARTICLE 1

The two Governments hereby agree to act upon system of strict reciprocity as hereinafter mentioned.

ARTICLE 2

Neither Government shall be bound in any case to surrender any person not being a subject of the Government making the requisition.

ARTICLE 3

Neither Government shall be bound to deliver up debtors, or civil offenders or any person charged with any offence not specified in Article 4.

ARTICLE 4

Subject to the above limitations, any person who shall be charged with having committed, within the territories of the Government making the requisition, any of the under-mentioned offences, and who shall be found within the territories of the other, shall be surrendered; the offences are murder, attempt to murder, rape, maiming, thuggee, dacoity, high-way robbery, poisoning, burglary, and arson.

ARTICLE 5

In no case shall either Government be bound to surrender any person accused of an offence, except upon requisition duly made by, or by the authority of, the Government within whose territories the offence shall be charged to have been committed, and also upon such evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the country in which the person accused shall be found, would justify his apprehension, and sustain the charge if the offence had been there committed.

ARTICLE 6

If any person attached to the British Residency, or living within the Residency boundaries, not being a subject of the Nepalese Government, commit in any part of the Nipalese territories, beyond the Residency boundaries, an offence which would render him liable to punishment by the Nipalese courts, he shall be apprehended and made over to the British Resident for trial and punishment; but subjects of the Nipal State under similar circumstances, are not to be given up by the Nipalese Government for punishment. Should any Hindoostanee Merchants, or other subjects of the Honourable Company not attached to the British Residency, who may be living within the Nipal territories, commit any crimes beyond the Residency boundaries, whereby they may render themselves liable to punishment by the Nipalese courts, and take refuge within the limits of the Residency, they shall not be allowed an asylum but will be given up to the Nipal Government for trial and punishment.

ARTICLE 7

The expenses of any apprehension, detention, or surrender made in virtue of the foregoing stipulations, shall be borne and defrayed by the Government making the requisition.

ARTICLE 8

The above Treaty shall continue in force until either one or the other of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate it, and no longer.

ARTICLE 9

Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any Treaty now existing between the High Contracting Parties, except so far as any such Treaty may be repugnant hereto.

This Treaty, consisting of nine Articles, being this day concluded and settled by Major George Ramsay, on behalf of the Honourable East India Company with Maharaja Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Shah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, Major Ramsay has delivered one version thereof in English,

Purbutteah, and Oordoo, signed and sealed by himself, to the Maharajah, who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same to Major Ramsay, duly executed by His Highness, and Major Ramsay hereby engages to deliver a copy of the same to His Highness the Maharajah, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within sixty days from this date.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Kathmandhoo, Nipal, this Tenth day of February A.D. one Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-Five, corresponding to the Eighth day of Falgoon, Sumbat, Nineteen Hundred and Eleven.

Sd/- G. RAMSAY, Major
Resident of the Court of Nepal (Seal)

Sd/- J. DORIN
Sd/- J. P. GRANT
Sd/- B. PEACOCK

Ratified by the Honourable the President of the Council of India in Council; at Fort William in Bengal, this Twenty-Third day of February, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-Five.

Sd/- CECIL BEADON
Secretary to the Government of India

Appendix 14

MEMORANDUM dated the 23rd of July 1866, supplemental to the Treaty with the State of Nipal of the 10th of February 1855, for the mutual surrender of heinous criminals, adding to the 4th Article of the said Treaty the offences of cattle stealing, of embezzlement by public officers, and serious theft.

It is hereby settled and concluded by Colonel George Ramsay, Resident at the Court of Nipal, by virtue of full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Sir John Laird Nair Lawrence, Baronet, G.C.B. and K.C.S.I., Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor General of British India, and by Maharajah Jung Bahadoor, Rana, G.C.B., Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Nipal, in virtue of powers to that effect granted to him by his Sovereign the Maharajah Dheraj of Nipal.

That, subject to all the other conditions of the Treaty which was executed at Khatmandoo by the same parties on the tenth day of February one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, corresponding to the eighth day of Fagoon, Sumbut nineteen hundred and eleven, and with the view to the prevention of frontier disputes, and the more speedy and effectual repression of crime upon the border, the offences of cattle-stealing, of embezzlement by public officers, and of serious theft, that is to say, cases of theft in which the amount stolen may be considerable, or personal violence may have been used, shall be included in the list of crimes for which surrenders shall be demanded by either Government. In fact, they are hereby formally added to the list of crimes specified in the 4th Article of the said Treaty.

Executed at Khatmandoo this twenty-third day of July A.D. one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, corresponding to the twenty-sixth day of Asarh, Sumbut nineteen hundred and twenty-three.

Sd/- G. RAMSAY, Colonel.
Resident at Nepal

(Seal)

Sd/- JOHN LAWRENCE,
Governor General

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Governor General at Simla on the 9th of August 1866.

W. MUIR,
Secretary to Government of
India

Appendix 15

DURING the disturbances which followed the mutiny of the Native Army of Bengal in 1857, the Maharajah of Nipal not only faithfully maintained the relations of peace and friendship established between the British Government and the State of Nipal by the Treaty of Segowlee, but freely placed troops at the disposal of the British authorities for the preservation of order in the frontier districts, and subsequently sent a force to co-operate with the British Army in the re-capture of Lucknow and the final defeat of the rebels. On the conclusion of these operations, the Viceroy and Governor General, in recognition of the eminent services rendered to the British Government by the State of Nipal, declared his intention to restore to the Maharajah the whole of the lowlands lying between the River Kali and the District of Goruckpore, which belonged to the State of Nipal in 1815, and were ceded to the British Government in that year by the aforesaid Treaty. These lands have now been identified by Commissioners appointed for the purpose by the British Government, in the presence of Commissioners deputed by the Nipal Durbar; masonry pillars have been erected to mark the future boundary of the two States and the territory has been formally delivered over to the Nipalese Authorities. In order the more firmly to secure the State of Nipal in the perpetual possession of this territory, and to mark in a solemn way the occasion of its restoration, the following Treaty has been concluded between the two States :

ARTICLE 1

All Treaties and Engagements now in force between the British Government and the Maharajah of Nipal, except in so far as they may be altered by this Treaty, are hereby confirmed.

ARTICLE 2

The British Government hereby bestows on the Maharajah of Nipal in full sovereignty, the whole of the lowlands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti, and the whole of the lowlands lying between the River Rapti and the District of Goruckpore, which were in the possession of the Nipal state in the year 1815, and were ceded to the British Government by Article III of the Treaty concluded at Segowlee on the 2nd December in that year.

ARTICLE 3

The boundary line surveyed by the British Commissioners appointed for the purpose, extending eastward from the River Kali or Sardah to the

foot of the hills north of Bagowra Tal, and marked by pillars, shall henceforth be the boundary between the British Province of Oudh and the Territories of the Maharajah of Nipal.

This Treaty, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel George Ramsay, on the part of His Excellency the Right Honourable Charles John Earl Canning, G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor General of India, and by Maharajah Jung Bahadur Rana, G.C.B., on the part of Maharajah Dheraj Soorinder Vikram Sah Bahadoor Shumshere Jung, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Khatmandoo within thirty days of the date of signature.

Signed and sealed at Khatmandoo, this First day of November, A.D. one Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty, corresponding to the Third day of Kartick Budee, Sumbut Nineteen Hundred and Seventeen.

Sd/- G. RAMSAY, Lieut-Colonel
Resident at Nepal

(Seal)

(Seal)

Sd/- CANNING
Viceroy and Governor General

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General, at Calcutta, on the 15th of November 1860.

Sd/- A. R. YOUNG
Deputy Secretary to the Government
of India

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E R R A T A

Page 8, line 13:	For 1,250 read 2,150
Page 14, line 19:	Omit thought
Page 15, line 18:	Omit is
Page 26, line 27:	For I' read L'
Page 29, line 16:	For Grieson read Grierson
Page 31, line 9:	For safe read sage
Page 32, line 23:	Omit comma after Saliputra
Page 40, last line:	For Patna read Patan
Page 49, line 18:	For processed read professed
Page 59, line 17:	For Krikpatrick read Kirkpatrick
Page 59, line 21:	For aggress read aggression
Page 59, last line:	For Kirpatrick read Kirkpatrick
Page 64, line 32:	For individuals read individual
Page 78, line 18:	Omit dash after deceive
Page 103, line 3:	Omit ask
Page 137, line 4:	For state read stage
Page 193, line 26:	For proportions read propositions
Page 233, line 21:	For intensibly read insensibly
Page 262, f.n. 17:	For 1892 read 1842
Page 267, line 26:	For snow read snowy
Page 286, line 28:	For inter-commercial read mutual commercial

